A European View On Nuclear Deterrance
AUTHOR Major Fred W. Hoogeland, RNLMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
During the first months of my year in Command and Staff
College, the use of both conventional and nuclear weapons was
frequently discussed. It became rapidly clear to me that most
American students were far from showing some understanding of the
European aversion against nuclear weapons. Conversely I discovered
that I did not have a realistic appreciation of the difficult
choice in (nuclear) options the United States faces in case Western
Europe needed the help from the US in a major armed conflict.
The European aversion against nuclear weapons is founded
in a realistic fear, the fear that the use of any type of nuclear
weapon, be it tactical or of intermediate range, will destroy their
home country. The Americans on the other hand are much in favour
of multiple (nuclear) options. The options provide a flexibility
to respond to Soviet aggression at any desirable level. It also
enables them to assist the Europeans in case of Soviet aggression.
ICBM's as only means to settle a major conflict is an
impossibility as the use of them would ensure total (mutual)
destruction.
The reasons as to how such a major share of the European
population was and still is motivated in demonstrating against
nuclear weapons, --be it simple fear or religion--, are clearly
illustrated in chapter three and four. It would be too easy to
dismiss demonstrations by peace-movements or other organizations
as pacifism and/or anti-militarism. Besides that, as so many
millions participated in activities of peace-movements and similar
organizations, governments in Europe's democratic nations cannot
afford to ignore these signals.
Especially today, when Soviet leadership is proposing
significant reductions, the combination with the Western European
aversion towards nuclear weapons, may prove a very serious threat
to the unity among the members of NATO. The outcome could well be
that, not only will the Europeans try to remove every nuclear
device of their soil, but also that they will appear reluctant --
to say the least-- to produce a credible substitute for the
extinction of a number, or all nuclear devices.
A European View on Nuclear Deterrence
Outline
The different viewpoints of Western Europe and the USA on
nuclear deterrence will remain in the foreseeable future. This
ambiguity within the NATO alliance can be managed, provided the
European allies are prepared to produce a valid conventional
substitute for their understandable aversion against nuclear
weapons. Recent developments however do not support this condition.
I The uncompromising dilemma between the United States and their
European allies
II Limited nuclear war
III Reasons for differing views
IV The peace-movement
V The present and the future
VI Conclusions
I: THE UNCOMPROMISING DILEMMA BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THEIR EUROPEAN ALLIES
In the annual report to the Congress of fiscal year 1990,
flexible response is mentioned as the foundation of US nuclear
deterrence. This "new" flexible response doctrine:
"...increased the number of options available to the
president, and provides the capability, either to respond
to Soviet aggression at the level at which it was
initiated or to escalate the conflict to a higher level.
Flexible response has enhanced deterrence, multiplying
the uncertainties confronting the Soviet leadership. "1
It is no secret that several European nations differ from
this official view of the US. The official position of the Dutch
government for instance on nuclear weapons is as follows:
...The truth of the matter is, that nuclear weapons, by
their very nature, render war highly unlikely, if not
impossible, as a means of settling disputes between
states. Nuclear weapons are above all political weapons:
they play their role in peacetime and are in reality
unsuitable for fighting a war. Nuclear weapons are a
political means for the prevention of war." and: "Each
category of these weapons should be considered in terms
of its political significance for the prevention of war."2
The quotations from the annual report to Congress
as well as the one from the Netherlands Defence White Paper are
both from members of NATO, but the considerable difference is
clear. Bluntly put, the US favours (the use of) a variety of
options, whereas several European members of NATO regard nuclear
weapons as unsuitable for fighting a war, they are thus only useful
as a political means for the prevention of war. Europeans prefer
not to have any nuclear weapons on their soil, and this is
understandable because they live on the potential battleground.
Wargames that are played between the parties of a major conflict
in Europe seem to justify this. In an exercise called "Carte
Blanch" in West Germany, tactical (nuclear) weapons were used only
by the NATO allies. The results showed that the German people would
be devastated in this sort of nuclear war through the effects of
blast and fallout. Over two days, 355 devices were exploded, mostly
over West German territory, Even without the effects of residual
radiation this would have left up to 1.7 million West Germans dead
and 3.5 million severely wounded.3
By contrast the Americans stress the importance of having
credible "responses on each level of violence. Of course there
are reasons for this concept. If the US would only have the
disposal of strategic systems (ICBM's), it would not be likely that
the Americans would come to assist the Europeans in case of a
Russian offensive, simply because the use of ICBM's would result
in immediate retaliation by the Soviet Union, i.e. total
destruction of the USA. Moreover, not only American citizens would
suffer; the vulnerability of the ICBM systems practically forbids
their use in all but the "very last" stage of an all out nuclear
war.
This situation opens up the theoretical option that the
Soviet Union might use medium, or intermediate range ballistic
missiles against Europe but not fire ICBM's against the US,
provided the US would not use their ICBM's against Soviet
territory. That poses the enduring European nightmare: a nuclear
war limited to Europe.4-
II: LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR
Especially in Western Europe there is a growing belief that
any nuclear war is highly unlikely to be controlled or limited.
