Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Who wants to start? Mr. Wright?

QUESTION: Yes, the Secretary said that you had assurances that, as he put it, this will be the end of it. Does that mean President Salih told the Secretary that Yemen would not buy any more SCUD from the North Koreans? Or that this was the end of that particular contract?

MR. BOUCHER: This was the end of the shipments of missiles such as this. The Secretary has been in touch with a number of foreign ministers. He talked to the Spanish Foreign Minister twice today, talked to her yesterday, as well. We certainly appreciate the role that the Spanish forces have played in this operation in the Arabian Gulf. They did this boarding at our request and we appreciate the fact that they did it so well and worked so closely with us. And so the Secretary has expressed our appreciation to the Spanish Government for the cooperation.

In addition, I'd say the Secretary has worked very closely with the Government of Yemen as well. Our embassy out in Yemen has consulted with the government, with Yemeni Government. Our Ambassador met with the Foreign Minister. The Secretary spoke today by phone twice with Foreign Minister al-Qurbi. The Vice President also spoke to President Salih and the Secretary, then, about noontime today spoke to President Salih.

The Yemeni Government has confirmed to us in its discussions with the Secretary and others that it was the purchaser of these missiles that were found on board this ship. They have assured us that Yemen is the final destination for the missiles and that they won't be retransferred. They have said that these missiles were ordered before Yemen's earlier commitments to end their missile purchases. They've told us that the missiles are for defensive purposes. They've said they are a continuation of previous deliveries, and that there are no more shipments beyond this one. So it was based on these assurances that we decided to release the ship and its cargo to Yemen. That's what happened.

QUESTION: Can I ask if there's a list?

QUESTION: Can I just follow up that?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes.

QUESTION: When did you get that assurance that they would not buy missiles?

MR. BOUCHER: There have been discussions of these missiles with the Yemeni Government a number of times, and I think in July of 2001, we heard from the

Yemeni Government that they were going to end their purchases of missiles.

Last year at the time of the sanctions, last August 2002, when we waived sanctions with respect to a transaction involving Category 2 items on the missile list. They also gave us commitments at that point about not further purchasing missiles. So the situation in this case was we heard from them very clearly that this was the last of the deliveries that were expected under this contract and the last of their missile purchases. And based on the assurances that we got that they were going to keep these, not retransfer them, and that this was the end of it, we decided to let this shipment go forward.

Barry.

QUESTION: I know the, mostly self-evident, but let me ask you anyhow because I would like to have the State Department's words on this. Given Yemen's improved relationship with the United States, this looks likes a whole lot of care the administration went through today, a whole lot of intervention, if that's the word. There are big players coming into play, the ship is stalled, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

There were reports that I understand are not accurate. There was concern that the missiles might be headed for some terrorist state. Even if those reports are not accurate, could you explain why it was such a high priority item? Because afterall, weapons go all the time to Arab countries and to Israel, that are friendly with the United States. Forget North Korea. Why is it a big deal for Yemen to be getting SCUD missiles?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we can't forget North Korea.

QUESTION: Well, I know.

MR. BOUCHER: North Korea is a known proliferator, particularly when it comes to missile technology. Our concerns about North Korea's missile sales have been quite evident for some time and I would say for many administrations. And it's important to know that this shipment apparently originated in North Korea.

The fact that we were concerned about this shipment of a product like missiles into a very sensitive part of the world at this time should come as no surprise to anyone. And therefore, in addition, we had various suspicions about the ship.

At first, one couldn't verify the nationality of the ship because the ship's name and the indications of nationality on the hull and the funnel were obscured. It was flying no flag. When the Spanish got on board and we got on board, the inspections revealed irregularities in the cargo and the documentation, and the SCUDS were found on board the ship. So, a ship like this acting suspiciously in a sensitive part of the world, carrying what might be missiles from North Korea, is obviously going to get a lot of attention. And it did. And we boarded it.

And at first, it was not possible to ascertain merely from the documentation or lack thereof on the ship the exact, intended recipients of this. And so then we went to the Yemeni Government, and as I said, had a series of discussions with them, at which time they confirmed to us that they were the purchasers, that they were going to receive this, they were not going to retransfer it, and that it was the end of the shipments.

QUESTION: And just a small point -- how did it come about that the Spanish had the role of boarding this ship?

