THE DEFENSE OF OUR COUNTRY (House - February 27, 1995)
Mr. Speaker, all of these budget cuts that we have imposed on the military and imposed on our national security establishment have forced us to push back further and further the whole issue that is my second topic tonight, and that is the issue of missile defense. This is an extremely important issue, Mr. Speaker, that we are going to focus on very aggressively between now and the end of this session because the facts have not been properly brought out to the American people about the real threat that is out there.
We know that there are Saddam Husseins in the world and the other threats that we have seen and had to face down, but it is harder to understand what the threat is in terms of a ballistic missile attack, whether it be deliberate or accidental, or even a C ruise missile attack. We are going to be focusing on
When I asked my constituents back in Pennsylvania if they think that we have a system to protect us against one single missile coming into America fired accidentally or deliberately, they cannot believe it when I say that we have no system in place. They just cannot understand how a country with the assets that we have, spending the money that we spend, does not yet have a ballistic missile defense system to protect mainstream America, as well as our troops in the field.
As a matter of fact, many of those who have fought long and hard for the past 20 years against missile defense were the same ones cheering the success of the Patriot system when it was brought into play in Desert Storm. The Patriot system was devel oped through the dollars that we put forth in the old SDI Program starting under President Reagan. If we had not spent money back then, we would not have had a defensive missile system to take down those missiles coming into Israel fired by Saddam Hussein , as primitive as they were.
Mr. Speaker, despite the money that we have spent and despite what the misconception is of the American people, we still do not have adequate missile defense capability for this country in three different areas, and I want to talk about each of them brief ly. First of all, Cruise missiles, the missiles that fly at low altitude, the kind that we saw Saddam fire at Israel called the Scud missiles. Seventy-seven countries in the world today have Cruise missiles. Seventy-seven countries in the world today, we have verified, have Cruise missiles. Over 20 countries in the world are capable of producing Cruise missiles.
Now, granted, cruise missiles are primarily aimed at sinking ships. But, Mr. Speaker, a cruise missile can be placed on any platform. A cruise missile can be put on a ship at sea. So when our liberal friends say that we do not need missile defense because no missile can hit our mainland, what they forget is that a cruise missile can in fact be mounted on a ship and in fact could be used to deploy against some part of the American mainland.
We are aggressively developing antimissile defenses for the cruise missile technology, but not as fast as many in the military would like us to proceed, and in fact not as fast as I would like us to proceed, because I think that poses a tremendous threat to our security.
Now, the Russians, on the other hand, have an aggressive program for cruise missile defense. They have the SA-10 and the SA-12. The SA-12 has more capability than our Patriot system, the one we used in Desert Storm. In fact, what are the Russians doing wi th that system? We have evidence they are selling it all over the world.
So here are the Russians selling a technology even better than the one that we have in terms of our ballistic missile defense. As a matter of fact, our CIA purchased one of these sophisticated systems and delivered it to Huntsville, AL. To the embarrassme nt of the CIA, the New York Times ran an editorial about how open this whole process was of buying this supposedly sophisticated piece of equipment from the Russians.
I can tell you, Mr. Speaker, that if we have the SA-12, countries all over the world have the SA-12, because the Russians have placed it on the open market. So cruise missiles are in fact an area that we have to focus our attention on.
The second area is the adequate protection of our defenses when they are in the theater of operation like we saw over in the Middle East called theater missile defense, where we can protect our troops from the kind of attacks that we saw with Scud missile s. The Clinton administration is in favor of theater missile defense, and, even though they have cut the funding for missile defense significantly, we do have a robust program looking to implement theater ballistic missile defense whenever our troops are deployed. Both the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force are working on aggressive theater missile defense capabilities, and I support those efforts. Hopefully we can wrap up some of the funding for those programs, because who knows where the next threat will come from, a theater missile being used against our troops or one of our allies' troops.
In addition, Mr. Speaker, we are working with the Israelis right now to develop a theater missile system that will be used specifically in Israel called the Arrow system, where 80 percent of the costs of that program are being paid for with United States tax dollars.
So theater missile defense is the second key area of missile defense that we are focusing on, and I support the administration's attempt in that area, as well as leadership of General O'Neill, who heads the office and that operation.
