Cuba, Castro, And The Cuban Missile Crisis
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
CUBA, CASTRO, AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
by
Maureen M. Lynch
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC
13 April 1995
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Cuba, Castro, and the Cuban Missile Crisis
Author: Lieutenant Colonel Maureen M. Lynch, USMC
Thesis: This thesis identifies and analyzes Cuba's role in
the Cuban Missile Crisis so as to provide important cultural
intelligence information heretofore unavailable on this
subject.
Background: The Cuban Missile Crisis was the single most
important event of the Cold War. For thirteen days, the
United States and the Soviet Union went "eyeball to eyeball"
in an epoch struggle that brought the world to the brink of
nuclear war. Inevitably, historical analyses of the Missile
Crisis focus on the superpower struggle between the United
States and the Soviets. Rarely is it considered necessary or
essential to consider the actions of a third actor, Cuba, in
the very crisis that bears its name. Consequently, to fully
understand and appreciate the lessons of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, it is necessary to understand Cuba's role in that
crisis. More importantly, however, as the Cold War fades and
the new world order takes shape, the importance of
understanding the actors and the events of that period so as
to build upon the present and prepare for the future assumes
even greater significance. Continuing among those actors,
then, is Cuba. Although now noticeably missing Soviet
military and economic support, Cuba still remains an area of
concern to U.S. national security interests. This thesis,
then, provides an important analysis of the actions of Cuba
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Providing an important
source of cultural information, its purpose is to link U.S-
Cuban relations of the past with those of the present so as to
provide military professionals with the information they will
need to defend our nation's national security interests in the
future.
Recommendation: That this thesis be made available to all
Marine Corps University students studying Cuba and to all
those Department of the Navy personnel, both military and
civilian, responsible for political-military planning
involving U.S. relations with Cuba.
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
1. INTRODUCTION 1
Thesis Statement, 5
Research Methodology, 8
2. THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA - A LONG HISTORY 10
The Growth of the Sugar Industry, Cuban
Prosperity, and the Development of U.S.-
Cuban Relations, 12
The Postwar Years, 17
Jose Marti and the War of Independence, 19
The First Intervention, 23
The Second Intervention, 25
The Growth of Opposition Parties, 29
Batista Comes to Power, 33
The Rise of Castro, 43
3. CASTRO'S REVOLUTION 45
The Success of the Revolution, 45
The New Castro Government, 46
The U.S. Response to Castro, 50
4. CASTRO AND COMMUNISM 58
The Castro Revolution - an Ideology of
Confusion, 58
Why the Shift?, 62
Soviet Reactions to a Communist Cuba, 66
Castro's Communism, 70
5. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 74
The Soviet Decision to Support Castro, 75
Castro's Decision, 79
Castro's Motives for Accepting the Missiles,84
Castro Reacts, 85
Withdrawing the Missiles, 91
6. CUBA AND THE CRISIS 96
Epilogue 103
Bibliography 107
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
On October 22, 1962, the President of the United States
reported to the American people the presence of "large, long
range, clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction"
on Cuba, an island 90 miles off the coast of Florida.1
Undeniably linked to a Soviet military buildup, the President
stated that the presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba
constituted an "explicit threat to the peace and security of
all the Americas."2
Detailed analysis showed the weapons to be ballistic
missiles of two distinct types: medium-range and
intermediate-range. The medium-range missiles were capable of
carrying a nuclear warhead a distance of more than 1,100
nautical miles, placing Washington, DC, Mexico City or any
other city in the southeastern part of the United States,
Central America or the Caribbean area at risk. The
intermediate-range missiles were capable of targeting most of
the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, from Hudson Bay,
Canada in the north to Lima, Peru in the south.3 The
President also reported that jet bombers capable of carrying
nuclear weapons were being simultaneously uncrated and
assembled in Cuba while Cuban air bases capable of supporting
the bombers were being constructed.4
As President Kennedy assured the nation that the United
States would not "unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide
nuclear war," in response to the "secret, swift, and
extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles," he also stressed
that America would neither backdown nor "...shrink from the
risks to be faced."5 In response to the clandestine Soviet
military buildup, the United States implemented a naval
quarantine of Cuba. In addition, the Soviet Union was warned
that any attack from Cuba would be met . with a "full
retaliatory response" in kind.
The following day, both Cuba and the Soviet Union
requested a meeting of the United Nations (UN) Security
Council to examine what the Soviets emphasized was the United
States' "violation of the Charter of the United Nations and
threat to peace." By 4:00 p.m. that afternoon, Ambassador
Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. Representative to the UN (and the UN
Security Council), was addressing the Security Council.
Ambassador Stevenson attacked Cuba's role in the missile
crisis, declaring that Cuba had "aided and abetted an invasion
of [the] hemisphere." In response, Ambassador Valerian Zorin,
Soviet Representative to the UN, criticized Ambassador
Stevenson's charges as "completely false" and a "clumsy
attempt to cover up aggressive [US] actions in Cuba."6
Challenging Soviet allegations, Ambassador Stevenson
distributed aerial photographs clearly depicting Soviet
nuclear missile sites in Cuba.7 Ambassador Zorin continued,
however, to neither confirm nor deny the existence of the
missiles and sites, stating only that the United States would
be given a response "in due time."8
As tensions between the United States and Soviet Union
increased, General Thomas Power, Commander-in-Chief of the
Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), raised the SAC alert level to
DefCon 2 on October 24th.1 On the 26th, the Lebanese
freighter Marucla, under charter to the Soviet Union, was
boarded and inspected by a party from the USS PIERCE and the
USS KENNEDY. That afternoon, after meeting with General Issa
Pliyev, the Soviet commander in Cuba, and being informed that
all units were "ready for combat," Castro authorized Cuban air
defense forces to fire on all U.S. aircraft within range.
On October 28th, Cuban antiaircraft batteries shot down an
American U-2 over Banes in eastern Cuba, killing the pilot,
Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr. Later that same day, U.S. and
Canadian naval forces established an antisubmarine barrier
southeast of Newfoundland while the 5th Marine Expeditionary
Brigade sailed from the West Coast of the United States toward
Cuba.10
Thus, the most significant event of the Cold War, the
Cuban Missile Crisis, played out on the world stage. For
thirteen days the two world "superpowers" - the United States
and the Soviet Union - went "eyeball to eyeball" in an epoch
struggle symbolic of of the Cold War period. To the Soviets,
the United States launched the "Caribbean Crisis" in open
____________________
1"DefCon" is an abbreviation for the military phrase "Defense
Condition." Defense conditions identify the state of alert of U.S.
military forces and range from DefCon 5, which indicates a state of
"all quiet," to DefCon 1, which indicates "major attack imminent."
defiance of both international law and common sense.
Humiliatingly aware of Soviet nuclear inferiority and
vulnerability, the crisis greatly worried Soviet Chairman
Nikita Khrushchev. For the United States, the Soviets had
instigated the Cuban Missile Crisis by placing nuclear
missiles in Cuba. The only acceptable solution for President
Kennedy was the fast and complete removal of the weapons.
However, a third actor was also a key player in this
major Cold War drama. That actor was Cuba. To Cuba, the
"October Crisis" was a very real experience. Many Cubans
expected the crisis to end in a bloody, protracted war. Cuban
newspapers carried banner headlines proclaiming that Cubans
were "prepared to die for their independence" while Castro
declared that "Whoever [wanted] to investigate Cuba must know
that they will have to come in battle fatigues!"12
Cuban faith in the Soviet Union was also complete.
Military support was expected not only from Soviet
conventional forces stationed in Cuba, but also from the
soldiers of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces controlling the
missiles. As Cuban forces mobilized to protect their
homeland, Soviet aid was considered a guarantee.
In the end, however, the October Crisis turned out to be
a profoundly bitter experience for Cuba and Castro. Viewed as
an act of U. S. agression, Castro felt that Cuba had been
abandoned by the Soviets during their hour of greatest need.
THESIS STATEMENT
Historical analyses of the Cuban Missile Crisis
invariably focus on the superpower conflict between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Rarely is it considered
necessary to examine Cuba's role in the very crisis that bears
its name. However, ignoring the participation of Cuba in the
Cuban Missile Crisis can be likened to analyzing the Vietnam
War without mentioning North and South Vietnam, or the Korean
War without mentioning North and South Korea.
