COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
(103d Congress, 2d Session) SAM NUNN, Georgia, Chairman J. JAMES EXON, Nebraska CARL LEVIN, Michigan EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JOHN GLENN, Ohio RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia BOB GRAHAM, Florida CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada STROM THURMOND, South Carolina JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine JOHN McCAIN, Arizona TRENT LOTT, Mississippi DAN COATS, Indiana BOB SMITH, New Hampshire DIRK KEMPTHORNE, Idaho LAUCH FAIRCLOTH, North Carolina KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas Arnold L. Punaro, Staff Director Richard L. Reynard, Staff Director for the Minority (II) Calendar No. 459 103d Congress Report SENATE 2d Session 103-282 AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES June 14, (legislative day, June 7), 1994.-Ordered to be printed Mr. Nunn, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the following REPORT together with ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS [To accompany S. 2182] The Committee on Armed Services reports favorably an original bill to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1995 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the armed forces, and for other purposes, and, recommends that the bill do pass. PURPOSE OF THE BILL This bill would: (1) authorize appropriations for (a) procurement, (b) research, development, test and evaluation, (c) operation and maintenance and the revolving and management funds of the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1995; (2) authorize the personnel end strength for each military active duty component of the armed forces for fiscal year 1995; (3) authorize the personnel end strengths for the Selected Reserve of each of the reserve components of the armed forces for fiscal year 1995; (4) authorize the annual average military training student loads for the active and reserve components of the armed forces for fiscal year 1995; (5) impose certain reporting requirements; (6) impose certain limitations with regard to specific procurement and RDT&E actions and manpower strengths; provide certain additional legislative authority, and make certain changes to existing law; (7) authorize appropriations for military construction programs of the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1995; (8) authorize appropriations for national security programs of the Department of Energy for fiscal year 1995; and (9) authorize appropriations for civil defense, including programs of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, for fiscal year 1995. Explanation of funding summary The administration's original budget request for the national defense function of the federal budget for fiscal year 1995 was $263.7 billion, of which $193.0 billion is for programs which require authorization. Subsequent budget amendments for procurement reform and reform of agency rent payments reduced the request for the national defense function to $263.3 billion. The bill reported by the committee includes an authorization recommendation of $263.1 billion. The committee's authorization recommendation is substantially larger than the amount requested for specific funding authorization. The primary reason for this difference is that the committee authorized $70.8 billion in funding for military end strengths and pay raises, which traditionally do not require a specific funding authorization. The following table summarizes both the direct authorizations and the equivalent budget authority levels for the fiscal year 1995 national defense authorizations in this legislation. The columns relating to the authorization request do not include funding for the following items: military personnel funding; military construction authorizations provided in prior years; and other small portions of the defense budget that are not within the jurisdiction of this committee or which do not require an annual authorization. As explained above, funding for military personnel is included in the amounts authorized by the committee, but not in the total funding requested for authorization. Funding for all programs in the national defense budget function is reflected in the columns relating to the budget authority request and the total budget authority implication of the authorizations in this bill. When taking into account all legislative provisions in this bill, including those which do not require direct funding authorizations, the budget authority implication of this bill is $263.3 billion, which is $0.5 billion below the Budget Resolution figure of $263.8 billion for the national defense function and $370 million below the original budget request. Offset Folios 19 to 22 Insert here ***TABLE GOES HERE*** Future defense budget reductions The committee remains concerned about the adequacy of the funding levels that will be available for national defense programs in the coming years. Of particular concern are the hidden reductions that are not readily apparent when looking at the outyear funding levels for defense contained in the Administration's fiscal year 1995 budget. Although the funding levels included in the Administration budget are said to be sufficient to support the force levels advocated by the Administration as a result of the Bottom-Up Review, this assumption is questionable on several grounds. First, as the Secretary of Defense testified before the committee, the Defense Department's Future Years Defense Program actually includes $20 billion more in program funding during fiscal years 1996 through 1999 than the defense funding levels in the Administration's own budget can support. The Secretary attributed this shortfall to a failure to fully budget for increased inflation. This situation will have to be resolved in the fiscal year 1996 budget. If the overall defense budget is not increased, funding for programs currently included in the Defense Department's planned fiscal year 1996 budget will have to be cut. Second, in both the fiscal year 1994 and 1995 budgets, the Administration proposed either freezing military and federal civilian pay rates or holding pay raises significantly below the rate of inflation. Congress rejected that approach last year. This year, the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives have recommended higher pay raises for military personnel than have been assumed in the budget, and action in other committees indicates that Congress may also increase civilian pay raises above the levels assumed in the fiscal year 1995 budget. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the total cost over the next five years of providing the full pay raises to which military and DOD civilian employees are entitled under current law is $26 billion above the amounts assumed in the Administration's defense budget. At a minimum, the five-year cost just for the 1995 military pay raise increase recommended by the committee, and of an equivalent raise for DOD civilians, is $4.8 billion. Third, the Administration's budget assumed unallocated government-wide savings for procurement reform of $12.2 billion over the next five years. A budget amendment allocated approximately 45 percent of the fiscal year 1995 savings to DOD. A similar allocation of the assumed savings in the outyears would require DOD to save at least $6 billion from procurement reform. Fourth, based on past history, there is every reason to expect that the upcoming 1995 base closure round will cost significantly more than is currently assumed in the Administration's budget. Finally, the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1995 lowered the discretionary spending limits in the Senate for fiscal years 1995 through 1999 by $30.8 billion. Because the defense budget represents approximately half of federal discretionary spending, this reduction in the discretionary caps is likely to require some reductions to the overall levels of defense spending currently assumed by the Administration. This combination of potential reductions in future defense spending toplines, a $20 billion funding shortfall already built into the current budget, and costs for items such as pay raises and procurement reform that will have to be absorbed within future defense budgets leaves the committee seriously concerned that the Bottom-Up Review force structure proposed by the Administration, which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified was "as lean as we dared make it'', will prove to be unaffordable. Force structure, strategy, and modernization The chart below shows past and planned funding, in constant dollars, of military personnel; operation and maintenance (O&M); research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E); and procurement. The chart shows that most of the increase in the defense budget during the 1980s was in procurement, but that most of the decline in the defense budget since the mid-1980s was also in procurement. Declines since the peak of spending in 1985 in O&M and RDT&E have been significantly less steep. The Administration has decided to reduce procurement funding as much as it has on the grounds that the buildup of the 1980s modernized most of the force and will provide a margin of technological superiority for some time to come. In the interim, the Administration hopes to achieve substantial savings in overhead costs and force level reductions, which can then be "re-invested'' in the procurement of modern equipment. This strategy is reflected in the planned upswing in the procurement budget in the last years of the current Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Elsewhere in this report, however, the committee outlines major unfunded liabilities facing the Department of Defense. Addressing these shortfalls is likely to lead to elimination of the hoped-for increase in procurement, and perhaps an even larger reduction. Procurement funding levels determine the rate at which forces are modernized with new or improved equipment. In general, if modernization rates decline too far, force effectiveness will diminish relative to potential opponents. Hypothetically, as an example, at projected procurement levels, the 10-division Army force level established by the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) may be unable in the long term to prevail in two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRC) if adversaries have engaged in significant force expansion and modernization. Conversely, a force size less than 10 divisions that is equipped with more modern equipment could be more effective in implementing the two-MRC strategy than 10 divisions that have been modernized at a slower rate. The committee is not satisfied that the Department of Defense has adequately analyzed the impact of sustained, low procurement levels on overall force capabilities over the long term, particularly since projected procurement levels may not be achievable. The committee also is not satisfied that the Department has analyzed the tradeoffs between force size and force effectiveness. The committee believes that the Department of Defense must address these issues. The committee therefore directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the congressional defense committees by December 31, 1994, that answers these questions: (1) What criteria does the Department of Defense use to determine the adequacy of its modernization program? (2) If the planned increase in procurement is not achieved, will the Department be able to execute the two-MRC strategy successfully? If so, at what increased cost and risk? (3) What mechanism is appropriate for gauging the trade-offs between force structure and modernization? (4) If force levels were reduced another 5, 10, or 15 percent, what would the direct and indirect savings be? (5) If these savings were applied to modernize the remaining forces at a higher rate, what would the effect be on the Department of Defense's warfighting capability 10 or 15 years from now? Would that force be more or less effective in implementing the two-MRC contingency strategy? Offset Folios 26 to -- Insert here ***TABLE GOES HERE*** Arms control compliance funding for the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) and the military services. The arms control budget request for the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), the military Services, and defense agencies was based on assumptions regarding the dates on which treaties would likely enter into force. To date, the following treaties have not been ratified by all signatories, which is resulting in a delay in the date of entry into force: the Open Skies Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, START II, and the Bilateral Destruction Agreement between the United States and Russia. As a result, the committee recommends a reduction of $7.0 million in the O&M account for OSIA, and reductions of $6.0 million to the Army, $3.0 million to Navy, and $4.0 million to the Air Force O&M accounts for arms control compliance activities due to these reduced requirements in fiscal year 1995. Because of the fast-changing nature of arms control agreements, in the event that inspection requirements for OSIA or the military Services increase, the committee will consider requests by the Department of Defense for additional adjustments in funding during the fiscal year, as appropriate. The budget of the Department of Defense funds the majority of the costs of implementation for arms control agreements to which the United States is a party. Recently concluded arms control agreements have included the creation of consultative commissions or groups to allow treaties to operate provisionally prior to entry into