MR. BOUCHER: It's a multinational operation in the area and I guess they had the ship -- it was at the right place at the right time to carry out the operation, and so they were asked by the -- however the task force makes these decisions, but -- asked by the task force to conduct this boarding. And as I said, it was quite a successful operation that they conducted. It was not a consensual boarding, should we say.

Terri.

QUESTION: Well, if everything was so above board in your discussions with the Yemenis about their missile shipments, why couldn't they tell you that they had one more coming? Why weren't you perfectly aware that they had bought this ahead of time and that it would be coming? It wouldn't have had to be hidden on a ship if they were telling you the truth.

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know, exactly, what kind of details of purchases were discussed at that time or last year, and it would not normally be the case that countries that are purchasing weapons would inform us every time there was a shipment. So I just don't know to what level of detail. There weren't supposed to be any further purchases. I don't want to try to cut it too fine. What we looked at was these circumstances, these assurances that we got this time, and the current circumstances involving this shipment and decided we should let this one through.

QUESTION: And are you asking for paperwork to confirm that the purchases were made at the time they say they were?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we've had a fairly detailed discussion already with the Yemenis on this and as I said, based on their assurances in these circumstances we decided this was a shipment that should go through once we knew what it was.

Charlie.

QUESTION: Irrespective of the assurances they gave you, did the US have any legal grounds for stopping the shipment or preventing it from proceeding to port?

MR. BOUCHER: I think in this particular case with regard to these circumstances as I think Ari Fleischer has said already at the White House that there was not a particular legal basis to stop this shipment.

This decision was made as much in this particular circumstance on the assurances that we received and the discussions that we had with the Yemeni Government. So that once we found a suspicious cargo, we ascertained what it was, where it was going, who was getting it, and satisfied some of our concerns.

QUESTION: Well, I understand that, but my question was -- did you have legal grounds to stop the ship irrespective of their --

MR. BOUCHER: I think in this situation Ari Fleischer has said in this particular circumstance is the answer is probably no.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Richard, three questions. I don't know if you can answer all of them. One, can you say to any extent that you had before assurances from the Yemeni that they would no longer have any of these shipments coming from Yemen? I'm sorry, coming from North Korea. Two, are you considering actually applying the sanction penalties that you had waived when, I guess this was brought up a couple of months ago and that I understand that for national security reasons before that there was a decision not to apply sanctions. Is that being reconsidered? And three, can you go into any kind of detail, or as best you can, as to what type of assurances in addition to the Yemeni word that they will not be transferred to third-party terrorist states or terrorists?

MR. BOUCHER: Can I pick the question that I remember among all those questions?

QUESTION: All right, I'm sorry.

MR. BOUCHER: Let's see. Let's go through them one by one. Start out with number one.

QUESTION: Do you want me to give you the question again?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes. It was a long time ago.

QUESTION: When you had the discussions in July with the Yemeni, was there any US understanding that not only were there no more purchases, but there was no more shipments? Can you establish if whether you think that this is a sort of violation of the Yemeni word?

MR. BOUCHER: I think, as I've said, we looked at the circumstances today much more than we looked at the circumstances from the last year. We had had these discussions before where they told us they were going to end their missile purchases and received those assurances in the past. But as I said, we looked at the circumstances today, we saw this was the last shipment of something that they said was ordered from before. We looked at their assurances on how they would be used and that they would be kept in their government inventory and decided that it was appropriate for this shipment to go through, and we released the ship cargo to the Yemenis as we should.

So that's as good an answer as I can give you to this particular question.

QUESTION: A few months ago there was a decision to waive those sanctions that were associated with this transfer from North Korea --

MR. BOUCHER: Well, not this --

QUESTION: Not this particular transfer, but other type of transfer.

MR. BOUCHER: Not this transfer, but this type of transfer, one might say. Yes.

That was in what was called Category 2 items transfer from North Korea toYemen. Category 2 items include components and materials used to produce missile technology control regime class missiles and subsystems. The announcement was in the Federal Register on August 23, 2002. Sanctions were imposed on a North Korean entity, the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation on August 16th of 2002. Now, at that time, consistent with US law, the United States decided to waive sanctions that otherwise would have been imposed because of missile nonproliferation commitments made by the Government of Yemen. We decided to waive it because of the commitments that they had made and in consideration of their support for the war on terrorism. Those factors both still apply, obviously. And in cases such as this, this current transfer, I'm sure we'll look at US law, but if necessary, I would expect the waivers to continue to apply.