To fully understand and appreciate the lessons of the
Cuban Missile Crisis, then, it is necessary to understand
Cuba's role. To provide this understanding, this thesis will
first, examine the complex factors influencing Cuba's
participation, and second, define, determine, and analyze
Cuba's role.
Accordingly, the first factor to be examined is the
unique relationship existing between the United States and
Cuba and, more importantly, the Cuban "perception" of that
relationship. Separated by only 90 miles of ocean, the United
States had influenced Cuban affairs since the age of Columbus.
Linked early to economics ties and strategic security, these
interests later expanded to include political interests.
Equally impacting the U.S.-Cuban relationship, however, were
obvious and substantial cultural, socioeconomic, and
geopolitical differences existing between the two countries.
In light of these differences, it is not surprising that both
the United States and Cuba not only differed in their
understanding, interpretation, and perception of their shared
relationship, but also judged the other based on their
divergent points of view.
The second factor to be examined is the influence exerted
by the individual most responsible for Cuba's decision to
participate in the crisis, Fidel Castro. Initially hailed as
the salvation of Cuba following the dictatorial rule of
Fulgencio Batista, Castro and his revolution changed Cuba from
a pro-American cousin to one that eventually conspired with
the Soviet Union to challenge U.S. hegemony in the Western
hemisphere. Castro's influence was complete and deeply rooted
in a political and socioeconomic system that enabled him to
quickly seize power and hold it. Egocentric and fanatical,
Castro's promise for Cuba was defined by his own personal and
political objectives that would not only influence his
decision to accept communism and an alliance with the Soviet
Union, but also make the legacy of the revolution of prime
importance to Cuba's way of life. Consequently, this thesis
will examine the influence Castro wielded in the Cuban Missile
Crisis and also demonstrate that had it not been for Fidel
Castro, Cuba would not have been involved in the Cuban Missile
Crisis.
The third and final factor to be examined is Cuba's
relationship with the Soviet Union. As a communist country,
"little Cuba" appeared to benefit immeasurably from the
immense wealth and superpower status of the Soviet Union.
Soviet economic subsidies bouyed Cuba's economy while Soviet
ports provided Cuba with ready export markets. These
benefits, however, came at a price. For to the Soviets,
Cuba's strategic location provided a key position from which
to challenge their chief Cold War rival, the United States.
And even though Castro had accepted communism and a Soviet
alliance, he was to learn the subtle realities and cost of
"doing business" with the Soviets. Consequently, the Cuban
Missile Crisis is not so much about the relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union as it is about the
relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba. This Soviet-
Cuban relationship defined how each party separately
perceived, interpreted, and reacted to the events of the
crisis. This effort will present how these actions/reactions
influenced Castro and ultimately the resolution of the crisis.
Upon completion of this examination of the above factors,
this thesis will define, determine, and analyze Cuba's role in
the crisis. This analysis will be accomplished by first
reviewing the events of the crisis and then pinpointing and
analyzing Cuba's role. Key to this analysis will be the use
of recently declassified material documenting the Kennedy
administration's decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis as
well as testimony provided by Fidel Castro and key Soviet and
U.S. decisionmakers during the crisis. An analysis of this
information provides not only Castro's intent during the Cuban
Missile Crisis, but also how his actions/reactions were
significant in bringing the world to the "brink" of nuclear
war.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Consequently, the approach and source material used in
this thesis make it unique among the material currently
available concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis for three key
reasons.
First, this thesis focuses and analyzes the Cuban Missile
Crisis from the perspective of Cuba and Castro. As previously
stated, the majority of literature discussing the crisis
concentrates on the United States, the Soviet Union, and the
Cold War competition existing between the two. Although
conceptually accurate from a historical and analytical
perspective, such an emphasis is also lacking. For one to
obtain a true understanding and a more complete perspective on
the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is necessary to understand and
analyze the participation of all the actors in the crisis
which includes Cuba. Especially now, as the world transitions
from a Cold War to a post Cold War modality, the lessons to be
learned by understanding Cuba's albeit Castro's role in the
crisis provides an invaluable historical reference point from
which to proceed into the future.
Second, the source material for this thesis was compiled
from documentation and literature not accessable to previous
authors. Key among these sources is recently declassified
documentation from the White House, the Department of State,
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); documentation
provided by representatives of Cuba and the former Soviet
Union during the January 1994 Havana Conference on the Cuban
Missile Crisis; and testimony provided by Fidel Castro,
General Anatoly I. Gribkov, General of the Army of the Russian
Federation and General Inspector of the Russian Ministry of
Defense, and former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara. In addition, personal interviews with Dr. Gregorio
DelReal, a former professor at the University of Havana who
not only knew and taught Castro, but also resided in Cuba
during the Castro takeover, and Mark Falcoff, resident scholar
at the American Enterprise Institute, provide a breadth and
understanding of Cuba, Castro, and Cuban affairs not
previously consolidated into any other single work.
And third, this thesis blends an examination and analysis
of four key areas: (1) the historical relationship between
the United States and Cuba, (2) the factors influencing
Castro's rise to power, (3) the factors impacting Castro's
decision to accept communism and an alliance with the Soviets,
and (4) Cuba's actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Unique in its approach, this methodology subsequently provides
the reader with not only a capsulized base of knowledge from
which to develop a more thorough understanding and evaluation
of Cuba's role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, but also an
understanding of the human environment that continues to
impact Cuba's relationship with the United States today.
CHAPTER 2
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA - A LONG HISTORY
In his October 22nd "Report to the People," President
Kennedy described Cuba as having a "...special and historical
relationship to the United States..." Upon more thorough
examination, however, the relationship between the United
States and Cuba is a complex, intricate web based on
misperception and good intentions gone bad. Although Cuba and
the United States share a common history, how this history is
perceived depends on the vantage point from which it is
viewed. When discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1992,
former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara best summed up
these differences in perception by stating that:
...our shared histories [Cuba's and the United States']
are viewed very differently by both countries ... this
divergence contributed both to the sharp break in
relations between our nations thirty-one years ago, and
to the attitudes with which we viewed the missile crisis.
Let me give four illustrations of these differences of
view. First, Americans have been taught that the U.S.
liberated Cuba from Spain, while Cubans learn that it was
the result of their long struggle for independence.
Second, Americans view themselves as idealistic and
selfless in not annexing Cuba after the end of the
Spanish-American war, whereas Cubans think the U.S. used
every chance to dominate their nation. Third, Americans
think they used the Platt Amendment2 to mediate and
____________________
2Named for Republican Senator Orville Hitchcock Platt who,
while serving as the Chairman of the Committee on Cuban Relations,
introduced the amendment in 1901 as part of the United States
Army's appropriations bill. The Platt Amendment provided for the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Cuba following the end of the
Spanish American War in 1898. In addition to restricting Cuba from
entering into any treaty with another country that would cause it
resolve internal disputes in Cuba, whereas Cubans tend to
think that the amendment was designed to permit the U.S.
to intervene in Cuban affairs for its own selfish
purposes; and finally, Americans tend to think that their
investments in Cuba contributed to the nations's
development, whereas the Cuban government has tended to
look at the economic relationship as exploitative.13
To understand Cuba's role in the Cuban Missile Crisis,
then, it is necessary to understand U.S.-Cuban relations
developed. To that end, this chapter will examine how and why
U.S-Cuban relations developed, what factors caused those
relations to change, and, more importantly, what political and
socioeconomic factors influenced the rise of Fidel Castro.
The United States' association with Cuba began with a
shared colonialism. Both countries were discovered by
Columbus in 1492, with Cuba emerging as a Spanish colony. In
addition to the discovery of gold and development of farming,
Cuba served as a transit station between Europe and the New
World. Due to its strategic location, forts were built to
protect Spanish trading galleons. Negro slaves were used for
forced labor while the Spanish also exploited the native
Indian population through an encomienda system of forced labor
and tribute. In actuality, Cuba was of little interest to
Spain, who considered the island as "not a colony to be
____________________
to lose its independence, the amendment also restricted Cuba from
increasing its public debt beyond the capacity of its ordinary
revenues to pay. By the terms of the amendment, Cuba was required
to permit U.S. intervention so as to preserve Cuban independence.
