Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments
Bureau of Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC
August 30, 2005
VI. COMPLIANCE OF OTHER NATIONS (INCLUDING SUCCESSORS TO THE SOVIET UNION) WITH MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
A. THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)As of December 2003, there were 151 States Parties to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. An additional 16 countries have signed but have not yet ratified the agreement, including Syria. This Report addresses the activities of China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Russia (and the former Soviet Union) and Syria. This Report examines whether these States Parties are complying with the obligations assumed under the BWC and are providing accurate data under agreed BWC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). It also addresses the BW-related activities of Syria, which is a signatory to the Convention. While the United States has concerns regarding the activities of other countries, the specific cases addressed here are those that have assumed obligations relevant to the BWC and for which the most evidence exists of actual or potential noncompliance.
At the 1986 BWC Review Conference, the States Parties adopted a set of non- binding CBMs; these were expanded at the 1991 Review Conference. The States Parties also agreed that the data called for in these CBMs should be submitted to the United Nations annually (by April 15).
Since adoption of the non-binding CBMs in 1987, some 85 of the 151 BWC States Parties have submitted at least one declaration. Of those, a small number of States Parties have made only an initial declaration, instead of annual declarations. Still others submitted declarations at one time but have not done so recently. Some have simply submitted a statement that they have nothing to declare, or that they are in compliance with the BWC. The lack of participation in the CBMs is a concern to the United States. Data provided by the CBMs has some limited utility for enhancing U.S. understanding of foreign biotechnical activities and capabilities, and CBMs clearly poorly serve their intended confidence-building purposes when States Parties implement them with such inconsistency and lack of transparency.
The Fifth BWC Review Conference suspended its 2001 session without agreement, and resumed in November 2002. At that time, it made a consensus decision to hold a series of annual meetings of States Parties in 2003, 2004, and 2005, leading up to the Sixth Review Conference in 2006. Each meeting was to be prepared by a meeting of relevant Experts. Setting aside previous failed attempts to use traditional arms control measures to enhance the transparency of biotechnical activities, the States Parties agreed to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on, a specified set of topics that – if implemented nationally or through relevant international organizations – could have practical utility in helping counter the BW threat. This approach is particularly important in an era in which the capability to create and employ biological weapons is spreading beyond state actors to terrorist groups and even individuals. These topics are:
- the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including enactment of penal legislation (2003);
- national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins (2003);
- enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating, and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease (2004);
- strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and combating of infectious disease affecting humans, animals, and plants (2004); and
- the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists (2005).
The meetings held in 2003 brought experts together to share experiences and views, and resulted in recommendations for national actions that – if taken – will reinforce the BWC and contribute to stemming the BW threat. The United States continues to encourage States Parties to follow through on their work program commitments.
There are significant challenges in monitoring and verifying compliance with the BWC. Article I, paragraph 1 of the Convention prohibits development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. Article I, paragraph 2 also prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. The emphasis in Article I upon whether or not the purposes for which materials or items are possessed are "peaceful" or "hostile" makes clear that not only the existence, but also the intent of any country’s biological program, must be part of any compliance determination. Making a judgment about intent is challenging given the dual-use nature of most biotechnology equipment, facilities, and activities. As with other agreements – particularly those involving dual-use technologies that may be used in a variety of legitimate or illegitimate ways – intent is a critical element, and it may have to be inferred from the circumstances, in light of all available information, if direct evidence is not available.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS
CHINA
ISSUE. The United States believes that China continues to maintain some elements of an offensive BW capability. The issue is whether this capability constitutes a violation of the BWC.
HISTORY OF COMPLIANCE EVALUATION. The United States has assessed the People’s Republic of China’s compliance with the BWC as early as June 1992. At that time, the United States concluded that it was highly probable that China had not eliminated its BW program since becoming a State Party to the BWC in 1984. In the 1994 Report, we indicated that China’s CBM-mandated declarations had not resolved U.S. concerns about this probable BW program, and reported that there were strong indications that China "probably maintains its offensive program." In the unclassified version of the June 2003 Report, the United States concluded more specifically that:
The United States believes that in the years after its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with its BWC obligations. China continues to maintain some elements of an offensive biological warfare program it is believed to have started in the 1950s.
DISCUSSION OF OBLIGATIONS. China deposited its instrument of accession, and thereby became a State Party to the BWC on November 15, 1984. Since that point, China has been obligated to comply fully with the provisions of the Convention.
ACTIONS. The United States believes that China began its offensive BW program in the 1950s and continued its program throughout the Cold War, even after China acceded to the BWC in 1984. Undoubtedly China perceived a threat from the BW programs of its neighbor, the Soviet Union. There are some reports that China may still retain elements of its biological warfare program. Such reports support the United States’ continued belief that China has not abandoned its offensive BW program.
China has a number of civilian and military facilities that could be associated with an offensive BW program. For example:
- The Chinese Ministry of Defense’s Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS) Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology (IME) in Beijing is acknowledged as a biodefense research facility.
- The Lanzhou Institute of Biological Products (LIBP) has been identified as a vaccine producer. We believe that LIBP has several BL-3 laboratories and dual use capabilities.
From 1993 to the present, military scientists have published in open literature the results of studies of aerosol stability of bacteria, models of infectious virus aerosols, and detection of aerosolized viruses using polymerase chain reaction technology. Such advanced biotechnology techniques could be applicable to the development of offensive BW agents and weapons.
Facilities in China that may have legitimate public health and commercial uses could also offer access to additional BW-enabling capabilities.
COMPLIANCE-RELATED DIALOGUE AND ANALYSIS. U.S. concerns regarding China’s BWC compliance are based on a number of indicators over a number of years. First, the United States believes that China possessed an offensive BW program prior to its accession to the BWC in 1984. Upon accession, China was obliged to eliminate its offensive program, but China never admitted this program and the United States believes that it maintained the program throughout most of the 1980s, at the very least.
Although China has submitted its voluntary annual BWC CBM data declarations every year – and did so again in 2002 and 2003 – we assess that the information submitted therein continues to be inaccurate and misleading. BWC CBMs since 1991 have called on the States Parties to declare, among other things, their past offensive activities, which China has not done. On the contrary, China insists it never had such a program at all. In its October 17, 2002, announcement on the promulgation of "Regulations on Export Control of Dual-use Biological Agents and related Equipment and Technologies," for instance, China stated that it "has always fulfilled earnestly its obligations under the Convention" and "has never developed, produced or stockpiled any biological weapons, and never assisted any country to acquire or develop these weapons." These claims, we believe, are inaccurate.
China’s current research activities and dual-use capabilities raise the possibility that sophisticated BW work could be underway. For example, because of the possible offensive applications of aerosolization techniques, the United States’ concerns are underscored by publications indicating military involvement in such research.
FINDING. The United States reaffirms its judgment that China maintains some elements of an offensive BW capability in violation of its BWC obligations. Despite China’s BWC CBM declarations to the contrary, indications suggest that China maintained an offensive BW program prior to acceding to the Convention in 1984.
CUBA
ISSUE. Cuba has the technical capability to conduct limited offensive BW research and development.
HISTORY OF COMPLIANCE EVALUATION. Prior to the June 2003 NCR, there were no specific discussions of Cuban noncompliance in this Report. The June 2003 NCR finding on Cuba concluded that:
The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited, developmental offensive biological warfare research and development effort. Such efforts are prohibited by the BWC.
DISCUSSION OF OBLIGATIONS. Cuba became a party to the BWC in 1976. Since 1991, Cuba has submitted annual declarations pursuant to the agreed BWC CBMs.
ACTIONS. Cuba has a highly sophisticated biotechnology industry encompassing the pharmaceutical, biomedical, vaccine, veterinary, and agricultural sectors. Cuba has well qualified scientists skilled in microbiology, virology, and biochemistry, who collaborate extensively with scientists around the world, including other countries of concern.
Reflecting a very large capital investment, Cuba’s biotechnology industry includes a full range of modern dual-use facilities for R & D, large-scale production, down-stream processing, and product finishing. Its product inventory includes vaccines, research reagents, medical diagnostic supplies, transgenic animals and plants, agricultural materials, and various pharmaceuticals supplying over 40 countries. Many of these products were developed using state-of-the-art recombinant DNA technology and reflect a sophisticated technical capability.
Although Cuba has had a long history of medical research, much of the current infrastructure was developed within the past 20 years such that the Cuban biotechnology sector offers low-cost products and services throughout the world. Reflecting a very large capital investment, the biotechnology program owes its genesis and ongoing support to Fidel Castro, largely to generate revenue and as a matter of national prestige.
COMPLIANCE-RELATED DIALOGUE AND ANALYSIS. As noted above, the June 2003 NCR finding stated that Cuba likely had "at least a limited, developmental offensive biological warfare research and development effort."
While it is clear that Cuba’s biotechnology industry could be put to offensive BW uses – and that this industry’s extensive international contacts could be a focus of BW-related proliferation – the key factual issue is whether or not Cuba has in fact applied its biotechnology skills to offensive BW work.
Based on the same body of reporting, there is a split view over whether Cuba maintains a BW effort. This arises because the body of information available on Cuba is inconclusive, supporting hypotheses both for and against Cuba having an offensive effort. In a recent National Intelligence Estimate, the Intelligence Community unanimously held that it was unclear whether Cuba has an active offensive biological warfare effort now, or even had one in the past. On the basis of the same reporting, the policy community believes that the compliance judgment of the June 2003 NCR that Cuba has "at least a limited, developmental offensive BW research and development effort" remains correct.
FINDING. Some continue to believe that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort and that this effort is in violation of Cuba’s obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Others believe that it is unclear whether Cuba has an active offensive biological warfare (BW) effort now, or even had one in the past. However, all judge with high confidence that Cuba has the technical capability to pursue some aspects of offensive BW.