force, promote the objectives and implementation of treaty provisions, and to discuss and resolve questions or problems that may arise relating to compliance with, or possible circumvention of treaties. Additionally, these commissions and groups can make technical changes and amendments to the treaties, which could affect inspection and monitoring provisions, and result in an increase to the costs of implementation of the treaties. The statement of managers accompanying the conference report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (H. Rept. 103-357) directed the Department of Defense to notify the congressional defense committees in writing 30 days prior to U.S. agreement to any recommendations of the various consultative commissions that would result in either a technical change to the treaty affecting inspection and monitoring provisions, or that would increase costs of implementation. The advance notification is to include information on the effect of the change, and the contribution to the U.S. national security. The committee recommends the continuation of this practice and further recommends that the congressional defense committees be notified in advance of any technical changes or amendments to treaties that result in clarification of the definitions of understood meanings. Offset Folios 29 to Insert here ***TABLE GOES HERE*** Budget exhibits The committee understands that the Department of Defense is considering making some major modifications to the procurement and research and development (R&D) budget exhibits. Some of these changes involve presenting R&D information, by project, in formats similar to those of the procurement display. The committee applauds the efforts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to bring some order to the terminology for aircraft inventory management. The committee believes that this standardization was long overdue. The previous Service-unique accounting schemes led to much confusion. The committee also believes that information on the total overall aircraft inventories would be a useful addition to the budget documentation. Such displays would provide detail by the appropriate active and inactive inventory categories, as compared to the total inventory requirements approved by the JCS. The committee believes that such changes could ultimately result in streamlining the budget review process, both for the Administration and the Congress. These changes could reduce the amount of time that is now wasted in reviewing the budget by people at all levels manually collating data from different sources, including asking (and answering) questions seeking to clarify factual data. DIVISION A-DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS TITLE I-PROCUREMENT The recommendations of the committee for the procurement of various defense weapons and equipment appear in this title of the report. EXPLANATION OF TABLES The tables in this title display items requested by the administration for fiscal year 1995 for which the committee either increased or decreased the requested amounts. Items that are not displayed have been approved by the committee in the amounts requested in the Department of Defense's budget justification documents. As in the past, the administration may not exceed the amounts approved by the committee (as set forth in the tables or, if unchanged from the administration's request, as set forth in the Defense Department's budget justification documents) without a reprogramming action in accordance with established procedures. Mission planning systems The committee report on S. 1298 (S. Rept. 103-112) directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to assemble a panel to survey all the mission planning systems currently in operation or in development in the Department; to identify those systems which utilize common data bases and computer models and those systems which require unique data and models; and to outline a plan for the consolidation and coordination of current and future mission planning systems. The committee was concerned that there has been little coordination among the Department's plans. The committee observed that the lack of coordination has produced multiple, redundant data base requirements. The Department has submitted an interim response indicating that the proliferation problem may be much larger than anyone had realized. The committee had been told that there were at least 17 mission planning systems in development with no clear plan for coordination. The indications now are that there may be dozens, if not hundreds of such systems. The committee encourages the Department to complete this review expeditiously. The Department can ill afford to delay getting this problem under control. Offset Folios 32 to 33 Insert here ***TABLE GOES HERE*** Medium range transport aircraft The committee notes the Army aviation modernization plan has identified a requirement for modernizing the Army's fixed wing aviation fleet by reducing the number of different types of aircraft the Army operates. The Army's fixed wing modernization strategy is focused on four basic types of aircraft. One of these is a medium-range utility aircraft (C-XX MR). The committee notes that the Army has a validated requirement for the C-XX MR, including a published mission needs statement. The committee recommends $23.0 million for acquiring four new production, small turbofan aircraft for the C-XX MR mission, consistent with the Army aviation modernization plan. Army helicopters As noted elsewhere in this report, the Army's modernization program has many, apparently serious, deficiencies. The Army believes it would need as much as a 50 percent increase in its research, development, and acquisition (RDA) accounts to modernize adequately. The committee does not believe that the Army is going to compete successfully for any increase of this magnitude, particularly when it is likely that the overall Department of Defense budget will be declining further. The Army's helicopter situation is a microcosm of what is happening in RDA overall: (1) too many programs chasing too few dollars; (2) sole source procurement decisions that may not take adequate account of protecting critical industrial base capabilities; (3) program cancellations that will ultimately result in increased industrial base problems; (4) sacrificing modernization to protect current force structure, which requires "band-aid'' measures to sustain current capabilities; and (5) the Army's hope that the budget situation will improve beyond the planning period. The committee is aware of the Army's aviation restructuring initiative, but even this plan may not be bold enough. The Comanche, the program that the Army claims is its number one priority, will not be ready for production until the end of the decade. In the meantime, the Army intends to halt production of UH-60 helicopters at one of the Comanche prime contractor's facilities in fiscal year 1997. The Army apparently hopes that: (1) the prime contractor will remain viable with little or no certain U.S. government production effort; (2) the Comanche budget can afford the long-term cost increases from reopening the prime contractor's plant; and (3) the Army's budget can afford increased overhead costs for Comanche R&D in the interim. The Apache upgrade program is another area of concern. The Army's plan is to negotiate a sole source contract for this upgrade with the prime contractor that built the new production Apaches. Yet, new production is slated to end several months before the upgrade program will get underway. The Army apparently hopes that foreign military sales (FMS) will sustain a production capability until the Longbow upgrade program begins rate production. However, if FMS does not fill the gap, the Army plans to pay substantial close down and restart costs. For utility helicopters, the Army plans to stop UH-60 production at a level several hundred short of requirements. Because of this shortfall, the Army will be obliged to operate old UH-1 helicopters for the foreseeable future. The statement of managers accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (H. Rept. 103-357) directed the Secretary of the Army to coordinate with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to thoroughly study light helicopter modernization requirements and alternatives. The Secretary was directed to provide this report by April 15, 1994. The Secretary has not provided the report. The committee is concerned that the Army is making decisions on a program-by-program basis, without considering the effect on other programs, the overall budget, or on the industrial base. What appears to be rational and cost-efficient from a program perspective may not be the case from a total Army perspective. It may be that the Defense Department intends to let this situation run on autopilot, at least until there is a catastrophe. The committee believes that the Department of Defense should not wait for louder warning. The committee believes that the Congress could benefit from an independent review of the Army's aviation situation. The committee has a number of questions: (1) What is the revised force structure, supported by the Bottom-Up Review, against which we should measure modernization requirements? (2) Is that force structure affordable in the context of Army modernization requirements? (3) If Comanche is the Army's number one priority, why would the Army put the Comanche development program at such risk? What should be done to mitigate the risk that the prime contractor will not be able to complete development and start production at reasonable costs? (4) If the Army is not going to compete the Apache upgrade, why shouldn't the Army consider using the Apache upgrade program to bridge the gap until Comanche is ready to build? (5) If the Army is not going to completely modernize its utility helicopter fleet, what is the affordable plan for ensuring that the force is sustained? The committee believes that the Department of Defense should complete a thorough assessment of these and other related Army aviation issues and submit its findings with the fiscal year 1996 budget request. UH-60 helicopter The committee understands that the UH-60 helicopter engine contract has achieved contract price reductions that are not reflected in the budget request. The committee recommends a reduction of $4.5 million to reflect better engine pricing. Kiowa warrior The budget request included $111.8 million for various upgrades to Kiowa warrior helicopters. One of these involves an upgrade to the control display systems. The committee understands that the budget request overstates the cost of these upgrades by $1.3 million. Accordingly, the committee recommends a reduction of $1.3 million. Hellfire The budget request included $121.6 million for the procurement of 830 Hellfire missiles. The committee recommends an authorization of $133.6 million, $12.0 million above the requested level. This small increase will allow the Army to procure an additional 400 missiles. TOW missile The budget request did not include funds to continue production of the TOW IIB antitank missile. The committee has sufficient reservations about the adequacy of the Army's long-range plans for maintaining a viable heavy antitank missile to warrant a recommendation to continue modest production of the TOW IIB missile for at least another year. The Army currently has an adequate inventory of TOW missiles. However, due to normal shelf-life aging and expenditures of missiles in training and testing, the inventory will begin to fall dramatically shortly after the turn of the century. Indeed, by the middle of the next decade, the Army will have enough TOWs to equip only the contingency force. Assuming successful development of a follow-on missile, which the Army intends to begin in fiscal year 1997, the Army would have to procure the new missile at a high rate to maintain total force readiness. The committee notes that these are the same years that the Army currently plans to be buying large quantities of the Javelin man-portable antitank missile. Elsewhere in this report, the committee questions the validity of the Javelin production profile. The committee's concerns increase if the Army plans to produce a large number of TOW follow-on missiles at the same time. The committee recommends that the Army submit a report through the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the congressional defense committees that addresses these issues: (1) the cost and schedule for the development of a TOW follow-on; (2) the production schedule, profile, and projected unit costs of the follow-on; (3) the potential to scale-up the Javelin missile or technology to meet TOW follow-on requirements, and the cost benefits to both programs if that could be accomplished; and (4) the costs to maintain TOW IIB production at levels necessary to sustain inventory requirements for the Total Force. This report shall be provided by April 15, 1995. In the meantime, the committee believes it would be imprudent to cease production of the TOW II missile. The committee directs the Army to use the $27.4 million requested for plant closure and production support to continue missile production. Multiple launch rocket system The committee recognizes that the Army has a plan to maintain the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) production base until the extended-range version begins production. Under this plan, for approximately five months, the contractor will have to reduce the production rate to about half the so-called minimum sustaining rate. Additional foreign military sales (FMS) may materialize which would solve the problem. The committee urges the Administration