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STATEMENT OF
DR. J.D. CROUCH II
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
BEFORE THE 108TH CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
4 MARCH 2003
COOPERATIVE THREAT
REDUCTION PROGRAM
Thank
you for inviting me to discuss the Department
of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction
program (CTR), and the President’s request for
fiscal year 2004 CTR funding.
The CTR
program is a product of Congressional action –
the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of
1991, which directed DoD to assist the states
of the former Soviet Union in dismantling,
destroying, consolidating and securing
Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction and
means of their delivery. As we think about
how to change CTR to meet changed security
challenges, we have to look back carefully
over a record of accomplishment, yet one with
many hard lessons. As we plan for the future,
we must look ahead with a realistic vision of
what can and cannot be done with CTR
recipients.
This
committee has been instrumental in helping DoD
focus its CTR efforts on projects with the
greatest potential benefit to US security.
The oversight role you have played has also
helped ensure that our CTR investments have
been effective and used for their intended
purposes. Your involvement has also helped us
convince recipients of CTR assistance that
they need to abide by their commitments.
Old
and New Factors Guiding CTR.
As we look ahead, there are a number of key
factors that have not changed since the first
days of CTR implementation:
· Russia
continues to hold the single largest stock of
WMD in the world, representing a significant
proliferation risk to the United States, its
friends and allies.
· FSU
states may be willing to eliminate or secure
some of their WMD materials, but are not doing
so on their own.
We also note several new
factors as we plan for the future, and take
account of many lessons learned.
· Proliferation
of WMD to terrorist organizations is now as
much of a threat as proliferation of WMD to
rogue states.
· Porous
borders in the FSU offer the potential for
illicit transit of WMD and related materials
to terrorist organizations and their sponsors.
· The
September 2002 National Security Strategy
and the December 2002 National Strategy to
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
highlighted the significant role
nonproliferation and threat reduction programs
play in preventing rogue states and terrorists
from acquiring WMD and related materials,
technology and expertise.
· We
now know that every assumption, expectation
and schedule for a project must be verified
repeatedly.
We have learned that, with
respect to Russia in particular, there are
difficult challenges to providing assistance
that is designed first and foremost to serve
United States national security interests.
Confidence and Credibility.
The year since I last testified
to Congress on CTR has been a difficult one
for the program.
At this time last year, Russia
had just told us that a facility built with
approximately $106 million in CTR assistance
would have no use. The missile fuel it was
intended to neutralize had been diverted to
the Russian commercial space program. The
waste in US tax dollars represented by the
so-called “heptyl” facility situation was
inexcusable.
The
heptyl situation was a wake-up call. We
impressed on the Russian government at all
levels the gravity of the situation that their
negligence had created. But more importantly,
we looked inward at how the program has been
managed, and found ways to better protect CTR
investments.
· We
asked the DoD Inspector General to review the
program. The first phase of the IG’s report
was completed in September 2002. OSD has
worked closely with the IG, which has joined
the CTR executive review team in meetings with
Russian officials.
· We
instituted a program of semi-annual “executive
reviews” with Russian agencies that serve as
executive agents for CTR projects. These
reviews, of which two have already been
conducted, revalidate project plans and permit
more direct, senior level input on CTR to the
Russian bureaucracy.
· We
analyzed all pending CTR projects for risks
that were similar to the heptyl facility
situation – reliance on good faith Russian
promises or assumptions – and are currently
working to convert such undertakings to
formal, legal agreements. At least two of
these four agreements should be signed by the
end of this month.
· In
the wake of the heptyl situation, we
reaffirmed some key management practices that
have protected US investments in the past: CTR
does not provide direct cash grants to
recipient governments; most CTR prime
contractors are US companies, and when any
Russian contractors are used today, they are
hired on a firm, fixed-price basis.
· We
have also reaffirmed the need for transparency
and access to confirm requirements for, and
use of, CTR assistance. For example, we
pressed the Russian MoD for agreements
guaranteeing access to loosely guarded nuclear
weapons storage sites and transshipment areas
where CTR would like to assist with security
and inventory control systems. The site
access agreements were recently approved as a
prerequisite for CTR assistance.