This appears to be in conflict with the ("new") flexible response
of the US as mentioned in the former chapter.
Already as early as 1951, Gordon Dean, the chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), spoke of a revolution in atomic
warfare:
"...What we are working toward here is a situation where
we will have atomic weapons in almost as complete a
variety as conventional ones, and a situation where we
can use them in the same old way. This would include
artillery shells, guided missiles, torpedoes, rockets and
bombs for ground support amongst others and it would
include big ones for big situations."5
It sounds convenient and rather reassuring and indeed, for lack of
sufficient (quality as well as quantity) conventional defence in
Western Europe, NATO adopted the flexible response concept in 1962,
which relied on an early (first) use of nuclear weapons, to make
up for deficiencies in conventional forces.
Since 1982 things have changed and despite the numerical
superiority of the W.P. forces, NATO armies at present (still)
possess a credible conventional deterrence. Defence with the threat
of a limited use of nuclear weapons, is in the long run only
credible in aggression in which the use of those weapons, is
actually intended. Only to counter that sort of aggression, NATO
needs tactical nuclear weapons. If however, in defence of a
conventional attack in Europe,tactical nuclear weapons would be
used, this would in all probability mean a major destruction of
Europe.6 It will be clear, that in this concept, even the use of
tactical nuclear weapons is perceived by Europeans in a strategic
sense, changing tactical nuclear weapons into strategic ones for
that matter. Thinking along this line, the government of the
Netherlands explained her "restructuring" in the Netherlands
Defence Budget 1989 as follows:
"...thought will be given to a possible shift from very
short range nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery) to
nuclear weapons with a longer range, within the 500 km
upper limit. The range of the successor to the LANCE will
be extended considerably, thus reducing vulnerability and
enabling targets to be covered up to a distance of
several hundreds of kilometres into the adversary's
hinterland."7
All this fits the concept stated in the first chapter, i.e.,
nuclear weapons are unsuitable for fighting a war and are thus only
useful as a political means for the prevention of war. In
advocating her "shift," (to the longer range weapons), the
Netherlands wants to stress this view towards (political) nuclear
deterrence, the effect being, that the threshold is gradually
raised to an extremely high level.
It will be clear that in the official Netherlands position
on nuclear weapons, there can only be a limited allowance for the
US point of view on multiple options, the way it was first
formulated by former Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger and
later by his successor Harold Brown. Both attempted to explain how
selective options reinforced deterrence without making nuclear war
more likely.8
Let us see how one of the more recent "options" --be it
this time to destroy nuclear (incoming) missiles--, is perceived
by quite a few Europeans:
From the Soviet perspective, the Strategic Defence
Initiative (SDI) is perceived as a fundamental change in the
strategic balance between East and West. It is regarded as an
additional (American) strategic option. Europeans opposing SDI do
so mainly for two reasons:
1. a lesser shared risk by the USA compared to Europe.
2. it lowers the nuclear threshold.
ad 1: Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty clearly states
that "an armed attack against one or more of them (the
parties) in Europe or North America shall be considered
an attack against them all. .." One of the first thoughts
resulting from this article is that of shared risks.
Those risks should be shared equally, i.e. not an "all
risk" concept for most members and a considerably "less
risk" for other members. Or, using the words of
ambassador Max Kampelman in his address to the students
of the Amphibious Warfare School and those of the Command
and Staff College on March 1 1989: "There cannot be
security for one nation if it cannot be provided for
all."
ad 2: The effect of SDI can be regarded as a possibility to
limit damage, to make it calculable and thus, make
(limited) nuclear war a (survivable) possibility. In
doing so, the consequence for the nuclear threshold is
one of a distinct lowering. Instead of adding to
deterrence, its effect is perceived as the opposite.
III: REASONS FOR DIFFERING VIEWS
In the former chapters, it has been indicated that the
foremost reason for a differing opinion on nuclear policy and
nuclear options is caused by the fact that Europe is the potential
battlefield for any major conflict, be it conventional and/or
nuclear. This of course gives a distinctly different perspective
than a situation where the involvement in a conflict takes place
5000 km away from the home-country, as is the case for the US.
Those who actively oppose nuclear weapons, can be divided
into two major groups:
1. those, who (even unilaterally) want to abolish all nuclear
weapons, whatever their size or purpose.
2. those, who for the time being accept the presence of nuclear
armies as a reality, but will in a responsible way, actively
seek to extinct every single category of nuclear armies.
Within the solidarity of the NATO alliance, the Dutch
government supports the latter view.
It is no secret that a large share of the population of
Holland has been, and still is very much opposed to all forms of
nuclear weapons. Public demonstrations by pacifists as well as
supporters from the "Anti Cruise-Missile Committee", have given
the government a hard time in dealing with these public sentiments.
