STATEMENT BY
DR. TONY TETHER
DIRECTOR
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
HOUSE ARMED SERVICE
COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MARCH 19, 2003
Mr. Chairman, Subcommittee Members, and
staff: I am Tony Tether, the Director of
the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA.) I am pleased to appear
before you today to discuss DARPA’s research
to counter the weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
that our nation faces today.
At
DARPA, our primary area of emphasis in
countering WMD has been biological warfare
defense (BWD) research, work that we began
in earnest in the mid-1990s when it become
clear that the threat of biological attack
was growing sharply. DARPA moved out ahead
of the threat by establishing a
comprehensive, aggressive, and innovative
BWD program. DARPA’s work complements
mainstream Federal and commercial BWD
efforts. However, DARPA does not constrain
its work to the Validated Threat List
published by the Defense Intelligence Agency
because our enemies will not necessarily
stick to the validated list.
It is important to also work
on “non-validated” threats that could pose a
great danger to our forces.
This lets us pursue general solutions to the
biological warfare (BW) problem, including
the worrisome threat from genetically
engineered pathogens.
A
framework for discussing BWD is to consider
the different stages surrounding a
biological attack. These stages tell us
what we need to do and when we need to do it
– that is, what technology we need and what
research we need to invest in.
· Prior
to a BW attack,
we need to boost our people’s immunity and
the effectiveness of vaccines and, if
possible, do all we can to keep an attack
from happening in the first place.
· During
an attack, we need sensors to
determine its nature – including what agent
was used and who was exposed – to set the
stage for our response.
· In
the minutes and hours after an attack,
we need immediate ways to protect our
people.
· In
the hours to days after an attack, we
must coordinate the first responders and
manage our medical system. During those
same hours and days, we must begin to
diagnose and treat the victims.
· And
in the days and perhaps years after an
attack, we must decontaminate the
attacked area.
Let me take these stages one by one, and
give you a sample of what DARPA has been
doing in each.
Prior to an Attack
Let’s begin with the time before an
attack. Obviously, our number-one priority
is to try to prevent an attack from
occurring at all. We want to discover the
plan for an attack and then take action to
disrupt it before it can be carried out.
This requires good, actionable intelligence,
and DARPA’s Information Awareness Office (IAO)
is focused on developing the tools to ferret
out terrorists’ plans. IAO’s programs have
been the subject of recent controversy, and,
since their scope is counter-terrorism in
general, rather than specifically focused on
countering WMD, I won’t discuss them in
detail today. But IAO’s activities are all
about “connecting-the-dots” to uncover
planned terror attacks and prevent them.
To
protect our people from an attack before it
occurs, we have been working with
considerable success on a compound called
CpG. CpG boosts the body’s natural immunity
to disease, essentially by priming the
immune system to mount an aggressive
defense, which could be of great use to
first responders. And, it can be used as an
adjuvant to dramatically improve the
effectiveness and speed of vaccines. For
example, animal tests have shown that by
combining anthrax vaccine with CpG, we need
less vaccine and fewer doses while achieving
faster protection with fewer side effects.
CpG is part of our comprehensive effort to
take anthrax “off the table” as a threat. I
will talk more about anthrax later, but we
think CpG will prove useful against many
other pathogens. We expect to begin human
trials of CpG with the current anthrax
vaccine this summer.
During an Attack
First,
I’d like to talk about sensors. The ideal
sensor would specifically identify
individual pathogens across the entire range
of pathogens, including previously unknown
ones, and it would be very fast. Moreover,
it would be small, inexpensive, lightweight,
and low-power. Unfortunately, as you might
guess, these qualities tend to be in
conflict with each other, and tradeoffs are
necessary. Hence, we need a whole family of
sensors – different ones optimized for
different purposes. For example, to protect
people from being exposed during an attack,
speed is paramount to protect first
and only later figure out what the pathogen
was. On the other hand, if an attack has
already happened and people have been
exposed, specificity is paramount,
because we need to determine exactly what
people have been exposed to so we can
immediately begin administering the right
treatment. Another issue is the false-alarm
problem, which varies with the specific
environment in which the sensors are used
and whose severity depends on the steps
taken in response to an alarm; in both
aspects, military and domestic applications
differ widely. Across this complex trade
space, DARPA has been working since the
mid-1990’s to develop a family of sensors
that systematically meet these challenges.
A
number of our sensors have been picked up by
the Military Services and are being fielded
or are close to being fielded. DARPA
developed a biosensor microarray for rapid
identification of biological warfare
agents. Like computer chips, which perform
millions of mathematical operations per
second, DARPA’s microarray biochips can
perform thousands of biological reactions in
a minute with great sensitivity. Moreover,
these biochips can be reused up to 50 times,
effectively reducing their cost to about
$1.00 per use. These biochips have been
transitioned to U.S. Army Soldier and
Biological Chemical Command for further
testing against live biological agents.
