Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

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QUESTION: Yes. Apparently, the President and the President of South Korea this morning agreed in a telephone conversation that they would resort to diplomacy to deal with North Korea. Could you tell us what form that diplomacy might take?

MR. BOUCHER: The White House has already briefed on that phone call and stressed that the President emphasized once again our intention to try to resolve the Korea problems peacefully. We have seen news yesterday about North Korea asking the International Atomic Energy Agency to remove their cameras and seals from nuclear facilities in North Korea. This is a very serious matter. We regret that North Korea decided to make that request.

Currently, we are consulting with other governments and with the International Atomic Energy Agency and we hope that North Korea will reconsider this decision. We strongly support Director General El-Baradei's call on North Korea not to take any unilateral action that might further complicate the Agency's ability to verify the North's inventory of nuclear material.

As we have said yesterday, we view North Korea's decision to lift the freeze on its nuclear facilities as regrettable and so we have been discussing with other governments how to handle this matter. The Secretary has, in fact, talked to a number of countries about this. We have sent instructions to our ambassadors around the world to talk to other governments about this, and of course our mission in Vienna to the International Atomic Energy Agency has been very active.

But just in the past 24 hours or so, the Secretary has talked to Foreign Minister Ivanov, to European Representative, High Representative Solana, he's talked to Foreign Minister Tang, as well as a number of others, and this has been one of the subjects of conversation.

QUESTION: Richard, you stressed the need for use of diplomacy with North Korea. I know this question has been asked before, but especially this week I think it deserves re-asking. If Iraq, Iran and North Korea are on the "axis of evil," and this week there have been revelations about Iran's potential, which we can talk about, I guess, in a minute, Iran's nuclear potential, nuclear facilities, and North Korea talking about its intention to reopen its nuclear facilities, why the distinction between Iraq and North Korea and Iran? What makes Iraq the most dangerous country right now and the most imminent threat?

MR. BOUCHER: I think the President has made clear that the situation with Iraq is unique. Iraq's repeated and continued defiance of UN Security Council resolutions represents a challenge to that organization. Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction represents a challenge to the whole world, to all the potential victims. The fact that Iraq has used gas against its own people, the fact that Iran has used gas against -- that Iraq has used gas against Iran represents a threat that the international community needs to recognize. The fact that Iran has repeatedly invaded its neighbors represents -- Iraq, I'm sorry. The fact that Iraq has repeatedly invaded its neighbors represents another unique facet to that.

The fact that the United States has a very strong nonproliferation policy, as represented in the Strategy for Weapons of Mass Destruction that we put out this week, is not a secret. And the fact that we pursue this in a variety of places is what's important. But we do pursue it in different ways in different places. The obligations for Iraq are to cooperate with the United Nations and we're trying to solve that peacefully. But we've made clear, given the unique circumstances of Iraq, Iraq has to be disarmed one way or the other.

In other cases, there's a different kind of effort all aimed at the same thing -- in bringing people into compliance with their international obligations and having them meet international standards of transparency and disclosure.

QUESTION: If North -- if this round of diplomacy does not work with North Korea, do you think you might take action at the United Nations to make North Korea comply with the IAEA?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't want to speculate on failure. I think we plan on success. I'm not going to take a speculative question at this point.

Betsy.

QUESTION: Richard, is the stated policy of this government not to have -- hold talks with North Korea until they --

MR. BOUCHER: -- immediately and verifiably --

QUESTION: -- get rid of their nuclear program in a verifiable way? Don't you feel that that hampers you, though? I mean, in this situation, you are now working -- you're now forced to work through other countries instead of to deal with them directly.

MR. BOUCHER: We've dealt with them directly. We've signed agreements with them directly. We signed an Agreed Framework with them directly and they have egregiously violated that Agreed Framework.

I guess I would have to answer the counter to that is: Why deal with them directly on this issue until they've at least respected the previous agreements we've signed? And that's the point that we've tried to make.

QUESTION: But this is going to take talks of some kind.

MR. BOUCHER: The point -- I mean if -- let's talk about this more specifically. She asked a general question, why we do one thing here and other things there. Let's talk specifically about what we are doing with regard to the North Korea situation, and I think that gives you a better sense to what we're doing.

We have the International Atomic Energy Agency trying to make sure that North Korea respects its obligations. We have worked with other governments to try to make sure that North Korea respects its obligations that it had previously under the Agreed Framework, under its declarations on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and under other international agreements, including its safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

So we're working with the International Atomic Energy Agency, we're working with the close partners we have in the region, Japan and Korea, and we're working with other governments like Russia and China who have influence and bearing on the situation to bring diplomatic pressure to bear and to make sure that North Korea understands that its aspirations of cooperation, its aspirations, as I think the President put it to Kim Dae Jung, of business as usual are not going to be met as long as it continues to violate its previous agreements.

QUESTION: Richard, in these conversations that the Secretary has had with Mr. Ivanov and Mr. Tang and Mr. Solana, has he floated any particular proposal as to how you jointly might handle the situation? Or do they just commiserate with each other on what a dangerous world it is? Or what, exactly, goes on in these conversations?

MR. BOUCHER: They talk about what to do. They plan together. They work together. They organize the kind of pressure that I just talked about. They talk about what I just talked to you about, which is how to make North Korea understand that its aspirations in the world, that its desire for some business as usual with foreign countries, is not going to be met until it ends these programs.

QUESTION: Right. Can you say any of these ideas about how to do it?

MR. BOUCHER: I can say that you've seen continuing evidence that people are doing that. You've seen it in the reactions of other governments to the disclosures and the declarations, the statements that North Korea has been making. You've seen it in the reaction of the International Atomic Energy Agency yesterday. You've seen it in the statements made by the International Atomic Energy Agency board less than a week ago. And maintaining and continuing that process is what the diplomacy is about.

QUESTION: On China, do you think it would be helpful for China to tell North Korea, as one of the few states thought to have some influence in Pyongyang, that it's not business as usual, as well?

MR. BOUCHER: We've been, I think, clear that we think it's important for all governments to tell North Korea that they should not expect to develop their relations with the world. North Korea should not expect to develop its relations with the world unless they get rid of these programs that attempt to nuclearize the Korean Peninsula. And that, I think, is a point that people have been making. We continue to do that.

QUESTION: Can we move on to Iran?

MR. BOUCHER: North Korea? One more.

QUESTION: Well, your friends and allies basically wants to keep the KEDO operation and maintain the Agreed Framework, the four countries, I think, most of them. And I think next week, your Secretary will talk to the Japanese Foreign Minister about this. But, how does stance about the KEDO operation at this point? Do you want to scrap or change the policy about, for example, LWR project?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, as you know, your characterization is wrong. The KEDO Board of Directors, which include these other countries, the Board of Directors reached a joint decision last month on what to do. They expect to meet again early next year, and I'm sure they will continue to reach joint decisions on what to do. And that's what we will do.

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