Was that two and three or was that two?

QUESTION: Do you have any other kinds of assurances besides the Yemeni word that they are not going to transfer the SCUDS? Do you have a way of checking them?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think we have gone into that level of detail now, but they have given us their assurances at various levels that they don't intend to retransfer these SCUDS and I'm sure that we will be happy to make those clear over time, as well.

Elise.

QUESTION: Richard, I'm sure you probably don't have the figures on hand but maybe you could get them about how much military aid, if any, the US gives to Yemen, and if you can speak a little bit about the military relationship with Yemen and whether the fact that Yemen is trying to buy this type of technology from countries that would rather them not, whether you think in the future you might encourage them to deal more with the United States on these type of purchases?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have specific numbers on Yemen's military purchases. And I think you have to look more broadly than that in terms of the developing relationship with Yemen, that over the last year or more we have developed a security relationship with Yemen that's based on cooperation against terrorism. And you will remember President Salih's visit here last year just about this time -- end of November, early December -- where we really did reach some understandings about how we could cooperate against terrorism and we have, in fact, cooperated against terrorism since then.

We have done a lot of cooperation, training, exchange of information, law enforcement cooperation with the Government of Yemen and we want to continue to do that. So it's a relationship, I think, that's been good for the United States and good for Yemen and good for the people of the United States and the people of Yemen.

I think your assumption that they are trying to buy this kind of missile, I think, you know, they have made clear it was something they bought in the past, they paid for it, and wanted their missiles to be delivered, but they made clear to us before and again in these recent conversations that this was the end of their missile purchases and they had no more shipments expected.

QUESTION: I'm saying that there's a State Department handout that is on the website from earlier this year that talks about a deepening military relationship with Yemen. And in the past if they've gotten their military equipment from somewhere else, do you expect that as they move away from countries like North Korea and things like that that US military aid to Yemen might increase? That you're looking at their defensive capabilities in a new way?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think I can speculate on that at this point. If we have something specific that we've done, I'll be happy to check into it, but I don't think I can do any broad speculation at this point.

QUESTION: If you can just look into the figures on US military assistance --

MR. BOUCHER: If there is such thing, I'll check.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. BOUCHER: Yes.

QUESTION: Yes, Richard, just a follow-up on that. When you talked about the sanctions and Category 2 and so on, I assume you're talking about restrictions on US arms sales under the Arms Export Control Act. Is that correct?

MR. BOUCHER: There are a variety of sanctions that apply to missile proliferation - I'm looking to see if I have the exact text. There is the Arms Export Control Act, there's Dual Use stuff under the Export Administration Act. I think there's also the question of purchases and sales to US Government entities -- a lot of different pieces involved. But the point is that the President has had these sanctions, has exercised these sanctions for good reasons. The assurance is cooperation against terrorism. And we'll look at the law in this case, but I would certainly expect those sanctions, those conditions and the waivers to continue to apply.

QUESTION: Can you at least tell us whether anything has happened since then where the waiver made a difference? In other words, have they received anything which they could not have received if this waiver had not been in place?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know. I guess, in part, by looking into her question I'll be answering the same question --

QUESTION: I'm not focused on detailed lists of --

MR. BOUCHER: No, but if we find that there have been purchases and sales of military equipment you can assume that that's stuff that, had we not waived, would not have occurred. Does that make sense?

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. BOUCHER: Yes.

QUESTION: We can assume so, we're not actually sure.

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know right now because I haven't had a chance to look into her question.

QUESTION: Richard, I just want to clarify. You would expect the conditions that applied previously for the waiver to apply this time if there were any sanctionable activity?

MR. BOUCHER: If there were a question of US law involving sanctions, I would expect that, based on the same conditions as last time, that we would exercise the waiver again.

Yes. Nick.

QUESTION: Richard, do you know when that contract was signed? The Secretary said some years ago, but do we know more specifically?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have any more details. You'd have to get that from the Government of Yemen.

QUESTION: And also the, Ari Fleischer mentioned that the United States will seek some kind of a regime similar to the Biological Weapons Convention or the Chemical Weapons Convention, also regimes that regulate the nuclear transfers. Do you have any, please, initial details on what type of regime that would be to regulate missile transfers?

