Nuclear tests and science in South Asia:
Selected statistics and quotes---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Compiled by Eric Arnett ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Statistics India Budget of Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation for FY 1996-7: 15 billion rupees Estimated total Indian expenditure on military research and development in FY 1996-7: 17 billion rupees Value of FY 1996-7 Indian military R&D expenditure in foreign exchange: $490 million Purchasing power of FY 1996-7 Indian military R&D expenditure in Indian economy: $2 billion Total Indian expenditure on military, nuclear and space R&D in FY 1994-5: 26 billion rupees Value of this figure in foreign exchange: $910 million Purchasing power of this figure in the Indian economy: $3.7 billion Percentage of Indian military expenditure devoted to R&D: 6.5% Number of other countries that devote that much of their military expenditure to R&D: 4 Drop in military output from Indian industry between FY 1990-1 and FY 1996-7: 57% Percentage of Indian government funding for science spent on military R&D: 28% Percentage of Indian government funding for science spent on military, nuclear and space R&D: 68% Percentage of funding for science in the Indian economy spent on military R&D: 18% Number of other countries besides the USA that spend this fraction of the science funds on defence: 0 Percentage real increase in Indian military R&D funding since beginning first build-up in 1983: 200% Percentage real increase in Indian military R&D funding since beginning debt crisis in 1992: 29% Percentage by which current government says it will increase military R&D budget in five years: 100% Average reliability of Indian power reactors (energy availability factor): 41% Average reliability of all power reactors in the world: 75% Number of states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with less reliable power reactors: 0 Number of power reactors in India: 9 Number of these among the six least reliable in the world: 4 Number of these among the 50 least reliable in the world (out of 499): 9 (All figures based on Indian government reports or submissions to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Currency conversions based on figures from the International Monetary Fund. Comparisons with other states based on SIPRI Yearbook.) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Pakistan Reported typical Pakistani expenditure on military R&D: 130 million rupees Value of this figure in foreign exchange: $4 million Purchasing power of this figure in the Pakistani economy: $20 million Drop in Pakistani funding for military production between FY 1993-4 and FY 1996-7: 33% Budget for Pakistani atomic energy research in FY 1996-7: 880 million rupees Value of this figure in foreign exchange: $24 million Purchasing power of this figure in the Pakistani economy: $120 million Average reliability of Pakistan's power reactor (energy availability factor): 28% Number of less reliable reactors in the world (out of 499): 0 (All figures based on Pakistani government reports, statements of officials, or submissions to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Currency conversions based on figures from the International Monetary Fund.) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Quotes Pakistanis appear to have an unwarranted confidence in nuclear deterrence: `The only reason why these eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations between the Pakistani and Indian armies [in 1987 and 1990] were not converted into military conflict was the nuclear factor.' -- Mushahid Hussain, Information Secretary for the ruling Pakistan Muslim League, 1991 'There is no danger of even a conventional war between India and Pakistan. ... There is no possibility of an Indian-Pakistan war now.' -- Mirza Aslam Beg, former Chief of Army Staff, 1993 The Indian military appears not to be deterred: `It would be feckless to presume that [the current] situation is innately stable, and does not possess any escalation potential . . . That [the 1987 and 1990] crises had the potential to escalate tensions and lead to a conventional conflict is indisputable . . . Conventional war is not implausible.' Indian military leaders do not `believe that Pakistan has a viable deterrent'. Pakistan's nuclear capability `could only serve as a "last-resort" weapon'. -- P. R. Chari, former Additional Secretary of Defence (second ranking civilian responsible for the IAF), 1995 `I don't see any threat of nuclear capacity or capability in Pakistan.' -- Former Chief of Army Staff General V. N. Sharma in the context of the 1990 crisis `The Pakistani nukes do not give me a cold sweat [since Indian nuclear retaliation] could be in the range of ten megatons for one.' -- An unnamed former Indian Chief of Army Staff In fact, the Indian Air Force have long planned to attack Pakistan's nuclear delivery systems in the event of war: India's defensive policy against a likely nuclear conventional attack by Pakistan must aim, at first priority, to minimise the nuclear threat. In this case, Pakistan's weak point will be its delivery system, because for a considerable time to come its only recourse will be the fighter-bomber. -- D. K. Palit, commandant of the Indian Military Academy, 1979 If there is a war, Pakistani military planners are afraid of losing if nuclear weapons are not used: The armed forces could not hold up for more than six to eight weeks under IAF 'plans to neutralise [Pakistani] radars and [surface-to-air missiles] and destroy the Pakistan Air Force on the ground and in the air.' -- An unnamed official of Pakistan Air Force, April 1997 The arguably better-trained PAF pilots could not compensate for the 'expected high attrition [on] the ground and [in the] air ... buzzing with advanced guided [weapons]. ... The IAF has a tremendous edge in numbers and in the quality of weapons.' -- Another unnamed official of Pakistan Air Force, April 1997 Pakistan would have to use nuclear weapons early to avoid defeat, and some Pakistani leaders apparently are not uncomfortable with that: 'In the event of war with India, Pakistan would use nuclear weapons at an early stage.' -- Then-President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, 1990 Pakistan can only hope to deter war if Indian planners believe 'we are primed, almost desperate to use our nuclear capabilities when our national objectives are threatened, for example, a major crackdown on [the] freedom movement in Kashmir.' -- Asad Durrani, former director of Inter-Services Intelligence, 1995 Pakistan may not test, despite the Indian tests: 'Why we are not testing this capability is because of the fact I want to show the world that Pakistan is a responsible country. ... If India is doing it out of sheer madness, we do not have to blindly follow suit.' -- Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, 19 May 1998Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control After the Test Ban; and Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and Iran are available from Oxford University Press Visit SIPRI's homepage: <www.sipri.se/projects/technology>!
Project on Military Technology Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Frosunda 16970 Solna Sweden tel: 46 8 655 9747 fax: 46 8 655 9733
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