Verification And Arms Control: Fiction Or Reality?
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Verification and Arms Control: Fiction or Reality?
Author: LtCol. Juan Pardo, Spanish Marine Corps.
Thesis: Despite the old controversy about the usefulness of verification and arms control, the
international disarmament agreements of today offer hope for the future.
Background: Presently, three forums are working, with more or less intensity, on different
disarmament agreements already in force or still in process. They are the Conference on
Disarmament of the United Nations, the Negotiations on Nuclear Disarmament, and the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Through the analysis of the most relevant
agreements
under these forums, though without delving into technical and specific details,
I
show
the evolution of the modem disarmament agreements, and how this evolution
reinforces the
importance
of verification measures and procedures. I analyze the different approaches to
these
kind
of international agreements, with their advantages and disadvantages.
Basically, I compare
the
agreements written in highly specific and technical language with those written
in general
terms,
avoiding details. I also compare bilateral and multilateral agreements. I
analyze failures
and
successes, weakness and strength on each approach. Then, I emphasize the
important impact
that,
from my point of view, verification regimes have on arms control, as well as
the risks that
verification tasks imply.
Conclusions and recommendations: Taking into account the current situation in disarmament
and arms control, as well as my own experience in these matters, I offer a perspective on the
future to conclude that, despite the recent world changes and the uncertain future, arms control
agreements provide an important way to further world security. Moreover, when backed by
efficient verification regimes, they will also serve to release international tensions and to defuse
mutual secretiveness. Finally, I make two brief, although to me important, recommendations:
first, not risk the success of arms control collecting intelligence through verification measures,
and
second, to provide financial and technical aid to poorer countries to encourage
and facilitate
them
to join and fulfill disarmament agreements.
ACRONYMS
ADM: Air Defense Missile
AFAP: Artillery Forces Atomic Projectiles
ACV: Armored Combat Vehicle
BTWC: Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
CD: Conference on Disarmament
CFE: Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CWC: Chemical Weapons Convention
EC: European Community
HLWG: High Level Working Group
INF: Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT: Non Proliferation Treaty
OOST: Ost-Outer Space Treaty
OS: Open Skies
OSI: On-Site Inspection
PTBT: Partial Test Ban Treaty
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SRNF: Short-Range Nuclear Forces
START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
UN: United Nations
UVE: Unidad de Verificacion Espanola
VCC: Verification Coordination Committee
WP: Warsaw Pact
VERIFICATION AND ARMS CONTROL: FICTION OR REALITY?
I. INTRODUCTION.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the processes of verification and arms control
carried out in the international realm. This study intends to reconcile the antagonistic postures
between those who still think that disarmament agreements are a myth and those who firmly
believe in their usefulness.
I will base the analysis on both the widely available bibliography and my personal
experience as a member of the Spanish Verification Unit for the last four years. During that time
October 1990 to July 1994 in which dramatic world changes challenged the letter and spirit
of many international agreements, I had the opportunity to participate in many verification and
arms control activities: as an inspector forming part of a national or multinational team, and as a
representative of my country in courses, meetings and seminars regarding these matters.1
The aspiration of the human being for avoiding wars or, at least, lessening their terrible
aftermath, is as ancient as mankind. The agreements, alliances, prohibitions or limitations
carried out by nations or group of nations to attempt to reach the desired peace are innumerable.
We can find examples of disarmament measures in the ancient ages, like the "obliged delivery of
the elephants by the Carthaginians to the Romans" or the "Roman imposition to King Philip of
Macedonia to hold a fleet of not more than six vessels" and, in the middle age, the "the ban on
using the cross bow dictated in the second council of Lateran.”2
Having suggested the antiquity of
disarmament agreements, I will turn now to analyze
the most recent international agreements. In this
context, consider the following statement of Dr.
Frank Barneby, director of the very famous Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI):
Verification is a crucial but controversial issue in disarmament negotiations. On the one
hand, States need adequate assurances of the compliance of others in any agreements
reached. On the other hand, verification can be, and often is, used as an excuse for lack
of progress
in arms control and disarmament negotiations. In the end, of course, the
main factor determining the success or failure of disarmament efforts is the political will
of the counties involved to obtain an agreement. But, even so, the importance of
verification cannot be doubted.3
I will not delve deeply into the specific and technical details of the different treaties and
agreements. After explaining the meaning of some elemental terminology, I will briefly show
the most significant aspects of the agreements in force and negotiations in progress. Finally,
through the analyses of their results, as well as my personal experience, I will offer a future
perspective to present some conclusions and recommendations.
