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STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE PAULA A. DESUTTER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
BUREAU OF VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
4 MARCH 2003
Mr.
Chairman, it is an honor to appear here today
to discuss Cooperative Threat Reduction and
the responsibilities of my bureau, the Bureau
of Verification and Compliance. The CTR effort
and the work of verification are
complementary. Programs initiated and funded
through CTR are intended to secure weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) sites throughout
Russia, fund destruction of weapons of mass
destruction, and prevent the transfer of
weapons, dangerous materials, and technologies
to terrorists and terrorist sponsor states.
The job of verification is to assess whether a
particular nation has met its obligations and
commitments and to seek to reinforce efforts
to bring noncompliant parties back into full
compliance with their obligations.
I would
like to note at the outset that we have had
excellent cooperation with Senator Lugar, the
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, and his staff, on compliance issues
related to CTR, particularly on Russian
compliance with the Chemical Weapons
Convention. I would also note that the
President’s granting of a waiver this January
for continuing CTR funding reinforces the fact
that there is still much to be accomplished.
As we look to the future, I believe we should
ensure that the funding provided for securing
sites and destroying WMD material should also
increase our certainty that the most serious
threat has been lessened and the purpose
achieved.
As the
Assistant Secretary for Verification and
Compliance, I have the lead responsibility for
tracking, determining, and reporting on areas
of noncompliance. My bureau also prepares the
President’s Annual Report on Adherence to and
Noncompliance with Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments.
My comments are drawn from my knowledge of
that report and others that the Verification
and Compliance Bureau has coordinated. I am
particularly concerned about Russian
compliance, access to the most sensitive sites
-- whether biological, chemical, or nuclear --
and providing for improvements in
transparency. I’ll also address the emphasis
and need for greater transparency as we
prepare to ratify the Moscow Treaty.
That the
Soviet Union violated its arms control
obligations is beyond dispute. What is
important now is that we gain adequate
information to give confidence that those who
inherited the Soviet WMD programs are
committed to their security and elimination.
While access could confirm our assessments of
past noncompliance, it is also a necessary
element in the path back into compliance.
I’ll offer several examples.
Russian
Noncompliance with the Biological Weapons
Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention
· We
believe, based on available evidence, that
Russia continues to maintain an offensive
biological weapons program in violation of the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).
· We
believe that the Russian Federation has not
divulged the full extent of their chemical
agent and weapon inventory, and that the
declaration is incomplete with respect to
chemical weapons production, development
facilities and chemical agent and weapons
stockpiles. Such activities are inconsistent
with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
As this
Committee knows, the Soviet Union had an
offensive biological weapons program in
violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention. The Soviet program was the
world’s largest and consisted of both military
facilities and civilian research and
development institutes.
In the
late 1980’s and early 1990’s, over 60,000
people were involved in the research,
development, and production of biological
weapons in the Soviet Union. The annual
production capacity was several thousand tons
of various agents. In 1992, the Russian
government publicly acknowledged the Soviet
program and committed to ending the former
Soviet biological weapons program. We knew
the program was massive and that it would be
no easy matter for Russia to terminate the
offensive program. Our noncompliance findings
in the early 1990’s reflected this. However,
starting perhaps with Russia’s 1992
declaration, provided under confidence
building measures it agreed to as part of the
BWC Review Conference, there were problems.
Their 1992 Declaration was incomplete and
misleading. In an effort to resolve our
concerns, a U.S., UK, Russia “Trilateral
Process” was initiated in 1992. As outlined
in the Joint Statement, it called for a series
of confidence-building visits and information
exchanges designed to demonstrate progress
toward achieving openness. However, this
process did not resolve all U.S. concerns and
broke down in the mid-1990’s. While there has
been downsizing and restructuring of the
biological weapons program, and research and
production facilities have seen severe cuts in
funding and personnel, some key components of
the former Soviet program may remain largely
intact. Of particular concern is the
possibility that some facilities, in addition
to being engaged in legitimate activity, may
be maintaining the capability to produce
biological weapons agents.