We
are all familiar with how canaries were used
in coal mines to test the air. DARPA has
been pursuing a similar approach, except in
our case the “canary” consists of cells on a
chip. Cells, of course, do not like being
exposed to pathogens, and they are very fast
and very sensitive indicators of a problem.
Tests have shown that these chips can detect
as few as 10 to 50 viruses or bacteria in
only 10 to 20 seconds.
A
more recent sensor program is TIGER
(Triangulation Identification for Genetic
Evaluation of Risk). TIGER is trying to
develop a universal sensor that can detect
any type of pathogen – even unknown and
engineered ones – through an innovative
method of measuring and weighing nucleic
acid sequences. TIGER
involves integrating data
from multiple regions along an organism’s
genome to derive a unique identifier for
that organism. This should enable us to
detect and classify known and unknown
threats in complex mixtures – especially
those that, today, are known to result in
false-alarm rates so high that other sensors
are effectively useless.
Turning from sensors to making sense of
information, our Bio-Alirt
(Bio-Event Advanced Leading Indicator
Recognition Technology) program, one of our
IAO Programs, is developing software
to detect covert biological attacks early
through statistical, population-level
analysis on items like school and work
absences, over-the-counter medicine
purchases, nurse hot line and poison control
center
calls, and even animal
illness.
Because the surveillance target of Bio-ALIRT
is diseases and not people, individual
identifying information is not needed or
wanted. What is important is statistics
about the population, not the activities of
any individual.
We are also using medical
information in nontraditional ways,
examining items such as initial complaints
or tests that are ordered, rather than
waiting for formal diagnoses. Advancing the
time we detect an attack by even a few days
could help cut short an epidemic and prevent
as many as half the casualties.
Bio-ALIRT technology is currently being used
to monitor the health of our nondeployed
military forces world-wide and will soon be
incorporated into the Joint Medical
Workstation for use by Central Command’s
command surgeon and his staff. Bio-ALIRT
technology is being tested and evaluated
around Washington, DC and Hampton Roads,
Virginia, which have large concentrations of
military assets.
Software developed at the University of
Pittsburgh and Carnegie-Mellon University
has been made available to public health
departments for their use.
In fact, Bio-ALIRT
technology identified outbreaks of scarlet
fever around Washington and the Norwalk
virus at the Marine Base in San Diego,
before they were noticed by local public
health authorities.
Minutes to Hours after an Attack
In
the minutes to hours after a biological
attack, we need to protect the people in the
area of the attack. Our most prominent
program addressing this time period is the
Immune Building program, the goal of which
is to keep people safe inside a building
that has been attacked by bioterrorists.
The Immune Building program predates the
anthrax attack on the Congress, which
demonstrated why such an effort is needed.
Protecting a building from an outside
attack, while not trivial, is fairly well
understood. The more insidious attacks
originate inside a building, as the anthrax
letters of 2001 demonstrated.
Unfortunately, the Heating, Ventilation and
Cooling (HVAC) systems in most office
buildings actually spread an agent around
the building and infect even more people.
DARPA is developing components, systems, and
architectures so “smart” HVAC systems,
including sensors and neutralization
devices, could be used to protect the
occupants of the building from attack and
isolate the attacked area, instead of
exacerbating its severity. These systems
are being designed to protect against
chemical attacks as well.
Hours and Days after an Attack
In
the hours and days after
a biological attack, we enter the
consequence management phase, which involves
managing the first responders and the
medical resources to care for the victims.
About two years ago, DARPA concluded its
ENCOMPASS program, which was designed to
effectively and efficiently deploy scarce
medical resources in chaotic circumstances.
A commercialized version of ENCOMPASS,
LEADERS, provided medical surveillance for
signs and symptoms of a biological attack
for the state of New York within 24 hours of
the attack on the World Trade Center. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) also used LEADERS to monitor for
specified syndromes from hospitals in the
New York City area and report them back in
real-time to the CDC in Atlanta via the
Internet. And, technology from ENCOMPASS is
being used in emergency rooms in Northern
Virginia to help 911 operators properly
route patients.
In
addition, while not originally designed for
consequence management per se, other
technologies that DARPA is working on today
may eventually prove useful in such
situations, particularly if adapted for use
by first responders. For example, we are
developing communications systems that could
create self-forming networks for people on
foot in urban environments (Small Unit
Operations Situation Awareness System
program). We may be able to restore
communications throughout a region via a
highly flexible, airborne communications
switchboard (Airborne Communications Node).
And our work in robotics and ducted-fan
unmanned aerial vehicles (Organic Air
Vehicle) could provide ways to enter and
investigate attacked areas without putting
more people at risk.
We
must also care for the exposed victims.
