STATEMENT
BY
MR. PATRICK J. WAKEFIELD
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION AND THREAT
REDUCTION)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY
BEFORE
THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON
THE U.S. CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION
PROGRAM
OCTOBER
30, 2003
Mr.
chairman and Distinguished Committee
Members, I wish to thank you for the
opportunity to appear before the committee
today to discuss the United States Chemical
Demilitarization Program. I am Patrick
Wakefield, the Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Chemical
Demilitarization and Threat Reduction.
I am the single focal point within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense
responsible for the oversight, coordination
and integration of the Chemical
Demilitarization Program; the Assembled
Chemical Weapons Alternative (or ACWA)
Program; Nuclear, Chemical and Biological
Treaties; and Cooperative Threat Reduction
efforts in the countries now referred to as
the Former Soviet Union. With regard
to the Chemical Demilitarization Program
mission, my Primary goals and objectives
are:
-
To
ensure that the leadership of the U.S.
Chemical Demilitarization Program
maintains an enhanced culture of safety
within the workplace, and to confirm our
requirements are clearly communicated
to, understood by, and acted upon by our
contractors and not in conflict with the
overall chemical weapons destruction
mission;
-
To
increase transparency and openness with
the public and the international
community, and to work for cooperation
from special interest groups in
accomplishing our mission, and
-
To
meet our Chemical Weapons Convention
Treaty requirements.
The
mission of the U.S. Chemical
Demilitarization Program is to destroy all
U.S. Chemical Warfare related material while
ensuring maximum protection of the public,
personnel involved in the destruction
effort, and the environment. At first
glance, this appears to be a fairly
straightforward mission, easily achievable
provided reasonable resources and effort.
What we have seen since 1986, when congress
mandated the destruction of our chemical
weapons stockpile, is there are many
unexpected and substantial challenges that
must be overcome while conducting a
national-scale chemical weapons destruction
program. As the GAO recently
highlighted, it is obvious that many of
these challenges corresponding to program
management. The Department has already
taken and is in the process of taking
additional steps to rectify program
management issues and continue to provide
rigorous program oversight.
Recent
Program Changes
Today
I would like to highlight for you the major
changes the Department of Defense is
implementing with respect to the United
States Chemical Demilitarization program.
Earlier this year, the Army consolidated the
program manager for Chemical
Demilitarization and its Chemical Weapons
Storage Mission under a New Agency, the U.S.
Army Chemical Materials Agency, otherwise
known as the CMA. The creation of the
CMA allows us to streamline our overall
efforts with respect to Chemical Weapons
Destruction, and will significantly improve
our program management in the long term.
This will be accomplished by consolidating
accountability, simply going the chain of
command, restructuring and combining
organizational functions to reduce
redundancies, and aligning the program under
the checks and balances of the acquisition
community through the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and
Technology, with continued oversight by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The
creation of the CMA allows us to streamline
our overall efforts with respect to chemical
weapons destruction, and will significantly
improve our program management in the long
term. This will be accomplished by
consolidating accountability, simplifying
the chain of command, restructuring and
combining organizational functions to reduce
redundancies, and aligning the program under
the checks and balances of the acquisition
community through the assistant secretary of
the army for acquisition, logistics and
technology, with continued oversight by the
office of the Secretary of Defense.
Additionally,
the Department of Defense has now selected
destruction technologies at all of our
chemical weapons sites. On July 16,
2002, the department selected
"neutralization followed by
biotreatment" as the technology to
pilot test the destruction of chemical
weapons at the Pueblo, Colorado chemical
depot. On February 3, 2003, the
department selected "neutralization
followed by supercritical water
oxidation" as the technology to pilot
test the destruction of chemical weapons at
the Blue Grass Army depot in Richmond,
Kentucky. These chemical weapons
destruction sites are currently being
managed by the program manager for ACWA as
mandated by public law 107-248.
The
GAO recently found that the division of the
program management structure, currently
bifurcated between the CMA and the program
manager for ACWA, is a significant program
deficiency. The Department of Defense
agrees with the GAO's assertion. While
the Department has operated strictly under
the tenets of public law requiring office of
the Secretary of Defense management of the
ACWA Program, we are looking at further
streamlining the management of the chemical
demilitarization program through statutory
change. The program manager for ACWA
completed his original charter by
successfully demonstrating alternatives to
the incineration process, and the department
now desires his consolidation under the CMA.
This consolidation would significantly
improve the overall management of the
chemical demilitarization program by making
the executive agent of the program, the
army, responsible for the program in its
entirety. We ask for your full support
of this proposal and can provide you more
detailed information upon request.
PROGRAM
STATUS
This year the chemical demilitarization
program has entered a critical phase, with
the Aberdeen, Maryland and Anniston, Alabama
sites operational. Within the next
year, we also expect to commence operations
at three additional sites: Umatilla, Oregon;
Newport, Indiana; and Pine Bluff, Arkansas.
Due
to unfortunate circumstances, the Army
destroyed little chemical agent over the
past year and a half. This is a
primary cause of why the U.S. asked the
organization for the prohibition of chemical
weapons in September for an extension to the
chemical weapons convention intermediate 45%
destruction deadline. I am pleased to
report that the organization granted our
extension request late last week.
While we are assured with a high degree of
confidence this will occur by December 2007,
we expect to achieve this milestone sooner.
We also expect to have to request an
extension to the convention 100% destruction
deadline in 2006. The convention
allows a maximum five year extension of the
100% deadline (until April 2012 at the
latest). As the chemical
demilitarization program matures over the
next few years, the Department will be
better prepared to determine the specific
length of extension required.
PROGRAM
ISSUES AND CONCERNS
Within
the next several years, our most significant
challenge will likely be a result of our
success. As we get our chemical
weapons destruction sites on-line, the army
will have to manage simultaneously, up to
six separate sites, each operating 24 hours
a day, seven days a week, in four separate
time zones, destroying multiple agents, with
different technologies, and different
contractors. As you could surmise,
this will be a significant challenge for the
army, though we are confident they will
perform this task exceptionally.
Other
factors could also present formidable
challenges in our chemical weapons
destruction program:
-
Although
we take every known precaution to
prevent them, accidents and safety
incidents may occur, sometimes crippling
our destruction efforts. We have
considerable strengthened our safety
program to mitigate any accidents to
counter any future risks.
-
We
also face continued opposition from
special interest groups through
litigation.
-
Requirements
for the chemical stockpile emergency
preparedness program (or CSEPP),
continue to grow. The federal
emergency management agency and the army
will continue to validate the states'
CSEPP requirements and ensure that they
meet the 'maximum protection' criteria
codified in U.S. Code 50, Chapter 32,
Section 1521.
-
And,
new environmental permitting and
monitoring requirements can influence
our program. These regulatory
changes introduce improvements which
affect baseline costs and schedules,
though presently this a manageable key
component of our overall chemical
weapons destruction program.
Finally,
at this crucial time in which many
destruction facilities are coming on-line,
effective resource management will be a
critical influence over our overall
destruction strategy.
FINAL
REMARKS
In
conclusion, I want to emphasize the
department's intention to address chemical
demilitarization program management issues
underscores our commitment to strengthening
and improving overall organizational
effectiveness. Change has already
begun at the top, with future changes
expected to positively impact different
aspects and levels of program management.
We have many distinctive challenges; however
we are also poised to work each and every
issue to bolster our overall efforts in this
prominent national security program. I
welcome your comments on all aspects of our
program's progress. I thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and this committee for the
opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to working with you to advance out
common goal of the safe and complete
destruction of our national chemical weapon
stockpile.
