Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) nonproliferation activities in Russia.  Before addressing our specific activities, however, I want to say how critically important I consider this Committee’s contributions, both past, present and future, to the United States efforts to stem the spread of weapons, materials, technology, and expertise.  I appreciate the Committee’s support and look forward to our continued work together.

I also want to note that progress on our nonproliferation activities in Russia is benefitting immensely from the cooperative relationship with Russia that the President has so masterfully crafted with his counterpart, President Putin.  In supporting this new relationship, both my programs and the United States as a whole have benefitted greatly from the support and leadership of the Secretary of Energy, Spencer Abraham.  On each of the five occasions that Secretary Abraham has met with Russia’s Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev, he  has worked hard to accelerate and expand our programs in Russia and to clear away bureaucratic obstacles to progress on issues such as access rights and taxation concerns.   And just last month, I sent my Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to meet with senior Russian officials from both the Ministry of Atomic Energy as well as the Ministry of Defense to reiterate our commitment to removing obstacles and to maintain our momentum.  The seriousness by which we take this threat is further reflected in the President’s FY04 budget request for the NNSA’s nonproliferation program, which is the largest in its history and a 30% increase over our FY03 budget.

Although I feel confident about where our relationship with Russia is headed and the progress we are making, we are hardly out of the woods.  As the President stated in his State of the Union address, Atoday the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons...  They could give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies, who could use them without hesitation.  In the hands of terrorists or others who wish to cause the United States harm, these weapons of mass destruction would have unimaginable consequences.  This is why the NNSA is working harder than ever to ensure that nuclear weapons and its materials are secure at their source and the world’s largest stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear materials and warheads remains securely in Russia.  Thus, the speed and effectiveness by which the NNSA’s nonproliferation programs achieve their objectives of reducing the proliferation risk of nuclear materials, warheads, technology and expertise in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union directly contributes to the security of the United States.

Now, I want to describe specifically what we are doing in Russia to address this threat.  

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation

First and foremost, the NNSA is working to improve as quickly as possibly under-secured nuclear weapons-usable material and warheads in Russia, amounting to approximately 600 metric tons (MTs) of fissile material and thousands of warheads.  In addition, we have secured and continue to secure trucks and railcars carrying nuclear weapons-usable materials through hardening and other measures; and we are taking steps to consolidate nuclear material at fewer locations, reducing its vulnerability to theft or sabotage.

As a result of our acceleration efforts, the NNSA now has a target date of 2008 for the completion of security improvements to the under-secured weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia, therefore transitioning to a sustainability phase two years ahead of schedule.

In addition to weapons-usable material, the NNSA is working in close coordination with the Department of Defense to improve the security of thousands of under-secured Russian nuclear warheads.  Specifically, we initiated cooperation with the Russian Navy to improve the security of its nuclear warheads in 1998 and plan to complete our security improvements by 2006.  In late 2002, Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces requested cooperative assistance from the NNSA to improve the security of their nuclear warheads that are suffering from similarly poor security, and work has already begun. 

Regarding border security cooperation, the NNSA is working with the Russian Federation State Customs Committee to install radiation detection equipment at Russia’s borders in order to prevent nuclear smuggling and illicit trafficking.  NNSA is in the process of accelerating these efforts by installing radiation detection equipment at approximately 20 additional strategic transit and border sites in Russia by the end of this year.  Installations in Central Asia and the Caucasus are also underway, and we have taken responsibility for maintenance of detection systems in 19 countries (in Eastern/Central Europe, Central Asia) previously managed by the State Department.  The same equipment that detects weapons usable materials will also detect source materials that could be used in a radiological dispersal device (RDD). 

On this subject, we have also taken preliminary steps to secure the most vulnerable radioactive source materials - Soviet-origin Radioisotope Thermal-electric Generators (RTGs), seed irradiators, and other devices abandoned in Russia and other countries of the Former Soviet Union.  We are undertaking this work as part of a Tripartite Initiative with Minatom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Our strategy is to focus on the most potent, long-lived, and dispersable material in the most vulnerable conditions.  However, we have no desire to let this work expand unchecked.  Our approach is to address extremely vulnerable cases with low-cost upgrades while focusing international attention on the problem and leveraging the resources of all countries to reduce risks globally.  We are co-sponsoring an international conference on RDDs with the IAEA next month to increase international focus on this issue.  Finally, as I said earlier, we believe detection of trafficking in source materials is a key component in our strategy, and our Second Line of Defense Program is well positioned to meet this objective. 