But there is a third area of missile defense we are completely ignoring, and that is the whole area of national missile defense. That was part of our debate that we had on the National Security Revitalization Act 2 weeks ago. There are those of us who fee l we owe it to the administration to come back and tell us whether or not we have technologies we can deploy that will give us some capability against a deliberate or accidental launch of one, two, three, or perhaps four or five intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Today we have no such system. Even though the ABM treaty allows each of the two signatories the opportunity to have a ballistic missile defense system, only Russia has one. In fact, Russia has today the only operational ABM system, surroun ding Moscow. In fact, if you add in the capability of the large phased array radars around that system, you can in effect say they have a larger system, perhaps even the one that would break them out of the ABM treaty. We have no such system in Am erica.
So if a country, whether it be Russia, or China, or eventually North Korea when they develop the capability, has their own technology or buys the technology to fire one missile at one of our cities, we have absolutely no way today to defend the American p eople. None. Zilch, zero. Despite all the money that we spend on defense in this country, we have no antiballistic missile system to protect our mainland.
Many say we do not need it because we operate on the theory of mutually assured destruction. We dare the Russians to attack us because of retaliation and vice-versa with them. But, Mr. Speaker, that is not the scenario today. In fact, the biggest potentia l problem we have today comes from instability within the former Soviet Union and the warheads and missiles that are still in place that can in fact be sold to a Third World nation or a rogue nation.
Now, what are the chances of that happening? I have confidence in our intelligence community being able to assess what is the command and control system in Russian today. Let me give you one example. I am going to elaborate on it in a special order in the future.
The mainstay of the Russian ballistic missile system with nuclear warhead capability is the SS-25. Russia has a number of SS-25's positioned throughout their country.
The SS-25 typically operates out of a battery of three missiles, each of which can be programmed to a different city or different target. On each of those missiles in that battery of three is a separate nuclear warhead which means they have three warheads on three different missiles, which can be aimed very quickly at any city in the mainland United States and could hit any one of those cities from any location inside of Russia, or in fact any place that they would choose to take that capability.
That system is the one that worries me the most. Now, why does it worry me? First of all, the SS-25 is mobilely launched, which means the mobile launcher for that rocket can be moved very quickly and very easily. What worries me secondarily about the SS-2 5 is that the Russians have offered that technology to Brazil to be used as a space launch vehicle.
Now, what is so scary about that? What is so scary about that is there is no difference in the configuration of a SS-25 in Russia with a nuclear warhead than it is in Brazil as a space launch vehicle. If the Russians are offering the SS-25 to Brazil, the question we have to ask is where else are they offering the SS-25?
Now, thank goodness, when we found out about the offering of the SS-25 to Brazil, we stepped in and said no, that is a violation of agreements that we have with the Russians, you cannot do that. So they did in fact back off. But, Mr. Speaker, the point is , how much time are we going to have from the moment that a rogue nation gets the capability of a SS-25 and decides they are going to aim that at one of our cities? Can we afford then to wait 6 to 8 years to develop an affective ballistic missile defense system for our country?
I say no. And that is why I think the prudent course for us to take is not to go off spending tens of billions of new dollars in missile defense. We cannot do that in this environment. But we do owe it to our people and to our citizens to look carefully a t technologies that we have been working on that are ready to be deployed.
Secretary Perry organized a Tiger Team task force to look at national ballistic missile defense in January of this year. Their preliminary report showed that we could implement a limited thin layer of protection for the entire continental U.S., headquarte red in Grand Forks, ND, that would be able to give us a 90 percent effective rate in taking out a battery of three intercontinental ballistic missiles such as the SS-25. That system is doable today. It could be deployed in a matter of 4 years from the dat e that we give the go-ahead, which could be as early as say July of this year.
The cost of that system over 5 years is not $25 billion or $30 billion. The cost of that system is approximately $5 billion over 5 years. But it would give us for the first time a defensive capability against an accidental or deliberate launch by a rogue nation of a missile like the SS-25.
Mr. Speaker, I think we owe it to our constituents and to our security interests to pursue the development and implementation of that kind of a system. Beyond the system that is outlined in the Tiger Team report is the need to establish a system of sensor s in space. Even our colleagues on the Democratic side led by our good friend and expert from South Carolina, John Spratt, agree that space-based sensors are necessary for us to detect when a missile is being launched any place in the world.