DARPA’s most prominent medical treatment
program is the Unconventional Pathogen
Countermeasures (UPC) program. UPC is an
aggressive and innovative program that has
been trying to go far beyond
“one-bug/one-drug” therapies for BW
pathogens. Instead, UPC is focused on
trying to develop new drugs and treatments
that would be useful against all pathogens,
known and unknown, naturally occurring and
engineered. We are trying to make drugs to
which pathogens cannot develop
resistance. We are trying to create
therapies to push out the “point of no
return” – that point in the progress of
disease beyond which there is no effective
treatment. Our work here is driven by the
recognition that there are extremely
dangerous natural threats, such as smallpox,
and there are engineered threats – pathogens
we have not seen before and against which
our current vaccines and therapies may not
be effective.
A
highlight of our UPC program has been its
work to eliminate anthrax as a threat, which
was accelerated in the aftermath of the
attack on the Congress. We have been
developing six new, distinct, and
complementary approaches to fighting
anthrax. One is CpG, which, as I mentioned
earlier, can boost immunity and the
effectiveness of vaccines. Another is an
extremely broad spectrum antigenomic drug
that should be able to kill most pathogens.
The antigenomic drug works by “jamming” DNA
that has many AT pairs, the nucleic acid
pair that overwhelmingly dominates the
genetic code of most pathogens. Another
drug is an antibiotic that works by blocking
a critical enzyme that is used briefly and
only during cell replication. It would be
extremely difficult for a pathogen to
develop resistance to either this or the
antigenomic drug. A fourth compound is a
protein that essentially functions as a
decoy to prevent anthrax toxins from being
assembled and released. This might be
particularly helpful in late-stage anthrax
to limit toxicity, while other drugs attack
the infection. A fifth compound is
similarly meant to strengthen the body’s
overall resistance to septic shock, extend
the point of no return, and buy time to
fight the infection. The sixth program uses
an enzyme called lysin as an antibacterial
“precision-guided munition” that
specifically targets and kills the anthrax
bacterium and nothing else. Seventy percent
of mice treated with this enzyme survived
after they were exposed to a lethal dose of
anthrax, compared to no survivors
among the untreated mice. This approach to
fighting disease was featured on the cover
of Nature magazine last August.
I am
pleased to report to you today that, based
on current status of the research and
assuming we continue to get good results, we
anticipate that a majority of these
accelerated anthrax therapeutics programs
will be conducting Phase I human safety
trials by the last quarter of this calendar
year. This is, frankly, better than we
expected. Just as important, and in keeping
with the philosophy of the UPC program, most
of these therapeutics show promise for many
pathogens besides anthrax. For example, the
antigenomic drug, when administered to mice,
has shown itself to be a better treatment
for malaria than the current “gold standard”
antimalarial drug. And most thrilling is
the fact that the antigenomic drug has shown
real potential to become the first actual
therapeutic for both anthrax and smallpox.
Days and Perhaps Years after an Attack
Now let me turn to the last phase of the
postattack timeline, decontamination. The
anthrax release in the Hart Building
demonstrated how difficult it is to clean up
a biologically contaminated building. Even
if systems such as those being developed in
the Immune Building program prove
successful, we must still decontaminate the
affected areas of buildings.
Because
of DARPA’s investments in the Immune
Building program, we were asked to provide
science advisors to the team responsible for
the anthrax decontamination of the Hart
Building. We reviewed decontamination
technologies and conducted quick-turnaround
testing on three separate candidates to
determine efficacy. The chlorine dioxide
approach developed under Immune Building was
selected for the challenging job of
remediating the Hart Building and, more
recently, the Brentwood Post Office. In
addition, DARPA helped identify and obtain
air sampling equipment to support the
Environmental Protection Agency and CDC in
verifying that the buildings were safe for
reoccupation. DARPA also developed,
installed, and tested mail-screening
equipment to prevent additional
contamination from entering the buildings
through the mail system.
Finally, in the area of non-BWD
decontamination, increasing attention is
being paid to the threat of a radiological
dispersal device, the so-called “dirty
bomb.” Nuclear decontamination of an area,
especially an urban setting, is an
enormously difficult and expensive problem
and helps explains its appeal to terrorists
bent on creating physical, psychological,
and economic havoc. This fiscal year, DARPA
has begun studying decontamination methods
and technologies following an attack using
this kind of terrorist device.
I
hope this brief sampling has illustrated the
breadth and depth of DARPA’s efforts to
counter weapons of mass destruction,
particularly biological warfare. Our
initial work in 1995 on biological warfare
defense has grown and adapted, we have made
very solid progress over the past eight
years. But we also know the threat remains
quite real and may be spreading. We
continue to press ahead to develop
technologies that will change our
fundamental approach to all phases of the
biological attack timeline.
This concludes my remarks. Thank you for
this opportunity to discuss DARPA’s
biological warfare defense research. I
would be happy to answer any questions.
