DATE=12/7/1999 TYPE=BACKGROUND REPORT TITLE=YEARENDER: U-S/NORTH KOREA NUMBER=5-44922 BYLINE=STEPHANIE MANN DATELINE=WASHINGTON INTERNET=YES CONTENT= VOICED AT: INTRO: The United States and North Korea, once battlefield enemies and still ideological adversaries, are working toward normalizing relations. This is the result of a U-S policy review conducted during the past year. Correspondent Stephanie Mann looks at how U-S policy toward Pyongyang has changed and what that may mean in the coming months. TEXT: The United States and North Korea were on opposite sides of a bitter war in the 1950's. Since a truce in 1953, an atmosphere of distrust has kept the two countries on the brink of hostility. // OPT // The United States has more than 35-thousand troops stationed in South Korea. And most of North Korea's one-million-strong army is deployed near the border with the South. // END OPT// Washington and Pyongyang reached an agreement in 1994 that halted North Korea's nuclear weapons program. But the United States and other governments recently suspected the North was secretly continuing its efforts to make nuclear weapons. In 1998, North Korea test fired a medium-range missile that flew over Japan, prompting new fears about North Korea's intentions. There were also signs North Korea was developing long-range nuclear-capable missiles. Given this atmosphere, the Clinton administration launched a policy review, looking for a new way to deal with North Korea. Former Defense Secretary William Perry led the study and presented his conclusions to the President. Mr. Perry says the level of U-S and South Korean deterrence is strong but could be undermined by North Korean nuclear weapons. He says no weapons-grade nuclear material has been produced at Yongbyon in North Korea since the 1994 agreement, but that could easily change. And he says the success of the 1994 accord would be in jeopardy if North Korea develops long-range missiles. Mr. Perry says his final conclusion is that the North Korean government is not on the brink of collapse. So, he says the United States and its allies must deal with Pyongyang the way it is, not the way they wish it would be. Mr. Perry says Washington must try to engage Pyongyang. // PERRY ACT ONE // The first alternative is that if North Korea will forego long-range missiles, as well as nuclear weapons, then we should be prepared, we the allies, should be prepared to move step by step in a reciprocal fashion to normalization - normalization of political relations, normalization of economic relations. // END ACT // On the other hand, Mr. Perry says if Pyongyang is not willing to remove the threat of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, the United States and its allies must act to contain those threats. // PERRY ACT TWO // I am confident that pursuing talks with North Korea seriously and creatively is a good idea, but . I cannot be confident that this process will actually lead to a peaceful peninsula. Therefore, the United States should keep its powder dry. In particular, we should make no reductions in military readiness during the course of these talks. // END ACT // At a Geneva meeting in October, the two sides agreed to work toward normalizing relations, and each made a concession. Washington agreed to ease economic sanctions against North Korea, and Pyongyang promised to suspend missile testing. Korea specialist Scott Snyder says that created the right atmosphere for dialogue, because either party can reverse its concession if it is not happy with the talks. Mr. Snyder, a research fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, expects negotiations will take a long time to make noticeable progress. The next step is for a high level North Korean delegation to come to Washington, but the date has not been set. A Korea specialist at the Institute for Defense Analysis, Katy Oh (Kongdan Oh), says the new approach continues the Clinton administration's engagement policy on a more comprehensive, less piecemeal basis. Ms. Oh says the policy revision was needed. // OH ACT ONE // It was necessary simply because after the Taepodong missile test of August 1998, Japan was very upset and (South) Korea was uncertain, and the U-S also. Not only the Congress, but overall the U-S policymakers and a lot of think- tank experts, including myself, were wondering what was going on between North Korea and the U- S. There was a need to re-examine it. // END ACT // Ms. Oh says William Perry's new approach involves reciprocity - the idea that rapprochement should be based on each side meeting certain conditions. But instead of handling each aspect of relations on a case-by-case basis, Ms. Oh says the United States has offered North Korea what she calls a package deal. // OH ACT TWO // We will try to normalize relations with you, and we will try to help you with economic aid and even food aid, and also agricultural long-term structural aid, and technological aid. We include all that. But at the same time, we expect you to put in your own package that you will not test, sell, and (be) involved in missile development and weapons sales, as well as continuing the nuclear agreement in full force. In that case, your package and our package can be swapped. And that is the new element. // END ACT // Scott Snyder says the policy approach suggested by Mr. Perry has strengthened U-S strategy. But he says it does not yet deal with the problem posed by the huge numbers of conventional weapons deployed on both sides of the demilitarized zone. // SNYDER ACT // In other words, are we over-emphasizing nuclear and missile questions and giving North Korea unnecessary leverage that would be better directed at the conventional military balance and attempts to address that question? // END ACT // Mr. Snyder also says fundamental differences between the two countries' political ideologies and economic systems are bound to complicate the negotiating process. // REST OPT // Before relations can be normalized, Mr. Snyder says some changes may have to occur in the basic nature of the two countries and their attitudes toward each other. For example, he says, if Pyongyang moved toward a less totalitarian system of government, the prospect for normalized relations would be further enhanced. Mr. Snyder says the state of North Korea's economy may also influence the progress of talks in the coming months. He notes in recent years North Korea has been in economic decline and that may have prompted its willingness to cooperate. Now, Mr. Snyder says there are signs its economy may be stabilizing, and he wonders if that will make Pyongyang more difficult to deal with in international negotiations. (SIGNED) NEB/SMN/RAE 07-Dec-1999 13:12 PM EDT (07-Dec-1999 1812 UTC) NNNN Source: Voice of America .