Following that movement toward a limited thin-layer defense system, we also need to develop a space-based sensor system, which allows us to detect when someone would in fact fire a system against us.
Mr. Speaker, for those reasons, I think it is absolutely critical that when we debate missile defense in this year's authorization and appropriation bill, that we do it based on the facts. Because of that, we are going to be implementing an aggressive pro gram to educate Members of Congress and their staffs with real information about situations occurring around the world that could threaten our security, and where missile defense comes in as a critical element, whether it is theater, whether it is cruise missile, or whether it is national missile defense.
We will be announcing within the week a major proactive effort that will be bipartisan that will include briefings for Members, that will include regular handouts for Members, focusing on the ballistic missile capabilities that are out there today, what c apabilities our enemies have, and what kinds of technologies are being distributed throughout the world.
It is extremely important that our colleagues, when faced with a vote on missile defense in the future, do so based on fact and not emotion. We are not talking about the term `star wars.' As I said during the debate on the National Security Revitalization Act, star wars has no place in the discussion today. Even our colleagues on the other side have acknowledged that.
We are talking about moving very deliberately into technology that we have been working on that we know are deployable within the near term, and doing it in such a way that we can afford it, based upon the budgetary constraints that we have, given our oth er concerns and priorities.
Mr. Speaker, this debate will occur in the May-June time frame, when we have defense bills on the floor, but I want to make sure as chairman of the Military Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on National Security that Members do so bas ed on factual information.
Mr. Speaker, the final topic I want to hit tonight as relates to defense has to do with technology transfer, and a very scary event that is about to happen or actually has happened and continues to unfold involving the ability of the Chinese enhance their Cruise Missile capability.
Mr. Speaker, an article in the Washington Times dated February 13 highlighted the sale of Russian rocket motors to China, and the Clinton administration's efforts to try to halt the Russian sale of the rocket motors to China because of our antiproliferati on legislation and laws, and because our officials feel the engines will be used in advanced Chinese cruise missiles.
The Clinton administration maintains that the sale of these engines by the Russians violates the missile technology control regime, but the Russian Government recently informed the United States Government and the Clinton administration it would not stop the sale because, and this is what is really outrageous, the White House had approved a similar sale of United States-made gas turbines to the Chinese last year.
We have seen the headlines today, where we have a new agreement with the Chinese on trade relations, but Mr. Speaker, how outrageous is it that we in fact are continuing under the Clinton administration to sell dangerous technology that will allow them to enhance their Cruise Missile capability?
We objected when the Russians wanted to sell their engines to the Chinese, because of what it would do, but we in fact ourselves are committing and have committed that same egregious error.
In fact, this past Monday, February 20, in the Jack Anderson and Michael Binstein column entitled `A Red Flag on Technology Sale to China, the Clinton administration is poised to allow a controversial technology sale that many believe could help the Commu nist country upgrade its missile program.'
We are not just talking now about the sale of the engines. The Clinton administration now is about ready to approve the sale of the technology, so that Chinese can now begin to build the engines that will be used in the cruise missiles that could in fact attack the United States or our allies.
Let me read a quote from one frustrated administration official in the Jack Anderson column: `The Administration knows this in fact would give China this new technology capability , but so far, no one has had the political will to stand up and say no.' It further goes on to say `Clearly, the Chinese could use this technology to make engines which are perfectly suited for that requirement,' of improving their Cruise Missile engines, `says Kenneth Timmerman, a security specialist and director of the Middle East Data Project.'
He goes on to say that there was a confidential memo that Jack Anderson was able to get a copy of that supports Mr. Timmerman's view. I quote from the memo: `Garrett engines,' and Garrett is a company that manufactures these engines in the U.S., `Garrett engines and/or production technology would provide an array of high performance capabilities to satisfy China's military requirements well into the 21st Century,' one document alleges.
`Another study indicates China could make engines capable of launching a biological warhead about 1,000 miles if it obtained these materials.'
Mr. Speaker, what the administration is saying internally, which has not yet come out in public until this article by Jack Anderson was revealed last week, is that internal documents in the administration are cautioning that giving the Chinese this techno logy will allow them to have cruise missiles that can go up to 1,000 miles with a biological warhead on that cruise missile.