The U.S. Government will seek to pursue additional information on which to assess this issue.
IRAN
ISSUE. Despite being a long-standing State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention and submitting confidence-building measures under the provisions of the BWC, Iran’s capabilities and activities continue to raise concerns about the nature of its BW-related activities.
HISTORY OF COMPLIANCE EVALUATION. In the unclassified version of the June 2003 Report, the United States concluded that:
The United States judges, based on available evidence, that Iran has an offensive biological weapons program in violation of the BWC. Iran is technically capable of producing at least rudimentary biological warheads for a variety of delivery systems, including missiles.
DISCUSSION OF OBLIGATIONS. Iran is an original state party to the BWC; it ratified the treaty in 1973. Iran submitted CBM data in 1998, 1999, and 2002.
ACTIONS. Iran began its offensive BW program in the early 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war. Hashemi-Rafsanjani – then Acting Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, as well as Speaker of the Majlis – was reported to have announced during an October 1988 speech: "We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. From now on, you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task." The United States believes Iran has endeavored to follow through on Rafsanjani’s direction in this regard.
Iran’s technical base in biotechnology has advanced since the mid-1980s, providing further expertise that could be – and may well be – employed in support of a BW program. Over the past decade, Iran has also improved its bioproduction capabilities across the board.
In spite of its growing indigenous manufacturing capability, Iran continues to aggressively seek foreign technology, training, and expertise to advance its biotechnology industry. Although these relationships are ostensibly for legitimate reasons, Iran could use them to support its BW program.
According to open press reporting, Iran is expanding its biotechnology and biomedical industries by building large, state-of-the-art research and pharmaceutical production facilities. These industries could easily hide pilot to industrial-scale production capabilities for a potential BW program, and could mask procurement of BW-related process equipment.
Iran is technically capable of producing at least rudimentary, bulk-fill biological warheads for a variety of delivery systems, including missiles.
COMPLIANCE-RELATED DIALOGUE AND ANALYSIS. The scope and nature of Iranian activities demonstrate an expanding legitimate biotechnology industry, which could house an offensive biological weapons program. Particularly in light of Iran’s approach towards compliance with its nuclear and chemical weapons-related nonproliferation obligations (see below), available information about Iranian activities indicates a maturing offensive program with a rapidly evolving capability that may soon include the ability to deliver these weapons by a variety of means.
The Iranian BW program has been embedded within Iran’s extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries so as to obscure its activities. The Iranian military has used medical, education, and scientific research organizations for many aspects of BW-related agent procurement, research, and development. Iran has also failed to submit the data declarations called for in the BWC CBMs.
FINDING. The United States judges that, based on all available information, Iran has an offensive biological weapons program in violation of the BWC.
IRAQ
ISSUE. During Saddam Hussein’s regime prior to 1991, Iraq engaged in activities that raised concerns regarding Iraq’s compliance with its BWC obligations and its adherence to UN Security Council resolutions.
HISTORY OF COMPLIANCE EVALUATION. In the early 1990s, the United States judged that Iraq had developed and produced biological warfare agents and weapons and had likely stockpiled them. This assessment noted that inspections, conducted after the end of the first Gulf War under the auspices of the United Nations, were not able to provide any support for Iraq’s uncorroborated claims that it had performed only basic BW research. However, following the 1995 defection of General Hussein Kamel Hassan, Iraq then presented the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) with dramatically new information on its past biological warfare program, including details concerning agent production, weaponization, and sites. We then expressed the belief that Iraq was capable of producing biological warfare agents and was probably intent on continuing its offensive BW program if the threat of UNSCOM inspections and long-term monitoring were removed.
The United States declared its suspicions that "Iraq may not be in compliance with the BWC" as early as CY1996 Report; however, we could not formally assess Iraq’s compliance until we completed our review of Iraq’s "Full, Final, and Complete Declaration." In that Report, however, we noted that "though the recent Iraqi disclosures have been substantial, we believe that Iraq has not yet presented all details of its offensive BW program."
This judgment remained unchanged until the CY1999 Report (dated October 1, 2000). In the CY1999 NCR, we noted that there had been no UNSCOM weapons inspections or monitoring since December 1998. In the June 2003 Report, the United States concluded that:
The United States judges that Iraq has biological weapons and a significant offensive biological weapons program in violation of its obligations under the BWC. After signing the BWC in 1972, Iraq developed, produced, and stockpiled biological warfare agents and weapons and continued this activity after ratifying the BWC in 1991. Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has invested more heavily in biological weapons. Iraq has rebuilt its biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production. Iraq has established large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capabilities based on mobile facilities. The Iraqi Government’s determination to hold onto a sizable remnant of its WMD arsenal, agents, equipment, and expertise has led to years of dissembling and obstruction of UNSCOM inspectors.
DISCUSSION OF OBLIGATIONS. Iraq signed the BWC in 1972. As required under UN Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq ratified the BWC in April 1991, thereby obligating it, pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article I of the BWC, to destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and delivery means in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control and not to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes." Iraq was also required, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article I of the BWC, to give up all weapons and means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
ACTIONS. Until July 1995, Iraq claimed that it had met its obligations under the BWC. As noted above, however, after the August 1995 defection of General Hussein Kamel Hassan to Jordan, Iraq presented UNSCOM with dramatically new information on its past biological warfare program, including details concerning agent production, weaponization, and sites. Nevertheless, Iraq’s accounts of weapon development and deployment remained incomplete, as did its accounts of overall military doctrine and concepts of use. By end of 2002, the UN had not yet received documentation or other evidence from Iraq that corroborated: (1) the majority of the information contained in Iraq’s Full, Final, and Complete Declaration; (2) Iraqi claims that all BW agents and weapons have been unilaterally destroyed; and(3) Iraqi claims that its BW program has been completely dismantled. On December 7, 2002, Iraq presented to the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) a "Currently Accurate Full and complete Declaration" for its BW program, but this contained little new information to answer the remaining questions about the program. In violation of its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions, Iraq did not permit any inspections or provide any new information to the UN from December 1998 until September 2002. In UNSCR 1441, adopted November 8, 2002, the Security Council declared that "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions …."
Iraq agreed to renewed UN inspections under UNMOVIC in November 2002, and UNMOVIC and IAEA issued daily inspections reports from November 27, 2002 to March 13, 2003. During this time UNMOVIC collected over 100 biological samples for analysis and found them all consistent with Iraq’s declarations.
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), which took place between March 20 and May 1, 2003, Iraq was legally bound by the BWC and a series of UN Security Council Resolutions obligating it to declare and destroy its WMD stockpiles and capabilities. The passage of UNSCR 1483 in May 2003 reaffirmed that Iraq must meet these disarmament obligations, and asked the United States and United Kingdom to keep the Council informed of U.S./UK activities in this regard. In June 2003, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), composed of largely military experts from some coalition countries, began to conduct WMD/missile search and analysis operations.
On October 2, 2003, the then-head of the ISG, Dr. David Kay, submitted his Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group to the Senate Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). Dr. Kay reported that Saddam Hussein had not given up his aspirations and intentions to continue work on offensive BW capabilities, and that the Ba’athist Iraqi Government had intended to resume WMD-related activities as soon as external restrictions (e.g., international sanctions, coalition "no-fly" patrols, and UN inspections) were removed.
In September 2004, Charles Duelfer issued a comprehensive report to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq’s WMD. The report notes that Saddam continued to see the utility of WMD. He explained that Saddam purposely gave an ambiguous impression about possession as a deterrent to Iran. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996 (including the reporting period of this report), had plans for a new BW program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes. The Duelfer report judges that in 1991 and 1992, Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW weapons and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent. However, the ISG lacked evidence to document complete destruction. The Baa’thist Iraqi Government retained some BW-related seed stocks until their discovery after OIF.
COMPLIANCE-RELATED DIALOGUE AND ANALYSIS. The United States finds that Iraq, during the course of the Saddam Hussein regime, was in violation of its obligations under the BWC. After signing the BWC in 1972, Iraq developed, produced, and stockpiled biological warfare agents and weapons and continued this activity even after ratifying the BWC in 1991. Despite an Iraqi obligation under UN Security Council resolutions adopted after the Gulf War to fully disclose and destroy its BW program, UNSCOMreported and the United Statesagrees that Iraq has concealed many details of its offensive biological warfare program and has engaged in a repeated pattern of obstruction, denial, and evasion. After UNSCOM weapons inspections and monitoring in Iraq ceased in December 1998, its successor, UNMOVIC, resumed on-site activities in Iraq but it never received full and active cooperation by Iraq. Iraq’s Declaration of December 7, 2002, failed to provide any new information or answer remaining questions about its BW program. Although the ISG found no direct evidence that Saddam’s regime, after 1996, had plans for a new offensive BW program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes, it did retain some BW-related seed stocks until their discovery after OIF.
FINDING. The United States finds that Iraq, during Saddam Hussein’s regime, pursued an active offensive BW development program and that various aspects of this program violated its obligations under the BWC. The United States has further determined that during this period Iraq was in violation of its obligation under UN Security Council resolutions to declare and destroy its prohibited WMD and long-range missile programs and to cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspections and monitoring.
LIBYA
ISSUE. In the wake of Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qadhafi’s pledge on December 19, 2003 to forswear all weapons of mass destruction programs, U.S. representatives continue to work to determine the extent to which Libya’s BW-related activities progressed prior to the Libyan commitment, and thus the extent to which Libya was compliant with the BWC.
HISTORY OF COMPLIANCE EVALUATION. The United States assessed Libyan compliance with the BWC as early as June 1992. In that initial assessment, we concluded that Libya had the technical manpower and knowledge to produce small quantities of warfare agents and an interest in obtaining dual-use biological equipment, but that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether Libya had "developed, produced, weaponized or stockpiled BW agents for hostile purposes." The CY1993 through CY2000 Reports reached similar conclusions, noting in CY1994 Libya’s progress in "seeking to move their research program into a program of weaponized BW agents." In the June 2003 Report, however, the United States concluded that "[e]vidence indicates that Libya has the expertise to produce small quantities of biological equipment for its BW program and that the Libyan Government is seeking to move its research program into a program of weaponized BW agents. The United States judges that Libya is in probable violation of its obligations under the BWC."