After considerable debate and insistance from the United States,
Cuba incorporated the amendment into its Constitution of 1901 and
treaty of 1903 with the United States. The United States
subsequently intervened in Cuba on several occasions over the next
thirty years. In 1934, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
persuaded Congress to abrograte the Platt Amendment at which time
a new treaty was then negotiated.
developed on its own." Consequently, under corrupt,
incompetent Spanish administration, Cuba flourished as a haven
for bandits, smugglers, and prostitutes.14
During the 18th century the signing of the Treaty of
Utrecht in 1713 between Britain and France and the rise of
Philip V to the Spanish throne, allowed British vessels to
carry African slaves and an annual cargo of British goods to
Cuba. Sugar production and tobacco soon became important
trade commodities in European markets. In August 1762, a
British naval force under the command of Sir George Pocock
laid seige to the island's most prosperous city and the
Spanish Main's richest port - Havana.15 Occupying the city
for ten months, the British opened the city to free trade.
Goods and slaves were imported at low prices. For Cuba,
British occupation resulted in the industrial development of
the island's major export item - sugar.
THE GROWTH OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY, CUBAN PROSPERITY, AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. -CUBAN RELATIONS
U.S. independence signaled the beginning of U.S. -Cuban
relations. In close proximity to the North American
continent, the young nation provided Cuba with new consumer
markets.
In 1796, slave revolts in Haiti, Cuba's chief competitor
in the sugar market, led to the destruction of Haiti's sugar
industry. An estimated 300,000 French Haitian refugees fled
Haiti for Cuba, bringing with them skilled mulatoo laborers
and more advanced sugar technology and managerial skills. By
the end of the 18th century, Cuba was transformed into an
economically viable Spanish possession. "King Sugar" became
Cuba's major export while the Creoles who both owned the land
and cultivated the sugar formed Cuba's new elite. The use of
Negro slaves and the availability of new markets enabled
agricultural production to thrive in Cuba. In addition to
sugar, coffee and tobacco soon became major export items to
both the United States and Europe.16 As sugar and coffee
cultivation decreased the availability of land in Cuba, the
need to import basic foodstuffs and other provisions grew.
Thus, Cuba's closest neighbor, the United States, became one
of the island's chief trading markets and suppliers.
Although the American government favored free trade with
Cuba, it opposed Cuban independence. Witnessing the slave
revolt in Haiti and the success of the slaves in achieving
political power, the Federalist administrations of George
Washington and John Adams feared the social, economic, and
political effects just such a revolt would have on America's
slave-holding South. In consequence, when formatulating Cuban
policy, the American government was cautious to distinguish
between commercial regulations in the island's ports and the
politicial structure of Spanish rule.17
However, U.S. attempts to distinguish between commercial
and political involvement in Cuba did not last long. Cuba's
close proximity to America would ensure that the fate of Cuba
was inextricably linked with that of the United States. In
1823, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams expressed this
concern when stating:
Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of
considerations has become an object of transcendent
importance to the political and commercial interests of
our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to
the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas; the character
of its population; its situation midway between our
Southern Coast and the island of St. Domingo; its safe
and capacious harbor of Havana...; the nature of its
productions and of its wants furnishing the supplies and
needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable,
and mutually beneficial, give it an importance in the sum
of our national interests and little inferior to that
which binds the different members of this Union
together.18
During the 1820s, wealthy Creole/Cuban planters grew
dissatisfied with the ineffectiveness of Spanish rule. Afraid
that England would force Spain to abolish slavery and that the
continued political instability of Spanish rule would cause a
Haitian-type slave revolt, Cuba looked to the United States
for help and for possible annexation.19 Since slavery was an
important facet of Cuban economic existence, the pro-slavery
South became Cuba's natural ally. However, those in the
United States who opposed slavery also opposed the annexation
of a slave-holding Cuba. The addition of another slave
holding state to the Union could potentially tip the advantage
of slave versus nonslave states in the union. Consequently,
caught in the political struggle surrounding the issue of
slavery, discussion concerning Cuban annexation was
temporarily tabled.
In fact for most Americans, as long as Cuba remained
firmly in the hands of the Spanish, the United States was
content to leave Cuba alone. Aware that Spain's military and
economic power were quickly eroding, the United States
preferred to leave Cuba under a weak Spanish monarch who posed
no real threat to U.S. security or national interests. If
anyone else was to have Cuba, some U.S. politicians and
business interests reasoned, it would have to be the United
States.20
Concerned, however, that Cuba would fall into the hands
of a much stronger European power, e.g., the French or the
English, President James Monroe articulated his concerns in a
message to Congress on December 2, 1823.21 In his now
famous statement, the Monroe Doctrine, he warned Europe
against interfering in the internal affairs of the American
states and in further colonizing the Americas.
However, westward expansionism unleashed by the United
States pursuit of its "manifest destiny" caused the issue of
Cuban annexation to be reconsidered. With California annexed
following the Mexican War, the idea of building a canal
linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans turned many in
Congress to thoughts of Cuban annexation. Aware of Cuban
plans to rebel against Spain, President James Polk, in 1849,
offerred Spain $100 million dollars for the purchase of Cuba.
Already humiliated, however, from the loss of other former
colonies, Spain not only rejected the United States' offer but
replied that it would "sooner...see the island transferred to
any [other] power [then] would [we] prefer seeing it sunk in
the ocean."22
Following James Polk, attempts to acquire Cuba were again
tabled. Neither Presidents Zachary Taylor nor Millard
Fillmore pursued Cuba's acquisition. Rather, both presidents
attempted to enforce neutrality laws in order to prevent
American assistance to Cuban rebels. However, Franklin Pierce
pursued the idea by commissioning a study that resulted in the
"Ostend Manifesto" of 1854. The manifesto argued that the
United States was justified in occupying Cuba if conditions in
Cuba threatened the "internal peace and. existence" of the
Union. The issue of slavey, however, again proved to be a
major impediment to the plan. As the United States turned to
grapple with the Civil War and its aftermath, the acquisition
of Cuba was again tabled as the United States dealt with more
forboding crises.23
As the United States dealt with its Civil War, Cuba
turned to separating itself from colonial rule. During
October 1868, a rebellion occurred in Cuba that was to lead to
the island's Ten Years War. Although unsuccessful, the
rebellion fostered, for the first time, the idea of Cuban
independence. Cuban regionalism with its emphasis on patria
chica or local loyalties gave way to a belief in the
"fatherland."24 National symbols such as Cuba's national
anthem, flag, and national weapon, the machete, became a part
of Cuba's heritage. Most importantly, the dedication of the
"mambises" or those who had abandoned positions of importance
and comfort to fight against the Spanish became, for future
Cuban generations, an example of unselfish sacrifice for the
fatherland.
Although the United States maintained its neutrality and
did not intervene in Cuba's Ten Years War, the revolt in Cuba
not only drew the interest and sympathy of the American public
but also caused deep and bitter division within the United
States. Those supporting the Cuban revolution saw the
rebellion as the self-determination by an oppressed people.
Believing Spanish colonialism to be corrupt, archaic, and
tyrannical, they conjectured that sooner or later the United
States would have to end the Spanish carnage. Others, to
included President Ulysses S. Grant, preferred a cautious
approach of "wait and see." While still others, to include
Grant's Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, were adamently
opposed to any recognition of the Cuban revolutionaries.
Although sharing the American public's disgust with Spanish
rule and slavery in Cuba, Fish believed the revolution
exercised no real power, possessed no real government, and
suprevised no real control over the guerrilla bands comprising
the revolutionaries.25
Attempts by the United States to either mediate or end
the Ten Years War proved unsuccessful. Spain refused to
accept the terms of a U.S. proposed agreement while the lack
of a cohesive U.S. policy and international support thwarted
all other attempts. The most that either President Andrew
Johnson or Ulysses Grant were able to do was to assert the no-
transfer principle and ensure it was placed in the Monroe
Doctrine.