· In
addition, negotiations continue on an
agreement guaranteeing DoD access to the
fissile material storage facility being built
with CTR assistance. This agreement will
provide for access during loading of the
facility and permanently thereafter to ensure
that only weapons-grade material is being
stored.
Another
illustration of the difficulty of dealing with
another country’s infrastructure relates to
local politics.
DoD officials were informed that local leaders
in Russia’s Udmurt Republic had reversed their
prior position and would bar construction of a
solid-rocket motor destruction facility. This
facility was intended to support the ambitious
decommissioning schedule for Russia’s mobile
SS-24 and SS-25 missiles. CTR had invested
some $14 million in the Udmurt site, near the
city of Votkinsk. CTR had also invested
approximately $85 million in designs and
testing for the rocket motor disposal facility
to have been built at Votkinsk.
The
Votkinsk situation is similar to the heptyl
situation in one respect. A significant US
non-proliferation investment was jeopardized.
However,
the Votkinsk situation is different from the
heptyl situation in many other ways. Our
information is that the Russian federal
government made significant attempts to secure
the necessary land and environmental permits
from local officials. In addition, the
Russian executive agent has come up with its
own alternatives to the Votkinsk facility, as
well as some of its own funding. Moreover,
Russian officials were fully transparent with
us regarding the local political problems as
soon as they began brewing last year.
Finally, over 400 SS-24 and SS-25s are still
scheduled to begin decommissioning later this
year: as opposed to the heptyl situation,
there remains a proliferable commodity that
the US has an interest in destroying.
A final
decision on whether or how CTR might provide
additional assistance to facilitate these
goals has not been made. Yet, we are again
confronted with a potentially significant loss
of CTR investment.
The past
year has been extremely frustrating. It
serves as a reminder that we need to do better
internally; I think we have moved quickly to
put better management controls in place. But
the past year also highlights how hard it is
to pursue this type of program in a state like
Russia, even if we do everything correctly.
Implementing Lessons Learned.
One of the key lessons learned
is that CTR recipients are not always all
alike. The Administration’s recent
implementation of the program recognized that
in the case of Russia, we cannot conduct
business as usual. For example, for fiscal
year 2002, Russia was not certified as
eligible for CTR assistance, while all other
states for which the funding was requested
were certified.
Russia
was not certified because the President could
not confirm Russian compliance with biological
and chemical weapons agreements as required by
the National Defense Authorization Act of
1993. This was a departure from years past,
and all new assistance for Russia was
suspended for much of 2002.
Congress
granted the President’s request for authority
to waive the certification requirements. The
President exercised this authority with
respect to Russia for 2002 and 2003 because
the benefit to US national security of CTR
assistance was deemed to outweigh the concerns
about Russian behavior. Obviously, we take
the authority Congress gave us to waive these
restrictions very seriously, and must
continually weigh the benefits of executing
the waiver against the costs.
This
Administration revised CTR’s four central
objectives last year. The current objectives
are:
· Dismantle
FSU WMD and associated infrastructure;
· Consolidate
and secure FSU WMD and related technology and
materials;
· Increase
transparency and encourage higher standards of
conduct;
· Support
defense and military cooperation with the
objective of preventing proliferation.
These revised objectives guide
CTR activities as we ensure the program also
supports the global war on terrorism through
defense and military cooperation on border
security, and the biological and chemical
weapons proliferation prevention initiatives.
CTR can make a valuable
contribution to the global war on terrorism.
We have taken the expertise developed from WMD
dismantlement in the FSU and are turning it
toward some of the most important threats
President Bush has outlined in the fight
against terrorism. We are expanding the
biological weapons proliferation prevention
program and focusing on the most proliferable
types of chemical weapons. We are also
leveraging CTR’s experience to address the
porous borders in the non-Russian former
Soviet, a potentially significant trafficking
area for WMD.