DISCUSSION OF OBLIGATIONS. On 19 December 2003, Col. Muammar Qadhafi pledged to eliminate material and equipment that might lead to the production of internationally proscribed weapons, and confirmed that Libya would be bound by its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention, to which it acceded in January 1982. Libya has never submitted annual CBM declarations. As part of its December 2003 WMD commitment, Libya has stated its intent to submit BWC CBMs, perhaps within the year, to satisfy its promise to abide by the BWC.
ACTIONS. As noted, in mid-December 2003, Libya publicly announced its intention to eliminate all internationally proscribed weapons programs, and affirmed that it would comply with its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.
Since 1999, Libyan dictator Qadhafi invested the equivalent of millions of U.S. dollars in Libya’s biotechnology infrastructure. Tripoli has also centralized all biotechnology research efforts under the Libyan Academy of Sciences umbrella, an organization headed by Professor Ma’tuq Mohammed Ma’tuq. The Libyan biotechnological infrastructure continued to see significant growth in 2002.
Prior to the Libyan disclosures in 2003, the United States had assessed that Libya had the expertise to produce small quantities of biological equipment for its BW program, and that information suggested that Libya was seeking to acquire the capability to develop and produce BW agents for offensive purposes. Such development or production would have violated key provisions of the BWC.
COMPLIANCE-RELATED DIALOGUE AND ANALYSIS. We judge thatLibya had an offensive BW program prior to December 2003, but that this program had not progressed beyond the R&D stage.
FINDING. Libya’s efforts over time result in an assessment that it had an active, developmental offensive BW program in the past that was in violation of Libya’s obligations under the BWC. While questions remain regarding the past offensive program – questions the Government of Libya has committed to help resolve – the United States judges that there is no longer an offensive biological weapons program.
NORTH KOREA
ISSUE. We continue to have serious concerns about the nature of North Korea’s BW-related activities.
HISTORY OF COMPLIANCE EVALUATION. In the June 2003 Report, the United States concluded that:
The United States believes North Korea has a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a BW capability and that it has developed and produced, and may have weaponized for use, BW agents in violation of the Convention. North Korea likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks of a decision to do so.
DISCUSSION OF OBLIGATIONS. North Korea became a State Party to the BWC in March 1987. North Korea’s only BWC data submission pursuant to the BWC Confidence-Building Measures was in 1990. That submission asserted that North Korea had nothing to declare.
ACTIONS. Available information suggests that North Korea has a mature offensive BW program, and that it may consider the use of biological weapons as an option in any future conflict. Its BW program probably includes Bacillus anthracis, Vibrio cholerae, and possibly other agents or toxins.
North Korea has pursued biological warfare capabilities since the 1960s and continued its program despite having become a State Party to the BWC in 1987. In the past several years, North Korea has focused on building its biotechnology infrastructure some of which could be exploited for BW purposes.
We assess that North Korea has developed and possesses a number of organisms that could be used as BW agents, including anthrax, plague, and cholera. Infectious diseases remain a serious problem in North Korea, and for the most part its vaccine program is consistent with current public health concerns. Nevertheless, North Korea is believed to possess a munitions-production infrastructure that would allow it to weaponize biological warfare agents, and may have such biological weapons available for use.
COMPLIANCE-RELATED DIALOGUE AND ANALYSIS. We judge that North Korea possesses a number of organisms that could be used as BW agents, including anthrax, plague, and cholera.
North Korea made its only CBM declaration — a "null declaration" stating essentially that it had nothing to declare — in 1990 and claimed to be in full compliance. The United States continues to believe that this declaration is false.
FINDING. The United States believes North Korea has a dedicated, national-level effort to develop a BW capability and has developed, produced, and may have weaponized for use, BW agents in violation of the BWC. North Korea probably has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks of a decision to do so.
RUSSIA
ISSUE. The United States is concerned that Russia maintains a mature offensive BW program.
HISTORY OF COMPLIANCE EVALUATION. In January 1984, then-President Ronald Reagan reported to Congress that the Soviet Union was maintaining an offensive biological warfare program and capabilities and that the Soviet Union had repeatedly violated its legal obligations under the BWC. The former Soviet Union’s offensive biological warfare program, in fact, was the world’s largest and consisted of both military facilities and civilian research and development institutes. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Government publicly committed to ending the former Soviet BW program; it claims to have done so in 1992. Nevertheless, serious concerns remain about Russia’s offensive biological warfare capabilities and about the status of some elements of the offensive BW capability inherited from the former Soviet Union (FSU). U.S. assessments in recent years have continued to cite these concerns, highlighting the apparent tension between what appears to be the commitment of key members of the Russian leadership to resolve BWC issues, and the continued involvement of veterans of the Soviet offensive program in both BWC-related meetings and in what Russia describes as its defensive BW program. In the unclassified June 2003 Report, the United States concluded that: "[t]he United States judges, based on available evidence, that Russia continues to maintain an offensive BW program in violation of the BWC. "
DISCUSSION OF OBLIGATIONS. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as the three depository governments for the BWC, all deposited their Instruments of Ratification on March 26, 1975. Russia has assumed BWC successor status from the Soviet Union and therefore is bound to comply fully with the obligations contained therein.
Even though the Soviet Union, and now Russia, regularly submitted annual CBMs, including in 2003, these submissions continue to be incomplete and misleading.
ACTIONS. The United States continues to assess that Russia maintains a mature offensive BW program and that its nature and status have not changed. Russia’s BW program builds on capabilities and expertise inherited from the far more extensive Soviet BW program that dates back to the 1920s. Since the Soviet era, elements of that former Soviet BW program have been subject to varying degrees of downsizing and restructuring. There have also been severe cuts in funding and personnel at some key BW facilities. However, some key components of the former Soviet program may remain largely intact and may support a mobilization capability for the production of biological agents and delivery systems. The United States continues to receive unconfirmed reports of some ongoing offensive biological warfare activities, and key officials from the Soviet offensive BW program continue to occupy influentialpositions.
A substantial amount of dual-use research conducted in recent years has legitimate biodefense applicability, but also could be used to further an offensive program. For example,
- In 2001, the former BW entity Vektor proposed work through the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) to examine Ebola vaccines using nanoemulsions. Although such work has clear biodefense applicability, it also could be used for offensive purposes.
- Scientists from the Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology in Kirov published an article, in August 2001, concerning antibiotic treatment of bubonic plague in primates.
- Researchers at Vektor in 2002 published an article on genetic manipulation of the Marburg virus.
- Researchers at the Volgograd Anti-Plague Institute published work in 2002 on Burkholderia pseudomallei – the causative agent of melioidosis – that attempted to explain through genetic engineering the difference between this organism and related ones.
The United States also assesses that Russia has the capability to mobilize BW production.
Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, there has been a pronounced lack of openness and candor about the past offensive biological weapons program. Russia regularly submits its annual BWC CBM declarations to the United Nations, including in 2003, but these declarations are assessed to be only partially complete, and to include misleading information.
The Soviet Government refused to admit the existence of its large and elaborate offensive BW program, despite repeated U.S. and UK inquiries and demarches. In April 1992, after the demise of the Soviet Union, then-President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree prohibiting all activities that contravene the BWC.
In September 1992, the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia agreed on a Trilateral Process to create confidence that Russia had terminated all illegal biological weapons activity. While there was progress towards achieving the openness intended in the Joint Statement (which calls for a series of confidence-building visits and information exchanges), not all U.S. concerns were resolved. The Trilateral Process broke down in the mid-1990s without resolving U.S. and UK concerns regarding Russia’s compliance with the BWC. In June 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s adherence to the Convention. In April 2001, the Duma removed Russia’s reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol that allowed for Russia’s retaliatory use of biological weapons – thereby eliminating an inconsistency with its BWC obligations.
The U.S.-funded Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) and International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) programs continue to have access to several civilian facilities formerly involved in the Soviet offensive BW program. This transparency has lessened, but not eliminated our concerns that these civilian facilities are directly involved in an ongoing, offensive BW program.
In 2002 and 2003, for instance, the United States was unable to certify, under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act and Title V of the Freedom Support Act (FSA), Russia’s commitment to comply with the Biological (and Chemical) Weapons Conventions, explaining U.S. concerns as follows:
... Russia continues an offensive BW program, although it is much smaller than the massive Soviet BW program. Research activities with potential offensive applications are ongoing at certain facilities known to have been involved in offensive BW work during the Soviet era. Some civilian facilities previously-associated with the Soviet offensive BW program have been subject to varying degrees of modification and equipment removal, and U.S. assistance has facilitated access to some of these civilian facilities, although many retain a capability to engage in offensive activity. Many key officials from the former Soviet offensive BW program continue to occupy influential positions. Funding for possible offensive BW activities at certain military sites has continued. Because the Ministry of Defense facilities remain closed to the West, the nature of Russian activities there remains uncertain.
Russia’s Pathogen Biodefense Initiative, publicly initiated in 1999, is ostensibly aimed at providing a unified government system to defend against human, animal, and environmental pathogens, but could also potentially support or provide cover for offensive BW capabilities.
Moscow has stated that it possesses no stockpile of BW agents and filled munitions. The United States is concerned, however, that dedicated and dual-use Russian facilities maintain a mobilization capability to produce such weapons [agents] quickly in time of need.
COMPLIANCE-RELATED DIALOGUE AND ANALYSIS. The United States continues to have concerns in several areas with respect to a Russian offensive BW program.
