Cuba, Castro, And The Cuban Missile Crisis
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
CUBA, CASTRO, AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
by
Maureen M. Lynch
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC
13 April 1995
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Cuba, Castro, and the Cuban Missile Crisis
Author: Lieutenant Colonel Maureen M. Lynch, USMC
Thesis: This thesis identifies and analyzes Cuba's role in
the Cuban Missile Crisis so as to provide important cultural
intelligence information heretofore unavailable on this
subject.
Background: The Cuban Missile Crisis was the single most
important event of the Cold War. For thirteen days, the
United States and the Soviet Union went "eyeball to eyeball"
in an epoch struggle that brought the world to the brink of
nuclear war. Inevitably, historical analyses of the Missile
Crisis focus on the superpower struggle between the United
States and the Soviets. Rarely is it considered necessary or
essential to consider the actions of a third actor, Cuba, in
the very crisis that bears its name. Consequently, to fully
understand and appreciate the lessons of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, it is necessary to understand Cuba's role in that
crisis. More importantly, however, as the Cold War fades and
the new world order takes shape, the importance of
understanding the actors and the events of that period so as
to build upon the present and prepare for the future assumes
even greater significance. Continuing among those actors,
then, is Cuba. Although now noticeably missing Soviet
military and economic support, Cuba still remains an area of
concern to U.S. national security interests. This thesis,
then, provides an important analysis of the actions of Cuba
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Providing an important
source of cultural information, its purpose is to link U.S-
Cuban relations of the past with those of the present so as to
provide military professionals with the information they will
need to defend our nation's national security interests in the
future.
Recommendation: That this thesis be made available to all
Marine Corps University students studying Cuba and to all
those Department of the Navy personnel, both military and
civilian, responsible for political-military planning
involving U.S. relations with Cuba.
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
1. INTRODUCTION 1
Thesis Statement, 5
Research Methodology, 8
2. THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA - A LONG HISTORY 10
The Growth of the Sugar Industry, Cuban
Prosperity, and the Development of U.S.-
Cuban Relations, 12
The Postwar Years, 17
Jose Marti and the War of Independence, 19
The First Intervention, 23
The Second Intervention, 25
The Growth of Opposition Parties, 29
Batista Comes to Power, 33
The Rise of Castro, 43
3. CASTRO'S REVOLUTION 45
The Success of the Revolution, 45
The New Castro Government, 46
The U.S. Response to Castro, 50
4. CASTRO AND COMMUNISM 58
The Castro Revolution - an Ideology of
Confusion, 58
Why the Shift?, 62
Soviet Reactions to a Communist Cuba, 66
Castro's Communism, 70
5. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 74
The Soviet Decision to Support Castro, 75
Castro's Decision, 79
Castro's Motives for Accepting the Missiles,84
Castro Reacts, 85
Withdrawing the Missiles, 91
6. CUBA AND THE CRISIS 96
Epilogue 103
Bibliography 107
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
On October 22, 1962, the President of the United States
reported to the American people the presence of "large, long
range, clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction"
on Cuba, an island 90 miles off the coast of Florida.1
Undeniably linked to a Soviet military buildup, the President
stated that the presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba
constituted an "explicit threat to the peace and security of
all the Americas."2
Detailed analysis showed the weapons to be ballistic
missiles of two distinct types: medium-range and
intermediate-range. The medium-range missiles were capable of
carrying a nuclear warhead a distance of more than 1,100
nautical miles, placing Washington, DC, Mexico City or any
other city in the southeastern part of the United States,
Central America or the Caribbean area at risk. The
intermediate-range missiles were capable of targeting most of
the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, from Hudson Bay,
Canada in the north to Lima, Peru in the south.3 The
President also reported that jet bombers capable of carrying
nuclear weapons were being simultaneously uncrated and
assembled in Cuba while Cuban air bases capable of supporting
the bombers were being constructed.4
As President Kennedy assured the nation that the United
States would not "unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide
nuclear war," in response to the "secret, swift, and
extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles," he also stressed
that America would neither backdown nor "...shrink from the
risks to be faced."5 In response to the clandestine Soviet
military buildup, the United States implemented a naval
quarantine of Cuba. In addition, the Soviet Union was warned
that any attack from Cuba would be met . with a "full
retaliatory response" in kind.
The following day, both Cuba and the Soviet Union
requested a meeting of the United Nations (UN) Security
Council to examine what the Soviets emphasized was the United
States' "violation of the Charter of the United Nations and
threat to peace." By 4:00 p.m. that afternoon, Ambassador
Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. Representative to the UN (and the UN
Security Council), was addressing the Security Council.