We are also looking beyond
Russia and the Soviet legacy. The
Administration is proposing legislation that
would give the President authority to use up
to $50 million annually in CTR funds outside
the FSU to resolve critical proliferation
threats, or to take advantage of opportunities
to achieve long-standing nonproliferation
goals. This proposal recognizes that the
world has changed since CTR began and that the
program should change with it to best protect
US interests. We contemplate using this
authority where DoD has a sizable presence, or
in close coordination with other departments
to maximize the expertise US agencies can
bring to bear against a proliferation threat.
Russia.
The United States would like to see Russia
become a full partner in the Global War on
Terrorism and combating WMD proliferation;
comply fully with its arms control and
nonproliferation obligations; and safely and
securely store its nuclear weapons, fissile
material and dangerous pathogens.
This is a vision for Russia, parts of which
CTR may help realize. The reality tells us
that we must be very cautious, and find new
ways to protect US investment in CTR projects.
Russia: Strategic Offensive
Arms Elimination (SOAE).
The FY 2004 budget request
includes $57.6 million for SOAE, a $12.5
million decrease from FY 2003, reflecting a
carryover of unobligated funds from previous
years. The carryover results principally from
the 2002 delay in certifying Russia for CTR
assistance. SOAE assists Russia in
eliminating strategic delivery systems and
infrastructure. SOAE assistance is framed as
an incentive for Russia to draw down its
former Soviet nuclear forces. One of the
larger project areas under SOAE relates to
Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher
Elimination, where $25.9 million is requested
for FY 2004. $18.7 million is requested for
SLBM Launcher Elimination and SSBN
Dismantlement. This is a $7.3 million
increase from FY 2003, resulting from our plan
to dismantle two SSBNs in FY 2004 as opposed
to one in FY 2003.
CTR’s
Nuclear Weapons Storage Security program
assists Russia with safe and secure storage
for nuclear warheads. We requested $48.0
million in the FY 2004 budget for this
program. The bulk of the funds, $47.9
million, are directed toward the Site Security
Enhancements project, which provides urgently
needed security enhancements to Ministry of
Defense (MOD) nuclear weapons storage sites
and temporary transshipment points for
movement of deactivated warheads. As noted
above, we concluded agreements with the MoD
last month that will guarantee CTR personnel
the access necessary to oversee security
upgrades at these sites.
We have
requested $23.2 million for the Nuclear
Weapons Transportation Security program, which
provides safe and secure transport of nuclear
warheads from deployed sites to dismantlement
or enhanced security storage sites. This is a
$3.6 million increase over the FY 2003
budget. The increase will support Russia’s
improved efforts to draw down its nuclear
stockpile pursuant to the Moscow Treaty. The
FY 2004 budget request for the Weapons
Transportation Safety Enhancements project
area is $5.7 million greater than for FY
2003. This will enhance safe and secure
transport, to include purchase of ten
replacement warhead transportation cars.
Russia agreed to destroy two unusable warhead
transport cars at its own expense in exchange
for each new car CTR provides.
To
assist Russia in providing a secure,
centralized storage facility for fissile
material removed from nuclear weapons, CTR is
building a Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF)
at Mayak. This project is over 92 percent
complete and requires no additional funding.
DoD is negotiating a transparency agreement to
ensure that only weapons-grade material is
stored at the FMSF.
Russia: Biological Weapons
Proliferation Prevention (BWPP).
Overall funding
requested for the BWPP program remains roughly
at the FY 2003 level, $54.2 million. FY 2003
increases in BWPP funding reflected the
Administration’s interest in combating
biological weapons proliferation as part of
the war on terrorism. DoD anticipates
obligating approximately $31 million in FY
2004 for BWPP activities in Russia.
These
activities will include additional cooperative
research projects with Russian scientists and
institutes that are designed to prevent
proliferation of BW expertise, enhance
transparency, improve standards of conduct and
leverage the extensive expertise of the former
Soviet bioweapons complex. Additional efforts
are planned to dismantle and eliminate BW
infrastructure in Russia as well as projects
to enhance security against theft or
accidental release of dangerous pathogens.
