[EXCERPTS] HOLUM MAY 15 NEWS CONFERENCE IN GENEVA
(15 May 1997 - transcript)
HOLUM: It is a pleasure to be back in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament. I am here for a little over three days of consultations, including, of course, the speech at the plenary session today. We believe very strongly in the United States that the Anti-Personnel Landmine ban and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty are ripe for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. There is a great deal of interest here in dealing with the question of nuclear disarmament. One of the things I emphasized this morning is that the Fissile Material Cut-off is precisely a nuclear disarmament step in the sense that it will facilitate and permit additional progress on nuclear disarmament among the nuclear weapons states, including the progress we have seen most recently in the joint summit statement at Helsinki. The Conference on Disarmament has a real challenge ahead of it. It has become immobilized by this concept of linkage; that it can't move on one issue until countries are satisfied that it is dealing with their particular unrelated issue. That is a formula not only for immobilization of the conference, but also for its ultimate failure. And one of the things the delegations will have to consider, and I am sure they are now beginning to wonder about at the end of the first session, is whether the conference itself has a viable future, given the pernicious influence, and the dangerous precedent set by the concept of linkage holding up all progress in the negotiations. So it is best for the conference, as well as for the cause of global security and peace and disarmament, that the conference get on promptly with its real work. I'll be happy to answer your questions. QUESTION: The arguments, however, don't seem to be that much different from when you were here last year, and I am wondering if you see any way out of the current impasse? HOLUM: I think the best way out is to begin action. Probably the only way out will be sufficient passage of time so the few delegations who are intent on holding up action hear from their colleagues that that is not the proper way to operate in a conference that depends on consensus for moving forward. (And) that every country is bound to be disappointed by some elements of the process, and by some parts of the treaties that are ultimately produced. But if we insist on linkages, then the conference itself is unviable. Remember that the Conference on Disarmament is the instrument by which many of the countries represented here, including in particular the non-aligned countries, have access to and have a prominent part in genuine negotiations on binding international agreements. It would be a terrible loss to them as well as to the international community and to the United States, frankly, if this forum were to decline in influence and value. So I think it requires some sober thinking of the sort I tried to inspire with my statement this morning. Am I hopeful about the prospects for immediate progress? I just can't say. I don't know what the impact will be. I have, in my consultations this week, found a number of countries who are increasingly frustrated at the delays and misdirection of effort, but how broad that is remains to be seen. ................. QUESTION: Sir, by taking this extreme position against nuclear disarmament aren't you being as inflexible as some of the states that are trying to push it? HOLUM: I am not taking a position against nuclear disarmament. What I am saying is that the Conference on Disarmament is an institution that is ill-suited to handle it. For example, how would the Conference on Disarmament deal with the specific methods of verification of reduction in nuclear warheads, or nuclear weapons? Those are obviously matters requiring detailed technical expertise, and careful bilateral negotiations. It is not something that can be done in a multilateral forum. Plus the fact, as I noted this morning, that the Conference on Disarmament would have a very difficult time, given its recent history and current operating practice, of agreeing to anything in nuclear disarmament. If it can't begin the first step, if it can't begin dealing with the spigot for nuclear weapons -- that is the fissile material -- how could it possibly deal with the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons? Does that mean that the countries other than the nuclear weapons states have no business in the nuclear disarmament process? Absolutely not. There are a multitude of forums in which the nuclear weapons states are answerable for their progress, and we just completed one in the first preparatory committee meeting for the year 2000 in the NPT review conference. These issues are discussed regularly at the U.N. First Committee, in the U.N. Disarmament Commission, and many other places. But this is a negotiating forum in Geneva. I am convinced that bringing nuclear disarmament here will have the opposite effect from that intended or professed to be intended by those who want to bring it here. It would stall it rather than move it forward. QUESTION: In your statement, you said that the Fissile Material Treaty should be accomplished relatively quickly. What time frame would you have in mind ideally? HOLUM: Well, nothing happens overnight in the Conference on Disarmament, but it seems to me that the time frame that we used in the case of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would be more than reasonable, given that this is a considerably simpler treaty. The obligations are not that complex. I think the Fissile Material Cut-Off is something that, if negotiations were begun in earnest, could be completed within a year. QUESTION: India successfully blocked the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the CD. Do you see India as the main, or one of the main, obstacles to furthering efforts on the Fissile Material Cut-Off and the Anti-Personnel Landmine negotiations? HOLUM: I would rather not single out specific countries. They can speak for themselves in terms of their positions. What I have been trying to do is emphasize objection to the principle of linkage, rather than personalize it with any specific country. QUESTION: The Ukraine this morning proposed to include also the destruction of existing fissile material in the negotiations. What is your reaction to that? Second question, as far as I understood it, Canada also joined in for the creation of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. What is your reaction to that? HOLUM: On the Ukraine proposal, it seems to me that it is best to stick with the mandate that was already agreed in 1995, the Shannon mandate, which made clear that stocks could be discussed, but the mandate focuses on the future production of fissile material for weapons. It is also very difficult in the context of a global treaty to deal with wide variations in fissile materials among countries. I don't know how you would equalize or level that out in the context of a global treaty. It is better suited to regional or bilateral discussions. I would emphasize that the United States has already removed some 225 tons of fissile material from that available