The United States discussed Russia’s BWC noncompliance, in the CTR Waiver request, as follows:
The Administration has continuing concerns about Russia’s commitment to comply with the 1972 BWC and believes that Russia continues to maintain a covert offensive BW program in violation of the BWC. Russian offensive BW activities are detailed above in the discussion of CTR Act and FSA Certification No. 2, in the section entitled ‘Biological Weapons.’
Russia regularly submits an annual BWC declaration to the United Nations, pursuant to voluntary Confidence-Building Measures adopted at past BWC Review Conferences. Russia’s initial 1992 declaration was purported to be a complete declaration of the Soviet BW program. A review of Russia’s 2001 BWC Confidence Building Measures Data Declaration, however, reaffirmed U.S. concerns that Russia’s 1992 declaration was incomplete and misleading in certain areas. There continues to be a profound lack of openness about the offensive BW program inherited from the Soviet Union. Subsequent data declarations provide no additions to Russia’s 1992 declaration of past offensive BW activities, which falsely denied past production and stockpiling of BW. The 1992 declaration also failed to list all of the sites that supported the Soviet offensive BW program and that retain at least some of their offensive capability. The more recent declarations focus on the ostensibly defensive aspects of military and civilian facilities without acknowledging the support many of them provided to the massive Soviet offensive BW program in the past and that at least some continue to provide to the current Russian program.
It is a matter of concern that contacts between the United States and the Russian Federation on BWC-related issues are increasingly strained, with public statements by Russian officials appearing to retreat from the statements made by President Yeltsin in 1992. Some have asserted that Russia has never had an offensive BW program. The United States has offered several times to have regular bilateral meetings on the BWC, but Russia has not accepted.
Notwithstanding U.S. concerns with Russia's offensive BW capabilities, the massive BW program Russia inherited from the Soviet Union has been considerably reduced. Since the Soviet era, there have been severe cuts in funding and personnel at key BW facilities associated with the Soviet program. In another positive development, U.S.-Russian cooperative biotechnology programs in recent years have enhanced transparency by providing controlled access to non-MoD [Ministry of Defense] facilities and personnel associated with the Soviet Union’s offensive BW program. This transparency has reduced, but not eliminated, U.S. concerns that these civilian facilities are directly involved in an ongoing, offensive BW program. This year, access for United States Government personnel was expanded to include cooperation-related visits to several key Soviet-era civilian BW production facilities in Russia.In another positive development, in November 2001, President Putin signed a Joint Statement with President Bush that reaffirmed Russia’s commitment to the BWC. Russia continues, however, to deny Western access to certain biological facilities, including Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Health facilities believed to have been associated with the Soviet offensive BW program.
This remains the United States’ assessment. Russia continues to challenge these charges.
FINDING. The United States judges based on all available evidence that Russia continues to maintain an offensive BW program in violation of the Convention.
SYRIA
ISSUE. We continue to have concerns regarding the nature of Syria’s BW-related activities.
HISTORY OF COMPLIANCE EVALUATION. The first time the United States discussed Syrian compliance in this version of the Report was in the June 2003 NCR. In that Report, the we concluded that: "[t]he United States judges, based upon the evidence available, that Syria is pursuing the development of biological weapons that would constitute a violation of the BWC if Syria were a State Party."
DISCUSSION OF OBLIGATIONS. Syria signed the BWC in 1972, but has yet to ratify the Convention. Syria has indicated that its ratification of the BWC is contingent upon Israeli accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
ACTIONS. Syria’s biotechnical infrastructure is capable of supporting agent development. However, Syria lacks the technical infrastructure for a robust or sophisticated BW program and depends on foreign assistance to upgrade its biotechnology infrastructure.
COMPLIANCE-RELATED DIALOGUE AND ANALYSIS. The United States believes that Syria, as a signatory to the BWC, has conducted research and development for an offensive BW program.
FINDING. The United States judges that based upon the evidence available, Syria is developing an offensive biological warfare capability that would constitute a violation of the BWC if Syria were a State Party.
B. THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed November 19, 1990, by 22 States. On June 14, 1991, the Soviet Union issued two related statements in an extraordinary conference in Vienna and in the Joint Consultative Group (JCG). One contained legally-binding obligations related to equipment of the same categories as treaty-limited equipment (TLE) held by Naval Infantry, Coastal Defense (NI/CD), and Strategic Rocket Forces. The second contained political commitments related to equipment of Treaty-limited types removed from the CFE area of application by the Soviet Union prior to Treaty signature.
In December 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved, and 12 newly-independent states (NIS) came into existence. In the Tashkent Agreement of May 15, 1992, the eight NIS with territory in the CFE Treaty’s area of application (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) agreed on principles for, and most of the details of, allocating the CFE rights and obligations of the Soviet Union. At the Oslo Extraordinary Conference of all CFE participants in June 1992, these eight states confirmed their acceptance of all CFE and CFE-related rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union (FSU).
On July 17, 1992, the CFE Treaty came into full provisional application. After the final instrument of ratification was deposited, the Treaty formally entered into force on November 9, 1992, with all Treaty timelines calculated from July 17, 1992.
CFE-1A, an associated agreement that came into effect simultaneously with the CFE Treaty, establishes aggregate national ceilings for personnel in military forces in the area of application. It requires each CFE State Party to provide data on its peacetime authorized personnel strength and to brief on-site inspection (OSI) teams on the personnel holdings of units inspected.
In January 1993, the Czechoslovak Federated Republic (CSFR) split into two separate states, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, which accepted the rights and obligations of the former CSFR and were accepted into the Treaty. This brought the number of CFE States Parties to its present 30.
Detailed CFE data, as of July 17, 1992, were exchanged in August 1992. Subsequent data exchanges required by the Treaty have occurred each year on December 15, with information as of January 1 of the following year. There was an additional data exchange as of November 16, 1995, at the end of the Treaty reduction period, when the Treaty’s limits on TLE and CFE-1A’s limits on personnel went into effect.
The first Review Conference of States Parties to the Treaty took place on May 15-31, 1996. Among the achievements of this conference were: agreement on understandings and interpretations to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty; identification of technical/administrative issues requiring further consideration in the Treaty’s Joint Consultative Group (JCG); a commitment to begin a negotiation process aimed at preserving the Treaty’s viability and improving its operation in a changing security environment (CFE adaptation); acceptance of a new schedule with some additional modalities for Russia’s obligations to destroy or convert equipment east of the Urals; and, in response to recognized Russian and Ukrainian flank concerns, an agreement revising the Treaty’s flank regime.
The Flank Document has three basic elements: (1) reduction of the size of the flank zone in Russia and Ukraine by a map realignment; (2) establishment of limits on overall Russian TLE that could be in the original flank zone, and on Russian ACVs and all three categories of Ukrainian ground TLE in specific areas removed from the original flank zone; and (3) provision of greater transparency regarding military forces on Russian and Ukrainian territory in the original flank zone through additional inspections, data exchanges, and notifications.
Under the agreement, Russia and Ukraine were required to meet all CFE obligations in the new and old (original) flank zones by May 31, 1999.
Major parts of the Flank Document went into provisional effect immediately (including an interim cap on Russian TLE in the original flank area, as well as the enhanced transparency measures). The Flank Document entered into force on May 15, 1997.
In January 1997, the States Parties began negotiations in the JCG to adapt the Treaty to new political circumstances, including the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and enlargement of NATO. During 1997, NATO proposed a new structure of limitations that all States Parties accepted. In summer 1998, NATO tabled detailed proposals concerning the operation of the new limitations, including key military flexibilities, enhancement of data and verification provisions, and reconciliation of the 1996 Flank Agreement and related provisions. On November 19, 1999, an amendment document to adapt the CFE Treaty was signed at the OSCE summit in Istanbul; it will enter into force upon ratification by all 30 States Parties. Key elements of the Adapted Treaty include: national and territorial ceilings (NC and TC); flexibilities for situations when it would be necessary to exceed TCs; enhanced provisions regarding host state consent for the presence of foreign forces; enhanced transparency on forces, activities, and TLE holdings; increased opportunities for on-site inspections; and the opening of the Treaty to accession on a case-by-case basis.
As noted in previous reports, including last year’s Condition 5 Report, in spite of some troubling exceptions, most of the provisions of the Treaty have been implemented with success. By the end of 2001, more than 52,000 pieces of conventional armaments and equipment had been reduced inside the CFE zone according to the Treaty’s reduction provisions, with many States Parties having reduced their holdings to lower levels than required – notifying over 6,000 voluntary reductions below limits. By that date, Russia had notified for destruction or conversion approximately 15,400 additional items in accordance with the provisions of Treaty-related agreements. Almost 4,100 intrusive on-site inspections had taken place by the end of 2001 (including supplementary flank inspections, expert’s visits, and reduction inspections). Through December 2002, Russia notified the destruction of over 5,700 tanks against its remaining east of the Urals (EoU) commitments. Through December 2003, States Parties notified over 1500 added reductions below their limits. Finally, the States Parties notified some 550 on-site inspections during 2002 and 2003 (including supplementary flank inspections, expert’s visits, and reduction inspections).
On a major compliance concern – Russian stationing of forces in Moldova and Georgia without host state consent – some important progress has been made, but more needs to be done. In regard to a second major concern, Russian data and related notifications indicated that the overages above Adapted Treaty flank limits had been almost eliminated. Nevertheless, there remained a continuing need to monitor the situation. (Subsequently, Russia’s flank data as of July 1, 2002, and a related notification indicated that Russian holdings of TLE for the adapted flank area were within the future limits of the Adapted Treaty.) In addition, a number of other longstanding concerns remained in regard to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. In addition, new issues arose in 2002 and 2003. These are all discussed below. Additional details can be found in the CFE Compliance Report pursuant to Condition 5 on the Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to the CFE Flank Document.