The NNSA is also helping to consolidate nuclear material in Russia by reducing the number of locations where this material is stored, which in turn greatly reduces its vulnerability to theft or sabotage.  For example, by the end of 2003, we will have removed all weapons-usable material from an additional 24 buildings, thus improving security.  Under this program, we have also converted 3.5 MT of HEU to LEU and we hope to eliminate an additional metric ton by the end of this year.

Russian Transition Initiative (RTI)

The NNSA also addresses the risk of adverse migration of WMD expertise from the former Soviet Republics through its Russian Transition Initiative (RTI).  The RTI partners former Soviet weapons scientists with U.S. industry partners on projects selected for their commercial potential, while also assisting the Russians in downsizing their nuclear weapons complex and opening the closed nuclear cities to commercial ventures.  Through its highly successful Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program, RTI has garnered over $125 million in matching resources from U.S. industry partners.  This amounts to $3 in private sector funds for every $2 in U.S. Government funding.  In addition, private investment funding has contributed over $90 million to  further augment its technology commercialization efforts.  It is safe to say that no other nonproliferation program in the US Government has attracted the level of private equity funds to help commercialize project results than has RTI. 

By finding commercial, peaceful employment for former Russian weapons scientists, we not only dramatically reduce the talent pool available to states that would employ those individuals for evil ends, but we also create new sources of technology and commercial opportunities for U.S. industry.   

These scientists are involved in many programs that will play an important role in how we address today’s threats.  For example, needle-free injector systems for mass inoculations; light-weight radiation detectors to detect smuggling of nuclear materials; high-technology, high-volume filters to remove dangerous pathogens from public water supplies; and other innovative projects  will have direct relevance to our counter-terrorism efforts and will be a tremendous resource to have on our side, as we seek innovative solutions to the threats that confront us today.

RTI’s nuclear weapons complex downsizing efforts has also had a highly successful year.  The program has negotiated an access arrangement that now allows for regularized and expedited access to the closed cities.  The Avangard nuclear weapons assembly/disassembly facility no longer exists as a separate entity.  Weapons assembly has ceased and the remnants of the Avangard operation, including conversion activities, are being absorbed into the All-Russian Research Institute for Experimental Physics (VNIIEF).  The transition of workers and delineation of responsibilities will be careful and gradual, and will continue at least through May.   The closure of Avangard fulfills a commitment made by MinAtom to RTI in August of 2001.  Conversion efforts by the RTI at Avangard are acknowledged by the Russians to have accelerated the promised closure. 

 

In sum, it is fair to say that NNSA is in its strongest position it has ever enjoyed, with respect to the access we stand to gain and our ability to facilitate the downsizing of Russia’s nuclear complex

Warhead Safety and Security Exchange Agreement

NNSA is the executive agent for the 1994 U.S.-Russian Federation Government-to-Government Warhead Safety and Security Exchange Agreement in which the NNSA, Department of Defense and the U.S. National Laboratories engage the Russian Ministries of Atomic Energy and Defense and the Russian Institutes in unclassified technical cooperation in three areas.  First, joint work is conducted to enhance the safety and security of nuclear weapons during the process of dismantlement, as well as during storage and transportation.  Second, technologies are developed and tested to provide for more effective measurement tools during the dismantlement process, which may have the potential to enhance the transparency of nuclear reductions.  Third, cooperation is ongoing to explore technologies and procedures with applications for counterterrorism involving nuclear weapons and nuclear materials.  In this third area cooperation ranges from the investigation of the dispersal of nuclear materials, to vessels that can be used to contain the detonation of high explosives, to the development of advanced monitoring equipment for the detection of nuclear materials and high explosives.  

Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP)

NNSA is also working hard to eliminate weapons-grade plutonium production in Russia by shutting down three reactors in Russia that are still producing plutonium and by providing the local communities with fossil fuel plants to replace their required heating and electricity needs.   In FY2003, responsibility for the program transferred from DoD to NNSA, and next week Secretary Abraham and Minister Rumyantsev will sign the two plutonium production shut-down agreements next month in Vienna. 

Highly Enriched Uranium Transparency Program

We also continue to support the Highly Enriched Uranium Transparency Program that monitors the conversion of Russian weapons-grade uranium into low enriched uranium for use as commercial reactor fuel in the United States.  Under this program, 171 MTs of Russian highly enriched uranium has been down blended to LEU in Russia and delivered to the U.S. as of December 2002.  This is equivalent to the destruction of approximately 6,500 nuclear warheads.

Plutonum Disposition

We are also ramping up our efforts to dispose of 34 metric tons of Russian surplus weapons-grade plutonium, as well as an equal amount in the United States.   Both the United States and Russia will turn this material into mixed oxide, or MOX, fuel, for use in existing nuclear reactors.  We are working hard to be able to begin building facilities, both here and in Russia, for making the MOX fuel in FY 2004.  As a result of these efforts, we will eliminate enough plutonium to make thousands of nuclear weapons.    

Accelerated Materials Disposition (AMD) 

A separate but complementary effort to disposing of Russia's 34 MTs of surplus material is a new initiative developed by Presidents Bush and Putin at the 2002 Moscow Summit.  This new initiative involves multiple options to dispose of additional Russian highly enriched uranium and plutonium over and above materials covered by existing agreements.  We are currently drafting agreements with Russia for two such options, the purchase of highly enriched uranium from Russia to supply to selected U.S. research and test reactors and the purchase of downblended Russian HEU for a LEU stockpile in Russia. 

Global Partnership

International support is important to the overall success of our programs.  In June 2002, G-8 countries committed to support a Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction by providing $20 billion over the next ten years to assist Russia and eventually others in reducing proliferation threats.  About half of the amount pledged will come from existing or planned U.S. threat reduction programs.  Other G-8 countries will provide the remaining amount.  While I can't be specific today about financial pledges that are still being worked internally by other governments, I can say that we believe that substantial additional funds will be provided through this mechanism by the time of the next G-8 summit in June, 2003.  Among the areas of particular interest to DOE that may receive new funding from other G-8 countries are plutonium disposition and the employment of former weapons scientists.

Equally important as the new funding is the endorsement by the G-8 leaders, including President Putin,  of principles that should govern cooperative programs under the Global Partnership. These principles explicitly call for transparency, access, liability protections, tax exemption of assistance, and other measures that we regard as necessary elements for successful threat reduction partnership with Russia.  Since last summer, we have had several rounds of senior-level discussion among G-8 officials about the implementation of these principles.  I wish I could tell you that we have secured Russian agreement to satisfactory approaches in all of the areas covered by the principles, but at this point all I can say is that our discussions are continuing.  I am convinced, however, that the strong support expressed by all of the other G-8 countries for the Kananaskis principles will make an impression on Russian leaders, and increase our chances for securing their agreement to acceptable implementation measures.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to make three fundamental points: 

-  First, our work to pro-actively and cooperatively engage Russia, as well as other countries, is vital if we are going to be successful at preventing terrorists and other rogue entities from acquiring nuclear weapons usable material, warheads and/or expertise.  The consequences if we do not are unacceptable;

-  Secondly, our work to achieve these nonproliferation goals has and will likely never be easy.  Whether it is trying to gain access to Russia's nuclear warhead sites or nuclear weapons assembly plants, or gaining the a comprehensive accounting of what is truly the world's largest stocks of weapons-usable material, our mission is going to be challenging every step of the way;

-  Thirdly, there should never be a question as to whether we will have set backs, but how effectively we respond to those set backs when they occur.  Much of what we are doing in Russia has never been done, much less tried before, and challenges and set backs must be anticipated.  However, considering the potential consequences if a terrorist were successful in acquiring a weapon or weapons-usable material from one of these sites, we have no other choice but to act. 

Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee, this concludes my prepared statement.  I would be pleased to answer any questions that you and members of the Committee may have.