THE POSTWAR YEARS
Subsequently, the Ten Years War not only affected Cuba
politically but also economically. Supporters and
symapathizers of the Cuban cause either lost their fortunes
during the war or saw their properties pass to loyalists who
had sided with the Spanish. With the abolition of slavery in
Cuba in 1886, Cuban sugar plantations suffered and many
Spanish and Cuban enterprises went bankrupt. As the Cuban
economy plummeted, U.S. interests began buying sugar estates
and mining interests. When the expansion of European beet
sugar markets closed those markets to Cuba, the United States
became the largest and most important buyer of the island's
sugar. In 1890, the McKinley Tariff, which placed raw sugar
on the free trade list, increased Cuban-American trade,
especially the sugar trade, even more. Although by 1895
control of the economy was still largely in the hands of the
Spanish, American capital and influence, particularly in the
sugar industry, exerted a dominate influence. Cuba became
dependent on U.S. markets which were now chiefly controlled by
a single company, the American Sugar Refining Company.
Controlling nineteen Cuban refineries, the American Sugar
Company supplied 70 to 90 percent of the sugar consumed by the
United States. In addition to sugar, U.S. private investors
also entered Cuban iron ore exploration, cattle raising, fruit
and tobacco plantations, and public utility companies.
Subsequently, by 1895, estimates of U.S. private enterprises
placed the total amount of investments at $50 million US
dollars.26
JOSE MARTI AND THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
Following the Ten Years War, many Cubans pressed the
Spanish government to implement "autonomismo" or autonomous
rule for Cuba. Patterned after the British colonial model,
this system of local self-government would require extensive
economic and political reform. However, by 1892, as Cubans
continued to experience Spain's oppressive and corrupt
colonial rule, it became evident that Spain had no intentions
of instituting change or reform in its policies. As
discontent and disillusionment grew, a move toward
independence again took shape. This time, the leadership for
the independence movement was provided by Cuba's "Apostle of
Independence" - Jose Marti.
In his "Fundamentals and Secret Guidelines of the Cuban
Revolutionary Party," Marti outlined the goals of the
revolution as equality, freedom from foreign political and
economic domination, and the establishment of democratic
processes. More importantly, Marti emphasized the need to not
only free Cuba from foreign power, which included the United
States, but also to end Cuba's historical colonial role.
Although viewed as "anti-Yankee," Marti favored a Latin
America patterned in the image of the United States. "The
Cubans," he wrote,
admire this nation, the greatest ever built by freedom,
but they distrust the evil conditions that, like worms in
the blood, have begun their work of destruction in this
mighty Republic...They cannot honestly believe that
excess individualism and reverence for wealth are
preparing the United States to be the typical nation of
liberty.27
Marti advocated friendlier U.S-Cuban relations as well as U.S.
support as long as that support did not result in Cuba
becoming politically or economically dependent on the United
States.
In February 1895, the war for Cuban independence
commenced. Despite Marti's death in the beginning of the war,
the Cubans achieved minor success and set up a provisional
republican government in the eastern part of the island.28
Most of Cuba, however, remained under Spanish control with
with many Cubans resorting to a scorched-earth policy to
render the island worthless to Spain. By using guerilla
tactics, the Cubans were able to hold off the Spanish and
refuse any offers of surrender that did not also guarantee
independence.
In the United States, the Cuban rebellion was met with
deep concern. Economically, the war disrupted lucrative trade
and jeopardized millions of dollars worth of American property
in Cuba. In addition, investigations and representations on
behalf of American citizens injured by the war, the drop in
customs receipts, and the requirement to pay for coastal
patrols to enforce U.S. neutrality created an expense that the
federal budget did not want to deal with.29 Strategically,
controlling the isthmus of Panama and its maritime approaches
was considered essential to U.S. national security.
Accomplishing this goal meant establishing a strong U.S. naval
presence, with access to a port in the Caribbean, preferably
in Cuba.30 A chief proponent of U.S. presence in Cuba was
Alfred Thayer Mahan. Then a professor at the U.S. Navy's
Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, Mahan's
influential writings called the attention of the American
public to the importance of national security. As Mahan
maintained, this security could best be provided by pursuing
such measures as American ownership of an Isthmian canal and
the acquisition of naval bases in Cuba. Finally, American
public opinion pushed for intervention. The American press,
especially the "yellow press" led by William Randolph Hearst's
New York Journal and Joseph Pulitzer's New York World, printed
gruesome news of Spanish atrocities and Cuban suffering
although ignoring the brutal acts of Cuban insurgents. In
addition, Cuban insurgent factions in the United States fanned
the flames of humanitarian outrage. Campaigning for
American financial support and supplies, the insurgents
preached the cause of Cuban independence and support for the
insurgents.31
For his part, American President Grover Cleveland
preferred to follow a policy of neutrality toward Cuba. After
repeated offers to assist Spain with negotiating a settlement
failed, Cleveland recommended to Congress that an American
warship be sent to Cuba to demonstrate U.S. concern for
American lives and property. On December 8, 1896, the idea was
approved by Congress. Additionally, as with American
presidents before him, Cleveland also toyed with the idea of
purchasing Cuba and "incorporating" the island into the United
States. However, Cleveland was not convinced that the Cubans
were capable of self-government. Although considering an idea
to grant the insurgent's belligerency, he rejected the idea
when he realized that recognizing a new government in Cuba
would enable Spain to abrogate its responsiblity to protect
American property still remaining in Cuba.
Upon assuming the presidency in 1897, William McKinley
also considered purchasing Cuba. Rather than pursuing this
course, however, he opted to "persuade" Spain to end the war
by threatening U.S. military intervention. Finally presenting
Spain with an ultimatum in the autumn of 1897, Spain reacted
by promising reforms. Although the solution seemed to satisfy
President McKinley, it only angered the insurgents all the
more, causing the war to continue on.
However, when riots broke out in Havana on January 12,
1898, McKinley responded by sending one of the U.S. Navy's
newest warships, the USS MAINE, to Havana. On February 15,
1898, the USS MAINE exploded in Havana Harbor, killing all who
were on board. When the American Naval Commission was unable
to determine who was responsible for the MAINE's explosion,
the United States held Spain responsible since the accident
occurred within Spanish jurisdiction. President McKinley
demanded Spain end its corrupt, despotic governance of Cuba
and enter into negotiations that would end the war. He later
modified this demand, stating that the only suitable
reparations was an agreement of freedom and independence for
"the people of the island of Cuba..."32 When Spain failed to
agree to US concessions, the United States declared war on
April 24, 1898.
For the United States, the Spanish American War was
short, decisive and popular.33 In June 1889, 17,000 U.S.
troops landed at Siboney and Daiquiri, east of Santiago de
Cuba. On July 1, the Americans stormed the Spanish outposts
at El Caney and San Juan Heights.34 Spanish resistance was
stubborn and casualties were heavy on both sides. However,
with the heights soon in U.S. hands, the Spanish fleet was
forced to either surrender or escape to open sea to escape
U.S. warships. Not accepting surrender, the ships of the
Spanish fleet chose the latter course and were either sunk,
driven ashore, or completely disabled. This destruction of
the Spanish fleet virtually ended the war for Spain.
On December 10, 1898, the Treaty of Paris was signed and
the war ended. Spain relinquished sovereignty over Cuba and
ceded Puerto Rico to the United States. In the U.S. Congress,
the Teller Amendment named for Senator Henry M. Teller pledged
that the United States would "disclaim any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control
over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and [to
assert] its determination; when that is accomplished, to leave
the government and control of the island to its people."35
THE FIRST INTERVENTION
With the end of the war in Cuba and the termination of
Spanish sovereignty on January 1, 1899, the United States
assumed responsibility for the island's government. The goal
of American policy was to pacify Cuba and to eventually turn
the government over to the Cuban people. President McKinley's
appointee for the military governorship of Cuba was Major
General John R. Brooke who was succeeded a year later by
General Leonard Wood.36 Zealously attacking what he believed
to be Cuba's major problems, Wood's administration made
signifcant advances in roadbuilding, judicial reform, and in
health and education. Hospitals were built, sanitation and
health conditions improved, and yellow fever eradicated,
primarily through the work of Cuban scientist Carlos J.
Finlay. A public school system was established and the
University of Havana modernized.37
However, attempts to "Americanize" Cuba and establish a
government in the American model proved unsuccessful. For a
Cuban society raised under colonial Spanish control, political
stability based on an absolute moral code, free enterprise
economics, a theory of public interest, and a just social
order through law were alien concepts. Although a Cuban
constitution was drafted in 1901, it proved ineffectual in
bringing about necessary social and economic changes.
Subsequently, the Platt Amendment, which was appended to the
Cuban Constitution and later embodied in the Permanent Treaty
of 1903 between the United States and Cuba, dictated U.S.
policy toward Cuba.