Ambassador Stevenson attacked Cuba's role in the missile
crisis, declaring that Cuba had "aided and abetted an invasion
of [the] hemisphere." In response, Ambassador Valerian Zorin,
Soviet Representative to the UN, criticized Ambassador
Stevenson's charges as "completely false" and a "clumsy
attempt to cover up aggressive [US] actions in Cuba."6
Challenging Soviet allegations, Ambassador Stevenson
distributed aerial photographs clearly depicting Soviet
nuclear missile sites in Cuba.7 Ambassador Zorin continued,
however, to neither confirm nor deny the existence of the
missiles and sites, stating only that the United States would
be given a response "in due time."8
As tensions between the United States and Soviet Union
increased, General Thomas Power, Commander-in-Chief of the
Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), raised the SAC alert level to
DefCon 2 on October 24th.1 On the 26th, the Lebanese
freighter Marucla, under charter to the Soviet Union, was
boarded and inspected by a party from the USS PIERCE and the
USS KENNEDY. That afternoon, after meeting with General Issa
Pliyev, the Soviet commander in Cuba, and being informed that
all units were "ready for combat," Castro authorized Cuban air
defense forces to fire on all U.S. aircraft within range.
On October 28th, Cuban antiaircraft batteries shot down an
American U-2 over Banes in eastern Cuba, killing the pilot,
Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr. Later that same day, U.S. and
Canadian naval forces established an antisubmarine barrier
southeast of Newfoundland while the 5th Marine Expeditionary
Brigade sailed from the West Coast of the United States toward
Cuba.10
Thus, the most significant event of the Cold War, the
Cuban Missile Crisis, played out on the world stage. For
thirteen days the two world "superpowers" - the United States
and the Soviet Union - went "eyeball to eyeball" in an epoch
struggle symbolic of of the Cold War period. To the Soviets,
the United States launched the "Caribbean Crisis" in open
____________________
1"DefCon" is an abbreviation for the military phrase "Defense
Condition." Defense conditions identify the state of alert of U.S.
military forces and range from DefCon 5, which indicates a state of
"all quiet," to DefCon 1, which indicates "major attack imminent."
defiance of both international law and common sense.
Humiliatingly aware of Soviet nuclear inferiority and
vulnerability, the crisis greatly worried Soviet Chairman
Nikita Khrushchev. For the United States, the Soviets had
instigated the Cuban Missile Crisis by placing nuclear
missiles in Cuba. The only acceptable solution for President
Kennedy was the fast and complete removal of the weapons.
However, a third actor was also a key player in this
major Cold War drama. That actor was Cuba. To Cuba, the
"October Crisis" was a very real experience. Many Cubans
expected the crisis to end in a bloody, protracted war. Cuban
newspapers carried banner headlines proclaiming that Cubans
were "prepared to die for their independence" while Castro
declared that "Whoever [wanted] to investigate Cuba must know
that they will have to come in battle fatigues!"12
Cuban faith in the Soviet Union was also complete.
Military support was expected not only from Soviet
conventional forces stationed in Cuba, but also from the
soldiers of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces controlling the
missiles. As Cuban forces mobilized to protect their
homeland, Soviet aid was considered a guarantee.
In the end, however, the October Crisis turned out to be
a profoundly bitter experience for Cuba and Castro. Viewed as
an act of U. S. agression, Castro felt that Cuba had been
abandoned by the Soviets during their hour of greatest need.
THESIS STATEMENT
Historical analyses of the Cuban Missile Crisis
invariably focus on the superpower conflict between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Rarely is it considered
necessary to examine Cuba's role in the very crisis that bears
its name. However, ignoring the participation of Cuba in the
Cuban Missile Crisis can be likened to analyzing the Vietnam
War without mentioning North and South Vietnam, or the Korean
War without mentioning North and South Korea.
To fully understand and appreciate the lessons of the
Cuban Missile Crisis, then, it is necessary to understand
Cuba's role. To provide this understanding, this thesis will
first, examine the complex factors influencing Cuba's
participation, and second, define, determine, and analyze
Cuba's role.
Accordingly, the first factor to be examined is the
unique relationship existing between the United States and
Cuba and, more importantly, the Cuban "perception" of that
relationship. Separated by only 90 miles of ocean, the United
States had influenced Cuban affairs since the age of Columbus.
Linked early to economics ties and strategic security, these
interests later expanded to include political interests.
Equally impacting the U.S.-Cuban relationship, however, were
obvious and substantial cultural, socioeconomic, and
geopolitical differences existing between the two countries.
In light of these differences, it is not surprising that both
the United States and Cuba not only differed in their
understanding, interpretation, and perception of their shared
relationship, but also judged the other based on their
divergent points of view.
