| Regime Strategic Intent |
|---|
| Key Findings |
1 |
| Who Made Iraq's Strategic Decisions and Determined WMD Policy | 5 |
|
Saddam's Place in the Regime | 5 |
|
|
The Apex of Power | 5 |
|
|
Personalized Rule | 5 |
|
Saddam's Unsettled Lieutenants | 5 |
|
A Few Key Players in an Insular Environment | 7 |
|
Saddam Calls the Shots | 8 |
|
Saddam Shows the Way | 9 |
|
Harvesting Ideas and Advice in a Byzantine Setting | 10 |
|
Weaving a Culture of Lies | 11 |
|
Saddam Became Increasingly Inaccessible | 11 |
|
Saddam's Command By Violence | 12 |
| Saddam's Effect on the Workings of the Iraqi Government | 13 |
|
Suspicion of Structures | 13 |
|
Powerless Structures | 13 |
|
The Higher Committee | 14 |
|
The Foreign Policy Committees | 15 |
|
Saddam's Grip on National Security and WMD Development | 16 |
|
Saddam Holding Court | 18 |
|
Saddam and Fiscal Policy | 18 |
| How Saddam Saw His Subordinates | 19 |
|
Mining Respect and Expertise | 19 |
|
Mutuality of Fear | 19 |
|
Dazzled by Science | 19 |
| How Saddam Saw Himself | 21 |
|
Saddam's Psychology | 21 |
|
Saddam's Personal Security | 21 |
|
Saddam the Dynasty Founder | 21 |
|
Saddam and His Sense of Legacy | 22 |
| Desire . . . Dominance and Deterrence Through WMD | 23 |
|
Saddam's Role in WMD Policy | 23 |
|
What Saddam Thought: The Perceived Successes of WMD | 24 |
|
What Saddam Thought: External Concerns | 28 |
|
Iran | 29 |
|
Israel | 31 |
|
The United States | 31 |
|
WMD Possession-Real or Imagined-Acts as a Deterrent | 34 |
|
Saddam's Prioritization of Getting Out From Under Sanctions | 34 |
|
Efforts To Lift Sanctions | 35 |
| Realizing Saddam's Veiled WMD Intent | 41 |
|
Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline | 41 |
|
Ambition (1980-1991) | 41 |
|
Decline (1991-1996) | 42 |
|
Scientific Research and Intention to Reconstitute WMD | 44 |
|
Reaction to Sanctions | 44 |
|
Husayn Kamil's Departure | 46 |
|
Cooperating With UNSCOM While Preserving WMD | 47 |
|
Recovery (1996-1998) | 48 |
|
Impact of the "Chicken Farm" Documents | 49 |
|
Looking Ahead to Resume WMD Programs | 49 |
|
Guarding WMD Capabilities | 51 |
|
Iraq's Internal Monitoring Apparatus: The NMD and MIC Programs | 53 |
|
Suspending Cooperation With UNSCOM | 55 |
|
Transition (1998-2001) | 56 |
|
Nullifying All Obligations To UNSC Resolutions | 57 |
|
Preserving and Restoring WMD Infrastructure and Expertise | 59 |
|
Pumping Up Key Revenue Streams | 60 |
|
Miscalculation (2002-2003) | 61 |
|
Renewing UN Inspections | 63 |
|
Iraq's Other Security Concerns | 64 |
|
Sorting Out Whether Iraq Had WMD Before Operation Iraqi Freedom | 64 |
|
Alternative Hypotheses on Iraq's Nonuse of WMD During Operation Iraqi Freedom | 66 |
Annexes |
| A. The Quartet-Influence and Disharmony Among Saddam's Lieutenants | 69 |
| B. Iraq's Intelligence Services | 73 |
| C. Iraq's Security Services | 85 |
| D. Saddam's Personal Involvement in WMD Planning | 97 |