Far reaching in implication, the Platt Amendment defined
U.S. -Cuban relations for the next 33 years. Proposed by
Secretary of War Elihu Root, the Platt Amendment applied the
Monroe Doctrine to Cuban relations by requiring that "...the
government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other
compact with any foreign power...which will tend to impair the
independence of Cuba...or permit any foreign power to
obtain...for military purposes...lodgement in ...said
island."38 Stating that Cuba could not "contract any public
debt" the servicing of which might impair her solvency, the
Platt Amendment also required that "...to enable the United
States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect
the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the
government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States
lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain
specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the
United States." This provision thus enabled the United States
to acquire rights to lease a naval coaling station at
Guantanamo Bay.39
Designed to protect Cuban independence as well as U.S.
interests in Cuba, the Platt Amendment only served to
perpetuate Cuban political irresponsibility. Developing what
soon became known as the "Platt Amendment mentality," Cuba
grew dependent upon U.S. intervention and protection, thus
stifling any attempts to develop any form of responsible self-
government.
THE SECOND INTERVENTION
Following the ratification of the Platt Amendment, US
occupation forces remained on the island for almost a year
until General Wood transferred power to Cuba's newly elected
president, Thomas Estrada Palma on May 20, 1902.
Estrada's first administration corresponded to a period
of growth in the Cuban sugar industry. Sound financial
management kept taxes low and surplus cash flow high.
However, the pattern of corruption and the political attitudes
perpetrated by a weak Spanish administration during Cuba's
colonial period remained. Public office was viewed as a
source of political profit with personalismo substituting for
principle.40 This corruption coupled with: (1) political
discord sparked by bitter factionalism, regional loyalites,
and disagreement over the Platt Amendment; (2) a dangerous
tendency to solve differences through violence; and (3) a lack
of national unity and purpose, led to increasing unrest and
instability.41
Consequently, in 1906 the United States, in keeping with
the provisions of the Platt Amendment, intervened a second
time in Cuba when President Estrada Palma's government was
overthrown by a Liberal Party revolt.42 Occupying Cuba so as
to "restore order," a provisional government under U.S.
auspices was established.43 Although President Theodore
Roosevelt was not eager to involve the United States in "a
destructive and wearisome civil war," U.S. forces remained in
Cuba until 1909. Despite this concern, however, the
cornerstone of U.S. Latin American policy as a whole under
Roosevelt became one of intervention.44
The second period of U.S. occupation in Cuba differed
significantly from the first. The United States was not eager
to govern Cuba for a second time and the provisional governor,
Charles E. Magoon, turned to dispensing government sinecures
or botellas in order to pacify quarrelling Cuban factions.45
Although Magoon implemented a series of public works projects,
organized a modern army, and introduced what appeared to be
one of the major U.S. objectives of this second occupation,
that of enacting fair legislation to prevent future civil
wars, his accomplishments were overshadowed by extravagant
spending that left Cuba with a huge floating debt.
Consequently, the second U.S. intervention not only
strengthened the Platt Amendment mentality, but also increased
doubts among Cubans about Cuba's ability to succeed at self-
government. Many Cuban leaders, intellectuals, and writers
became disillusioned with the possibility of independence and
transferred this hopelessness to the Cuban population.46 As
a result, irresponsibility and a growing cynicism increased as
did the reliance on violence to resolve political differences.
As unrest in Cuba grew, U.S. intervention continued into
the next decade. In 1915, U.S. Marines landed in Cuba to put
down an uprising of the Agrupacion Independente de Color
(Independent Color Association) party; in 1917, U.S.
intervention was required to resolve a Liberal Party rebellion
protesting the fraudulent reelection of Cuba's then incumbent
president, President Mario Garcia Menocal.47 Again, in 1920,
when fraud was claimed during Cuban elections, General Enoch
Crowder, a member of an independent Cuban consulting board,
intervened on behalf of the United States. Retained as a U.S.
advisor to Cuba, General Crowder remained to assist with a new
election and in establishing an "honest cabinet"48.
In the early 1920's, Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of
State under Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge,
began the process of stepping back from the Roosevelt Latin
American policy of intervention. An incomplete process,
however, none of the policies specifically requiring or
authorizing American intervention were ever renounced. Calvin
Coolidge, the most successful of the noninterventionists,
simply terminated American meddling in Cuban domestic affairs,
leaving the Cuban government "free to develop into the type of
corrupt dictatorship that was seemingly indigenous to the
soil."49
Throughout this period, however, U.S. economic presence
in Cuba, especially in the sugar industry, continued to
expand. A number of measures such as the Treaty of Relations
in May 1903, encouraged U.S.-Cuban economic ties and trade by
lowering tariffs for Cuban sugar exported to the United States
and providing preferential treatment to U.S. goods exported to
Cuba.50 Although a good crop and market conditions caused a
boom in the sugar market during World War I, this prosperity
ended following the termination of the war. During the summer
of 1920, prices fell 83 percent per pound. In addition, a
higher U.S. sugar tariff caused many Cuban-owned sugar
concerns to be foreclosed by U.S. banks. As a result, U.S.
investments in Cuba soared, reaching $1.2 billion dollars by
1924. Half the Cuban sugar industry was controlled by the
United States, which soon expanded into Cuba's public
utilities. The United States became Cuba's most important
export and import market, supplying 75 percent of Cuba's
imports.51 By 1929, U.S. investors acquired $1.5 billion
dollars worth of property in Cuba.
The economic and domestic conditions created in the United
States by the stock market crash of 1929, however, were
mirrored in the Cuban economy. U.S. trade in Cuba dropped by
90 percent and U.S. bankers retreated from many major
projects.52 Defaults and bankruptcies were common and as
Cuban unemployment rose, so did opposition to Cuban dependence
on U.S. business interests.
THE GROWTH OF OPPOSITION PARTIES
It was during this time period that unexpected opposition
to U.S. intervention developed. A Cuban student protest
movement initially established to pursue academic reform was
circumvented as the reform movement turned to political
issues. By the 1920's, efforts at reform the movement ceased
as students began to blame the United States and its close
supervision of Cuban affairs as the cause of the island's many
problems.53 A key leader of the reform movement was Julio
Antonio Mella, a young law student with strong anti-American
feelings. Although disposed to agree with his colleagues
concerning U.S. policies, Mella also viewed the movement as
"another battle of the class struggle."54 Through his
protest activities, Mella became associated with Carlos
Balino, a prestigious figure of Cuba's War of Independence
and, later, founder of the Communist Association of Havana.
In 1925, Balino and Mella called for a congress of all
Communist groups on the island. Despite its meager
attendance, the congress developed into the Cuban Communist
Party of which Mella became one of its most important
leaders.55
In the mid-1920's, Cuba's President-elect, Gerardo
Machado, became the target of Mella and a small group of
students. Although supported by business and conservative
sectors due to the success of his economic programs, Machado
won the support of the Cuban military through bribes and
threats. Key government positions at the local and national
level were filled by military officers while those officers
considered "disloyal" were purged from their ranks. In
addition, Machado prevented political dissension by aligning
the two opposition parties, the smaller Popular Party and the
Conservative Party with his own Liberal Party. Garnering
growing opposition, Machado was labeled the "tropical
Mussolini" by Mella for his ruthless authoritarianism.56
In November 1928, Machado was reelected to a second term
during a fake election in which Machado ran as the only
candidate.57 The United States, busy with domestic and
internal concerns, was not eager to become involved in Cuban
affairs as long as Machado maintained order and a friendly
relationship with the United States. However, an increasing
number of diverse student protest groups rose to confront the
Machado regime. Chief among the groups were the Directorio
Estudiantil Universitario (University Student Directorate or
Directorate); the left wing Ala Izquierda Estudiantil (Student
Left Wing) which became a tool of the Cuban Communist Party;
the Union Nacionalista which was organized by a War of
Independence colonel Carlos Mendieta and former Cuban
President Menocal; and the clandestine ABC, which was composed
of Cuban intellectuals, many of whom were Harvard University
graduates as well as middle class members of Cuban society.