However, the official position to support NATO's dual-track
decision (zero option for INF weapons), has never been challenged
by the government. On the contrary, in maintaining her views, not
only in theory but also in practice (continuing of all preparations
for the stationing of the cruise-missiles unless...), Holland
played a considerable role in driving back the importance of
nuclear weapons on both sides.
What motivated and still motivates those, who oppose all
nuclear weapons? Obviously a sufficient answer is hard to give;
however, a few causes can be indicated:
1. Fear; fear for utter destruction, death and suffering. Fear
is a bad advisor for governments, nations and public opinion
alike. Fear disturbs rational thinking. But fear does exist
and, in public protest against nuclear wars, it does
constitute an important social factor that cannot be ignored.
2. The second major motivation is that of religion. Except for
the Roman Catholic Church, both the Reformed Church and the
Presbyterian Church condemned views of tolerance of nuclear
weapons, be it as actual fighting weapons or as a political
means. As the Christian Democrats have been in government for
the past seven years, it will be evident that there has been,
and still is,a definite influence of the churches and their
constituency on political life in both parliament and
government.
3. The third reason is more difficult to describe; it refers to
those who are not possessed by fear, and are intellectually
very well able to understand the "need" for nuclear weapons,
but still say no. As an aid to the minister of Defence of the
Netherlands, I asked Dr. Hans van Mierlo during the hectic
times of anti-cruise-missile demonstrations in 1982, what his
constituency thought of the official government position
(including his) on INF weapons. He answered: "you would not
believe it, there I stand, speaking to my constituency, trying
desperately to convince them of the necessity of their support
(of the dual-track decision) and then they look at me, tell
me they understand very well what I mean and conclude saying:
"but we don't want them (the cruise-missiles). "9
As Holland already in an early stage took the lead in the
so called peace-movements, this paper justifies a closer look at
how it all started.
IV: THE PEACE-MOVEMENT
In the evolution of the peace-movement, three phases can
be distinguished: In the first phase, (peace) activities on a
larger scale only occurred in Holland. For this reason some people
believe that the ideas spread from there as an "infectious
disease". The disease was called "Hollanditus". In 1977 the action
group "Stop de neutronenbom" gained tremendous support for its
goal. In April 1978, parliament was offered a petition with 1,2
million signatures. When president Carter stopped the production
of the Enhanced Radiation Weapon (ERW), the action group lost its
momentum.
Also in 1977 the IKV (Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad, meaning:
peace consultation between churches), started a campaign with the
slogan (translated) "Help kick the nuclear weapons out of the
world, to start in the Netherlands." By her actions, the IKV
provided the incentive for a discussion not only among the
churches, but in the entire society. Rapidly most of the larger
unions and the socialists parties supported the basic idea i.e.:
unilateral actions to come to mutual disarmament. The IKV soon
found itself the centre of the Dutch peace-movement.
The second phase is marked by the start of similar
peace-movements in other countries, notably Great-Britain and
West-Germany. In Great-Britain three facts contributed to the
foundation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in 1980:
a brochure issued by the government on measures in case of a
nuclear war, the dual-track-decision, and plans for the British
Trident submarine. In the FRG, people were triggered by possibility
of a limited nuclear war in Europe, and became more and more
convinced that Germany would be the battlefield for such a war. The
"Krefelder" Appeal had no problem in convincing two million people
to sign a petition for a withdrawal of the dual-track-decision
(1980). In other European nations, the peace-movement existed on
a smaller scale (Belgium, Italy and the Scandinavian countries).
In the fall of 1981 it was clear by the number of people,
participating in organized protests, that the peace-movement could
not be ignored. (see table)
Major peace-demonstrations in 1981 and
1983 (including number of participants)
PLACE 1981 1983
Bonn 10 Oct. 300,000 22 Oct. 250,000
Rome 24 Oct. 300,000 22 Oct. 500,000
London 24 Oct. 250,000 22 Oct. 250,000
Brussels 25 Oct. 200,000 23 Oct. 300,000
Madrid 15 Nov. 500,000 22 Oct. 150,000
Amsterdam 21 Nov. 400,000
The Hague 29 Oct. 550,000
Hamburg,
West-Berlin
Stuttgart 22 Oct. 1,000,000
The third phase is characterized by the increasing interest of
citizens of the United States since the end of 1981. The most
prominent movement was the one that advocated to freeze research,
production, and stationing of nuclear weapons as a first step for
mutual disarmament. According to polls, already in April 1982 two
thirds of the population agreed on this proposal and so did an
increasing number of members of Congress. In June 1982 a
demonstration in New York was attended by more than 700,000 people;
it was clear how widespread the support for the peace-movement had
become. 10
V: THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE
What will the answer of the Europeans be on their aversion
to nuclear weapons? Of course the answer could be very simple:
continue to rely on the deterrent of the US, but at the same time,
strengthen and increase the conventional forces. (For the sake of
argument, both the British and the French nuclear weapons are
disregarded in this paper.) If the Europeans maintain their wish
to extinct all tactical, as well as medium range nuclear weapons,