Previous
assessments of Russian compliance have
highlighted the dichotomy between what appears
to be the commitment of key members of the
Russian leadership to resolve BWC compliance
issues and the continued involvement of “old
hands” in BWC Protocol negotiations and in
what Russia describes as its defensive
biological weapons program. We appreciate
expressions of commitment. However, what we
need is for these expressions to be translated
into practice.
A report
prepared in support of a CTR waiver in
December, 2002, also notes “There continues to
be a profound lack of openness about the
offensive BW program inherited from the Soviet
Union . . . The 1992 declaration also failed
to list all of the sites that supported the
Soviet offensive BW program and that retain at
least some of their offensive capability.”
The same report outlines progress made in
terms of cooperation-related visits to several
key Soviet-era civilian BW production
facilities in Russia, but observed “Russia
continues, however, to deny Western access to
certain biological facilities, including those
believed to have been associated with the
Soviet offensive BW program.”
There is
no disagreement about the nature of the
program or what is required to address the
problem. We need greater access -- not only
to the biological weapons sites -- but to
chemical weapons activities as well.
Focus on
Noncompliance with the CWC
In
becoming a State Party to the Chemical Weapons
Convention, Russia accepted legal obligations
to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile and
to forego the development or possession of
chemical weapons. This includes the chemical
weapons stockpile and program remaining in
Russia at the breakup of the USSR. In recent
years, the Russian Federation has taken steps
to strengthen its chemical weapons destruction
program, including consolidating
responsibility under civilian leadership and
significantly increasing funding. Progress
has been slow and Russia has had to request
extensions on its chemical weapons destruction
deadlines from the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). With
international assistance, Russia, in
mid-December 2002, started destroying its
Category 1 blister agent stockpile. However,
we remain concerned that Russia may not have
fully declared its chemical weapons stockpiles
and facilities. In addition, Russia may
maintain chemical weapons production
mobilization capabilities. For example,
Moscow television commentary related to a July
1998 OPCW inspection of the Khimprom Chemical
Weapons Production Facility (CWPF) in
Novocheboksarsk noted that, “in line with
safety regulations, the so-called mobilization
capacities are being maintained. This is
costing Khimprom vast sums of money even
though this is a matter for the federal
government.” Clearly, any offensive chemical
weapons program is a violation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
Ending
Russia’s Offensive CW Activities
The United
States continues to work closely with Russia
in an attempt to resolve our concerns with
Russia’s CWC declaration. We have an intense
dialogue on these issues, even if we have yet
to achieve satisfaction on our concerns. On
several occasions, Secretary Powell, Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, John Bolton, and other
senior U.S. officials have stressed the
importance of resolving these concerns,
particularly related to Russia’s CW stockpile,
with senior Russian officials, including the
Chairman of the State Commission on Chemical
Disarmament.
The United
States and the Russian Federation also hold
periodic bilateral meetings at the expert
level, with political oversight. The last
experts’ meeting on declaration issues was
held in February 2002. The primary topic of
discussion during that meeting entailed our
concerns with the Russian chemical weapons
stockpile. In response to official U.S.
questions about Russia’s stockpile
declaration, Russia provided some additional
information and a proposal for U.S. experts to
review documentation related to its declared
CW stockpile. Consequently, a team of experts
visited Moscow in early December 2002 to
conduct the documentation review. However,
the Russian Federation only offered for review
documents already available to the United
States through the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
The
United States also proposed to Russia that
U.S. experts conduct site visits as part of
our plan to resolve concerns related to the
Russian chemical weapons stockpile. The U.S.
proposal requests a series of short-notice
visits, with unimpeded access, to undeclared
suspect Russian chemical weapons sites. The
United States also provided detailed
procedures governing how such visits would be
conducted and made clear that such visits were
not reciprocal. To date Russia has only
agreed to site visits at declared chemical
weapons storage and destruction facilities.
The United States has made clear our concern
is not with declared facilities, but with
sites that were not declared under the CWC.