The student demonstrations became increasingly more violent as
confrontations between the students and the government turned
into riots. Forbidden by police to hold organized meetings,
the students of the Directorate developed tangana or protest
gatherings that turned from clashes with police into organized
violence and terrorism.58 Members of the Union Nacionalista
staged a short-lived uprising in Pinar del Rio Province while
the ABC used sabotage and terrorist actions to undermine
Machado's position. Cuba was in chaos. Machado's gunmen
became a common sight in the streets of Havana while the rural
countryside was ruled by lawlessness and terror.
As the situation in Cuba worsened, the U.S. attempted to
resolve the differences between Machado and the opposition
groups by sending Assistant Secretary of State Benjamin Sumner
Welles to Cuba in April 1933.59 Upon arrival, Welles met a
Cuba divided between those who, for political and economic
reasons, favored U.S. intervention and those advocating
Machado's removal and Cuban independence. As the unrest
continued, labor strikes and the loss of the Army's support
convinced Machado that he had lost the battle to remain in
power. Subsequently, in August 1933, Machado relinquished
power and fled Cuba.
The abrupt departure of Machado was followed by the rapid
formation of a coalition government under Dr. Carlos Manuel de
Cespedes y Quesada.60 However, the oppostion movement that
had successfully displaced Machado now took the form of a
revolt as various factions fought for power. The new
coalition government under Cespedes barely survived as the
worsening depression intensified Cuba's economic conditions.
In reaction, the United States under President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt ordered two destroyers to Cuban waters.
Maintaining that the warships were not symbolic of U.S.
intentions to intervene in Cuban affairs, the President's
action appeared to violate his newly established "Good
Neighbor" policy. This policy, however, which declared, inter
alia, that "No state [had] the right to intervene in the
internal or external affairs of another" excluded Cuba since
the Permanent Treaty of 1903 (which authorized U.S.
intervention in Cuba) still existed.61 To correct the
discrepancy, President Roosevelt abrogated the Permanent
Treaty and its binding restrictions in May 1934. With that,
the United States gave up the right to intervene in Cuban
affairs and lifted restrictions on Cuba's ability to negotiate
with other foreign powers and borrow money.
For a Cuban political system used to American
intervention, however, this sudden reversal in American policy
appeared to only add to the growing state of chaos. For
thirty years, American diplomatic favoritism and recognition
had influenced Cuban politics. Accordingly, as each political
faction vied for power following the departure of Machado,
each also attempted to meet Ambassador Welles' criteria for
good government and gain the diplomatic recognition needed to
guarantee permanent political power.
BATISTA COMES TO POWER
On the nights of September 3 and 4, 1933, the unrest in
Cuba came to an end. At Camp Columbia in Havana, army
noncommissioned officers displeased with proposed pay
reductions and a promotion freeze rebelled and took command of
the camp. Known as the "Sergeants Revolt," the group was led
by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar.62 Batista, who was
the Army's best stenographer, had befriended many of the
students from the Directorate who had been tried for
participating in the anti-Machado protests. When approached
by these same students following the Sergeants Revolt, Batista
agreed to join ranks in order to overthrow Cespedes' and
establish a five-man pentarchy (a five-member civilian
executive commission). Alarmed over this unexpected mutiny,
Welles cabled the President on September 5th, requesting that
three U.S. warships, two for Havana and one for Santiago, and
1,000 troops be sent to Cuba to safeguard the Cespedes
government. Opposed to intervention, the President rejected
the idea, believing that it not only constituted an undue
expression of partiality and violated neutrality, but also
condemned any Cuban administration that received U.S. support
as a creation of Washington.63 Although the President did
eventually agree to send the warships, this action was viewed
only as a precaution and was not considered a direct
intervention in internal Cuban politics.
Without the support of the United States, the ineffective
pentarchy collapsed. In an attempt to maintain some semblance
of control, Batista and the members of the Directorate met to
appoint a provisional president for Cuba. Their selection was
Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin, a University of Havana professor
who had been supportive of the Directorate during their anti-
Machado opposition. Heavily influenced by the Directorate,
Grau purged Machado followers from the government, dissolved
the old political party machine, and gave autonomy to the
University of Havana, freeing it from governmental influence.
Opposed to the dominance of foreign capital, Grau abrogated
the Cuban Constitution of 1901, promulgated provisional
statutes to govern Cuba, and called for a constitutional
convention with elections to follow in April 1934.64
Attempting to institute social reforms, Grau also established
an eight hour workday, a minimum wage system, compulsory
arbitration of labor-management arguments, and the beginnings
of agrarian reforms.65 For his part Batista, who had been
given the rank of colonel by the former pentarchy, was made
head of the Cuban army, and promptly began promoting enlisted
Cuban soldiers into the Cuban army's officer corps.
This overthrow of the Cespedes regime was considered a
defeat for President Roosevelt's new Cuban policy and, in
particular, Welles' mediation efforts. When Grau seized and
nationalized two American-owned sugar mills closed down due to
labor problems and temporarily assumed control of the Cuban
Electric Company, also closed due to labor problems and rate
disputes, U.S. apprehensions mounted.66 Concerned that
another revolt would occur, Welles appealed to the President
to send a strong statement to the Grau government calling for
conciliation between the opposition factions. When the
President denied the request, Welles recommended that
recognition not be granted to the Grau government.
As Grau continued to deal with the continued instability,
Batista gradually distanced himself from the Grau regime and
soon emerged as the only individual who could bring law and
order to Cuba. Following a conversation with Batista on
September 21, 1933, Welles, who was apparently impressed by
Batista's ability, reported his respect for Batista's
"reasonableness." Informing Batista that the only criterion
for U.S. diplomatic recognition was a government supported by
the people and capable of maintaining order, Welles continued
to explain that the United States would "...welcome any
government in Cuba, no matter by what individuals it was
composed [as long as it] fulfilled the requirements made clear
in the official declaration of the Secretary of State."67
Thus, following his meeting with Welles, Batista met with
student leaders and established a compromise by which Grau was
to be substituted by a new president, one who would be
mutually acceptable to both the students and the army.
Continuing to operate outside the Grau government, Batista
announced to the students in late October, 1933, that the army
had selected Carlos Mendieta to be the new president, and
warned the students against opposing the selection.
In late 1933, Welles was replaced by Jefferson Caffery as
the United States Ambassador to Cuba. Caffery shared Welles'
assessment of Grau's ineffectiveness, and believed the Grau
government would end only through Grau's resignation or by an
army coup. On January 13, 1934, Batista met with Caffery and
reconfirmed the criterion for U.S. diplomatic recognition.
Additionally, he declared his intent to make Carlos Mendieta
Cuba's next president. Mendieta, however, pushed to obtain
recognition of his soon to be new government prior to his
appointment as President of Cuba. Caffery considered the
proposal, fearing that to do otherwise would drive Batista to
the leftists or cause him to establish a military
dictatorship. Although President Roosevelt refused to grant
Mendieta diplomatic recognition in advance, within ten days
Grau resigned as President of Cuba, Mendieta assumed Grau's
former position as President, and the United States extended
diplomatic recognition to the new government of Cuba.
Although short, the revolution of 1933 had a profound
impact on Cuba. The army under Batista was transformed into
a political weapon that was soon used to dominate Cuban
politics. Corruption returned as Batista allied himself with
many of the former politicians expelled from power with
Machado. Repression flourished while opposition groups
resorted to the terrorism and sabotage of the anti-Machado
years. The students who were so important in Machado's
overthrow became disillusioned and frustrated. Many turned to
radical political groups such as the Communist Party while
others shed their idealism to share in the coruption of
Batista's regime. Others still attempted to carry on the
revolutionary zeal by organizing the Partido Revolucionario
Cubano (the Autenticos). A political party that took its name
from Marti's Partido Revolucionario Cubano party of 1892, the
party appointed the deposed Grau San Martin as its
president.68
Economically, foreign domination of Cuba's economy was
weakened as state involvement in its management increased.
For many, the revolution proved that profound structural
change in Cuba was not possible while remaining friendly
towards the United States. Consequently, for the more radical
elements, it became clear that only an anti-U.S. revolution
capable of destroying the Batisita military would be
successful in eradicating Cuba of its problems.69
Ruling Cuba through a series of puppet Presidents, Batista
retained tight political control on Cuba. Attempting to win
popular support, Batista sponsored legislation to improve
Cuba's public administration, health, sanitation, education,
and public works. Efforts were made to improve the living
conditions and education of Cuba's rural society while his
"Sugar Coordination Law" protected the tenants of small sugar
plantations against eviction. With each attempt at
improvement, however, Batista and his associates also
continued the practice of pocketing a portion of the funds
earmarked for social welfare projects.70 Through the army,
Batista retained tight control. When a general strike
involving labor, professionals, and students occurred
throughout the island in 1935, Batista used the military to
squelch it. Fearing that the strike might topple his Mendieta
government, students and labor leaders were persecuted,
imprisoned, or assasinated. Labor unions were dissolved while
the University of Havana was closed and occupied by the army.