Russia:
Chemical Weapons Destruction.
The
budget request for the Chemical Weapons
Destruction (CWD) program in Russia is $200.3
million, an increase of $67.4 million. This
reflects the President’s direction to
accelerate progress at the Chemical Weapons
Destruction Facililty (CWDF) project in
Shchuch’ye ($190.3 million). The Shchuch’ye
project is a CW destruction facility for nerve
agent-filled, man-portable, tube and rocket
artillery and missile warheads. This facility
will be able to destroy 1700 metric tons of
nerve agent per year. $126.6 million of FY
2003 funds will be obligated for Shchuch’ye,
provided that Russia agrees to destroy all
nerve agent weapons at Shchuch’ye. We expect
to complete this agreement this month. The
President sought and Congress granted
authority to waive certification requirements
related to the Shchuch’ye project. The
President exercised this authority on January
10, 2003 because of proliferation concerns
about the types of munitions to be eliminated
there. However, the Administration continues
to press Russia for a full and complete
accounting of its chemical weapons stockpile,
in addition to completing a practical plan for
eliminating nerve agents.
CTR continues to assist Russia
with dismantling and demilitarizing the former
CW production facilities at Volgograd and
Novocheboksarsk. CTR
is also enhancing security for highly
proliferable chemical weapons stored at
Planovy/Shchuch’ye and Kizner. DoD already has
provided interim security enhancements, and is
in the process of installing comprehensive
security upgrades that will be completed in
2003.
Non-Russian FSU States
As with Russia, the vision for CTR
assistance in the other FSU states is tempered
by a mixed record of responsiveness. There are
a number of areas in which certain FSU states
have demonstrated a significant commitment to
cooperation and transparency. For example,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine are free of nuclear
weapons with the help of CTR assistance. On
the other hand, final elimination of SS-24
missiles in Ukraine has taken far longer than
originally foreseen.
Non-Russia FSU States:
Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms and
WMD Infrastructure.
Ukraine.
We have requested $3.9 million for CTR’s
Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination program
area in Ukraine. This will help fund
construction of an SS-24 Propellant
Disposition Facility for removal and
elimination of solid fuel from SS-24 missile
motors. DoD has successfully removed all
SS-24 missiles from their silos, and
eliminated all launchers and launch centers.
The SS-24s have been disassembled and safely
stored since January 2002. CTR will use prior
year funds to continue elimination of Tu-142
Bear and Tu-22M Backfire bombers and KH-22
nuclear capable air-to-surface missiles.
For DoD’s WMD Infrastructure
Elimination program area in Ukraine, no new
funds are requested for FY 2004. DoD will use
FY2003 funds to eliminate nuclear weapons
storage sites, liquid missile propellant
facilities, and heavy bomber airbase
infrastructure.
Kazakhstan. CTR’s
WMD Infrastructure Elimination program area
assists Kazakhstan in providing safe and
secure storage of fissile material and in
destroying former nuclear weapons and liquid
propellant storage sites. We are requesting
no additional funding in FY 2004 and will rely
instead on FY 2003 funds.
Non-Russian FSU States: Biological Weapons
Proliferation Prevention (BWPP).
DoD has concluded Biological
Threat Reduction Implementing Agreements with
Uzbekistan and Georgia and negotiated an
agreement with Ukraine. We are also providing
BWPP assistance to Kazakhstan under the WMD
Infrastructure Elimination agreement. DoD
already conducts BWPP projects in Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan and is planning to begin
activities in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003.
·
In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, CTR’s BW
Infrastructure Dismantlement and Restructuring
program assists with destruction of WMD-related
infrastructure. In Kazakhstan, CTR is helping
eliminate the anthrax production facility in
Stepnogorsk. The project has now entered into
phase IV, which includes dismantlement of the
facility. In
Uzbekistan, CTR has implemented phase I of the
destruction of the Soviet BW testing facility
on Vozrozhdeniya Island. We belive this phase
fully destroyed viable anthrax spores left in
approximately 100 tons of anthrax weapons
agent the Soviet military buried near the
laboratory complex on the island in the late
1980’s. DoD is working with Uzbekistan to
determine whether additional work at
Vozrozhdeniya is required.
