STATEMENT BY
DR. DALE KLEIN
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
HOUSE ARMED SERVICE
COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
CONCERNING
COUNTERING THE THREAT OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
MARCH 19, 2003
Chairman
and Distinguished Members: I was appointed
by President Bush in November 2001,
following Senate advice and consent, to my
present position. Within the Department of
Defense, I have responsibility for all
matters concerning the formulation of policy
and plans for nuclear, chemical and
biological defense programs. However, I
will focus most of my remarks on chemical
and biological defense programs rather than
on my nuclear responsibilities. While the
committee has asked our panel to appear in
the connection of terrorist use of Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD), our concern
includes any WMD threat against our women
and men in uniform. It is not just enough
to consider terrorism—we must also consider
traditional acts of war, industrial or
transportation accidents, weather-induced
releases, operator errors or other potential
predicates for WMD release. The warfighting
commander does not need to consider if a
trucker failed to close a valve or if
lightning struck a toxic industrial chemical
storage site or if al Qaeda operatives are
releasing toxins near an overseas base. In
each case, the warfighting force needs
protection. The experts before you today
develop technology solutions; work on new
concepts to improve tactics, techniques, and
procedures; provide WMD combat support
expertise; and manage the fulfillment of our
chemical and biological defense equipment
requirements with the industrial base of our
nation and our allies. Due to the support
of the Congress and with the help of the
resources you have made available to the
Department; our fighting forces are equipped
and trained far better than in 1991 during
OPERATION DESERT STORM. The priority placed
on, and concern taken with, chemical and
biological defense shows a focus at a high
level. In fact my boss, Pete Aldridge,
commented that for a period of time, he was
spending more of his personal attention on
anthrax vaccine than on the Joint Strike
Fighter which may become the largest program
in DoD history! I want to assure members
and our citizens we are supporting our
troops and that the equipment they will use
has been designed and tested to withstand
enemy chemical or biological attack. Our
logistics experts have made sure that the
right equipment has been supplied to the
right units at the right time. Commanders
have conducted numerous training drills
simulating WMD attacks and our troops have
practiced their individual protection
actions. I am confident we are as ready as
we can be given the technology available
today.
Congress
has called for and we have delivered on a
number of initiatives which significantly
improve our ability to protect our fighting
forces in the field, at sea, or in the air.
We have improved detection and
identification technologies; individual
protection systems; decontaminants;
biological medical protection; and,
warfighter awareness of the threat. Our
commanders in the field have the benefits of
those improvements. I will describe, in
specifics, Force Protection Initiatives,
Biological Detection Capabilities, Chemical
and Biological Protection Ensembles and
Biological Defense Vaccines.
Force
Protection Initiatives
In
fiscal year 2003, $32.9 million was
allocated for installation protection
equipment within the Chemical and Biological
Protection Program. The Chemical and
Biological Installation Protection Equipment
is an integrated suite of highly effective
sensors and related equipment to be
installed at nine stateside military
installations. The equipment suite will
provide tiered sampling and collection,
detection, identification and warning
capabilities. It is designed to provide
early, indoor and outdoor collection,
detection, presumptive identification, and
warning. Confirmatory identification and
enhanced medical surveillance capability is
also included.
In the
Fiscal Year 2004 President’s Budget, we have
requested a significant force protection
initiative. This program will provide
chemical and biological protection coverage
to 200 DoD installations. This protection
will include sensors to detect radiological
threats. The equipment to be deployed will
be integrated in the base operational
command and control infrastructure.
Bio-detection equipment will consist of
automated Joint Biological Point Detection
Systems and Portal Shield systems along with
manual dry filter unit samplers. Support
from laboratories will consist of tiered,
multi-technology, confirmatory testing
protocols. Chemical detection will be
provided by Automatic Chemical and Agent
Detector Alarms and the Joint Chemical Agent
Detector integrated with base command and
control systems. The program will procure
initial detection agent consumables, new
equipment training, spares, contractor
logistics support and operators.
Biological Detection Capabilities
Aside
from a sick person requesting medical aid,
biological detection capabilities available
in 1991 were very limited. The primary
system available included assays that were
manually operated, capable of detecting only
a few pathogens and were susceptible to
false readings. Over the past several
years, the Department has fielded several
new biological detection capabilities. With
the Army’s Biological Detection Companies,
the Biological Integrated Detection System
or BIDS, will provide a multi-technology
point detection system. The Navy has
installed the Interim Biological Agent
Detector on ships deploying to the Persian
Gulf. In addition, we have fielded the
Portal Shield network sensor system for
protection of critical fixed sites. We have
also fielded the Biological Weapon Sampling
Kit which includes hand-held
immunochromatographic assay, a simple,
antibody-based test used as a quick screen
to presumptively identify biological agents
from environmental samples. The M93A1 NBC
Reconnaissance System provides a variety of
capabilities including the new Chemical and
Biological Mass Spectrometer and improved
warning and reporting systems to reduce
reaction time throughout the theater.