In 1934, U.S. presence and intervention in Cuba lessened
significantly when Mendieta signed the Treaty of Reciprocity
with the United States.71 Modifying the terms of the
Permanent Treaty of May 1903, the treaty abrogated the Platt
Amendment but still allowed the United States to continue to
lease its naval base at Guantanamo Bay. In August of 1934,
the commercial Treaty of Reciprocity was also signed between
the United States and Cuba. Giving preferential treatment to
U.S. exports to Cuba, the treaty also guaranteed Cuba 22% of
the U.S. sugar market at a special low duty.
In 1940, under the terms of Cuba's new constitution,
Batista, under a coalition supported by the Communist Party of
Cuba and the Revolutionary Union Party, which had merged to
form the Communist Revolutionary Union (URC), was elected
President.72 However, to show continued support for the
United States, Batista as Cuba's President, declared war on
the Axis powers in 1941. In turn, the U.S. increased aid and
trade relations with Cuba and granted Batista credits for
agricultural development and for public works in Havana.73
Cuban sugar production rose with the war effort and from 1942
to 1947, the United States purchased all Cuban sugar at a
relatively high price while imposing low duties.
Batista's iron rule, however, was nothing short of
dictatorial. Confident in his presidency, Batista catered to
the wealthy while cultivating labor support. Courting the
Cuban left, Batista established diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union in 1943. Although some acts of violence had
occurred during the late 1930's and early 1940's, Batista's
strict control prevented the growth of political opposition
groups.
Consequently, when the Cuban elections of 1944 occurred,
Batista was confident that his party would win. Grau San
Martin, Batista's former opponent who was now backed by a
coaliton of the Conservative Republican Party and the
Communists, was the opposition candidate.74 Calling for
agrarian reform and an end to administrative corruption, Grau,
however, won the election, defeating Batista soundly.
Although shocked at the defeat, Batista stepped down from his
position as President and went into retirement in the United
States.
Had Grau and his successor Carlos Prio Socarras
accomplished the intended goals of the 1933 Revolution and
instituted reform, Cuba might have avoided significant strife
and the eventual Castro rebellion of the 1950's. As it was,
Grau's conciliatory policy toward opposition groups and lack
of support from the army created an environment in which
organized urban violence ran rampant. Student activism again
took hold as students aligned themselves with oppostion groups
and used organized force to accomplish their objectives. An
entire system of nepotism, favoritism, and gangs developed as
three key urban groups, the ARG (Accion Revoluncionaria
Guiteras), the MSR (Movimiento Socialista Revolucionario), and
the UIR (Union Insurreccional Revolucionaria), came to
prominence.75
In 1947, a split occurred in the Autentico party when a
group led by the politically ambitious Congressman Eduardo
Chibas became disatisfied with Grau's ineffectiveness. Known
as the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo), the party became
the new repository for the ideals of the "frustrated
revolution."76 Attacking Cuba's political leadership, the
Autenticos demanded social justice, economic independence, and
honest government while insisting that Cuba remain free from
political pacts. Although gaining in popularity, Chibas
commited suicide in August 1951 while giving a weekly radio
address. The purported reason for his action was frustration
at not being able to reach the objectives of the Revolution of
1933.77
Chibas's death created a leadership vacuum and rift in
the Ortodoxo Party.78 The continued ineffectiveness of the
ruling Autentico Party soon discredited the party in the eyes
of the Cuban people and only added to the growing political
instability. Consequently, on March 10, 1952, unsure if he
could successfully win the elections that year but confident
of the army's support, Batista overthrew Prio in a bloodless
cout d'etat.79
To foreign observers, particularly the United States, the
Batista-ruled Cuba of the 1950's seemed to blossom. Cuba was
stable, foreign investment was protected, and tourism
flourished. By supporting government agencies such as an
Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank, a Cuban Foreign
Trade Bank, and a Technological Research Institute, which
served as foundations for industrial research, Batista
attracted commercial interest. Although the sugar industry
still dominated all other economic areas, a U. S. Department
of Commerce bulletin described Cuba as having "one of the
highest standards of living in Latin America."80
Behind the glitter of Havana and facade of prosperity,
however, Cuba was still an island economy in colonial status.
The reformist promises of the 1940 constitution remained
largely unsatisfied. American investment in the sugar
industry had declined by the 1950's to about one-third of
Cuban production capacity although the sugar interests still
continued to influence power in controlling the annual Cuban
sugar quota in the United States. In other areas of Cuba's
economy, particularly in the public utilities, railroads,
banking, nickel mining, and various retail concerns, U.S.
capital dominated. From Batista, American investment received
beneficial treatment while Cuban investment seemed to be
ignored.
Accordingly, beneath the Batista-built shell of wealth
and democracy, Cuba was ripe for rebellion. Opposition to
Batista's dictatorial practices started to mount. University
students again took to the streets, launching an anti-Batista
campaign. The primary influencer of student activities this
time was the Ortodoxo Party which contained a small faction
that advocated violence as the best means to combat Batisto.
A member of this small faction who had earned his law degree
from the University of Havana in 1950 was Fidel Castro.
Captivated by Chebas and the zeal of the Ortodoxios
nationalistic platform, Castro saw the Ortodoxos as Cuba's
only hope for defending its sovereignty.
During the 1952 elections, Castro was asked to run as an
Ortodoxo candidate. When the elections were preempted by
Batista's coup, Castro continued his campaign, circulating a
petition that the Batista government should be deposed because
it came to power "illegitimately."
On July 26, 1953, in a demonstration of his opposition to
Batista, Castro led 165 men in an unsuccessful revolt against
the Moncada army barracks near Santiago de Cuba. Although
receiving some notoriety for his act of rebellion, it was
during his trial, however, that Castro first garnered
attention as a Cuban revolutionary. Delivering a long oration
in his defense in which he stated that "history will absolve
me," Castro condemned Batista and his lack of social reforms
and emphasized the need to restore Cuba to a constitutional
government.81
With Castro subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in
prison, Batista's position was once again secured. Running
as the self-appointed candidate of his own Progressive Action
Party, Batista easily won the Cuban presidential elections of
1954 after the oppositon candidate, Grau San Martin, withdrew
from the race.
In May 1955, Batista, in both a sign of confidence and as
a result of pressure to spare those who had participated in
the Moncada attack, declared a general amnesty. One of the
prisoners released from jail was Fidel Castro, who departed
Cuba for exile in Mexico on July 7, 1955.82
THE RISE OF CASTRO
While exiled in Mexico, Castro continued to pursue his
revolution. Establishing the 26th of July Movement (M-26-7),
a group named to perpetuate the attack on the Moncado
Barracks, Castro concentrated on clandestine politics and
prepared for the revolution that would overthrow the Batista
regime.83 On December 2, 1956, a M-26-7 group of 81 men led
by Castro sailed from Mexico on GRANMA, a yacht provided by
Batista's old adversary Prio, and landed in the Cuban province
of Oriente. A counterattack from Batista's forces killed or
captured a majority of the group. Castro and his brother,
Raul, as well as an Argentine physician named Che Guevara, and
a small remaining number of the group fled to the Sierra
Maestra mountains. There, Castro's guerrilla force grew in
strength and importance, attacking small military outposts in
order to capture weapons and ammunition. As Castro carried
out his campaign, his image as the revolutionary changed to
one of patriotic hero. An urban underground-developed that
soon became the backbone of the anti-Batista struggle.
Supplies, obtained chiefly from the United States, supported
Castro's revolutionary efforts which soon included hit-and-run
raids, sabotage, and attacks on military installations.84
As Castro's revolution gained momentum, Batista denied
that Castro was a threat, by publishing accounts that Castro
had been killed. However, when the New York Times printed an
interview with and photographs of Castro, stories of Batista's
brutality and dictatorial repressions surfaced, reaching the
United States. The $1 million dollars in military aid granted
to Batista was soon interpreted as aid to Batista in his
struggle against Castro.85 In response, the American
Ambassador in Cuba, Earl Smith, was instructed to inform
Batista that the United States would pursue a policy of
impartial neutrality and support for the Batista effort would
be suspended.