to pursue FMS, especially for Korea. MLRS is a premier counter-battery weapon, and the Republic of Korea faces formidable artillery forces. The committee has considered the merits of accelerating the schedule for the extended-range MLRS, but agrees with the Army that such action would be too risky at this time. The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to examine this issue in the coming year and notify the committee if an opportunity develops to accelerate the program. The committee urges the Army to consider a reprogramming action to prevent a production slowdown during the transition to the extended-range version. Over the long term, the committee is concerned about the MLRS inventory, which will begin to decline precipitously in the next decade due to shelf-life limits. Even if requirements are reduced further due to force reductions and increased performance from the extended-range version, the Army's current plans for production rates of the extended-range MLRS will be far short of the level needed to sustain the required inventory. The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to report to the congressional defense committees, through the Director of Tactical Systems in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, on the Army's inventory requirements for MLRS and plans for sustaining it. This report shall be provided by April 15, 1995. Stinger missile modifications The current Stinger missile inventory of about 30,000 missiles is significantly less than the stated Army requirement. The committee is concerned that the Army will not be able to sustain even this minimum inventory due to shelf-life limitations and low planned production rates of modified missiles. The committee estimates that the Army will have to modify between 1,000 and 2,000 missiles a year to sustain the inventory over the long term. The Army intends to reprogram $9.6 million to begin modifying Stinger missiles to the block I configuration. This amount will procure only 780 missiles but an additional $5.0 million would provide almost 600 more. The committee therefore recommends authorization of an additional $5.0 million. The committee also stresses the importance of the planned Block II upgrade, which will provide improved capability to engage targets operating in clutter and using advanced countermeasures. The committee directs that no additional funds beyond those previously authorized be obligated or expended for tests of complementary missiles, since none of the candidates provide a "fire-and-forget'' capability and are less cost-effective than the Block II Stinger, and since the Army has failed to provide a report on candidates and flight tests. The committee also recommends $5.0 million in PE 23801 (line 173) to accelerate the development of the Block II seeker. Tank gun mounts The committee understands that half the tank gun mounts for the M1 tank program for the Army, and all gun mounts for foreign military sales (FMS), are manufactured at an Army arsenal rather than by the M1 prime contractor. The committee considers this inappropriate and inefficient, and at odds with the goal of strengthening the tank industrial base. The committee directs the Army to allocate at least half of the FMS gun mount manufacturing to the prime contractor and maintain at least an even split of gun mount manufacturing for the Army M1 program in fiscal years 1995 and 1996. The committee directs that by the start of fiscal year 1997, all gun mount production for the M1 tank, for both the Army and FMS, shall be performed by the M1 prime contractor, unless the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology demonstrates to the congressional defense committees that it is more cost-effective to continue to maintain a production split between the private and public sector. This direction is consistent with the preference for private sector utilization expressed in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circular A76, and with the conclusions of the Defense Science Board report on the tracked vehicle industrial base. Tank engine industrial base The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 directed the Defense Science Board (DSB) to create a blue-ribbon commission to study the tank engine industrial base. The committee understands that the DSB panel has concluded its study and recommends several actions to attempt to preserve a tank engine engineering and manufacturing base. This manufacturing capability is based on continued operations at the Stratford Army Engine Plant (SAEP). The Army does not now require new tank engines, and, in the near term, the prospects for additional foreign military sales, which would require new engine production, are not favorable. The Army does require continued production of spare parts and engineering expertise to support the Abrams tank, but these needs could probably be met without operations at SAEP. Nevertheless, Army budget justification documents for fiscal year 1995 state that the Stratford Army Engine Plant "will be required through the year 2001 to accommodate demands for the tank upgrade program, to support the fielded fleet, and for potential Foreign Military Sales requirements.'' The DSB concluded that the nation should retain the ability to produce new heavy tanks, if that can be accomplished at a reasonable cost and risk. Also, it is possible that engine durability tests scheduled to start this fall, and future Abrams modification programs, could lead to a remanufacturing or more comprehensive engine overhaul requirement for increased durability or performance. For either eventuality, preservation of SAEP likely would be necessary. The DSB task force recommends that the Army fund $20.0 million of engine overhaul work at SAEP, in addition to continuation of funding for necessary spare parts and engineering support. This measure, along with a progressive dual-use leasing arrangement and an aggressive plant downsizing effort, could permit the contractor to preserve operations at SAEP. The DSB notes that the success of this initiative depends on the development of commercial business at SAEP, which the DSB panel acknowledges is uncertain. The committee is persuaded that the Department of Defense should attempt to preserve a tank manufacturing capability at the level of investment recommended by the DSB. Accordingly, the committee: (1) directs the obligation of remaining funds authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 1994, and authorizes an additional $15.0 million in fiscal year 1995 for systems technical and engineering support, engine durability upgrade efforts, and plant downsizing for fiscal year 1995; (2) authorizes $20.0 million in procurement for engine overhauls at SAEP in fiscal year 1995; (3) authorizes the request of $15.3 million for procurement of spares; (4) directs the Army to pursue a progressive dual-use leasing arrangement for SAEP; and (5) permits the Army to apply other funds, such as funds requested for production base support, severance, and production continuity, to these efforts, as needed. If the Secretary of the Army certifies that a tank engine industrial base is necessary and that the Army needs to buy new tank engines to protect that base, the committee would consider a reprogramming request by the Army for such purpose. In addition, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to develop a contingency plan in the event that SAEP is not viable over the long term. This plan shall include examination of alternative diesel or turbine engines for heavy tanks. The committee also believes that the Department of Defense must establish a deadline for determining whether SAEP will be viable. The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to recommend to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology a schedule and milestones for measuring progress toward sustaining the Stratford plant with additional commercial business and report annually to the congressional defense committees. The committee recommends the requested amount for operation and maintenance for depot activities at Anniston Army Depot in support of the M1 tank, in light of actions recommended elsewhere in this report, and since the Army can move engine overhauls forward. 120mm mortar The committee recommends continued procurement of 120mm mortars to achieve the Army's inventory objective if funding is made available to the Army for fiscal year 1995. The committee notes that an additional $30.0 million would buy out the Army's inventory objective of 1,322 weapons. Army ammunition The committee recommends a decrease of $300,000 to the budget request for Army ammunition based on fact-of-life changes to the Army request. The committee recommends an increase of $78.3 million to the budget request for the following high priority ammunition programs: Item Dollars in millions 120mm HEAT-MP-T M830A1 18.2 25mm, all types 13.9 105mm HERA M913 21.4 MINE, AT/AP M87 (VOLCANO) 8.0 60mm mortar, M840 3.0 40mm, all types 4.3 5.56mm, all types 9.5 Total 78.3 This increase would be offset by the transfer of $79.8 million in prior-year savings from the fiscal year 1994 authorization for the following Army ammunition programs: Item Dollars in millions .50 cal cartridges -5.6 35mm M968 -.7 105mm M490A1 TP-T -5.0 105mm M490AT TP-T tank -10.0 105mm M724A1 DS-TP -5.0 105mm M724A1 DS-TP tank -10.0 105mm M804 -10.0 M438-M864 conversion -25.0 Upgrade/improvement of AT-4 -5.0 CAD/PAD, all types -1.4 Ammo components, all types -2.1 Total -79.8 The savings are available due to fact-of-life changes in the fiscal year 1994 program. Transfer of 155mm propelling charges The committee directs the Army to transfer to the Marine Corps 17,000 155mm M203A1 red bag propelling charges. These items are to be transferred at no charge to the Marine Corps. Demilitarization of excess SUU-30 dispensers The committee recommends an increase of $5.0 million to demilitarize or repackage, as appropriate, approximately 50,000 SUU-30 dispensers. This demilitarization program should be the result of a combined effort by the Air Force and the Army, with the single manager for conventional ammunition responsible for all demilitarization actions. 120 millimeter tank ammunition The committee has learned that the Army plans to transfer the load-and-pack (LAP) operations for 120 millimeter tank ammunition from the Milan Army Ammunition Plant to another Army ammunition plant. The committee questions the cost-effectiveness of such a move at this time. Any final decision by the Army on this matter would be premature prior to the conclusion of the 1995 round of base closures. Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to maintain the 120 millimeter tank ammunition LAP operations at the Milan Army Ammunition Plant until after the 1995 round of base closures and the Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees that it would be cost-effective to perform this function elsewhere. Ammunition demilitarization The committee supports the budget request for ammunition demilitarization and the Army's plans to initiate demilitarization contracts for small, medium, and large caliber ammunition. The committee remains concerned, however, about the continuing practice of open burning and open detonation (OBOD) to dispose of the excess ammunition. This practice is used not only for ammunition, but for explosives as well. As discussed in the section of the committee report dealing with the research and development accounts, continued use of OBOD is neither economically nor environmentally sound. Accordingly, the committee directs the Army to accelerate, where possible, the award of demilitarization contracts that make use of environmentally sound recycling and reuse technology. In addition, the committee directs the Army to work closely with the other military Services to identify recycling and reuse technologies or use contained destruction where appropriate. This will allow the Army, as well as the other military Services, to stop OBOD as soon as possible. The committee encourages the Army to prepare a comprehensive demilitarization plan that provides for both Army and commercial facilities to share responsibility for demilitarization. Family of medium tactical vehicles The budget request contained $382.7 million to procure 3,535 medium trucks under the Army's family of medium tactical truck (FMTV) program. The Army's current plan is to procure 87,600 2.5 and 5-ton trucks over about 20 years, dating from fiscal year 1991. Total program cost is projected to be almost $15.0 billion in then-year dollars. The average age of the Army's 2.5 ton trucks is already 23 years, and some of these trucks date from the Korean War. These old trucks performed poorly in Operation Desert Storm. At the rate the Army is buying FMTVs, however, they will continue in service for a long time. In addition, because the program is so stretched out, annual quantities do not justify competitive procurement, in the Army's opinion. Also, this stretched-out procurement plan encouraged the reserve components to demand a near-term service-life extension program (SLEP) for their trucks due to concerns that the reserves would have to wait too long to receive FMTV trucks. The Army signed a multi-year procurement contract for this effort, but has failed to request funds to continue the program in fiscal year 1995, due to budget constraints. The committee notes that the reserve component established the truck SLEP before the recent decisions to downsize the Army substantially. The effect of this downsizing, according to the Army, is that the reserves are slated to begin receiving trucks off the FMTV line within a year of the active forces. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps is also in need of improved trucks due to the age of its fleet. The Marine Corps relies today on the same trucks used by the Army. The Marine Corps and the Army were jointly developing the FMTV program, and according to the Army, Marine Corps-unique requirements were incorporated into the FMTV program. Now, however, the Marine Corps claims that the FMTV program will not meet its needs and has requested funds for a service-life extension and upgrade program for its medium tactical trucks. The Marine Corps cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) purports to show that the Marine Corps program is significantly superior to the FMTV system in every measure of merit (cost, cross-country mobility, speed, and payload). This COEA raises the question of whether the FMTV program is the best choice for the Army's 5-ton truck requirement. The Department now has three separate tactical truck programs for ground forces, none of which appears to be adequately funded. The committee believes that an effort must be made to determine if these programs can be consolidated and made more affordable. Accordingly, the committee directs the following actions: (1) The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) shall review all requirements for medium tactical trucks and determine whether a common set of requirements for all Services' active and reserve components can be established. (2) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)) shall review the Marine Corps medium tactical truck COEA and explain why the Marine Corps truck proposal is not also the best buy for the Army. (3) The USD(A&T), in conjunction with the JROC, shall determine whether a single acquisition program can satisfy the needs of all users. The Under Secretary shall consider the merits of mandating that an appropriate share of new or improved trucks be specified for the reserve components. (4) The USD(A&T) shall study what savings could be achieved, if any, by a consolidated procurement, establishment of a second source for the Army's FMTV program, and an accelerated production profile. (5) The Secretary of the Army shall ensure that the Army obtains rights to the FMTV technical data package before the current multiyear procurement contract expires. The committee directs that none of the funds authorized for the Marine Corps truck upgrade program and no more than 75 percent of the funds authorized for the FMTV program may be obligated until the USD(A&T) reports to the congressional defense committees on the results of these reviews and any recommendations he may have. Palletized loading system The Army has decided to cease procurement of so-called demountable cargo beds, or "flatracks,'' for the palletized loading system (PLS) because of declines in the overall budget. The committee understands the Army's budget situation, but is troubled by this decision. The PLS concept was to field a number of large trucks along with a much larger number of flatracks for efficient ammunition delivery. The flatracks could be loaded with ammunition at a supply point, and hoisted onto an arriving heavy truck returning with an empty rack. Similarly, at the delivery point, the fully loaded flatrack could be dropped off intact, and empty racks could be picked up. The point was to limit the amount of time that scarce, expensive trucks would have to wait at pickup and delivery locations, and to limit the downtime of support personnel. The flatracks are the least expensive part of the system, but clearly the concept will not work without an adequate number of racks. Unfortunately, that is precisely the position the Army is now in. It has bought almost all the trucks it requires, but is far short of requirements for flatracks. The Army requirement for flatracks for the ammunition mission alone is 51,000; to date, the Army has procured only about 14,000. At that level, the purpose of the PLS initiative cannot be realized. Accordingly, the committee recommends $20.0 million to continue procurement of flatracks in fiscal year 1995. The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to analyze the effect of flatrack shortfalls on the PLS concept of operations and on fire-support effectiveness under the two major regional contingency planning scenarios. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology shall review this analysis and forward the results to the congressional defense committees by April 1, 1995. Echelon above corps communications The committee recommends a $37.8 million increase to the echelon above corps (EAC) communications program to initiate an Army-wide tactical switching modernization program. This multi-year program includes downsizing circuit and message switches and associated software upgrades, takes advantage of advances in communications technology, and corrects operational deficiencies identified after Operation Desert Storm. The committee expects the Army to continue this effort in fiscal years 1996 and 1997. Commander's tactical terminal The budget request contained $8.2 million for the procurement of the commander's tactical terminal (CTT). This small, easily transportable terminal receives critical intelligence broadcasts from collection systems at all levels, such as Guardrail, the U-2, the RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft, and national assets. The Army has been understandably enthusiastic about this program for several years. The committee is informed that the Army could accelerate fielding of CTT to the contingency force by two years simply by allocating an additional $5.0 million to the program in fiscal year 1995. The committee cannot understand why the Army would hold up a program like this for such a small amount of money. The committee recommends an additional $5.0 million for this program. The committee expects the Army to avoid shortchanging this program in the future. Air defense alerting devices Critical to the air defense mission is an ability to alert forces to the presence of potentially hostile aircraft. Existing air defense systems have difficulty acquiring targets in clutter beyond short ranges. This deficiency is due, in part, to the inability of sensors to cue and track targets. The committee understands that there may be non-developmental items (NDI) that could assist Army ground forces in alerting air defense forces. The committee believes that the Army should investigate the potential for evaluating such NDI equipment to help fulfill this mission and for deploying candidate systems showing promise. Night vision weapon sight replacement program The committee continues to support efforts to maintain U.S. military forces' advantage in night vision capabilities that enables U.S. forces to "own the night''. This advantage is derived, in large measure, from the availability of superior night vision technology to individual soldiers. The Army currently has over 20,000 night weapon sights that incorporate older technology developed in the 1970s. The committee is aware that recent improvements in image intensification technology (generation III) would double the detection range of the currently fielded Army weapon sights. Moreover, the generation III tube is a direct drop-in replacement for the older tube, so no system modification costs are incurred. The Army's Dismounted Battle Lab recently documented the advantage of the new tubes and recommended procuring and fielding them as soon as possible. The committee believes that future procurements of night vision devices should be limited primarily to those with generation III capabilities and recommends an additional $2.25 million to procure 500 generation III image intensification tubes for retrofit into existing weapons sights. The committee urges the Army to include funds in future budget requests to continue replacement of older technology tubes with generation III tubes. Advanced field artillery tactical data system The Army is developing a new system to increase the speed with which information is shared among fire support forces, called the advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS). The committee believes that this system will provide much needed capability improvements. The committee understands, however, that the contract award date for AFATDS has been delayed until fiscal year 1996. Therefore, the committee recommends a reduction of $29.0 million to the budget request. Automated test equipment The committee continues to support a single family of automated test equipment for the Army. The committee notes that the Army has not completed the congressionally-mandated report on the feasibility of incorporating existing test equipment into the integrated family of test equipment (IFTE), as well as other issues. The committee therefore directs the Army to continue to utilize direct support electrical systems test set (DSESTS) equipment and to incorporate the DSESTS into the IFTE family where the DSESTS is more cost-effective. Chemical/biological protective shelter The budget request included $9.539 million for chemical/biological protective shelters for the Army. The committee understands that as a result of program delays and a compressed acquisition schedule, it may be difficult to use fiscal year 1995 funds the first year they are available. In order that the funding profile for this program correspond much closer to actual project milestones, the committee recommends that funds for this program be included in the fiscal year 1996 budget request. Accordingly, the budget request has been reduced by the requested amount. Refrigeration equipment The budget request included $4.8 million for the procurement of refrigeration equipment. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has informed the committee that schedule delays will preclude the Army from awarding contracts in fiscal year 1995. The GAO recommends a reduction of $2.9 million from the requested level. The committee therefore recommends $1.9 million for this program. Causeway systems Last year, the committee expressed concern that the Army and the Navy were procuring two different systems for conducting the same logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) mission. The committee continues to believe that operating common equipment could provide enhanced support of joint operations, lower life cycle costs, and reduced acquisition costs, through more efficient production rates and eliminating such costs as licensing fees. The committee directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report comparing the Army's barge ferry system and the Navy's elevated causeway system. This report was to consider: (1) inter-operability and compatibility; (2) government ownership of design rights pertaining to each system; (3) suitability for joint LOTS operations; and (4) safety and training considerations. The Department has not submitted the required report. Nevertheless, the Army requested $14.3 million for causeway systems in the fiscal year 1995 budget. The committee understands that the Army's causeway system could still be delivered on the same schedule if funds are budgeted in fiscal year 1996. The committee recommends no funding for Army causeway systems in fiscal year 1995, delaying funding until fiscal year 1996 without prejudice. This would allow the Department additional time to prepare its report containing information that should form the basis for more rational decisions on LOTS mission equipment. Offset Folios 48 to 49 Insert here ***TABLE GOES HERE*** F/A-18 C/D aircraft The budget request included $1,117.2 million to purchase 24 F/A-18 C/D aircraft. The Navy is developing a newer version of the F-18, called the F/A-18 E/F, that will have greater range and payload capabilities. The Navy intends to start production of this new variant in fiscal year 1997. In large measure, the Navy is continuing production of the F/A-18 C/D to maintain a warm production base while development of the F/A-18 E/F is completed. The committee recommends 17 aircraft and $826.7 million for F/A-18 C/D production. The committee believes that 17 aircraft for the Department of the Navy, in addition to foreign sales, will be sufficient to maintain production. The Navy should plan to buy the more capable version in greater quantities when it becomes available. CH/MH-53E helicopters Last year, the Navy had planned to buy 4 CH-53E aircraft in fiscal year 1995. However, the actual budget request for fiscal year 1995 included only $41.1 million to close the CH-53 production line. This decision reflected a broader Navy plan that included: (1) shifting CH-53E helicopters from Navy vertical on-board delivery (VOD) squadrons to the Marine Corps; (2) back-filling VOD squadrons with MH-53Es from airborne mine countermeasures (AMCM) squadrons; and (3) outfitting some air-cushion landing craft (LCAC) with mine countermeasures equipment, making it an "MCAC.'' These actions persuaded the Navy that it could truncate procurement of the CH-53Es at the end of the fiscal year 1994 buy. The 4 CH-53Es that the Navy had planned to buy already represented a reduction from previous estimates, which had included purchases of MH-53Es as well. This change reflected in part a Navy decision to reduce AMCM force structure. Last year, concerned about apparent year-to-year inconsistencies in the Navy's force structure plans, the committee asked the Navy for a study of mine countermeasures force levels. The Navy has provided this report. It concluded that the overall mine countermeasures force structure is marginally adequate to support the mine countermeasures scenarios that the Navy studied. Unfortunately, the report analyzed requirements only for sea lines of communications (areas like the Straits of Hormuz or the Sea of Japan). It did not deal with mine countermeasures operations to support port operations or amphibious operations. Unfortunately, the committee believes that it may be seeing the first signs of returning to old habits: we get to relearn mine countermeasures history every time we face a real mine threat. The committee believes that the Navy has not sufficiently justified cutting this important force structure. Therefore, the committee recommends an additional $60.0 million for buying four CH-53 helicopters. This will help support Marine Corps and Navy VOD lift requirements and preclude the need to reduce AMCM force structure. The committee reserves judgment on the MCAC concept. This proposal may have merit, but it is still in its formative stages. Discarding an actual AMCM capability in favor of an undeveloped concept would be premature. EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft modifications The budget request contained $38.4 million for EA-6B aircraft modifications. The Navy recently canceled the EA-6B advanced capabilities (ADVCAP) upgrade program, but has no plans to retire or replace its fleet of EA-6Bs. Also, the Navy has indicated to the committee it is awaiting the results of a joint Navy/Air Force electronic warfare study before recommending any future upgrades to the EA-6B. The committee is concerned that any delay in making prudent upgrades to this aircraft could prevent the Navy from capitalizing on its prior ADVCAP investment. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to carry out expeditiously a lower cost alternative program to the ADVCAP program. The committee intends to consider reprogramming requests to use funds previously provided for the EA-6B ADVCAP program only if the committee believes that the alternative program is robust enough to meet the Defense Department's needs. F-18 modifications The General Accounting Office has identified $40.0 million in excess fiscal year 1993 funds for F/A-18 aircraft modifications. The committee recommends a reduction of this amount to the fiscal year 1995 request of $86.1 million. P-3 series modifications Last year, the committee endorsed the concept of adapting the P-3C aircraft to better support operations in potential Third World crisis situations. The committee, however, was concerned about the degree of concurrency between testing and procurement in the P-3 anti-surface warfare (ASUW) improvement program (AIP). Similarly, the statement of managers accompanying the conference report on H.R. 3116 (H. Rept. 103-339) stated that the ". . . ASUW improvement program may be initiated in Fiscal Year 1994, but funds for 12 of 13 proposed systems are deleted until program testing has commenced . . .'' The Navy has testified that the P-3 AIP program will be ready to begin program testing in December 1994. The fiscal year 1995 budget request contained no funding for the P-3 AIP. The committee believes that the Department of Defense may have misinterpreted congressional intent by deleting all P-3 AIP funding from the Navy's budget request. The committee believes that the P-3 AIP program merits funding in fiscal year 1995. Accordingly, the committee recommends $136.3 million for P-3 modifications, an increase of $32.0 million from the requested level. Of this amount, the committee intends $25.0 million to provide for component testing, the development of a logistics and training infrastructure, and the procurement of additional systems. The remaining $7.0 million should be used to complete procurement of new computers for the P-3C update III program, a separate action necessary for P-3 AIP. Common ECM equipment The General Accounting Office has identified excess fiscal year 1994 funds that were appropriated for Navy common electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment. The budget request for fiscal year 1995 included $12.7 million for this program. The committee recommends that the request be denied and that prior year funds be made available for fiscal year 1995 requirements. Trident submarines The committee understands that the current Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) document does not contain required out-years funding for either the option to backfit Trident II (D-5) missiles into the eight west coast Trident submarines, or to maintain the existing Trident I missile capability in those submarines. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that one of these two options is adequately funded in the next FYDP submission. Weapons industrial facilities The committee recommends $28.5 million to continue the modernization of Allegany Ballistics Laboratory, a government-owned, contractor-operated facility in West Virginia that currently produces propulsion units for Navy missiles. Navy machine gun ammunition The budget request included $14.2 million for Navy machine gun ammunition. Included in this amount is funding for 20mm PGU-27 ammunition and 25mm PGU-32 ammunition. The committee is concerned about the inventory levels of these two type rounds and therefore designates both type rounds as items of special interest. The committee intends that no reprogramming of these two type rounds be accomplished without prior committee approval. Submarine vendor industrial base The Navy has completed a number of analyses of the nuclear submarine industry. Although these analyses have identified several potential problem areas, the committee is not convinced that the Navy is focusing appropriate attention on the portion of the vendor base that are second and third tier contractors furnishing equipment directly to the prime contractors. The committee believes that the Navy should more explicitly identify the situations for specific capabilities and vendors that merit government intervention, and the resources that the Navy has programmed to support that intervention. LHD-7 amphibious assault ship In reviewing the DOD budget request, the committee found it necessary to choose between two programs that it considers extremely important to national security-strategic sealift and LHD-7, an amphibious assault ship. In the final analysis, the committee revised the DOD budget priorities in order to lower the long-term cost of fielding the military capability inherent in these two programs. The operational requirement for both was clear. In written reports and testimony at committee hearings, a series of senior military leaders, including the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, have confirmed the strong military requirement for LHD-7 as the anchor for a twelfth amphibious ready group (ARG). Its contributions to amphibious operations and superb command and control capabilities are clearly important components of the naval force structure envisioned by ". . . From the Sea'', the Navy's blueprint for the next century. The case for additional strategic sealift to implement recommendations made in the Joint Staff's mobility requirements study is also compelling. As a consequence of lessons learned during Operation Desert Storm, the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) is expanding by acquiring up to 19 large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSR) in order to pre-position afloat the equipment for an Army armored brigade and for surge sealift to rapidly deliver cargo to areas of conflict. In developing its fiscal year 1995 budget request, DOD included $600.8 million in the National Defense Sealift Fund to exercise contract options on two LMSRs. The Department acknowledged the requirement for another LHD by including advance procurement funding for LHD-7 in future years. The Department, for affordability reasons, however, could not include LHD-7 in the fiscal year 1995 budget request. Given a strong requirement for both programs, the committee carefully considered the acquisition strategy reflected in the Navy's shipbuilding plan. It appeared that breaking the LHD production line and then restarting it in the year 2000 made little sense if the objective was to obtain a given capability at the lowest price to the taxpayer. The cost impact was estimated at several hundred million dollars. Also, the contract option on LHD-7 will expire on December 31, 1994 while the contract option on the two sealift ships will not expire until December 31, 1995. Taking such diverse military and economic factors into account, the committee determined that the best course of action to pursue in fiscal year 1995 was to defer authorization of the two sealift ships until fiscal year 1996 and, instead, use the funds allocated for these two ships in the budget for authorization of LHD-7. This will permit all ships to be acquired at a favorable price without loss of their contract options. The committee acknowledges that the $600.8 million available in the NDSF is insufficient to fully fund LHD-7 in fiscal year 1995. The committee firmly believes that full funding is the correct way to budget for procurement in the DOD budget. It departed from this policy reluctantly, and only after spirited debate. In the case of LHD-7, however, the committee decided that the cost-effective acquisition of this ship warranted such a departure. Further, this action should not be construed as a lessening of support for the strategic sealift program, which the committee continues to believe is a vital element of our national security. Assuming appropriation of the necessary funds, the committee authorizes LHD-7 with the understanding that the Navy will exercise its contract option for LHD-7 before the option expires, and include the residual increment of funding for the ship in its fiscal year 1996 budget. Further, the committee affirms that it desires the Navy to include funding for the two LMSRs deferred by the committee's action on LHD-7 in its fiscal year 1996 budget and exercise its contract option before December 31, 1995. Combat logistics forces The budget request included $30.6 million for conversion of one ammunition ship (AE) and $22.8 million for conversion of one stores ship (AFS). The committee report on S. 3114 (S. Rept. 102-352) directed the Navy to submit a report on alternatives for maintaining combat logistics forces capability with a fleet consisting of either 12 or 10 aircraft carriers. The Department submitted an interim report in October 1993, with a promise to provide the final report with the fiscal year 1995 budget request. The Navy Department has not submitted the report. The committee remains concerned that the Navy does not have a coherent plan for its combat logistics forces that reflects force structure concepts implied in the Bottom-Up Review. The committee recommends no authorization for conversion of logistics force ships in fiscal year 1995. Ship alterations The Navy is launching a campaign to expand the opportunities for getting women to sea at a more rapid pace. The Navy has requested funds to modify a number of ships to add sea duty billet opportunities for women. The committee understands that the Navy has identified additional opportunities beyond those that were foreseen when the Navy submitted its budget request. The committee recommends an additional $5.0 million for performing surface ship alterations to facilitate assigning women to sea duty billets. Surface ship torpedo defense (SSTD) Unresolved technical issues have raised doubts about the feasibility of a major portion of the surface ship torpedo defense program. In December 1993, the committee learned that the surface ship torpedo defense (SSTD) program was experiencing developmental problems. At present the operational testing of the SLR-24 torpedo detection subsystem is in disarray, and the program is not ready to begin production. As a consequence, the committee recommends $21.4 million for surface ship torpedo defense procurement, a reduction of $10.5 million from the requested level. Sonobuoy procurement The statement of managers accompanying the conference report on the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (H. Rept. 103-339) directed the Navy to submit a report on sonobuoy inventories, projected over a five-year period, that accounted for shelf life, procurement and usage rates, and future requirements. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition sent the report to Congress on April 13, 1994. The report, which was based on a very thorough inventory, indicated that the quantities of sonobuoys authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 1994, and those requested in the 1995 budget request, did not properly reflect actual Service requirements. The Navy has initiated a reprogramming request to shift fiscal year 1994 funds to procure the proper mix of sonobuoys. The committee recommends the following authorization to reflect actual fiscal year 1995 requirements: Sonobuoy Dollars in millions AN/SSQ-36 $2.3 AN/SSQ-53 0 AN/SSQ-62 $22.5 AN/SSQ-77 0 AN/SSQ-86 $2.4 AN/SSQ-110 $37.2 Expeditionary airfields The Marine Corps has equipment, called expeditionary airfields, that enables it to operate tactical aircraft from unimproved airfields. The committee report on S. 1298 (S. Rept. 103-112) directed the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report to the congressional defense committees identifying what would be required to have Navy squadrons operate from expeditionary airfields. The committee was concerned that integration of Marine Corps squadrons into carrier air wings might degrade their ability to provide close air support. The committee asked for various information, including: (1) additional expeditionary airfield investment; (2) additional spares and support equipment for Navy squadrons; and (3) additional training that Navy squadrons might require. The committee has received a report. The Navy's report says, "Additional spares and repair parts, aviation support equipment, mobile facilities and miscellaneous items to support automatic test equipment (ATE) may be necessary to support the maintenance effort of the squadron.'' The committee is pleased that the Navy was able to produce a report. Unfortunately, the report provides no illumination of requirements for additional spares and support equipment that Navy squadrons could require, or the associated costs. The committee reiterates its broader concerns about close air support for Marine Corps forces, including how the Navy will provide squadrons (Navy or Marine Corps) with adequate close air support training. Because of other deficiencies (such as naval shore fire support), tactical aviation providing close air support is relatively more important for a Marine Corps expeditionary operation than for other operations. The committee understands that the Department of the Navy may be considering further expansion of the integration of Marine Corps tactical aircraft squadrons aboard aircraft carriers. Based on the Navy's report and other information, the committee sees no evidence that the Navy has adequately planned for maintaining close air support capability under the current arrangement. There is even less evidence that the Navy has any plan for maintaining this capability while making further shifts of Marine Corps squadrons away from the Fleet Marine Forces. The committee is concerned that, unless the Department has fully investigated the ramifications of providing additional tactical aviation support for Marine Corps forces, such action would be premature. The Navy should develop a mechanism for gauging close air support capability. In the absence of a thorough plan, and mechanisms for evaluating changes in capability, the committee will oppose such a move. Marine Corps ammunition The committee recommends a decrease of $12.0 million for 155mm M203A1 red bag propelling charges based on the transfer of these propelling charges from the Army to the Marine Corps. The committee recommends an increase of $5.0 million for .50 caliber SLAP ammunition. Offset Folios 58 to - Insert here ***TABLE GOES HERE*** C-130 tactical airlift modernization Last year, the committee was made aware of a proposal by the C-130 contractor team to develop a follow-on C-130 aircraft, called the "C-130J.'' The goals of this C-130J upgrade would be improved performance and reduced operating and support costs. The committee has expressed its concerns about tactical airlift modernization on numerous occasions. The committee was interested in the C-130J proposal, but asked the Air Force to develop more information about the proposal. Although the Air Force has not provided the report, the committee understands that the Air Force finds the proposal an attractive alternative for modernizing active tactical airlift squadrons. The committee received testimony from the Commander of the Air Combat Command indicating that the Air Force was very interested in this aircraft to modernize the fleet. The committee understands that the Department of Defense has approved a proposal to use fiscal year 1994 Guard and Reserve procurement funds to procure 2 C-130Js, and deliver these aircraft to the active Air Force. Under this proposal, the active Air Force would, in turn, transfer two C-130Hs purchased with fiscal year 1993 funds directly to the Air National Guard from among those scheduled to be delivered to the Air Force in mid-1994. The committee understands that these two aircraft would be used in the testing program and would help lead to FAA certification of the configuration that the Air Force would want to buy. The committee believes that the Department should implement such an arrangement, based on the preliminary reports from the Air Force and the Air Combat Command. This is the first positive sign in a couple of years that the Air Force and the Department may be seriously considering the plight and overdue modernization of the active component of our tactical airlift forces. Joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) The budget request included $564.2 million to modify two aircraft to the JSTARS configuration. The committee has been a longstanding supporter of the JSTARS program and the capability that the system will provide to U.S. operating forces. Even as a developmental platform in the Persian Gulf War, the JSTARS system showed enormous potential. The committee believes that the Department should acquire this capability as rapidly and efficiently as possible. In that light, the Secretary of the Air Force has informed the Congress that there may be an opportunity to purchase a number of used B-707 aircraft in a common configuration that could later be modified to the JSTARS configuration. Having the same configuration aircraft would yield significant savings throughout the life of the program by streamlining the operation and support infrastructure costs. The Air Force believes that this proposal could also yield nearer-term acquisition savings. Therefore, the committee recommends an additional $99.9 million to purchase used B-707 airframes of common configuration for later use in the JSTARS program. F-16 modifications The budget request included $157.2 million dollars for various modifications for F-16 aircraft. The committee understands that the budget request can be reduced by $36.7 million. The Air Force has canceled one planned modification, and the costs of two others are less than previously estimated. Therefore, the committee recommends $120.5 million. C-135 modifications The budget request included $103.4 million to perform various modifications to the fleet of C-135 aircraft. Included within these funds were $16.7 million designated for making various communications and electronics upgrades that will not be ready for contract award until fiscal year 1996. The committee recommends $86.7 million for C-135 modifications. Tri-Service standoff attack missile The budget request contained $66.7 million for the Navy, and $81.1 million for the Air Force, to continue development of the tri-Service standoff attack missile (TSSAM). The budget request also contained $373.9 million in procurement to begin low-rate initial production of the Air Force's combined effects bomblet (CEB) version of the missile. Finally, the budget request included $82.5 million to pay for termination charges to cancel the Army portion of the program. TSSAM is designed to provide the Air Force and the Navy with a weapon that can survive the heaviest air defenses and attack high value targets. The TSSAM payoff comes from reducing the exposure of manned aircraft to enemy air defenses and a higher probability of successfully attacking the toughest targets than any alternative standoff weapons. The TSSAM is an essential program for providing enhanced standoff capabilities in many existing and planned platforms. The TSSAM program has experienced technical problems in the testing program since last year. When the missile works, performance meets or exceeds specifications, providing the designed capability to attack the most heavily defended targets. However, a series of process control problems has plagued the program. The Air Force, as manager of the joint program, has been disappointed with the contractor's performance, but has begun to see improvements in various program management indicators. The committee, adhering to its longstanding "fly-before-buy'' philosophy, believes that the Air Force budget should reflect the current testing delays, by delaying production until testing can demonstrate the expected performance and reliability. Therefore, the committee supports the Air Force and Navy budget request for research and development, but recommends a reduction for Air Force procurement of $65.8 million. The committee directs that none of the fiscal year 1995 production funds be obligated until the testing program has: (1) achieved all contractual exit criteria for proceeding to the next phase of the program, and (2) passed the standards set forth in the classified annex to the statement of managers accompanying the conference report on the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (H. Rept. 103-339). The committee also understands that $50.0 million of the funds in the Army's TSSAM budget request are excess to termination requirements, and recommends a similar reduction. Offset Folios 62 Insert here ***TABLE GOES HERE*** Joint service imagery processing system The committee is disturbed by the collapse of the joint Service imagery processing system (JSIPS). Each Service now appears to be proceeding unilaterally to acquire a deployable imagery processing capability. The committee directs that no deployable imagery processing system other than JSIPS be fielded unless and until there is formal agreement to a plan that will ensure that every such system will be compatible and interoperable. This plan shall be submitted to the congressional defense committees. The budget request included $22.4 million for RDT&E and $47.6 million for procurement of the JSIPS program in fiscal year 1995. The committee understands that the restructured program will require $28.3 million in RDT&E and $41.7 million in procurement in fiscal year 1995. The committee recommends an authorization of these amounts in PE 35154D and in line 3 of defense-wide procurement, respectively. Corresponding decreases in Service procurement accounts are recommended to offset the additional amount in defense-wide procurement. Programs included in the defense airborne reconnaissance program The committee is concerned about the inconsistent criteria for including airborne reconnaissance programs under the management of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO). The committee agrees that the DARO cannot practically absorb additional programs in fiscal year 1995, but directs that the Guardrail and ES-3 programs be included in the defense airborne reconnaissance program with the submission of the fiscal year 1996 defense budget request. The DARO director shall also inform the congressional defense committees of his evaluation of the arguments for and against inclusion of the Army's air reconnaissance low program, the Navy's reef point program, and the Navy's BGPHES program. Global command and control system The committee is pleased with the progress made by the Department of Defense in developing and validating the "C4I for the Warrior'' concept, which was developed by the Joint Staff. This concept has been applied to the global command and control system (GCCS) program, which will replace the worldwide military command and control system (WWMCCS). The committee directs the Defense Information Systems Agency and the Services to curtail all but minimum, essential efforts in support of the WWMCCS system. WWMCCS maintenance (both hardware and software) should be undertaken only to correct or prevent critical failures. Resources made available through reductions in WWMCCS sustaining efforts should be redirected to the GCCS program. Offset Folios 65 to - Insert here ***TABLE GOES HERE*** National Guard and reserve equipment The committee has consistently and strongly supported the equipment modernization of the reserve components. In previous years, the committee has authorized additional funds for the National Guard and reserve components to procure the most modern combat equipment. Last year, the committee took the first steps toward refocusing these funds toward those activities that meet important military needs, and also enhance the capability of the reserve components to assist civilian authorities. The committee continues to believe that the reserve components can make important contributions to this effort. The National Guard, which has a dual mission in support of the states, is particularly well-situated to assist civilian agencies in meeting civilian needs. Therefore, the committee recommends additional funds for the National Guard and reserve components in broad categories, such as medical equipment, aviation and aeromedical equipment, construction and transportation equipment, and electronic and communications equipment, as outlined in the attached table. Last year, the committee noted the special situation for night vision devices. While some could consider these devices to have solely military missions, the committee notes that they apply to the civil mission of the National Guard and should be considered in that category. To ensure that the funds are spent for the highest priority items, the committee directs that none of the funds in these areas may be obligated until the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the head of each reserve component report on the proposed use of such funds in accordance with established reprogramming procedures. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS Offset Folios 67 to - Insert here ***TABLE GOES HERE*** Chemical agents and munitions destruction The budget request included $575.3 million for the chemical agents and munitions destruction program. Of that amount, $355.5 million is for operation and maintenance (O&M); $208.4 million for the procurement of all process and support equipment used in the disposal facilities for destroying the unitary chemical stockpile, spare parts, capital equipment for the chemical stockpile emergency preparedness program (CSEPP), and equipment for the non-stockpile materiel program; and $11.3 million for the research and development of equipment to recover and treat non-stockpile chemical materiel with alternative technologies. REPORT ON ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES On April 12, 1994, the Army submitted a report to Congress endorsing numerous recommendations by the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences on potential alternatives to the baseline disassembly and incineration process. The Army has endorsed the NRC recommendation to study a stand-alone neutralization process and neutralization with a secondary treatment of biological treatment as a potential alternative technology for use at the two low volume waste sites located in Indiana and Maryland. The Army also endorsed the following NRC recommendations: implementation of an enhanced stockpile surveillance program for the M55 rockets; implementation of an enhanced public outreach program; updated risk assessments; and procurement and installation of carbon filters in the pollution abatement system at Tooele and other sites. Funds to implement these recommendations were not included in the fiscal year 1995 budget request because the report was concluded after the budget was submitted to the Congress. The committee recommends an $8.0 million increase to operation and maintenance to support Army implementation of the following NRC recommendations: updated risk assessments for storage, handling, and disposal activities at each site; an enhanced stockpile surveillance program; and a public outreach program. Additionally, the committee recommends authorization of $215.265 million for procurement, an increase of $6.8 million to the fiscal year 1995 budget request. Of the funds available, the committee recommends that $22.5 million be used for the procurement request of carbon filtration systems and ancillary equipment for the pollution abatement system at Tooele Army Depot and equipment modification design for all sites. Lastly, the committee recommends authorization of the $25.0 million appropriated in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994 for research and development of alternative technologies. The committee also recommends that unobligated fiscal year 1992 procurement funds for the cryofracture program be used to complete the design of the cryofracture facility. DESTRUCTION OF THE CHEMICAL STOCKPILE Citizens in the communities surrounding the U.S. chemical stockpile storage depots, where the destruction facilities are to be constructed, want to delay the destruction of the stockpile using the baseline process so that an alternative technology can be developed. They are concerned that international agreements and legislative mandates are driving the destruction schedule of the U.S. chemical stockpile without consideration of their concerns about the health and safety risks of using the baseline process. In response to questions raised about concerns of citizens in a hearing before the committee, witnesses from the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the General Accounting Office, and the NRC testified that destruction of the U.S. chemical stockpile was a national priority, regardless of legislative mandates and international treaties requiring the stockpile to be destroyed by a certain date. Additionally, both the Army and the NRC recommended that the disposal program not be delayed while research and development is conducted on an alternative technology. The risks associated with alternative technologies are not known, and the technical feasibility of alternative technologies has not been proven. As such, delays in the disposal program would result in higher overall risk. LATENT HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO LOW LEVELS OF CHEMICAL AGENT The committee directs the Department of the Army to work with the DOE national weapons laboratories to demonstrate, utilizing existing technologies and resources, programs to detect low level exposure to chemical weapons. The committee recommends a technology developed at the national weapons laboratories to detect the paths and means by which chemical agents affect human DNA (adducts to DNA) to determine how long after initial exposure to chronic and acute levels of chemical weapons agents can be detected. Another technology developed at the national weapons laboratories which should be pursued further is re-usable aerogels for toxic gas collection and stack emissions reduction, or other chemical abatement technologies associated with CW destruction. Of the funds available to the Department for the research and development of alternative technologies, $2.0 million may be utilized for these programs. These programs also have application in the chemical and biological defense program. PUBLIC OUTREACH PROGRAM The committee is concerned that the Army's efforts to explain its chemical stockpile disposal program to local communities near the stockpile sites have not been effective. The committee recognizes the Army may not have been prepared or funded to conduct such an important and substantive program, and recommends $500,000 to be derived from funds authorized in the operation and maintenance account for this purpose. CRYOFRACTURE The Congress has supported the development of cryofracture as a means to demilitarize chemical munitions. The process has the potential to solve numerous problems with baseline disassembly, especially in demilitarizing mustard-filled projectiles in which the agent is often not in liquid form. Cryofracture is particularly attractive because the condition of the agent is not critical to the process. The baseline facility on Johnston Atoll has not demonstrated it could achieve satisfactory throughput rates for mustard filled projectiles during operational verification testing phase IV. The committee has seen no analysis or scientific evidence to support the Department of Defense preference not to construct a cryofracture facility for the destruction of the mustard-filled projectile stockpile at Pueblo, Colorado. The NRC conclusion that energetics and agent cannot be incinerated in the same kiln, and the risks posed by a mixed feedstream, appear to be subjective in nature. Since the Department has not built a cryofracture facility, the contention that a cryofracture facility should not be built because cryofracture is an "immature technology'' is specious. The lack of credible justification, evidenced by statements such as this, detracts from the Department's position. The committee is not convinced that the Department has made a reasoned or wise decision. Further, the Department's inclination not to build a cryofracture facility forecloses a high potential alternative to accessing the agent in chemical weapons, and has implications for the ability of other countries to destroy their weapons. M1A2 upgrade The committee believes that the Army must improve the electronics capability of the M1A2 tank to ensure that it meets the requirements of the Total Force for embedded digitization. The Army's request for battlefield digitization includes $18.0 million for this purpose. The committee directs that no less than that budgeted amount be dedicated to M1A2 improvements and recommends an additional authorization of $3.0 million. The committee also believes that the Army should accelerate incorporation of the second-generation forward-looking infrared sensor and an eye-safe laser for the M1. Accordingly, the committee recommends an additional $25.0 million in the combat vehicle improvement program line item. The committee recognizes that the decrease in foreign military sales of the M1 tank will increase the unit cost of the M1A2 and that currently programmed funds will not permit the Army to produce 120 M1A2s a year. To compensate for the loss of foreign military sales, maintain stability in the tank industrial base, and acquire as many tanks as possible with the funding available, the committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Army to enter into a multi-year procurement contract for the M1A2. Estimates are that the Army could modify an additional 25 tanks over the Future Years Defense Program with programmed funds by executing a multi-year procurement in fiscal year 1995. To execute this plan in fiscal year 1995, the Army requires a shift in funds from current procurement to advance procurement. Accordingly, the committee recommends an authorization of $124.6 million in advance procurement and $50.6 million in current procurement. M1A1 tanks for the Marine Corps Reserve The committee received a report from the General Accounting Office earlier this year suggesting that the Army transfer excess M1 tanks to fill out requirements in the Marine Corps. The committee has also received testimony from the Marine Corps on its tank requirements. The Marine Corps operates the M1A1 version of the tank. The Army has been reluctant to transfer M1A1s to the Marine Corps when all of the Army prepositioning equipment stocks have not been filled. The Army also has Guard and reserve units operating basic M1s that are in line to be modernized. The Army intends to modernize these units with M1A1 tanks that are displaced as early deploying armor units are provided with M1A2 tanks from the Abrams upgrade program. The committee is concerned that Marine Corps Reserve tank battalions are operating with only eight tanks each, when they should have 32 tanks. The committee notes the outstanding success of the Marine Corps Reserve tank units in the Persian Gulf War. The committee also notes their requirement for early deployment. The committee believes that the Marine Corps situation could be rectified by upgrading additional M1 basic tanks to the M1A2 configuration and transferring one M1A1 to the Marine Corps for each additional M1A2s scheduled for the Army. This option would leave the active Army with more M1A2s (which they require), the Marine Corps reserve with the needed M1A1s, and the Army Guard and reserves modernizing at the same rate predicted under the current Army plan. The committee recommends $108.0 million for upgrading 24 additional M1 tanks to the M1A2 configuration. The committee views this as the first year of a two-year program for 48 additional M1A2 tanks. The committee recommmends a provision that would direct the Army to transfer, either simultaneously or in advance, one M1A1 tank to the Marine Corps Reserve as each one of these additional M1A2 tanks is made available to the Army. Korea surveillance initiative The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Army to use the savings from early retirement of OV-1 aircraft currently deployed in Korea to lease a replacement MTI radar surveillance capability, provided that: (1) the system is deployed within six months of the enactment of this Act; (2) the Republic of Korea pays half the cost of the lease; (3) the leasing contract includes a provision that would enable the Republic of Korea to purchase the aircraft once the joint surveillance and target attack radar system (JSTARS) program reaches initial operational capability (IOC); and (4) the lease expires within six months of the currently planned IOC date of the JSTARS system. In view of the heightened tension on the Korean peninsula, maintaining adequate warning and surveillance capabilities is essential. Some in the Department of Defense appear to be under the misapprehension that the law requires retirement of the OV-1 Mohawk observation aircraft by October 1, 1996. The committee notes that a waiver of section 1439(b)(2) of Public Law 101-510 was provided by section 1024 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. The committee sees no reason why the Secretary of Defense would be unable to exercise the waiver option, based on current plans and the status of the JSTARS program. Accordingly, the impending retirement of the OV-1 is not a sufficient justification for seeking resources or authority to buy new capabilities for U.S. forces in Korea. If, however, the Secretary of Defense determines that the OV-1 is incapable of providing adequate support for forces in Korea before the JSTARS system is fielded, the provision would enable the Army to acquire additional capabilities. The committee views this potential requirement as interim only, until JSTARS is fielded. If the Secretary determines that JSTARS will not be able to provide indications and warning on a routine basis in Korea subsequent to JSTARS fielding, the committee firmly believes that the Republic of Korea can and should provide this capability. The committee directs the Department to notify and consult with the congressional defense and intelligence committees before adopting any solution other than retention of the OV-1 or temporary leasing of surveillance aircraft. The committee notes that JSTARS is the sole, wide-area moving target indicator (MTI) radar system planned for the Department of Defense. The committee sees no reason to proliferate other wide-area MTI radar systems. Therefore, the committee will not tolerate proliferation of other, less capable systems. Small arms industrial base The committee last year required the Army to commission an independent panel of the Army Science Board to examine the small arms industrial base. The panel has finished its assessment and transmitted the results to Congress. The panel criticized the Army for halting production, after fiscal year 1995, of all small arms weapons, despite inventories of several key weapons well below requirements. The panel concluded that this action would imperil the small arms industrial base. The panel observed that existing small arms basically meet the Army's requirements for performance and reliability and that most deficiencies and limitations that have been identified can be remedied with modest investments in R&D and procurement. The panel noted further that the Army has been developing such improvements in the soldier enhancement program (SEP), but does not plan to procure them. The panel pointed out that the Army is also starting to shift R&D funds away from product improvements towards development of advanced