Finally, there were a number of smaller, more technical concerns such as late or erroneous notifications, failure to notify removal of TLE from designated permanent storage sites (DPSS), failure to report correctly objects of verification (OOV), and the inability of escorts and unit commanders to account for missing TLE.
COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS
ARMENIA
Declaring and Meeting Required Reduction Liabilities. As noted in previous Reports, Armenia has failed to notify properly or carry out all of the reductions required by the Treaty. This problem has existed since the Treaty came into force. Armenia’s failure to notify properly or to complete its required CFE reduction obligations contributes to the collective failure by the Soviet CFE successor states to meet their 1992 Oslo commitment to declare and to complete reduction requirements that are no less than the reduction requirements of the FSU (discussed under Collective Obligations).
Apparent Failure to Report TLE Received from Russia. Reports over the last three years outlined possible Treaty implications of TLE transfers from Russia into Armenia between 1994 and 1996. There has been no change in this issue on the Armenian side, and there have been no new steps toward resolving the CFE issues surrounding these transfers. It is not clear whether it will be possible to make progress on this issue outside of the context of a political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) dispute which is the focus of the OSCE’s Minsk Group (co-chaired by the United States, Russia, and France).
Failure to Declare Look-Alikes of the MT-LB Variant Armored Personnel Carrier (APC). For the first time in several years (after repeated U.S. questioning, and after an on-site inspection [OSI] in 2000 observed several MT-LB-U APC look-alikes at a site in Armenia), Armenia declared in its data as of January 1, 2001, exactly the number of MT-LB APC look-alikes based on the MT-LB-U chassis that had been observed during the inspection. Questions, however, remain. When Armenia previously declared MT-LB-Us in its annual data, for instance, it declared a much larger figure, and the declared Armenian force structure has not changed significantly.
Late, and Possibly Incomplete, Notification of TLE Entry into Service. As reported previously, Armenia was late in notifying entry into service of multiple rocket launcher (MRL) systems acquired from China, and may have failed to report the full number received (according to press reports). Armenian representatives deny that more MRLs were received than the number they notified. The Armenians did not follow CFE procedures for providing technical data and photographs of these systems, but they hosted a Vienna Document 1999 demonstration of the new equipment in August 2000.
Improper Site Diagram and Denial of Inspection Access. As reported last year, during the U.S.-led inspection in May 2000, the Armenian site diagram improperly excluded two common area units and access was denied to those areas. This problem, however, has not resurfaced and Armenian representatives have attributed it to inadequately trained escort personnel.
Compliance with Limits. Previously, Armenia, while asserting compliance with its limits in the five major categories of TLE, exceeded its limit in the armored infantry fighting vehicle (AIFV)/heavy armament combat vehicle (HACV) sub-category of ACVs by more than 30. This overage had remained unchanged since Treaty limits came into effect. However, on August 22, 2000, Armenia notified the transfer of almost 60 AIFVs from the conventional armed forces to internal security forces and Armenian data as of January 1, 2001 through January 1, 2004 showed Armenia to be within all of its limits, including those for AIFV/HACVs. However, because of other questions we continue to track this issue.
Possibly Unreported TLE. In addition to the MT-LBu variant APC look-alikes and any TLE apparently transferred to Armenian forces from Russia between 1994 and 1996, there have been several indications and confirmations of other TLE (and possibly APC look-alikes) that Armenia has never declared.
Tanks: As reported previously, although Armenia never reported T-54s or T-55s in any of its CFE data declarations through 2000, information in 1999 and later indicated that it did possess such equipment. In May 1999, a U.S. inspector reported several T-55s at a Russian Armor Maintenance Facility in Georgia, and the Russian escorts stated that three of them belonged to Armenia. The Russians also stated that one of these tanks had arrived in 1996 and the other two in 1998. In its data as of January 1, 2001, for the first time, Armenia declared the same number of "T-54/T-55" tanks as those seen at the Russian facility in Georgia. Subsequently the Armenians issued a notification raising the number by several more. However, the designation "T-54/T-55" was highly questionable. Although not always readily distinguishable by external observation, the owner would be expected to know the difference between the two types, and other States Parties holding T-54 or T-55 tanks identify them separately. This sequence strongly suggested that the Armenians were responding to their having been caught in noncompliance withreporting obligations in regard to these tanks. Later, in its data as of January 1, 2004, Armenia did break out these tanks separately into T-54s and T-55s.
Artillery: As previously reported, figures in Russian open sources identified 18 D-1 artillery pieces as being shipped from Russia into Armenia between 1994 and 1996. Since its data as of January 1, 1994 (prior to the shipping of items from Russia into Armenia), Armenia has consistently declared less than five D-1s. This may leave several D-1s transferred from Russia unaccounted for. Finally, as discussed in previous reports, although Armenia has declared only a small number of WM-80 MRLs received from China, Azerbaijani officials have claimed, and the Russian open press has indicated that the actual number received may have been slightly larger. See last year’s report for additional details.
ACVs: Armenia has never declared any MT-LB APCs in its data and ceased reporting MT-LBT APC look-alikes as of January 1, 1998. However, during the past three years inspection reporting has documented the presence of MT-LB APCs and/or MTLB APC look-alikes among Armenia’s conventional forces. A U.S.-led inspection in May 2000 revealed a small number of both MT-LB APCs and MT-LBT APC look-alikes, none of which were included in Armenian data for the site inspected or briefed during the inspection. The Armenians stated that the MT-LBs belonged to the Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF) -- the auxiliary organization that prepares youths for service in the armed forces. However, Armenia has stillnot declared any MT-LB APCs in either its conventional armed forces or its internal security forces. The Treaty requires that armored combat vehicles (ACVs) in the conventional armed forces be declared both by number and type, but APCs in internal security forces are only required to be declared by aggregate numbers in each administrative district or region. However, Armenia’s data each year show all declared internal security APCs by type and have never included any MT-LBs.
FINDINGS. Armenia has failed to comply with Treaty provisions in regard to reduction liability declarations and reductions completed. According to notifications and Armenian data as of January 1, 2000, through January 1, 2004, Armenia no longer exceeds Treaty limits in the AIFV/HACV sub-category of ACVs, but the possibly unreported TLE creates questions. There is evidence that Armenia may have failed to notify increases in unit holdings involving TLE transferred from Russia. After several years during which Armenia failed to report MT-LB-U look-alikes of the MT-LB APC that have remained in its inventory, Armenia in its latest data did report several such look-alikes, but far fewer than it had regularly reported in the years before Armenia stopped including them in its data. Also, in 2000, Armenia notified the acquisition of MRLs late, and may not have reported all of them. There is also evidence of possibly unreported TLE. Finally, Armenia presented an improper site diagram and improperly denied access to two excluded common area units during an U.S.-led inspection in May 2000, although this problem has not resurfaced since then and is considered to have been corrected.
AZERBAIJAN
Declaring and Meeting Required Reduction Liabilities. As noted in previous reports, Azerbaijan has stated that it cannot notify and carry out its required reductions so long as the dispute in N-K continues. This position has not changed. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan has notified and carried out reduction events. To date, Azerbaijan has notified and apparently completed some 430 TLE reductions out of a putative liability of over 1,000. Azerbaijan’s failure either to notify or to complete its required reductions contributes to the collective failure by the Soviet CFE successor states to meet the Oslo commitment to declare and to complete reduction requirements that are no less than the reduction requirements of the FSU.
Compliance with Limits. According to its data as of January 1, 2000, January 1, 2001, and January 1, 2002, Azerbaijan no longer exceeds its declared limits in any TLE category. However, as described in previous reports, two inspections (one in 1999 and one in 2000) led to questions about these data. See previous Reports for details.
Suspension of CFE Provisions. In its data as of January 1, 2001, Azerbaijan continued to fail correctly to report eight objects of verification (OOVs). Then, in its data as of January 1, 2002, January 1, 2003, and January 1, 2004, this number rose to nine. Also, during 2002 and 2003, Azerbaijan continued its unilateral suspension of CFE provisions requiring notifications of changes of ten percent or more in TLE assigned to units. Azerbaijan has continued to defend its unilateral suspension of certain Treaty notifications on the grounds that these notifications would provide operational information to Armenia in the N-K context, and again alluded to military security necessity in regard to the lack of notifications on changes in unit holdings and the failure to report locations for deployed units whose garrisons were occupied by the enemy. However, considering that a cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh has been in place for several years, it is difficult to justify increasing the number of units whose garrisons are "enemy-occupied."
FINDINGS. Azerbaijan has failed to comply with Treaty provisions with regard to reduction liability declarations, and has continued to unilaterally suspend selected Treaty requirements. Although, according to its last three data exchanges, Azerbaijan has asserted that it is in compliance with its Treaty limits, there is continuing information to suggest improper use of equipment allegedly reduced by virtue of being transformed into working order static display items.
BELARUS
Questionable Declaration of Tanks for Export. As reported for several years, there have been questions about the number of tanks Belarus has declared as being in the "awaiting export" category. Over the last few years, these numbers have decreased, and subsequent UN and OSCE data about Belarusian tank exports confirm that (except for one instance in which the number of modern tanks decreased due to their replacement in the export category by older, more exportable models) the decreases have represented exports. Belarusian data as of January 1, 2001, continued to show almost 150 tanks awaiting export. Its data as of January 1, 2002 through January 1, 2004 showed very slightly fewer. Although Belarus now apparently is properly implementing its obligations in regard to TLE awaiting export, this does not fully resolve all of our concerns about previous Belarusian use of the exemption from accountability for equipment awaiting export, especially in regard to its reduction liability and to the collective obligation described below. Belarus continues to state that the tanks declared as awaiting export are in excess of its needs and that it needs the hard currency they could bring if exported.
Denial of Access to a Portion of a Declared Site and Failure to Declare Equipment. In its data as of January 1, 2001 through January 1, 2004, Belarus continued to declare the Spetsnaz brigade at Marina Gorka, but again without any of the TLE that could still remain there. The site has not been subject to inspection since 1999, when access was last denied.