· CTR’s
Collaborative Biological Research (CBR)
projects in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan help
prevent the proliferation of BW expertise,
enhance transparency, improve standards of
conduct of former BW scientists and leverage
their extensive expertise. There is currently
one project in Kazakhstan and two in
Uzbekistan. CTR plans to expand CBR projects
to Ukraine and Georgia.
· In
Kazakhstan, two CTR Biosafety and Biosecurity
projects are (1) characterizing and protecting
strain collections of dangerous pathogens at
the Scientific Research Agricultural Institute
in Otar, and (2) designing and constructing an
earthquake- proof building to secure dangerous
pathogens at the Kazakh Institute for Research
on Plague Control in Almaty.
· The
FY 2004 request calls for $23 million for
CTR’s Bioattack Early Warning and Preparedness
project. This new program area received 42%
of the overall FY 2004 budget request for the
BWPP program. Under this project, CTR will
expand research cooperation with Ministry of
Health institutes in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Georgia and Ukraine to build infectious
disease surveillance networks that will allow
these countries and the US to better detect,
characterize and monitor disease outbreaks and
to consolidate pathogen collections in secure,
DoD-accessible, institutes.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI).
$39.4 million is requested in
FY 2004 to
support this initiative, which
is designed
to enhance non-Russian FSU capabilities
to prevent, deter, detect and interdict
illicit trafficking in WMD and related
materials. DoD is collaborating with other US
agencies to develop an overarching US
government strategic plan for export control
and border security assistance to FSU states
that will encompass assistance provided
through this initiative. This initiative will
build on the foundation created by the CTR
Defense and Military Contacts program.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks,
subsequent discoveries of terrorist plans to
obtain WMD, and the need for a rapid expansion
of border security efforts in Central Asia
underscored the role that DoD could play
through CTR in support of the war on terrorism.
This initiative is designed to develop self-sustaining
capabilities, not merely to provide equipment
and services. This vision will require close
coordination with other US agencies to ensure
that recipient countries are developing the
law enforcement and regulatory capabilities
necessary for a comprehensive approach to WMD
border security.
In implementing the WMD-PPI,
DoD has developed projects designed to produce
comprehensive operational capabilities based
on the interagency approved US strategic plan
and country/regional requirements. These
projects will provide not only equipment and
related training, but also self-sustaining
operations and maintenance capabilities.
DoD is developing the following
prototype projects through the WMD
Proliferation Prevention initiative:
· A
Caspian Sea maritime control capability in
cooperation with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to
interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and
related materials.
· Supporting
Ukraine’s plans to develop mobile response
teams to address WMD trafficking incidents
between ports of entry on the land border with
Russia.
· Completing
deployment of fissile material portal monitors
at key border crossings in Uzbekistan to
detect illicit trafficking in nuclear
materials.
· Developing
a Regional Training Center to provide
realistic training on border control
operations and procedures to prevent illicit
trafficking in WMD and related materials.
Conclusion. Since its inception, CTR has
assisted with deactivation or elimination of a
total of 6032 warheads and 847 ballistic
missile launchers, 101 heavy bombers, 25
ballistic missile submarines, 510
air-to-surface nuclear missiles and 856
ballistic missiles. These are important
achievements. The Administration is also
acutely aware of the difficulties encountered
by the program. The reality is that this
program, which we undertake for our own
national security purposes, comes with costs
that we must bear if we continue to take
advantage of this approach to threat
reduction. This Administration believes that
it is worth the cost. As we urge your
continued support we pledge our efforts to
ensure that additional non-proliferation
achievements within, as well as outside, the
FSU are won through responsible stewardship of
US resources. |