for weapons and is in the process of putting that material under international safeguards, and we and others are very actively engaged in efforts to reduce and eliminate excess fissile material. In the case of the proposal for an ad hoc committee dealing with nuclear disarmament, this is something that a number of delegations have expressed some interest in. My concern is that, again, this is a negotiating body. If it is going to get into nuclear disarmament as a theoretical discussion, it is not productive, it is a waste of resources. On the other hand, if it intends to negotiate the reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons states, it won't work. It will prevent rather than expedite progress. So I think either formulation of that is not helpful. QUESTION: Just to follow up, first of all, were you surprised by Canada's position this morning, and you couldn't see the proposition of the Ukraine as a kind of compromise to get the third world countries into the deal? HOLUM: Well, dealing with the Ukraine proposal first. If you just change the name, it doesn't do anything. On the other hand, if you change the content of the negotiations you get into the problems I was raising. And I think most countries are determining their positions on this based on more than the cosmetic aspects of it. On the Canadian proposal, we have had consultations. I guess I would rather not get into specific reactions to individual country proposals. QUESTION: If the CD is not the appropriate forum for negotiations on disarmament, then which is the forum in your view? HOLUM: There is a forum that is operating very effectively and that is the bilateral negotiations between the United States and Russia, which as I said in my statement this morning, have produced now a further agreement at Helsinki that after Start II is in place, we will begin work on the next step, which will include cumulative total reductions of some 80 percent from the Cold War peaks in deployed nuclear warheads. Let me also stress that I am not excluding nuclear disarmament discussions in the CD. Or nuclear disarmament negotiations. That, in fact, has occurred here in the NPT, in the Comprehensive Test Ban, in the Fissile Material Cut-Off. Those are all elements of the nuclear disarmament process and are appropriate to be negotiated here. What I am concerned about is the impossibility of negotiating in a global forum on the U.S. and Russian and other nuclear weapons states' disarmament process. QUESTION: What about China? Are you talking to China? HOLUM: We are talking with China in general terms. I think the nuclear disarmament process has to go a considerably further distance, as between the United States and Russia, before other countries would join the process. It was certainly appropriate to be engaged in strategic discussions with China and other nuclear weapons countries and we are doing that. QUESTION: You say that time may be the only way out of this impasse, and yet you say that the credibility of the CD may be dwindling. How much time do you think there actually is before this body really loses its stature? HOLUM: That is a very hard question to answer, its a very good question, but I think it depends on so many variables. Speaking for the United States, I can say this: We have participated actively in the Conference on Disarmament throughout its history. We believe very strongly in this body as a forum for serious international negotiations. At the same time we are under pressure from our Congress to reform and limit expenditures on all international institutions, and that inevitably forces us to examine whether resources are being spent effectively. And the longer we go on without having real negotiations underway here, especially when there are issues ready for resolution, and in fact that were assigned to this body, in the case of the Fissile Material Cut-Off, more than two years ago, I think there will be more cynicism about the conference, and I think that would be tragic. I don't personally favor that, but I think it is an inevitable consequence of prolonged delay. QUESTION: Just to follow up, what do you pay the CD, what part of your budget goes to the CD? HOLUM: It comes out of the regular UN budget. I don't know what the specific amount is. We also pay to maintain our delegation here, obviously. QUESTION: Is that then an indication that you are going to give some consideration within the next year, say, for example, to withdrawing the U.S. position here? HOLUM: No, no, I certainly am not suggesting that, and I am glad you asked for the clarification. I am just responding to the question of what the costs are for U.S. participation. What I am concerned about is, if we are unable to move, the United States, other countries, are likely to start wondering whether their participation is justified. My preferred solution, my fervently desired solution, is that this body begins again to do what it is capable of, and that is to achieve real progress in negotiations. QUESTION: But are you giving the people here in the CD a time frame about how long you are willing to go along with this impasse? HOLUM: No, and there is no way to judge what such a time frame would be. ............ QUESTION: Sir, Egypt made quite a strong statement rejecting the double standards which allow Israel to maintain a nuclear program when other countries of the region are under sanctions, obviously in reference to Iraq, and calling on nuclear power states to put more pressure on Israel. Does the United States intend to have this conversation with Israel in any serious way that they should finally think of coming under international safeguards and joining the NPT? And how do you respond to Egypt's accusations? HOLUM: I think the case of Israel inevitably will be resolved in the context of the broader security situation in the region, so it is closely linked with the overall peace process. At the same time, we do, for reasons of our non-proliferation policy, limit our cooperation with Israel in the nuclear field. We have participated actively in the effort to make the nuclear non-proliferation treaty universal, and it is approaching that now with 185 member countries, and we have been very favorably disposed toward the idea of a nuclear weapon free zone in the region, which obviously is dependent on the security situation. QUESTION: Since the last session, do you have any fresh concerns about fissile material. I am thinking of North Korea and some of the things that came out of the IAEA recently about their having this fissionable material and not squaring with it? HOLUM: I have seen the recent press accounts of a high level defector from North Korea and statements that seemed to imply a larger quantity of fissile material there than we have previously estimated. As you know, the conclusion of the United States has been that there may have been diverted in the late 1980s a sufficient quantity for one or perhaps two nuclear weapons. That is an issue that will have to be resolved before the Agreed Framework is fully implemented. I don't have a basis for judging the accuracy or the reliability of estimates that would suggest a larger amount. (end transcript)
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