FINDINGS. Belarus’ recent tank exports reinforce the conclusion reported previously that Belarus is now using its holdings of equipment for export in the manner intended. Belarus has continued to fail to report TLE at one site, and to deny access to part of that site, where TLE could still be present.
RUSSIA
Failure to Declare Look-Alikes. There has been no change on this issue. Russia continues to refuse to declare either APC look-alikes of the MT-LB-U version or Engineer Reconnaissance Vehicle (IRM) AIFV look-alikes, insisting that their earlier inclusion in Soviet data as of Treaty signature and in Russia’s first data exchange of July 17, 1992, was merely a technical error. The United States rejects this view. Moreover, the MT-LB-U is included in the Protocol on Existing Types (POET) and Russia’s refusal to declare these APC look-alikes is not in accord with Treaty rules.
Russian Stationed Forces. For several years, there have been important concerns about Russian forces stationed in Moldova and Georgia without host state consent. At the November 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul, Russia committed to specific actions related to withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova, and there was, until recently, considerable progress in the case of Russian forces in Georgia. Meanwhile, after a year and a half of virtually no progress in Moldova, a number of encouraging developments have taken place there since the summer of 2001.
The United States and the OSCE have continued to offer and provide assistance in the form of reimbursement for costs associated with the relocation of Russian troops and military equipment from Georgia and Moldova, as well as for removal or destruction of military equipment and ammunition stored at Russian facilities in Moldova. (Previous reports, including last year’s Condition 5 Report, provide additional details.)
As also reported previously, in Annex 14 of the CFE Final Act, Russia committed to decrease, by no later than December 31, 2000, its TLE holdings on Georgian territory to not more than 153 tanks, 241 ACVs, and 140 pieces of artillery. Russian CFE data reported some 140 tanks, over 500 ACVs, and close to 170 pieces of artillery in Georgia as of January 1, 2000, not including ACVs and artillery in Russian "peacekeeping" forces present in the Abkhaz and South Ossetian regions of Georgia. Russia’s flank data as of July 1, 2000, showed the same numbers of tanks and pieces of artillery, but a drop in ACVs to about 480. But counting the peacekeeping forces and over 20 decommissioned ACVs, the total number of ground items present on Georgian territory was some 140 tanks, close to 650 ACVs, and almost 170 pieces of artillery. After a series of withdrawals and TLE destruction events which were all either observed and confirmed by U.S. and/or OSCE observers or confirmed by Georgia, Russia met this TLE commitment by the end of 2000 and issued a notification to that effect. Russia’s data as of both January 1, 2001, and July 1, 2001 (adjusted to include the peacekeeping forces), showed total TLE holdings in Georgia to be within the levels committed to at Istanbul.
At Istanbul, Russia also agreed to withdraw or dispose of the TLE at the Russian military bases at Vaziani and Gudauta and the repair facility in Tbilisi by December 31, 2000, and to disband and to withdraw from the bases at Vaziani and Gudauta by July 1, 2001. Other aspects of the remaining Russian presence in Georgia were to be resolved in the same timeframe. While the Vaziani base was turned over on time, agreement over some of the terms of the closure of Gudauta was not reached by the July deadline. In November, the Russians announced fulfillment of their Istanbul Summit commitments with respect to Gudauta, claiming to have disbanded the base and withdrawn regular military forces there – leaving only CIS "peacekeepers" and the necessary facilities to support their presence. Georgia, however, disputed Russia’s characterization of the status of Gudauta. The United States and NATO Allies underscored to Russia that it was essential to reach agreement with Georgia on any continuing Russian presence at Gudauta and urged Russia and Georgia to renew their talks. This theme was echoed in the Statement on Georgia agreed by all 54 OSCE Ministers at their meeting in Bucharest December 3-4. The Ministerial document, agreed by Russia and Georgia, called for the resumption of Georgia-Russia talks on transparency regarding Gudauta and early legal transfer of the facility to Georgia. This appears to offer a way forward on these issues that both Russia and Georgia can accept. (In May 2005, Georgian and Russian Foreign Ministers signed a Joint Statement establishing timelines for the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Akhalkalaki and Batumi bases and addressing the Russian presence at the Gudauta base. Under the Joint Statement additional actions are needed, including completion of a technical agreement -- which was under negotiation in summer 2005 -- on Akhalkalaki and Batumi, and further steps regarding Gudauta, in order to fulfill the Istanbul commitments with respect to Georgia.)
With regard to Moldova, Russia announced in November that it had fulfilled its Istanbul commitment to withdraw or destroy all TLE by the end of 2001. In Russia’s CFE data both as of January 1, 2001, and as of July 1, 2001, there were close to 110 tanks, some 130 ACVs, and over 120 pieces of artillery stationed in Moldova. Russia began notifying and carrying out destruction events in July, completing the TLE portion of the Istanbul requirement. By December 2001, OSCE observers, including CFE inspectors, confirmed the withdrawal or destruction of all TLE Russia had declared in Moldova, and Russian data as of January 1, 2002 through January 1, 2004 showed no TLE in Moldova.
The second Istanbul commitment regarding Moldova was for the full withdrawal of all Russian forces by the end of 2002. Other than the politics related to Transnistria, the biggest obstacle to meeting this second commitment is the removal, destruction, or demilitarization of some 42,000 tons of stored Russian ammunition. In addition, there are over 25,000 stored Russian small arms that must be withdrawn. Throughout the summer and fall, intensive negotiations were under way to identify the best and most satisfactory methods, including on a cost-effectiveness basis, to accomplish the disposal of the ammunition and the withdrawal of the remaining Russian materiel. Russia invited the OSCE mission to observe loading of the first four trainloads of ammunition to be withdrawn to Russia. The first trainload of Russian munitions departed the Kolbasna depot December 2, containing 20 cars carrying approximately 1,000 220mm Uragan rockets. Developments on Moldova were welcomed at the December OSCE Ministerial, and several states, including the United States, announced their intention to make additional contributions to the OSCE Voluntary fund-Moldova to help support the Russian withdrawal effort, in particular the costly process of disposing of ammunition stocks.
Throughout 2002 and 2003, U.S. and NATO officials continued to press the Russians bilaterally and at the OSCE in Vienna to take action to fulfill their commitment to withdraw Russian equipment and personnel from Moldova. Important progress began in spring 2001. The OSCE Head of Mission agreed with Russian authorities on procedures for the use of the OSCE Voluntary Fund to support withdrawal and/or destruction of Russian troops, arms, and military equipment from Moldova. It was agreed to establish a group of experts to work out the technical procedures for the destruction, conversion, or removal of the large quantities of Russian ammunition stored in Moldova. Meetings were held in August and September of 2001. Discussions have also been ongoing between Russia and the OSCE to arrange the withdrawal of the large numbers of stored Russian small arms. Contributions by the United States to the OSCE Voluntary Fund to support the withdrawal of Russian troops and to support the withdrawal or destruction of Russian arms and military equipment from Moldova have been critical to these efforts.
A Russian representative has also reiterated the argument that Russia’s non-TLE related Istanbul commitments regarding Georgia and Moldova "did not have anything to do with CFE." This is not correct. The stationing of a State Party’s forces on another State Party’s territory without permission from the host state is a violation of Treaty rules (specifically in Article IV, paragraph 5) regardless of whether or not TLE is present.
Additional details on U.S. actions can be found in the Secretary of State’s Annual Report on Withdrawal of Russian Armed Forces and Military Equipment.
Failure to Notify of Equipment Transfers within the CFE Zone. The last three Reports outlined details of the possible Treaty implications of TLE transfers from Russia into Armenia between 1994 and 1996. There has been no change in this issue on the Russian side (as previously reported, Russia has admitted that "illegal" transfers did take place), and there have been no new steps toward resolving the CFE issues surrounding these transfers. It is not clear whether it will be possible to make progress on this without a political settlement of the N-K dispute, which is the focus of the OSCE’s Minsk Group (co-chaired by the United States, Russia, and France).
Improper Designation of ACVs as Ambulances. Last year’s Condition 5 Report, based on examination of Russia’s data as of January 1, 1999, indicated that, at least at two sites of previous concern, units might no longer hold improperly marked "ambulances" – suggesting that this issue had been resolved. Subsequently, however, a U.S.-led challenge inspection of the Sevastopol area discovered a number of questionable APC "ambulances" and a corresponding reduction in previous declared holdings of APCs. As a result, it is not clear how much of the APC ambulance problem was eliminated and how much had just been relocated. In a number of these inspections BTR-70 APCs and BTR-80 APCs marked as ambulances were observed. The designation of BTR-70s and BTR-80s as ambulances raises questions because the small access doors make it virtually impossible for a stretcher carrying an injured soldier to be placed inside the vehicle – thus seeming to preclude the vehicles’ use as ambulances and suggesting the possibility of a fraudulent redesignation.
Since September 2000, Russian representatives have maintained that this issue had been solved. But, as noted earlier, subsequent inspections again suggested it was not. In 2001, when this issue was raised, the Russian representatives questioned the significance of the instances cited and stated that Russian inspectors often saw more ambulances than this during inspections at U.S. and German sites. The United States pointed out that its concerns had nothing to do with the relative number of ambulances, but with situations where the previous unit holdings of APCs (e.g., in a motorized rifle battalion) had been replaced by APC ambulances that were marked only by the addition of a red cross, with no other modifications, and were parked in motorized rifle battalion sets alongside the other equipment of a motorized rifle battalion. The Russians responded only by indicating that they did not see this as a continuing problem.