MR. BOUCHER: There is a missile technology control regime, and I think if you look in the Strategy on Weapons of Mass Destruction, for example, there is a series of paragraphs that describe our goals to enhance and strengthen those kind of regimes internationally. So, I am not quite sure what the quote would be from Ari in that regard, but certainly that's one of the elements of the strategy that he has talked about today and we have put out today.

Yes, Joel.

QUESTION: Richard, with respect to North Korea, was this a plan much like the 1962 Cuban Missile-type Crisis whereby a plan maybe by North Korea and others to destabilize the Horn of Africa shipping and even north to Saudi Arabia and other governments?

MR. BOUCHER: Not that I know of, but you can ask them if you want. (Laughter.) I don't know. I wouldn't speculate in that direction.

QUESTION: Do you have any plans to convey your deep concern to the DPRK through diplomatic channel like on New York channel, for example, at this point?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know of any particular diplomatic contact with the North Koreans at this point. The channel is open as necessary, but I think they are fully aware of the concerns the United States has had for many years in previous administrations and this one about North Korea's missile sales.

Jonathan.

QUESTION: Richard, as I'm sure you'll recall, the previous administration believed it was close to reaching an agreement with North Korea on restricting missile exports. Does this administration have any regrets that it failed to follow up on that and therefore might have missed an opportunity to prevent this shipment?

MR. BOUCHER: I think I have to stand on my head. That question is so upside-down, I don't quite know how to answer it. The last administration, as you will recall, did not conclude an agreement with North Korea to curb its missile exports and, if you recall, the last administration did not conclude that agreement because they were unable to reach understandings on provisions of verification and compliance that were very important to them. This administration has identified a number of issues that we want to deal with with North Korea. And we have always said that they need to be done in a manner that can be clear to both sides.

We, as you'll remember, went out with Jim Kelly's trip earlier this year and said we were prepared to take a bold approach to resolving these issues, including the issues of missiles. And unfortunately, North Korea's failure to comply with previous agreements regarding nuclear weapons is what has stood in the way of resolving these issues.

QUESTION: Yes, but you went into suspension not with the State Department's approval, as we all understand, for about a year and you lost momentum in dealing with North Korea.

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think that's --

QUESTION: That's this administration.

MR. BOUCHER: Barry, if you remember, in June of 2001, the President put a statement --

QUESTION: A reassessment.

MR. BOUCHER: No. Not reassessment, Barry. Read the President's statement -- end of May, early June, 2001, ready for serious discussions with North Korea on the issues, including the issue of missile exports. So don't say it was this administration's year-long suspension.

Charlie.

QUESTION: You were speaking about the previous administration's failings --

MR. BOUCHER: No, I didn't say the previous administration failed. I said the previous administration, as your colleague said, wanted an agreement, but the North Koreans failed to agree to any terms on verification, and they, quite rightly, were unable to conclude that attempt because they couldn't get from the North Koreans some way of verifying it.

QUESTION: Isn't it something, excuse me, that you've thought about with cutting off the fuel shipments to North Korea and, I believe, North Korea has probably mentioned this as well, that they're going to need to start selling things? They don't have money. They don't have fuel. Aren't you concerned that the policy now of not giving this fuel oil to them will make them branch out and perhaps proliferate more than they might have if they were still getting more support from the KEDO?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't see any cause and effect. I think that would be the ultimate in sophistry to claim that we pushed them into selling missiles by not giving them fuel because they were spending their money on nuclear programs. It just doesn't make sense to me. Sorry.

QUESTION: Richard, would the United States still like a missile control agreement with the North Koreans?

MR. BOUCHER: I think if you look back at what the President said in early 2001 and you look back at what Jim Kelly said in 2002, in the summer when he went to North Korea, you will see that the United States was fully prepared to deal with these issues and to try to reach verifiable agreements with North Korea on the questions of missiles, nuclear and other matters of concern. What stood in the way of that is North Korea's violation of its previous obligations and commitments -- North Korea's pursuit of nuclear enrichment programs despite its previous commitments. Those are the facts.

QUESTION: So, are you trying to say that this is a minor offense and that the real concern is the nuclear program?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I am saying this is one of many concerns.

QUESTION: You said that you're not going to talk to the North Koreans until they verifiably and completely suspend their nuclear uranium enrichment. Does that mean that they'll be no talks on missile transfers and proliferation until they suspend their nuclear program?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we made clear that we were prepared to take a bold approach to solve all these issues, but that that approach was not possible under circumstances where the previous negotiations, the previous commitments, that North Korea had concluded were not being respected.