2. THE MEANING OF DISARMAMENT, CONTROL AND VERIFICATION.
To understand the reach and importance of verification and arms control, it is first
necessary to
clarify terminology. Defining "disarmament" is not hard; it means the
reduction or
elimination of weapons. The problem comes in
describing precisely what weapons to eliminate.
David W. Ziegler presents a list of seven distinct
possibilities along the wide range of
disarmament: (1) Total disarmament, (2) Disarmament to the lowest point consistent with
domestic safety, (3) Disarmament to the lowest point
consistent with national safety, (4)
Qualitative disarmament, (5) Quantitative
disarmament, (6) Budgetary limitation, and (7)
Regional disarmament.4
More difficult is to
establish an unambiguous definition for the word ”control.” The word
not only has different meanings in different languages, but even within and individual language it
may have a range of meanings. The French definition describes the verb as “to check, test or
verify by evidence or experiments,” and the noun form as “the act or instance of controlling.”
The English connotation of the word is “to exercise restraining or directing influence over,”
hence “to regulate and “to have power on ,” hence “to rule.” The definition of the noun form is
“the skill in the use of a tool, instrument or technique,” or alternatively, as “direction, regulation,
coordination.”5
This variety of meanings leads to considerable confusion on the field of disarmament
negotiation. Thus, because of the predominance of English as an international language, the term
has come to denote a specific type of disarmament in which states restrain their armaments in
order to rationalize their security efforts or to curb their most dangerous military activities. In
this sense of the word, control has come to be synonymous with arms limitation, but the word is
also used in its French sense, as meaning the act of checking or verifying the actions of states
implementing disarmament.6
Finally, “verification” is, according to the Webster’s dictionary, “the act or process of
verifying or the state of being verified; the authentication of truth or accuracy by such means as
facts, statement, citations, measurements, or attendant circumstances, confirmation by evidence
in law....”7 Although this definition does not seem very applicable to disarmament, we can apply
to it the idea of positive and negative verification. Different authors define “verification of
disarmament” in different ways. The SIPRI offers, in my opinion a comprehensive definition
for our purposes:
Verification of disarmament. A process, specifically established or approved by a
disarmament agreement, carried out by individual state parties to the agreement, either
reciprocally or not, or by an international body established or empowered to carry out
the process, by personnel or by technical means, in order to determine the degree to
which the parties to the agreement have implemented its provisions and thereby observed
or discharged their obligations under the treaty.8
3. AGREEMENTS IN FORCE AND NEGOTIATIONS IN PROGRESS.
Dynamics and growing complexity of the field of arms control demand permanent action
by nations. Currently three forums are working on the different agreements already in force or
still in progress: (1) the Conference on Disarmament of United Nations, (2) Negotiations on
nuclear disarmament, and (3) the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I will
mention the
most relevant agreements under each forum.
Conference on Disarmament (CD) of United Nations (UN), with seat in Geneva:
This conference consists of 10 western countries, 23 former Warsaw Pact (WP) countries,
and 21 neutral countries. Although a significant number of committees are working on
different
matters9, it is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) that, for the time being, seems to
promise some success.
Besides the convention itself, a bilateral agreement between the United States and the
former Soviet Union, signed in July 1990, reinforces the firm purpose of no chemical weapons
production, supporting the CWC. Unfortunately, this agreement is still awaiting ratification.
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) lacks funds and adequate organization, and the
United States is still checking the efficiency of its destruction facilities.
On January 14, 1993, after hard and intense negotiations, more than one hundred
countries signed the CWC. In accordance with its article XXI, the agreement will enter in force
180 days after deposit of the 65th ratification instrument . Containing a global application, this
agreement has a great advantage over the bilateral START or regional agreements concerning the
Conventional Armed Forces. It represents major progress in the field of disarmament, because
of the fact that it not only prohibits the use of chemical weapons" but also their production and
storage. However, it is the detailed verification process that this agreement contains which
actually reinforces its credibility.