Decommissioned Equipment. As noted in previous Reports, Russian data through July 1, 1999, regularly declared more decommissioned tanks, ACVs, and artillery items than the Treaty allows to be exempted from counting against limits. Russian data as of January 1, 2000, no longer showed an excess of decommissioned items. However, in those data, Russia improperly wrote off a total of almost 190 tanks and over 250 ACVs that were present at two capital repair facilities and had previously been reported as either decommissioned or in service (see discussion below on the issue of manipulation of annual data). Because these tanks and ACVs have never been properly removed from Russia’s accountable holdings, they should still be listed as either decommissioned or in service. Subsequent Russian data continued to exclude somewhat diminishing numbers of such items. Russian data as of January 1, 2001, once again showed an excess in decommissioned items (over 10 items), while still continuing improperly to exclude almost 15 tanks and over 250 ACVs that should either be included in its holdings or reported as decommissioned. In Russia’s data as of July 1, 2001, the number of decommissioned items in the flank alone was over 40 tanks and almost 170 ACVs – some 10 items of decommissioned ground TLE above what the Treaty allows for Russia in the entire area of application (AoA). The number of improperly excluded tanks dropped slightly, but the number of excluded ACVs remained the same. These same concerns, albeit with slightly different numbers, continued through 2002 and 2003.
Compliance with Flank Limits. According to its own data and notifications, Russian holdings continue to exceed most of the legally binding limits for both the original and revised flank zones. Russian holdings also continue to exceed the future limits for tanks in the flank area of Russia under the Adapted CFE Treaty. According to Russian data as of January 1, 2002, and a related notification, the overages related to the Adapted Treaty had been reduced and ostensibly eliminated by the end of 2001. However, these data and the notification do not incorporate 11 tanks still improperly excluded from accountability at St Petersburg – leaving a continuing overage of at least five tanks. In its data as of January 1, 2001, July 1, 2001, and January 1, 2002, Russia continued to improperly exclude equipment at capital repair facilities that it characterizes as "non-combat capable."
A notification accompanying the Russian data as of January 1, 2000, voluntarily referenced TLE "temporarily introduced" into the adapted flank from outside the AoA. This information was not provided, however, in subsequent data exchanges and notifications on the amount of TLE temporarily located in the adapted flank. In these latter exchanges and notifications, the Russians only referenced TLE temporarily introduced into the adapted flank with no clarification of how much came from other locations in the AoA or how much came from outside the AoA. Because no information was provided on the peacetime locations of this TLE, it is not possible to determine how much of the total amounts were added to the original flank area.
The amounts of these overages, according to Russian figures, and comparisons among the last three data exchanges and notifications are shown in the charts below. In all cases, Russian data and notifications have been adjusted to also include the items improperly excluded from data, but do not account for excess decommissioned items.
|
Overages above Adapted Treaty Flank Limits on Russian Territory: | |||
|
Tanks |
ACV |
Artillery | |
|
Future limits |
1300 |
2140 |
1680 |
|
Jan 2002 Overages |
At least 5 |
0 |
0 |
|
July 2002 Overages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Jan 2003 Overages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
July 2003 Overages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Headroom as of July 2003[1] |
Over 70 |
Almost 80 |
Over 200 |
|
Overages above Current Treaty Limits for Active Units in the Revised Flank Zone:[2] | |||
|
Tanks |
ACV |
Artillery | |
|
Current active limits |
700 |
580 |
1280 |
|
Jan 2002 Overages |
Over 750 |
Over 2000 |
Over 500[3] |
|
July 2002 Overages |
Over 650 |
Almost 2000 |
Over 460 |
|
Jan 2003 Overages |
Almost 700 |
Almost 2050 |
Close to 500 |
|
July 2003 Overages |
Close to 700 |
Over 2000 |
Almost 450 |
|
Overages above Current Treaty Flank Limits for the Original Flank Zone: | |||
|
Tanks |
ACV |
Artillery | |
|
Current total limits |
1800 |
3700 |
2400 |
|
Jan 2002 Overages |
0 |
At least some 475 |
0 |
|
July 2002 Overages |
0 |
At least some 700 |
0 |
|
Jan 2003 Overages |
0 |
At least almost 750 |
0 |
|
July 2003 Overages |
0 |
At least almost 600 |
0 |
|
Headroom as of July 2003 |
Almost 200 |
N/A |
Over 300 |
Nevertheless, there are concerns that Russia may not be declaring properly the total number of ACVs in the adapted flank area. First there is the question of APCs that are being used to transport combat infantry squads, but which are claimed improperly to be "ambulances" as discussed earlier. A second concern relates vehicles that are being declared as MT-LBT APC look-alikes but are configured and used as MT-LB APCs. (Physically the only significant and readily visible difference between the MT-LB APC and the MT-LBT APC look-alike is that the inside of the MT-LB contains passenger seats on both sides allowing transport of a full infantry squad, while the MT-LBT contains artillery ammunition racks instead of seats on the left side, and is a towed artillery primemover with seats only for the smaller gun crew. Both versions existed in the Soviet (and Russian) inventory prior to entry into force of the Treaty. According to the POET, for 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty, an MT-LB could be modified into an MT-LBT against reduction obligations by altering the interior of the vehicle through removal of the left-hand combat infantry squad seating and the welding of the ammunition racking to the side and floor at a minimum of six points. To replace seats with ammunition racks, or vice-versa, is a simple procedure that can be easily carried out at the holding unit level.) This practice could lead to declarations of artificially lower holdings of ACVs for the units in question and for the adapted flank area as a whole.
a) During a U.S.-led inspection in February 2002, Russian escorts claimed that some 40 "may have been deployed to Chechnya." Inspectors observed some 40 ammunition racks of the type used in MT-LBT APC look-alikes stacked in a storage shed.
b) On October 1-2, 2002, a U.S.-led inspection examined more than 60 MT-LBTs that may have returned from Chechnya. The welds of the ammunition racks of all of these MT-LBTs appeared to have been completed only recently, and a few of the vehicles required additional welds to complete the process of modification.
This raises another complex issue. The footnote in the POET that allowed nations to receive credit for "reducing" MT-LB APCs via modification into MT-LBT APC look-alikes had only a 40-month duration – the 40 months of the CFE reduction period, during which the groups of states were required to destroy or otherwise eliminate equipment in excess of agreed ceilings according to methods specified in the Treaty. The MB-LT modification allowed a limited exceptional reduction mechanism in order to reach limits. However, the Treaty is silent on what can or must be done to eliminate TLE from accountability beyond the reduction period of the Treaty, which ended in 1995, nor does it specify how decommissioned items can be disposed of. Accepted practice over the life of the Treaty after the Treaty reduction period offers some answers. Several NATO allies have notified reductions below limits that involved TLE being converted to other non-TLE (or even other non-Treaty-reportable) items that would continue to be used militarily, and no nation has raised an objection in the CFE Joint Consultative Group (JCG), the Treaty’s implementation body. Similarly, during recent Russian conversions of MT-LB vehicles that changed the mix of TLE and TLE look-alikes, no nation has pursued a formal objection. What does seem clear, however, is that such changes must be reflected in annual CFE data, and, if involving a change of 10 percent or more in a unit’s holdings of APCs, they must be formally notified. Russian annual data has regularly reflected such changes, but timely notifications of 10 percent changes have not always been made in these cases.
In its data as of January 1, 2001,through that of January 1, 2004,Russia continued to exclude equipment at capital repair facilities in the flank that it characterizes as "non-combat capable" but which, by the Treaty, must be counted against limits if not declared as decommissioned. Details are provided below.
A notification accompanying the Russian data as of January 1, 2000 voluntarily referenced TLE "temporarily introduced" into the adapted flank from outside the AoA. This information has not been provided in conjunction with subsequent data exchanges and notifications on the amount of TLE temporarily located in the adapted flank. In these subsequent data exchanges and notifications, the Russians only referenced TLE temporarily introduced into the adapted flank, with no clarification of how much came from other locations in the area of application (AoA) or how much came from outside the AoA. Because no information was provided on the peacetime locations of the TLE temporarily introduced, it was not possible to determine how many of the "temporarily introduced vehicles" had been added to the original flank area or Russian territory within the AoA.
Denial of Full Access During Inspections and Improper Site Diagrams. As reported last year, this recurring problem continued in 2001, when this issue occurred at least once. However, in 2002and 2003, it has apparently not occurred.In the past, this infrequent, but recurring, problem has involved a Russian attempt improperly to define a declared site (and thus inspection access) on the basis of subordination, rather than geography (as the Treatyrequires). This Russian practice is an issue that has been discussed in the JCG. The disagreement over the definition of a declared site and the contents of a site diagram has not been resolved. Only Belarus supports the Russian interpretation; the United States believes it to be incorrect.
East of the Urals (EoU) Commitment. As discussed in last year’s Report, the Russian EoU commitment, as revised by the 1996 Review Conference, called for the destruction (or conversion into civilian equipment) of 6,000 tanks, 1,500 ACVs, and 7,000 pieces of artillery "by the year 2000." Annex E of the Final Document of the First Conference to Review the CFE Treaty allows Russia to apply ACVs destroyed in excess of the 1,500 commitment to any shortfall of not more than 2,300 in tanks. However, a number of tanks equal to the shortfall must be subsequently eliminated. Although Russia had not destroyed or converted the full 6,000 tanks, as of February 24, 2001, Russia had notified the destruction of a sufficient number of tanks (almost 5,000) and excess ACVs (over 1,500) so as to allow it to claim the EoU commitment "in general to be deemed completed." Since then, Russia has continued to notify the destruction of additional tanks. In late spring, 2003, the United States and NATO concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support Russia’s claim of having fulfilled its entire EoU commitment. See previous Reports for details of the events leading up to this decision.