The
comment I heard on my first visit to the
field and one I have heard frequently,
involves the need for standoff detection of
biological agents. I want to be especially
candid: the problem of stand-off detection
of biological pathogens in near-real-time
remains an extremely difficult challenge.
We can detect many important kinds of
dangerous radiological and chemical threats
at stand-off distances in near-real-time.
However, there are many interfering
biological signals present in the
environment; we must be able to distinguish
between the dangerous and benign strains;
and we will have to determine if threat
organisms will remain viable and pathogenic
as they traverse the space between their
current location and the deployed military
force. We are investigating techniques such
as multi-spectral laser-based technologies
to provide earlier warning to our
warfighters.
Chemical and Biological Protective Ensembles
Beginning in 1996, an improved individual
protective ensemble known as the Joint
Service Lightweight Integrated Suit
Technology (JSLIST) first became
available. JSLIST, or in Marine parlance,
Saratoga, replaced the Battle Dress
Overgarment (BDO), used in OPERATION DESERT
STORM, as our first choice in individual
protection. While BDOs remain fully
effective and available as a backup, they
are heavier than the JSLIST. My wife
actually wore the BDO during her service in
OPERATION DESERT STORM. She told me the
carbon protective element of the BDO would
leak through the inner liner and provide a
thin and unattractive coating of black dust
on her skin. This characteristic didn’t
make wearing the BDO popular! The JSLIST
provides a greater duration of protection
once presented with a chemical threat and it
may also be laundered. As you know, the
Department discovered defective BDOs
purchased before the JSLIST became
available. We were able to locate 600,000
defective BDOs before issue to units. All
units were advised to use the remaining,
already distributed, defective BDOs for unit
training use only and remove them from war
reserve stocks. Three different times, the
Army has tasked units to search for and
remove from war reserve stocks any defective
BDOs identified by lot number. Much has
been made of the possibility that defective
BDOs remain in the logistics pipeline
because we did not account for every
defective BDO as it was used in training.
While I cannot fully eliminate the
possibility that in a locker somewhere there
might be a small handful of defective BDOs,
I believe the possibility is quite low and I
am confident this issue has been resolved.
Since
initial fielding, there has been increased
emphasis to field JSLIST to the entire force
and to phase out the BDO entirely. Our
procurement strategy, supported by
Congressional authorization and
appropriations, has permitted the Department
to ensure that all of our forces in the
region will have two JSLIST each and Marines
will have three each. Continued production
in JSLIST procurement is needed to fully
replace the BDO, and to replace any JSLIST
used if hostilities occur.
The
Department is committed to improving the
design of the JSLIST. We are investing in
our science and technology base to find
non-carbon based materials to reduce weight
and thereby improve comfort and mobility.
We are attempting to develop
self-detoxifying clothing that will allow
our personnel to better sustain operations
in a contaminated environment with reduced
risk. Additionally, improved masks and
filters are being designed to increase
protective margins, improve visual
awareness, and improve weapon system
compatibility.
Biological Defense Vaccines
Medical
protection is crucial to military operations
and success in the field. In 1991, we had
very limited stocks of vaccines and no way
to surge production. Currently we have a
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved
production line for anthrax vaccine. FDA
approval was not obtained without a strong
effort by both the government and the
contractor members of the team. All
deploying forces receive smallpox and
anthrax vaccines. DoD supplies anthrax
vaccine to other federal agencies once DoD
requirements are fulfilled. The Joint
Vaccine Acquisition Program is working to
fulfill defense biological vaccine
requirements including maintenance of a
military vaccine stockpile. The Department
is working with the private sector, the
Department of Health and Human Services, and
the Department of Homeland Security to
establish a national approach to assured
vaccine supplies both for homeland security
and homeland defense missions.
Summary
DoD
places a very high emphasis on protecting
our warfighters from chemical and biological
agents. We are ready for combat operations
in southwest Asia. We are working many
approaches: arms control, cooperative
international programs, combat operations,
and consequence management operations, to
name just a few. We intend to reduce,
eliminate, or secure WMD sources. We will
predict, detect, and interdict the
transmission of WMD to the extent possible.
Finally when we are targeted, we will
protect our people and facilities and follow
with effective decontamination. We are
better prepared on all fronts: battle
management, contamination avoidance,
individual and collective protection,
medical countermeasures, and
decontamination. We deeply appreciate the
support of the Committee and the members and
we are grateful for the sacrifices of our
troops, their families, and our coalition
partners.