Negotiations on nuclear disarmament.
On the multilateral field, we can mention the following treaties and agreements: the
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963, negotiated by the Soviet Union and Great Britain,
banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, the exterior space, and underwater; the Ost-Outer Space
Treaty (OOST), which bans the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in space; and the Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 that commits countries without nuclear weapons to not
acquire them, while the owners commit themselves to look, by means of negotiations, for nuclear
disarmament.
In the framework of bilateral negotiations, the famous Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, signed in December 1987 by the United States and the Soviet Union, was a
milestone of disarmament agreements. The INF Treaty revolutionized verification procedures by
providing for On-Site Inspections (OSI) of the elimination of missiles and launchers, the
confirmation of baseline data exchanged, and the establishment of portal monitoring (a
twenty-four-hour-a-day presence) at missile facilities at Votkinsk in the Soviet Union heartland
and at Magna, Utah, in the United States. Thus far, the INF Treaty has been the most extensive
and intrusive verification process agreed to in arms control history before the entry in force of the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.11
On July 31, 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the START I (Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks), considered the main goal in the process of reduction of weapons of mass
destruction. The two more relevant aspects of this treaty were the reduction of Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) until reaching
an equal ceiling of 1600 and 6000 warheads, respectively, by the 7th year after the entry in force;
on the other hand, and more interesting to this analysis, the establishment of very important
verification measures.
The year 1992 began what we could call the "war of initiatives," in which both the United
States and Russia committed themselves to perform a series of unilateral measures reducing and
limiting their weapons of mass destruction. As a result, a few days before he left the White
House, George Bush signed the START II Treaty with Boris Yeltsen. The Treaty was much
more ambitious and significantly decreased the ceilings agreed to in the previous START I.
Finally, the Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SRNF) Talks foresee the destruction and global
elimination of all the Artillery Forces Atomic Projectiles (AFAP) and all the nuclear warheads of
short-range surface-to-surface missiles. In addition, Russian President Gorbachov announced
that his country would destroy all Air Defense Missiles (ADMs) and consolidate their nuclear
warheads.
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
On July 3, 1973, the inauguration of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe took place in the city of Helsinki. All European countries (with the exception of
Albania), the United States, and Canada participated. Currently, after the incorporation of
Albania and the breaking-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia", as well as the division of
Czechoslovakia, the total number of members is 55.
The first fruit of their negotiations was the Stockholm Document (September 19, 1986)
which represented an important milestone in arms control procedures and in confidence and
security measures. This document agreed to a series of new actions. These actions involved the
previous notification of military activities exceeding determined ceilings and provided a
verification system that included OSIs, observation of military activities exceeding certain
ceilings on troops, and evaluation visits of military units. Under this remarkable regime, the
Soviets inspected military maneuvers in Turkey and vice-versa; the Bulgarians did the same in
Italy; and the Polish in West Germany. Soviet and United States inspectors have each observed
a number of exercises by each side.13
Although very important, the Vienna Documents of 1990 and 1992 have already
superseded this document. The Vienna documents include important modifications to the
former Stockholm Document, mainly regarding data exchange, which include detailed
information on military forces, equipment and deployment plans, as well as military budgets.
They also reinforce the verification system; open a mechanism of consultation and cooperation
on risk reduction matters; establish a formal procedure to carry out military contacts; and open a
direct communications net among capitals to transmit messages related to the agreed measures.
The negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe among the member countries
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which began in Vienna in March 1989, resulted in the
conclusion of the CFE Treaty on November 1990. The 22 States signed the Treaty during a
summit meeting in Paris under the framework of the CSCE.
As a result of the dramatic political and military developments which have taken place
since 1989, some of the initial premises for the CFE Treaty changed along the course of the
negotiations. Key factors were the unification of Germany, substantial Soviet troop withdrawals
from Eastern Europe, the advent of democratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe, and
the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact.14
The Treaty imposes limits on key
categories of forces and equipment held individually
and collectively. The purpose of these limits is not only to bring about dramatic reductions, but
also to ensure that no single country is able to play a dominating military role on the European
Continent. Tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), combat aircraft, and helicopters
are the main categories covered by the provisions of the CFE Treaty.