Despite the red flags being raised, the Clinton administration last year lifted the export controls for this particular engine that normally cover the Garrett technology, and they are now about to let the technology itself be transferred to the Chinese.
`Critics of the deal are outraged,' as they should be. `This is exactly what we said would happen a year ago,' an American official said. `We warned that the Chinese would come after the technology after they got the engines, but the administration decont rolled it anyway. In my mind, it constitutes criminal negligence.'
An administration official that opposed the sale of the engines and now the technology itself, saying that they told the administration the Chinese would go to get the technology, which they are doing right now, and that we did it anyway, in his mind, it is criminal negligence.
Mr. Speaker, this administration has to understand that the defense of this country and our people is of the highest priority, and those of us who serve on the Committee on National Security, both Republicans and Democrats, use every minute of the day tha t we have to focus on how to support that defense.
However, Mr. Speaker, what we are seeing occur today with defense spending numbers, with the lack of an effort for adequate missile defense capability, and with uncontrolled arms sales that jeopardize our future security, that is absolutely outrageous.
Mr. Speaker, over the next 4 weeks we will be highlighting each of these components in detail. I ask you and our colleagues to read with great interest what we provide, to challenge it, to ask for backup material and data, so when we have a full debate in May on the authorization bill, that we do it based on the facts and not emotion.
Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the editorial from the Tampa Tribune of February 13, and that articles from the Washington Times dated February 13, entitled `Russia Sells Rocket Motors to China' be entered, and that the Monday, February 20 Ja ck Anderson column entitled `A Red Flag on Technology Sale to China' also be entered in the Record.
I thank the Speaker and our hard-working staff for their dedication in allowing me to complete this special order.
The material referred to is as follows:
From the Washington Times, Feb. 13, 1995
Russia Sells Rocket Motors to China
(By Bill Gertz)
The Clinton administration is trying to halt Russia's sale of rocket motors to China because anti-proliferation officials say the engines will be used in advanced Chinese cruise missiles.
State Department officials notified Moscow last year that the sale of military rocket motors would violate the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the international accord aimed at blocking the spread of missile technology, according to administrati on officials.
But the Russian government recently informed the U.S. government it would not stop the sale because the White House had approved a similar sale of U.S.-made gas turbine engines to China last year.
One official said the small rocket motors are taken from Russian cruise missiles and are suitable for use in Chinese cruise missiles.
The official said the sale would put Moscow in violation of the 1987 MTCR, which bars sales of missiles or components capable of lofting a payload of at least 1,100 pounds of a range of at least 186 miles.
The engine deal is part of broader Russian efforts to supply military hardware and technology to China, regarded as a major proliferator of weapons and technology, officials said.
The U.S.-Russia dispute over the sale comes amid fresh reports that the United States tried unsuccessfully to block an $800 million contract between Moscow and the Iranian government to build a nuclear power plant.
Russian officials went ahead with the Iranian reactor because of the U.S. agreement with North Korea to provide that rogue nation with nuclear reactor technology, said officials who spoke on condition of anonymity.
U.S. officials believe the Russian support will assist Tehran's drive for nuclear weapons, which many officials say are several years away.
`We have expressed our concerns on that issue and continue to express our concerns,' White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta said yesterday. `And, obviously, we think that ultimately there's some hope that this will not take place.'
Mr. Panetta said the administration will review `our relationship' with Russia in an effort to force Moscow to `adhere to the policy that we believe in, which is, let us not give aid to terrorists in this world.'
Administration officials said U.S. efforts to halt the proposed sale of Russian rocket motors to China were undermined by the sale last year of jet engines made by the Phoenix-based Garrett Co., a subsidiary of AlliedSignal.
The Garrett jet engines were sold to the Nanchang Aircraft Co., which manufactures jet trainers used by the Chinese military.
The engine sale lifted controls on the small engine technology that the CIA believes could be used in long-range Chinese cruise missiles.
China produces six types of surfaced-launched cruise missiles, including the Silkworm, and has exported cruise missiles to Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Pakistan. It also has exported airlaunched cruise missiles to Iran.