Consultations are continuing on this U.S.
proposal. A letter from Senator Lugar to
Foreign Minister Ivanov reinforced our
concerns. We explained the situation to
Senator Lugar’s staff and, as a result, the
Senator raised this issue on several occasions
with Foreign Minister Ivanov. I raise this as
an example of how we can work together to use
the CTR program, the reports, and the waiver
process to try to bring Russia into
compliance.
Russia is
continuing to revise its previous plan for
destroying its stockpile of nerve agents. On
July 5, 2001, the Russian government approved
the revised chemical weapons destruction plan
(Resolution No. 510) that amends the initial
Russian plan of March 21, 1996, (Resolution
No. 305). Russia has provided the United
States and the OPCW numerous details on the
planned destruction of its nerve agent
stocks. However, the United States is
continuing to seek additional clarification as
the Russian plan continues to evolve.
Gaining
access to sites of concern is not only
critical for programs that have been
identified, it underscores the need for
transparency that will define our relationship
with Russia in the future.
We have
over the past two years seen surprising
cooperation between the United States and
Russia, as Presidents Bush and Putin have
defined a new course forward for our bilateral
relationship. One striking example of this is
our ongoing cooperation in the global war on
terrorism, which includes, among other things,
significantly increased exchanges of
intelligence. We hope to bring this kind of
cooperation and transparency to address our
BWC and CWC concerns as we further develop our
relations with Russia.
The Moscow Treaty
Another example of cooperation
between the United States and Russia is the
Treaty of Moscow, signed by the two Presidents
last May, which provides for significant
reductions in strategic offensive forces. The
Moscow Treaty recognizes a new strategic
relationship between the United States and
Russia based on the understanding that the
principles, which will underpin our
relationship, are mutual security, openness,
cooperation, and predictability. This
understanding played an important role in our
judgments regarding verification.
As was
discussed with the Senate in support of Moscow
Treaty ratification, the United States will
gain transparency into the disposition of
Russia’s strategic nuclear warheads and the
overall status of reductions in its strategic
forces through our own intelligence resources,
bilateral assistance programs, including CTR,
the START Treaty, and the work of the
Consultative Group for Strategic Security (CGSS)
and the Moscow Treaty’s Bilateral
Implementation Commission. We expect Russia
to gain transparency in much the same way.
Information obtained through START’s
verification regime, including its data
exchanges and short-notice on-site
inspections, and U.S. national intelligence
resources will continue over the course of the
decade to add to our body of knowledge
regarding the disposition of Russia’s
strategic nuclear warheads and the overall
status of reductions in Russia’s strategic
nuclear forces. Moreover, the ongoing U.S.
programs to assist Russia in eliminating its
strategic offensive arms and enhancing the
safety and security of nuclear warheads in
Russia will provide additional transparency
into Russia’s reduction efforts.
We also
recognize that more contacts and exchanges of
information could be useful. The CGSS met in
September 2002 and the Working Groups have
been meeting as well. The Bilateral
Implementation Commission will meet once the
Treaty enters into force.
It is
possible that the Russian Federation may need
additional nonproliferation and threat
reduction assistance as it reduces its
strategic nuclear warheads under the Moscow
Treaty. As these discussions develop, we
intend to continue to work with Russia, under
the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
program. We hope that the U.S. assistance
programs remain as robust as they have in the
past, since they have the opportunity to
contribute both to threat reduction (safety
and security), as well as to our body of
knowledge, as we implement treaties.
Conclusion
Mr.
Chairman, thank you for the invitation to
speak today. I believe that the Cooperative
Threat Reduction programs can contribute to
verification of arms control and proliferation
agreements and commitments. These programs
are another means to bring Russia into
compliance with their obligations and
commitments. Much has been done, but as the
President has made clear in his decision not
to certify Russian commitment to compliance,
much remains to be done.
The
Executive Branch’s efforts to accomplish these
goals are multiplied by active support of the
Legislative Branch in these endeavors.
So Mr.
Chairman, Members of the Committee, I thank
you for your interest and for inviting me to
discuss the verification and compliance
perspective on the CTR programs. |