In November 1958, presidential elections were held with
Batista's candidate, Andres Rivero Aguero, winning the
election. By 1958, however, opposition to Batista began to
take on massive proportions. The overwhelming majority of
Cubans wanted Batista out and the dictatorship to end. With
no specific political ideology in mind, Cubans simply sought
the re-establishment of contitutional legality. When fraud
was subsequently claimed in the election, Castro seized the
moment. Bursting out of the Sierra Maestra mountains,
Castro's revolutionaries attacked the army under Batista's
control. As his army deserted around him, Batista fled Cuba
on January 1, 1959. The following day, Che Guevara and 600
revolutionaries took Havana.86 Castro's revolutionary forces
were now in control of Cuba.
CHAPTER 3
CASTRO'S REVOLUTION
With the overthrow of Batista, the fate of Cuba was now
in the hands of one man - Fidel Castro. Considered a hero by
many, Castro embodied what many Cubans hoped would be a new
era of peace and prosperity for Cuba. Castro and his
nationalistic fervor, it was hoped, would reestablish a
constitutional, democratic government in Cuba, free of the
corruption of the Batista regime, and one that would enable
Cuba to develop into a free and independent state. As history
has recorded, however, such was not the case. Consequently,
this chapter will examine and analyze why Castro's revolution
was successful, what influenced the breakdown in U.S.-Cuban
relations, and how that breakdown in relations impacted the
events of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLUTION
Castro's success in overthrowing Batista was the offshoot
of a violent anti-Batista movement supported by Cubans from
all walks of life. Although often asserted that Castro and
his barbudos or "bearded ones" led a popular peasant revolt,
in actuality, the "revolt" included a mix of all classes of
Cuban society. Students, university professors, middle-class
intellectuals, peasant soldiers, and businessmen alike engaged
in various forms of active and passive resistance which all
aided in Batista's downfall.87 As Dr. Gregorio DelReal, a
former law professor of Castro's and minister in the National
Bank of Cuba remembered, Castro was welcomed by the Cubans
because it was perceived that Castro would "[do] very good
things for the country. Everybody was for him [Castro]
because everybody wanted to get rid of Batista."88
For that generation of Cubans experiencing the Revolution
of 1933 and now the Castro revolution, it was easy to
understand their willingness to accept this new victor.
Castro himself had spoken of the need to restore the Cuban
constitution of 1940. Prior to 1959, he had also been a
member of the zealously nationalistic Ortodoxico Party, whose
fervor was based on a program of restoring the promises of
1933 revolutionary Cuba. Consequently, there was nothing in
Castro's actions, political or otherwise, that led the Cuban
people to believe that Castro's interests were other than
legitimate. His only intentions appeared to be to retore Cuba
to a constitutional government and to focus, at least for the
moment, on those measures necessary to best care for Cuba and
her people.
THE NEW CASTRO GOVERNMENT
Following the exodus of Batista, Castro moved quickly to
establish a new government. On January 6, 1959, Castro's
moderate designee for President, Dr. Manuel Urrutia y Lleo,
was installed as Cuba's new president.89 Castro himself
arrived in Havana on January 8th after triuphmently making his
way westward from Oriente Province. Immediately upon arrival,
Castro began implementing measures that included championing
housing for the poor and financial reform. Vowing to end the
corruption that had marked the Batista regime, Castro easily
won popular support.90
Even initial relations between the United States and Cuba
appeared hopeful in early 1959. As a result of highly
favorable media coverage and his formidable public relations
skills, Castro became something of a folk-hero in the United
States. Charismatic and articulate, the tone of Castro's
proposed policies prior to 1959, although vague, gave no
indication that traditionally close U.S.-Cuban relations would
deteriorate under a Castro regime. 91 Subsequently, on
January 7, 1959, Ambassador Smith personally delivered the
United States official note of recognition to the new
government of Cuba.92 Although the Soviet Union also
extended recognition that same month, the Cubans did not
bother to reciprocate or even reply to the Soviet
overtures.93
In addition to taking quick control of Cuba, Castro's
political skill was also demonstrated by his ability to
maintain momentum by capitalizing on the weaknesses of fellow
revolutionary groups. The Cuban Communist Party or Partido
Socialista Popular (PSP), for example, appeared to exert
little, if any, political influence on the new Castro
government. On the contrary, the PSP appeared to be only one
of the many political factions on the "outside looking in."
Issuing a statement on January 6th entitled "The Overthrow of
the Tyranny and the Immediate Tasks Ahead," the PSP promised
the new government "all the support and all the cooperation
necessary," while also calling for the "formalization,
extension, and consolidation of unity of all
revolutionaries."94 Focusing on the "disintegration of the
Batista political regime," the PSP statement provided support
for Castro's proposed "Land Law," the expansion of Cuban
export markets to socialist countries, and the restoration of
the 1940 constitution so as to prepare for democratic
elections "after the changes or adjustments deemed necessary
by the people [were made]".95
Consequently, although Castro would later state that he
had been a Communist from the beginning of the revolution, his
initial attempts at reform neither mirrored or supported the
"language of marxism."96 In fact, as the Castro regime
pursued the objectives of its revolution, it became apparent
that the revolution seemed to follow no specific political
ideology. Rather, the revolution itself seemed to originate
from an amorphous set of reformist goals designed to appeal to
a variety of groups and classes. Calculatingly ambiguous, the
appeal of the revolution appeared to reside more in Castro's
ability to represent it as "anything and everything to anyone
and everyone. The movement had "...an unusual appeal to all
sectors of Cuban society, either legitimate or convenient."97
What was even more pronounced, however, was the
realization that Castro was exceptionally ambitious,
authoritarian, and fiercely nationalistic. As described by
Dr. DelReal, "Everything with him [Castro] was ego."
Additionally, given the history of U.S. interventions, the
Platt Amendment, and the extent of U.S. economic presence in
Cuba, Castro did not hold the United States in high regard.98
Well aware of Cuba's "shared history" with the United States,
Castro was convinced that American imperialism had caused
Cuba's problems, and only the elimination of Cuba's dependence
on America could correct them.
Accordingly, the first open signs of Castro's alienation
from U.S. influence came only a few months after he seized
power. Following his April 1959 visit to the United States,
a steady breakdown in communication between Washington and
Havana slowly began. As the Castro government pursued
"revolutionary justice" to systematically hunt down and try
Batista supporters, the American public was shocked at the
level of anarchy. Public trials, jeering spectators, and an
atmosphere of tribal justice seemed to rule the day. At the
same time, Castro began nationalizing foreign-owned
businesses. Contending that private investment subverted Cuba
to foreign control, Castro appointed "intervenors" who
supervised the operation of American companies, particularly
the Cuban Telephone and Electric Companies. Under Law 851,
the Cuban government began to seize foreign-controlled
landholdings that produced rice, tobacco, and coffee.
Additional taxes were levied on foreign companies while in May
1959, the Cuban Court of Social and Constitutional Guarantees
approved the nationalization of lands owned by Nicaro Nickel,
Moa Bay Mining, and the Freeport Sulphur Company. When the
companies protested and threatened to close down their
operations, Castro simply took them over. On behalf of the
investors, the American government filed legal protests,
arguing that the new Cuban nationalization laws were in
violation of international law.99 The American protests,
however, were ignored by the Castro government.
In early 1960, the Eisenhower administration issued a
statement on Cuban-American relations that implied a
condemnation of Castro's action. Drafted with the aid of
Ambassador Philip Bonsal, the United States Ambassador to
Cuba, the statement pledged the continuation of America's
policy of nonintervention, expressed dismay at the
unwillingness of Cuba to accept the overtures of the United
States, asserted that Cuba must abide by international law,
and maintained that the American government would use legal
remedies to protect the interests of its citizens in Cuba.
The statement was criticized by the Castro government who
contended it was only another American attempt to dominate the
Cuban economy. Consequently, when Castro initiated trade
relations with the Soviet Union, his actions were viewed by
global leaders not as an attempt to widen the gulf between the