The implementation of the provisions of the Treaty is subject to a precise calendar and a
very rigid process of data exchanges. However, the strength of this document lies in the very
strictly detailed verification clauses contained in its Protocol on Inspection. Under the provisions
of this protocol, it is possible to verify not only the exactness of the military information
provided by the parties, but also the complete development of the reduction process.
The breaking-up of the Soviet Union endangered the enforcement of the Treaty.
However, the members of NATO, together with their cooperation partners, were determined to
move forward promptly with its ratification and implementation as the cornerstone of Europe's
future military security and stability. They jointly established a High Level Working Group
(HLWG) which, in May 1992, reached an agreement with the eight former Soviet states about
the apportionment of rights and obligations assumed by the former Soviet Union under the terms
of the CFE Treaty. This agreement allowed, finally, the implementation of the CFE Treaty
throughout the area of application on July 17, 1992. Consequently, the signers immediately
implemented the verification procedures.15
The Joint Consultative Group (JCG), a committee formed by representatives of all the
signatories countries, discusses all ambiguities, problems, and proposals. The JCG, which meets
at least twice a year, guarantees the continuity, updating and improvement of the CFE Treaty.
Finally, the Open Skies Treaty (OS) is the most modem agreement in the field of
verification and arms control. In a speech on 12 May 1989, President Bush recalled President
Eisenhower's proposal at the 1955 Geneva Summit for "Open, Skies", which would have allowed
unarmed aircraft from the United States and the Soviet Union to overfly the territory of the other
for surveillance to "convince the world that we are... lessening the danger and relaxing tension".
As President Bush noted, the Kremlim quickly rejected this proposal in that earlier era of
mistrust.16
After being presented such a proposal on a broader, more intrusive and radical base,
Moscow responded positively to this new Open Skies concept in September 1989.17 The
objective is to encourage reciprocal openness among members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to
observe military activities and installations and reduce tension by increasing transparency.
Basically, the treaty allows each of the signatory states to overfly the territories of the other,
including United States, Canada and the Russian territory beyond the Urals. In this treaty-- in
fact, an enlargement of the CFE Treaty the expression "from Vancouver to Vladivostock"
substitutes the CFE phrase "from the Atlantic to the Urals" when referring to the territory of
application.
Therefore, the great value of the Open Skies Treaty is that, despite the fact that it does not
contain any clause concerning the reduction of weapons or ceilings of military forces, it allows
all parties to verify disarmament agreements by means of the most advanced and sophisticated
observation devices. This treaty, already signed by the same signatories of the CFE Treaty, will
enter in force 60 days after a minimum of 20 countries, with more than 8 passive quotas18, ratify
it.
4. DIFFERENT APPROACHES: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES.
Arms control agreements generally take one of two forms, each one with its own
advantages and disadvantages. The first approach is to formulate broad principles to deal
comprehensively with a particular issue area. The objective is to emphasize intent in general
terms with the advantage of avoiding the specifics of a laundry list that may turn out to be
incomplete. Such "deliberate vagueness" is a characteristic of the Chemical Weapons Agreement
signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachov in June 1990 and the Vienna Document 1992. On the
other hand, agreements such as the CFE Treaty and OS Treaty contain language that is highly
specific and very technical. This second approach is one of specificity which can more easily
avoid troublesome "gray areas." Disputes over definitions, and disagreements over what is or is
not included, should be less frequent. To be exhaustive, however, can also be dangerous. It is
very difficult to think of everything, and attempts to devise language that will cover
unanticipated technical developments can open up a legal hornet's nest.19
The verification processes can also structure themselves in a general or a specific form.