The second factor to be examined is the influence exerted
by the individual most responsible for Cuba's decision to
participate in the crisis, Fidel Castro. Initially hailed as
the salvation of Cuba following the dictatorial rule of
Fulgencio Batista, Castro and his revolution changed Cuba from
a pro-American cousin to one that eventually conspired with
the Soviet Union to challenge U.S. hegemony in the Western
hemisphere. Castro's influence was complete and deeply rooted
in a political and socioeconomic system that enabled him to
quickly seize power and hold it. Egocentric and fanatical,
Castro's promise for Cuba was defined by his own personal and
political objectives that would not only influence his
decision to accept communism and an alliance with the Soviet
Union, but also make the legacy of the revolution of prime
importance to Cuba's way of life. Consequently, this thesis
will examine the influence Castro wielded in the Cuban Missile
Crisis and also demonstrate that had it not been for Fidel
Castro, Cuba would not have been involved in the Cuban Missile
Crisis.
The third and final factor to be examined is Cuba's
relationship with the Soviet Union. As a communist country,
"little Cuba" appeared to benefit immeasurably from the
immense wealth and superpower status of the Soviet Union.
Soviet economic subsidies bouyed Cuba's economy while Soviet
ports provided Cuba with ready export markets. These
benefits, however, came at a price. For to the Soviets,
Cuba's strategic location provided a key position from which
to challenge their chief Cold War rival, the United States.
And even though Castro had accepted communism and a Soviet
alliance, he was to learn the subtle realities and cost of
"doing business" with the Soviets. Consequently, the Cuban
Missile Crisis is not so much about the relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union as it is about the
relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba. This Soviet-
Cuban relationship defined how each party separately
perceived, interpreted, and reacted to the events of the
crisis. This effort will present how these actions/reactions
influenced Castro and ultimately the resolution of the crisis.
Upon completion of this examination of the above factors,
this thesis will define, determine, and analyze Cuba's role in
the crisis. This analysis will be accomplished by first
reviewing the events of the crisis and then pinpointing and
analyzing Cuba's role. Key to this analysis will be the use
of recently declassified material documenting the Kennedy
administration's decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis as
well as testimony provided by Fidel Castro and key Soviet and
U.S. decisionmakers during the crisis. An analysis of this
information provides not only Castro's intent during the Cuban
Missile Crisis, but also how his actions/reactions were
significant in bringing the world to the "brink" of nuclear
war.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Consequently, the approach and source material used in
this thesis make it unique among the material currently
available concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis for three key
reasons.
First, this thesis focuses and analyzes the Cuban Missile
Crisis from the perspective of Cuba and Castro. As previously
stated, the majority of literature discussing the crisis
concentrates on the United States, the Soviet Union, and the
Cold War competition existing between the two. Although
conceptually accurate from a historical and analytical
perspective, such an emphasis is also lacking. For one to
obtain a true understanding and a more complete perspective on
the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is necessary to understand and
analyze the participation of all the actors in the crisis
which includes Cuba. Especially now, as the world transitions
from a Cold War to a post Cold War modality, the lessons to be
learned by understanding Cuba's albeit Castro's role in the
crisis provides an invaluable historical reference point from
which to proceed into the future.
Second, the source material for this thesis was compiled
from documentation and literature not accessable to previous
authors. Key among these sources is recently declassified
documentation from the White House, the Department of State,
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); documentation
provided by representatives of Cuba and the former Soviet
Union during the January 1994 Havana Conference on the Cuban
Missile Crisis; and testimony provided by Fidel Castro,
General Anatoly I. Gribkov, General of the Army of the Russian
Federation and General Inspector of the Russian Ministry of
Defense, and former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara. In addition, personal interviews with Dr. Gregorio
DelReal, a former professor at the University of Havana who
not only knew and taught Castro, but also resided in Cuba
during the Castro takeover, and Mark Falcoff, resident scholar
at the American Enterprise Institute, provide a breadth and
understanding of Cuba, Castro, and Cuban affairs not
previously consolidated into any other single work.
And third, this thesis blends an examination and analysis
of four key areas: (1) the historical relationship between
the United States and Cuba, (2) the factors influencing
Castro's rise to power, (3) the factors impacting Castro's
decision to accept communism and an alliance with the Soviets,
and (4) Cuba's actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Unique in its approach, this methodology subsequently provides
the reader with not only a capsulized base of knowledge from
which to develop a more thorough understanding and evaluation
of Cuba's role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, but also an
understanding of the human environment that continues to
impact Cuba's relationship with the United States today.
CHAPTER 2
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA - A LONG HISTORY
In his October 22nd "Report to the People," President
Kennedy described Cuba as having a "...special and historical
relationship to the United States..." Upon more thorough
examination, however, the relationship between the United
States and Cuba is a complex, intricate web based on
misperception and good intentions gone bad. Although Cuba and
the United States share a common history, how this history is
perceived depends on the vantage point from which it is
viewed. When discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1992,
former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara best summed up
these differences in perception by stating that:
...our shared histories [Cuba's and the United States']
are viewed very differently by both countries ... this
divergence contributed both to the sharp break in
relations between our nations thirty-one years ago, and