ADMIRAL JOSEPH W. PRUEHER, U.S. NAVY COMMANDER IN CHIEF UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY 7, 1998 Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee, on behalf of the men and women of the United States Pacific Command, thank you for this opportunity to present my perspective on security in the Asia-Pacific region. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Financial crisis. As this Committee is fully aware, Asia is in the midst of a serious financial crisis. Some might even say it is a broader economic crisis. It is important that this financial crisis also be understood in security terms. We have seen early signs of instability in Indonesia and have concerns about the situation in other countries as well. As President Clinton said in his State of the Union address, a secure, stable Asia is in America's interest. Our military presence and our military-to-military contacts throughout the region undergird overall security and stability in the region. Security alliance with Japan. Our alliance with Japan continues to be the most important U.S. security relationship in the region. The signing of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1997 enhances this relationship. Japanese host-nation support for U.S. forces is a critical part of U.S. military presence in Asia and meets Congressional goals for burden-sharing. China. China's growing economic and military power is a major issue for regional leaders. The past year brought improvements in U.S.-China relations. Carrying out the policies of the Secretary of Defense and, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Pacific Command worked successfully to improve our military-to-military relationship with the People's Liberation Army. Our goal is to lay a foundation for a relationship based on mutual understanding, trust, and increased openness. Along with the U.S., China will play an enormous role in determining if the next century is one of conflict or cooperation. On the subject of Taiwan, we recognize from China's perspective this is a core sovereignty issue, while China recognizes that the United States is committed to the peaceful resolution of Taiwan issues. I am personally optimistic for the growth of the U.S.-China relationship; however, we must continue to deal with China from a position of strength, combined with respect, and not have unrealistic expectations. This is a long-haul process. Korean peninsula. The Korean peninsula remains a volatile flashpoint. U.S. and South Korean troops would be in harm's way in the first hour of a conflict but are key to rapid conflict resolution. Our 37,000 troops stationed on the Peninsula and our alliance with the Republic of Korea have deterred North Korea from offensive action for 45 years. U.S. forces on the Peninsula, coupled with our reinforcement capabilities and ROK forces, are adequate for this task. The goal is eventually to facilitate a non-cataclysmic end to this situation. We must stay the course of deterring conflict, providing food aid, engaging in four-party talks, and supporting the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, particularly in light of North Korea's continued economic deterioration. Readiness and OPTEMPO. U.S. Pacific Command's forward-deployed forces are ready to execute assigned missions, but significant deficiencies exist under a "two major theater wars" scenario. In 1997, U.S. Pacific Command Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps components all reported shortages of personnel in some units. Although components have overcome these problems in the short term, readiness for deployed forces is increasingly achieved at the expense of non-deployed forces. Currently, some forces required for long-term commitments in the Asia-Pacific area of responsibility are positioned in the Persian Gulf. Any reduction in personnel, equipment, or funding would significantly erode our capabilities in the Pacific. With some minor exceptions, we have been able to manage the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) for forces under U.S. Pacific Command, because we are accountable for and can trade off between training and operations. There are no firm indicators that the forces are "wearing out." (end text)
