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TESTIMONY
OF
DR. PATRICK MEEHAN
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PROGRAM NATIONAL
CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(CDC)
AND
AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES
AND DISEASE REGISTRY (ATSDR)
BEFORE THE
HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REGARDING THE ARMY'S CURRENT FORCE
PROTECTION PROGRAM INITIATIVES AND OTHER
MAJOR GROUND COMPONENT ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
APRIL
1, 2004
Mr. Chairman and members of the
Subcommittee, I am Patrick Meehan, Deputy
Director for Program at the National Center
for Environmental Health, one of the centers
within the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC). I would like to thank the
Subcommittee for inviting me here today to
discuss CDC’s legislatively mandated public
health oversight role in the chemical
demilitarization program of the Department
of Defense. I would also like to thank the
subcommittee for your interest in ensuring
the safe destruction and disposal of our
nation’s chemical weapons stockpile.
My
testimony will focus on two general topics:
(1) CDC’s mandated role in overseeing the
plans of the Department of Defense for
destroying the nation’s stockpile of
chemical weapons and (2) CDC’s involvement
at the Newport, Indiana and the Aberdeen,
Maryland disposal facilities.
CDC’s Overall Chemical Demilitarization
Mission
The U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services is mandated by law to oversee the
plans of the Department of Defense for
destroying the nation’s stockpile of
chemical weapons, including any plans to
transport or dispose of lethal chemical or
biological warfare agents. This mandate was
delegated to CDC from the Office of the
Surgeon General in 1981. Our mission in
carrying out the mandate is to protect the
public’s health and safety by reviewing
plans, providing advice, and making
recommendations on the safe disposal and
transportation of both stockpile and
non‑stockpile chemical warfare agents. The
Secretary of Defense is required to
implement CDC’s recommendations for
precautionary measures to protect the public
health and safety. In carrying out these
activities, CDC’s primary focus has been on
preventing potential problems that could
adversely affect the health of disposal site
workers and the surrounding communities.
CDC begins its oversight function for the
disposal of agent by reviewing the Army’s
proposed destruction technology. CDC then
examines facility design provisions and
operating procedures that are to protect the
workforce and surrounding communities.
During operations at chemical weapons
destruction facilities, CDC conducts
periodic on‑site reviews for the purpose of
ensuring safety. Because air monitoring is a
critical element in detecting any possible
agent release incidents, CDC regularly
examines air monitoring procedures and
strategies, including the number and
placement of air monitors as well as the
quality of the data from these systems.
In
addition, CDC, in conjunction with state and
local environment and health authorities
where chemical weapons stockpiles are
located, evaluates other functions at a
chemical destruction site, including process
safety, industrial hygiene, and medical
readiness. Together, such activities
contribute significantly to preventing
exposure to chemical agents. Finally, to
ensure that medical and emergency personnel
near a facility are prepared to respond to
an incident involving release of a chemical
agent, CDC makes itself available to provide
consultation services to those personnel and
the Community Stockpile Emergency
Preparedness Program (CSEPP).
In
undertaking our oversight responsibilities
at destruction sites, CDC is currently
addressing several key issues. First CDC is
working with the Army to implement revised
airborne exposure limits of chemical warfare
agents for workers and the general
population. In response to a request from
the Army, CDC recently updated these limits
to ensure that workers and the public are
protected from exposure to a harmful
concentration of agent. Second, CDC must
strive to ensure worker and public safety
are adequately addressed during the start‑up
of disposal facilities. Third, CDC is in
discussions with the Army to improve air
monitoring methods and technology in such a
way as to reduce false positive instrument
responses, improve response times, and meet
the newly recommended airborne exposure
limits. Finally, we are faced with the task
of examining unique problems impacting human
health associated with new non‑incineration
technologies such as those at Newport and
Aberdeen.
CDC’s Activities at the Newport and the
Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities
Both the Aberdeen and the Newport facilities
were constructed rapidly following the
events of September 11, 2001. The rapid
construction occurred within the goal of
reducing the threat of terrorism in
connection with the nation’s chemical
weapons stockpile. We believe that some of
the difficulties at these facilities arose
because there is less experience with the
new neutralization technologies compared to
the incineration technology used at other
sites. An added challenge is that both
design and construction occurred
concurrently at these facilities.
During 2004, CDC’s chemical demilitarization
program has focused much of its activities
on the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal
Facility in Indiana because the planned
process is a relatively new technology, and
operations are scheduled to begin soon. The
proposed process at Newport, Indiana will
use chemical neutralization of the chemical
agent VX, followed by secondary
transportation to and treatment and disposal
of the resulting wastewater at an off‑site
facility. CDC has devoted significant
resources to evaluating the first phase, the
neutralization of VX at the Newport site.
The two basic concerns with this first phase
are (1) ensuring that the waste hydrolysate,
the waste byproduct of neutralized VX, does
not contain any detectable level of VX and
(2) ensuring that the facility can operate
safety.
Last year, CDC conducted an evaluation of
the Newport site’s hazard analysis process.
The review provided recommendations in
several key areas, including (1) the extent
of independence of the contractor’s review
team, (2) whether the hazard review
methodology is appropriate, (3) whether the
documentation for the review is complete,
(4) the need for a human error/human factors
study, and (5) the need to manage and
evaluate changes to the design and
processes. The Newport staff and contractor
are currently addressing our
recommendations. In addition to the CDC
review, the Newport project team has
contracted with the Mary Kay O’Connor
Process Safety Institute of Texas A & M
University to conduct an independent risk
analysis of the process. CDC will review
the results of the analysis before the
facility begins processing agent.
In
conformity with public laws delineating our
involvement in chemical demilitarization,
CDC’s role generally ends when the waste no
longer contains any detectable level of
chemical weapons agent, at which time the
responsibility for the waste falls under
existing transportation and environmental
disposal regulations. Nonetheless, CDC is
available to provide assistance to the Army
or to EPA within our areas of expertise.
The Army’s proposal for secondary treatment
of Newport caustic hydrolysate at a Dupont
facility in New Jersey has generated
significant public controversy. CDC has
reviewed and provided comment on one draft
Dupont report related to health hazards
associated with the hydrolysate—a document
titled Health Hazard Considerations for
Safe Management of Newport Caustic
Hydrolysate (NCH). CDC was not asked to
review the other three Dupont documents. In
short, CDC has not conducted a
comprehensive review or an analysis of the
proposed project to transport and treat the
secondary waste generated by the VX
neutralization.
The Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal
Facility is another chemical neutralization
facility at which CDC has been active in an
oversight role during the start‑up of
operations. Before the Aberdeen facility
began processing agent, CDC evaluated the
air monitoring systems and laboratory
capabilities, attended integrated operation
demonstrations, and enlisted the support of
occupational health experts at CDC’s
National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health to assist in an examination of
process safety. CDC is aware of the
operational problems at the Aberdeen site
and has been briefed by the Army on the
status of the facility. CDC is planning to
revisit the facility in May of the current
year to review changes the Army has made to
the operation.
Although I have pointed out a number of
challenges currently associated with our
oversight responsibilities, I must also
emphasize that CDC has had a long and
successful working relationship with the
Army’s chemical demilitarization activity.
The successful completion of the agent
destruction mission at Johnson Atoll and the
safe elimination of the GB stockpile at
Tooele, are representative of the true
accomplishments in reducing the threat of
chemical weapons. CDC looks forward to
contributing to continued safe progress in
this vital program.
Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my testimony. I
would be happy to answer any questions and
respond to any requests for additional
information. |