Violation of Overall Limits for Holdings in Active Units. For several years, Russian data have shown violations of overall limits in ground TLE in active units. Russia’s data as of January 1, 2002, showed only an overage above overall active unit limits in artillery of over 100, but these did not include any of the items notified as being temporarily in the adapted flank zone (a few tanks, over 175 ACVs, and over 40 pieces of artillery) that may have come from outside the AoA. Russia’s data as of January 1, 2003, showed overages above overall limits for holdings in active units in tanks of over 125 and in artillery of some 270, but did not include any of the items notified as being temporarily in the adapted flank zone (a few tanks, close to 160 ACVs, and over 40 pieces of artillery) that may have come from outside the AoA. One reason for the overage in tanks probably is that Russia no longer declared Buy as a DPSS, thus adding its declared holding of over 190 tanks to its holdings in active units. Russia’s data as of January 1, 2004 showed holdings in active units in tanks of over 170 and in artillery of over 220. Russia also appears unilaterally to have applied the Adapted Treaty limits for overall holdings of TLE in active units that are greater than the current Treaty limits for such holdings. However, as noted earlier, Russia has acted as if the Agreement on Adaptation had already entered into force and modified ("adapted") the Treaty, but the Agreement has not done so, there is no authority to provisionally apply the Agreement in whole or in part and no State Party may unilaterally apply future provisions that are not yet in force. On the basis for these future limits, Russia’s overall holdings in active units would be below limits.
Improper Exemption of TLE from Accountability. As reported previously, for the past few years Russian data have improperly excluded from accountability a significant number of tanks and ACVs that were present at Kushchevskaya and St. Petersburg. Because these tanks and ACVs were not properly removed from Russia’s accountable holdings, they should have been listed as either decommissioned or in service. Proper accounting of these items would have resulted in Russia having (1) declared far more decommissioned items than allowed, and/or (2) increased overages above overall limits in active units and flank limits. Russian data as of January 1, 2002, excluded over 10 tanks and some 250 ACVs at the two capital repair facilities on these same improper grounds. As noted earlier, during the first half of 2002, the "non-combat capable" tanks at St Petersburg were destroyed, but a note in Russia’s data as of July 1, 2002, still showed a few tanks and over 250 such ACVs at Kushchevskaya. This same situation was reflected in Russia’s data as of January 1, 2003, and Russia’s flank data as of July 1, 2003. In the notification on holdings at Kushchevskaya as of October 1, 2003, Russia reported a slight decrease in the number of "non-combat-capable" ACVs. This continued in Russia’s data as of January 1, 2004, with only minor changes.
New MT-LB Variants. As previously reported, in a development that had potential compliance ramifications, the Russians deployed limited numbers of two new variants of the MT-LB APC, the Kondor and the Berkut, in Chechnya as of September 24, 2001. Both variants have characteristics of ACVs as defined in Article II of the Treaty, but neither vehicle is listed in the POET, nor had either been notified as entering into service with the Russian armed forces in the AoA. See previous reports for details.
The United States conducted a declared site inspection of a DPSS in October 2002 where the Russians briefed the presence of over 90 MT-LB variants and declared them to be used exclusively for R&D. The inspection team observed over 70 of the MT-LB variants, all of which were canvas covered. The escort team chief declared the remaining MT-LB variants to be in a storage building at the DPSS to which he denied the inspection team access by declaring the building a sensitive point.
However, through November 30, 2003,there had been no notification of Kondors entering into service nor had Russia notified the presence of these vehicles at any unit. In December, 2003, Russia notified the entry into service of the MT-LBMB (Kondor) AIFV and the MT-LBMA (Berkut) APC and included these vehicles at a naval infantry unit in its CFE data exchange on December 15, 2003 (as of January 1, 2004). Given that Russia has interpreted the June 1991 agreement on Naval Infantry/Coastal Defense forces (NI/CD) as somewhat separate from many Treaty rules relating to TLE, earlier absence of notifications may not be surprising. Russia does not normally notify changes of ten percent or more in TLE holdings in NI/CD forces, but such changes are incorporated in holdings declared in the separate Charts on these forces during the annual data exchange.
FINDINGS. Although Russia continues to station forces in both Georgia and Moldova, Russia has committed to the withdrawal of some (Georgia) or all (Moldova) Russian TLE and forces, and has met its commitments in regard to TLE in Georgia and Moldova, but has failed to complete the second part of these commitments in either Georgia or Moldova. Russia continues to refuse to declare MT-LB-U APC look-alikes and IRM AIFV look-alikes in data exchanges and, in some cases, to include them in inspection briefings. Russia may have failed to make Treaty-required notifications of transfers or reassignment of TLE entering Armenia. Russia again has declared excessive numbers of decommissioned ground items. Russia remains far over the current Treaty limits for tanks, ACVs, and artillery in active units in the revised flank and the current limits in ACVs for the original flank zone. Russian data and notifications now portray Russia as being in compliance with flank limits for the Adapted Treaty. Moreover, Russia is over its limits for artillery in active units in the AoA. In 2001, Russia again improperly denied access to part of at least one declared site, but has not done so in 2002 or 2003. As noted above, Russia continues to manipulate its data by unilaterally and improperly excluding some 250 items of TLE as "non-combat capable." Although Russia failed to complete its CFE-related EoU destruction commitment by the year 2000 as required, Russia did meet most of the terms of that commitment by February 2001 by an allowed substitution of ACV destructions for shortages in tank destructions – leaving only a non-time-limited commitment eventually to destroy additional tanks equal to the numbers for which excess ACV destructions had been substituted. This was completed by Spring 2003. Finally, a new potential compliance issue arose in 2001 in regard to apparently new variants of the MT-LB APC, but was resolved by the end of 2003.
UKRAINE
Active Unit Limits. As noted in previous Reports, Ukrainian data since 1996 have repeatedly indicated that Ukraine was above several of its notified limits for holdings in active units. In its data as of January 1, 2001, Ukraine no longer had any overages above overall active unit limits. Ukraine, however, still had overages above active unit limits in Zone 4.3 of almost 140 tanks and close to 50 artillery pieces. Although there are some internal inconsistencies in Ukraine’s data as of January 1, 2002, it appears to show an overage, but only in tanks in active units in Zone 4.3 of some 120. Ukraine’s data as of January 1, 2003, shows no overage in tanks in active units in Zone 4.3, but an overage of close to 20 artillery pieces in holdings in active units in Zone 4.3. It also shows an overage of some 50 ACVs in active units in Zone 5.1. Ukraine’s data as of January 1, 2004 showed overages in Zone 5.1 of over 100 APCs. The changes in Zone 4.3 appear to be the result of changes in the number of tanks and artillery pieces in DPSS, while the changes in Zone 5.1 appear to be the result of transferring SRF ACVs to the conventional armed forces. (ACVs assigned to the SRF in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine are limited in number by a Treaty-related commitment, but do not count against TLE limits in the conventional armed forces.)
The overages in Zone 4.3 began following the entry into force of the Flank Document, which removed the Odessa Oblast from the revised flank zone, thereby adding the equipment in that oblast to Zone 4.3.
FINDINGS. Ukraine remains over its limits in active units in Zone 4.3 in tanks.
COLLECTIVE OBLIGATIONS
Naval Infantry/Coastal Defense-related Reductions. Russia and Ukraine shared a legally-binding commitment to declare and to complete Naval Infantry/Coastal Defense-related (NI/CD) reductions equal to those the Soviet Union had committed to carry out. In March 2000, Russia completed its remaining share of the NI/CD-related reduction obligations. Ukraine has not fulfilled its share of the reductions.
There have been no further tangible developments in regard to Ukraine on the issue of the unfulfilled Ukrainian obligation for NI/CD-related reductions (close to 160 tanks, some 370 ACVs, and over 150 pieces of artillery) that Ukraine shared with Russia. Ukraine continues to contend that it should not have to carry out these reductions because it is already in compliance with overall limits.
When this issue was raised with Ukraine in 2001, the Ukrainians responded with a detailed argument against the reduction obligation. This argument ignored some of the precise wording of the NI/CD commitment and, in the final analysis, differs from the conclusions and interpretations held by the United States and (apparently) all other States Parties except Ukraine. A main thrust of the Ukrainian argument continued to be that Ukraine is fully within all of its overall limits when NI/CD holdings are added to holdings of conventional armed forces (after having conducted very significant CFE reductions outside of any theoretical NI/CD-related reduction obligations).
Declaring and Meeting the Reduction Obligations of the USSR. There have been no changes from what was reported in the October 2, 2000 Report on this issue.
FINDINGS. Ukraine has not yet met its shared NI/CD-related reduction obligation. In addition, the USSR’s eight CFE successor states have not fulfilled their collective obligation to declare reduction liabilities and to complete reductions that will, in the aggregate, be no less than what the USSR would have had to declare and to complete. The majority of the shortfall in reduction liabilities can be attributed to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. However, even if Armenia and Azerbaijan were to declare and to complete their maximum putative reduction liabilities and Belarus were to increase its reduction obligation to include tanks awaiting export, there would still be shortfalls.
C. THE VIENNA DOCUMENTS OF 1992, 1994, AND 1999
On March 4, 1992, the participating States in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), including all successor states to the Soviet Union, adopted the Vienna Document 1992 (VD-92), which added to and built upon the undertakings in Vienna Document 1990 (VD-90). Subsequently, most of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia also joined VD-92. In November 1994, at the CSCE Summit in Budapest, VD-92 was expanded and incorporated into Vienna Document 1994 (VD-94). At that time, the CSCE also changed its name to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). During 1999, the participating Parties to VD-94 completed discussions to update VD-94. Improved provisions were accepted in the Vienna Document 1999 (VD-99) at the Istanbul Summit in November. The measures contained in Vienna Documents 1992, 1994, and 1999 are politically binding.
The main provisions of the VD include: an exchange of military information, requirements to notify and invite observers to military exercises above certain thresholds in personnel and equipment, airfield visits, provisions for on-site evaluations of military units to confirm the information on them, provisions for inspections of specified areas to determine if an unnotified military activity is going on, and other confidence and security building measures (CSBMs).
In general terms, compliance with the Vienna