As a general rule, the more specific the treaty, the more rigorous are the provisions on the
structure of verification. We can compare, as an example, the 1992 Vienna Document and the
CFE Treaty: both agreements contemplate many similar aspects (the area of application and the
military forces subject to both documents are, although not identical, very similar); However,
while the CFE Treaty is actually an exhaustive and detailed treaty, with a rigorous verification
process, the 1992 Vienna Document is a very brief document in which implementation depends
more on the willingness of the signatories than in its own provisions. The difference is clear; the
spirit of the 1992 Vienna Document rests on mutual confidence and trust; it attempts to foster
confidence and security among the signatories by mean of a series of measures in which
application depends, mainly, on the willingness of the different countries. Contrary to this, the
CFE Treaty bases its philosophy on verification; "rely, but verify" is a very diplomatic phrase
with which people involved in this business sum up this concept.20
The CSCE forum gave birth to the great contradiction between two arms control
agreements. How to reconcile these two different approaches? My personal experience suggests
that what is happening is, in reality, a spontaneous merging of both agreements, probably
because the majority of the national verification agencies employ the same inspectors to carry out
visits, observations, evaluations, and verification tasks on both agreements. The consequence is
that while smoothly carrying out the CFE inspections, members of the Vienna Document tacitly
accept many provisions of the CFE Treaty as a way to facilitate the fulfillment of an agreement
which would, otherwise, undoubtedly raise many ambiguities.21
Another matter is the difference between bilateral and multilateral agreements.
Apparently, a bilateral agreement is easier to carry out than a multilateral one. However, it is
also true that the more countries interested in signing a treaty, the more benefits the treaty will
bring. The problem is to achieve the consensus among them; the interrelation among different
national interests often interfere with the successful entry in force. Some of the current
disarmament agreements are still waiting for the mandatory ratification of the national
parliaments.
This is the case, for example, of the CWC. Despite the fact that more than one hundred
countries (among them United States, Russia, Israel, South Africa, Iran, and the European
Community (EC) countries) have signed it, most of the Arabic countries have refused to sign it
until Israel agrees to abide by the provisions of the NPT. Another example of delay in the entry
in force of a treaty because of a lack of parliamentary ratification is the OS Treaty. As
mentioned above, this treaty will enter in force 60 days after at least 20 countries, with more than
8 passive quotas, ratify it. Currently, there are only 18 instruments of ratification. The key
countries include Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, three important countries with more than 8
passive quotas which are having difficulty obtaining ratification by their respective parliaments,
because of high cost.22
From the point of view of verification, bilateral agreements are, in general terms, easier to
carry out, because of the fact that they only involve
two parties. However, it is also true that the
multilateral agreements, despite complicated
procedures to accomplish the verification processes,
allow "universal benefits;" the more
members involve themselves in an international treaty, the
more credibility it will have within the
International Community.
Finally, let me mention the last, although
not least, problem which arises from modem
disarmament agreements which include a verification process: the conflict between "intelligence"
and "verification." James Brown says:
The entire process of verification is one of intelligence gathering capabilities specifically
directed to arms control provisions. What can or cannot be verified sets the limits on
what can legitimately be controlled by a treaty.23
Until this point, I would agree with his statement; however, he continues to set the
following five general categories of verification measures: (1) Cooperative measures; for
instance, exchange of military information; (2) National technical means, such as non- intrusive
observation from radar, optical, and satellite surveillance; (3) Technical monitoring devices
placed at or near sites; (4) OSIs; and (5) Intelligence channels, such as agents, emigre or defector
interviews, communication intercepts, and information leaks.24
To me, with the exception of the last procedure, which in my personal opinion supposes a
serious violation of any agreement, the rest of the verification measures would be acceptable
while maintaining themselves within the limits of the provisions of the treaty. The reality is,
however, that in many occasions these measures, when used in an abusive way, go far beyond the
mere purpose of verifying. Then, when the use turns into abuse, conflicts arise, and the treaty
itself can come into risk.25
OSIs are, perhaps, the most
controversial verification procedure from this particular point
of view. They have occupied much of the time and
effort of arms control negotiators. The
purpose of the OSIs is, precisely, to discourage
cheating by making the cost of evasion
unattractive. Therefore, the prevention of abuse in this sort of verification is essential to the
success of the agreement. As previously mentioned, the INF Treaty between The United States
and the former Soviet Union contains a very detailed verification process, including OSIs.
Overall, the verification provisions of this treaty have set new standards of rigor." Another
example of successful and rigorous OSIs are those carried out under the provisions of the
protocol on verification of the CFE Treaty; since the entry in force of this treaty on July 17,
1992, inspectors from the 30 signatory countries have performed more than one thousand OSIs,
either in national or multinational teams.
5. PRESENT AND FUTURE.