The officials did not disclose the exact type of cruise missile engine being marketed by the Russians.
The sale of jet engines by the Phoenix-based manufacturer Garrett was bitterly opposed by some CIA and Pentagon officials last year because of just the type of problem raised by efforts to head off the proposed engine sale by the Russians.
`The administration's counter-proliferation program is a total failure,' one official said. `There isn't one program that has been able to stop the proliferation of weapons technology.'
The Chinese are more interested in acquiring the Garrett engine production technology than the Russian engines, which are inferior to the U.S. engines.
In fact, the Chinese are now seeking to buy the technology needed to produce their own versions to produce their own versions of the Garrett turbine engines, U.S. officials said.
From the Post, Monday, Feb. 20, 1995
A Red Flag on Technology Sale to China
(By Jack Anderson and Michael Binstein)
The Clinton administration is proving once again that on arms proliferation issues, profit often rules over prudence.
At a time when American officials are threatening the People's Republic of China over its unfair trade practices, human rights abuses and weapons exports, the Clinton administration is poised to allow a controversial technology sale that many believe coul d help the communist country upgrade its missile program.
`This [sale] would give China the technological know-how to make engines for long-range cruise missiles capable of hitting any city in Japan, Korea--all the way through India,' one frustrated American official explained. `The administration knows this, bu t so far no one has had the political will to stand up and say no.'
The proposed deal involves AlliedSignal Inc., the California-based aerospace giant. The company recently informed the government that it intends to sell China the manufacturing technology used to build its Garrett gas turbine engines. This follows on the heels of a controversial decision by the administration last year to allow the Garrett engines to be sold.
AlliedSignal officials told us the technology poses little risk because it is suited only to build aircraft engines.`We are not in a position to judge China's missile engine manufacturing capability,' a company spokesman said, `However, the technology inv olved is specific to civil-certified [Garrett] engines, which are designed for aircraft operations.'
Arms proliferation experts believe China wants the Garrett technology to establish a domestic production line for upgraded cruise missile engines. `Clearly, the Chinese could use this to make engines which are perfectly suited for that requirement,' says Kenneth Timmerman, a security specialist and director of the Middle East Data Project.
Confidential government studies obtained by our associates Dean Boyd and Dale Van Atta support Timmerman's view. `Garrett engines and/or production technology would provide an array of high * * * performance capabilities to satisfy [China's] military requ irements well into the next century,' one document alleges. Another study indicates China could make engines capable of launching a biological warhead about 1,000 miles if it obtained these materials.
Despite the red flags, the Clinton administration last year lifted the export controls that normally cover the Garrett technology. This means AlliedSignal is free to sell its manufacturing technology without government approval--unless the administration reverses itself. So far, there's been little indication this will happen.
Iain S. Baird, the Commerce Department's deputy assistant secretary for export administration, maintains there is no legal basis to oppose the sale. He says the Garrett technology is more than 20 years old and `completely impractical' for use in cruise mi ssiles. Baird added that AlliedSignal should be applauded for taking `the unusual step of advising' the government of the sale when it wasn't required to.
In the original engine sale, which came in the wake of the administration's 1994 decision, the engines were to be used in a military jet China was developing with Pakistan. Many American officials opposed the deal, after intelligence studies found that th e Chinese recipient was involved in missile building and that the engines could form the basis for a new Chinese cruise missile.
Nevertheless, the Clinton administration approved the sale, allowing the engines to be exported as civilian goods despite their declared military end-use. Despite specific warnings from Congress, officials at the Pentagon and the Commerce Department also removed export controls from the Garrett manufacturing technology.
Allied Signal says it has sold only 33 Garrett engines to China, and the technology sale hasn't been finalized. A company spokesman added, `At this point, we don't need government approval.'
Critics of the deal are outraged. `This is exactly what we said would happen a year ago,' an American official said. `We warned that the Chinese would come after the technology after they got the engines, but [the administration] decontrolled it anyway. I n my mind, it constitutes criminal negligence.'
The anger generated by the proposed sale is not surprising considering a simulated war game played out by the Pentagon last year. In the fictitious battle scenario, which projected what China's military capability and manpower would be in 2010, China rout ed the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet, due in part to a line of new precision-guided cruise missiles.
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