technology for future infantry weapons. The committee believes that a balanced program is required and that near-term soldier enhancements should not be sacrificed for uncertain future development efforts. Moreover, the Army budget reflects a willingness to sacrifice the small arms industrial base in order to develop and produce futuristic weapons. The Army hopes to begin production of this new generation of weapons in about 2004, which is almost a decade after it plans to discontinue production of existing small arms. The committee does not see how there would be an industrial base in existence to produce the new weapons under the Army's plan, even if they could be successfully developed. The panel recommended a funding level of about $20.0 million per year for production of four weapons: the MK19-3 grenade machine gun, the M4 carbine, the M16A2 rifle, and the squad automatic weapon. This level was proposed in conjunction with other recommendations-to shift $10.0 million in small arms overhaul work from the depot to contractors, and to stop buying spare and repair parts from small businesses, which currently dominate this market of $15.0 million per year. The committee believes that it is premature at best to make such shifts, absent a consensus on the general policy questions surrounding depot versus contractor overhaul and maintenance, and absent a change in policy on small business set-asides. Moreover, the funding profile recommended by the Science Board would not permit the Army to reach its inventory objectives for these weapons for perhaps 20 years or more, which the committee regards as excessive. The committee believes the Army should continue to produce existing small arms (1) to fulfill its stated requirements, and (2) to preserve the industrial base until a new generation of small arms is ready for production. Since the Army intends to field new weapons in about 10 years, the committee believes the Army should plan to continue production of at least some existing weapons during that interim period. The committee intends to provide the Army with as much flexibility as possible in executing this policy. The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Army to enter into multiyear procurement contracts for small arms for periods which might extend to 10 years, where appropriate. Weapon production rates should be adjusted to coincide more closely with the anticipated dates of new production weapons. Concurrently, the committee emphasizes that production rates and facilities must be planned to achieve economical rates for each weapon while preserving essential elements of the industrial base identified in the Science Board report. The Science Board panel concluded that the small arms industrial base has significant excess capacity. It is clear that capacity within the industry must be reduced in accordance with the Army's decreasing small arms requirements in order to maintain viable, critical firms and elements in a restructured industrial base. The provision also would: (1) authorize $89.1 million for continued production of the squad automatic weapon, MK-19 grenade machine gun, M-16A2 rifle, and M-4 carbine; (2) authorize $5.0 million for research, development, test, and evaluation of the objective crew-served weapons system; (3) authorize a total of $3.0 million for research, development, test, and evaluation of product improvements to existing small arms weapons; (4) require the Secretary of the Army to coordinate the development of a joint master plan for meeting the immediate and future needs for small arms. Development of the master plan will include an examination of the relative advantages and disadvantages of improving existing small arms weapons as compared to investing in new, advanced technology weapons and an analysis of the effects of these two approaches on the small arms industrial base; and (5) direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology to review the results of this examination and master plan, and provide them to the congressional defense committees with his comments no later than April 1, 1995. Of the amount provided for RDT&E for product improvements to existing weapons under the soldier enhancement program, $750,000 is available for evaluating upgraded 7.62mm machine guns for the Army medium machine gun program. The committee agrees with the Army's plan to compare upgraded M60 machine guns to the M240 machine gun. In order to ensure that comparisons between candidate guns are valid, the committee directs that all guns used in the evaluation be in new or similar condition. The result of this comparison should be included in the small arms master plan. Carrier replacement program The budget request included $2,447.0 million for full funding for CVN-76, the next Nimitz class aircraft carrier. The budget also requested authorization to transfer $1,200.0 million to CVN-76 from funds appropriated in fiscal year 1994 to the National Defense Sealift Fund. Congress authorized and appropriated advance procurement funds for CVN-76 in fiscal year 1993. In testimony before the committee this year, the Secretary of the Navy testified that the Navy needed to acquire CVN-76 in fiscal year 1995, both to maintain the carrier shipbuilding industrial base and to permit orderly replacement of an older carrier in the current fleet of 12 carriers. At present, the carrier force is the centerpiece of the nation's forward presence capability. The committee understands that the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) derived different carrier force structure requirements for wartime and for supporting peacetime deployments. According to the BUR, supporting two major regional contingencies would require 10 carriers, while keeping peacetime presence commitments would require 12 carriers. This 12-carrier requirement assumes no change in the assumptions about the forward basing of carrier battle groups in the presence mission. The committee has a longstanding interest in the diverse factors associated with naval forward presence. Section 1361 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 required the Secretary of Defense to analyze the options for providing forward presence of naval forces during peacetime. Two years later, the Department has still not provided this report. The committee believes that this analysis is important for making decisions on future naval force structure. The Secretary of the Navy has personally assured the committee that the Defense Department's report will be delivered to the committee by July 31, 1994. The committee recommends $2,447.0 million in fiscal year 1995 funds for CVN-76. The committee also recommends a provision that would authorize the transfer of $1,200.0 million from the National Defense Sealift Fund. This carrier will be able to make important contributions to national security well into the next century. C-17 airlift aircraft The committee recommends funding for implementation of the settlement agreement negotiated between the Department of Defense and the C-17 prime contractor in January 1994. The committee recommends the budget request for six new aircraft but reduces the fiscal year 1995 procurement request of $2.8 billion by $387.4 million. The committee also recommends long-lead funding for eight additional aircraft. The committee hopes that the settlement agreement will promote progress in a C-17 program characterized by cost overruns, schedule slippages, and performance problems. Improving the bomber force and preserving bomber options The committee has demonstrated a steadfast commitment over the years to supporting, and initiating when necessary, the programs needed to ensure a robust and effective bomber force, including the needed weapons. Thus, the committee has strongly supported the recommendations in the Air Force "Bomber Roadmap'' of June 1992. This report identified a requirement for 184 total bombers, armed with precision conventional munitions, to deal with a single major regional contingency (MRC) in which an enemy armored force had begun a short-warning invasion of the territory of an ally. The new Administration undertook a comprehensive review of future force requirements necessary to successfully deal with a variety of possible contingencies. This Bottom-Up Review (BUR) ultimately determined that the United States should retain the capability to deal with two "nearly simultaneous'' MRCs. The BUR also called for a total force of 184 bombers, in order to provide "100 deployable'' heavy bombers for each MRC. This analysis assumes that the highly-capable and stealthy B-2s would be shifted from the first theater to the second, once that second MRC began to unfold. The BUR identified important roles for bombers armed with advanced conventional munitions. It concluded that, under many short-warning scenarios, long-range bombers and carrier-based tactical aircraft would be the only U.S. forces available early in a conflict to help a beleaguered ally defend itself against an invading armored force. This long-range offensive strike capability would be operational while U.S. ground and tactical air reinforcements were being deployed to the theater, and waiting for their required logistics chain to be established. U.S. reinforcements might have to "fight their way in'' against future theater air and missile threats. Viewed in the context of these demanding requirements, the committee finds the Department of Defense's bomber force posture and funding proposals unacceptable: (1) The "Bomber Roadmap'' and the BUR called for a force structure of 184 bombers, yet the budget request funds only 100 during fiscal year 1995, and only 80 thereafter. The committee believes this is inadequate to meet current and future requirements. (2) Four recent independent studies all find that the planned DOD force structure of 80 to 100 non-stealthy bombers with only 20 B-2s is inadequate to deal with two MRCs. DOD has been unable to offer a coherent and consistent explanation for these discrepancies. (3) DOD appears unwilling to consider options for interim precision weapons for bombers, preferring to wait until the end of the decade for the tri-Service standoff attack missile (TSSAM) and the joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) family of weapons. Should conflict be thrust upon the United States before then, the bomber force would have only "dumb'' iron bombs available. The committee believes interim precision weapon capabilities for bombers are both feasible and an inexpensive hedge. (4) DOD has settled on a force structure and modernization plan before it has completed numerous ongoing analyses and tests that bear on those plans: (a) The Nuclear Posture Review, which includes bomber requirements for maintaining nuclear deterrence, is still ongoing. The Secretary of Defense has testified that the bomber review is "unfinished business.'' (b) The independent Roles and Missions Commission is examining bomber force structure tradeoffs with other military forces. The Commission will not submit its report on force structure tradeoffs until next summer. (c) An important test of B-1B bomber operational readiness has just begun; results will not be available before next spring. (5) The committee believes that, if DOD intends to reduce the bomber force level to between 80 and 100 non-stealthy bombers, then more than 20 B-2 stealth bombers will be required to meet the demands of a two-MRC scenario. Yet the final B-2 bombers are moving down the assembly lines, and more and more subcontractors and facilities are completing deliveries. The production base for bombers is rapidly disappearing. Thus, the committee found itself with many unanswered questions as it addressed the current budget request. The committee decided to set in motion a process to ensure that DOD and the committee will be better prepared to address bomber requirement issues during the fiscal year 1996 budget cycle. To accomplish this, the committee directs specific actions in the following subsections in order to: (1) preserve all bomber force structure options for one year; (2) preserve the bomber industrial base for one year; (3) receive the results of further bomber force structure and effectiveness analyses prior to next year's defense budget deliberations; and (4) begin procurement of improved interim conventional weapons for bombers. In summary, the committee recommendations would prevent DOD from retiring any B-52 or B-1 bombers this year, fully fund planned conventional upgrades for those bombers, preserve the B-2 industrial base for one year, initiate a program to acquire limited numbers of effective bomber weapons within the next two years, and direct numerous analyses to better prepare DOD and the Congress to decide future bomber force structure issues next year. PRESERVATION OF BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS The committee has concluded that the planned bomber force level of between 80 and 100 is insufficient to meet current and future requirements, unless additional B-2 bombers are to be procured. Further, the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review is to address additional requirements for bombers to contribute to the maintenance of deterrence. The Roles and Missions Commission is to examine force tradeoffs including bombers. In other sections of this report, the committee also directs several independent studies of bomber issues. Therefore, the committee believes that all force structure options should be kept open at least through the next budget cycle. First, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense not to retire any B-52H or B-1B bomber aircraft. All 95 B-52H and all 95 B-1B bombers (excluding one non-flying weapons-loading trainer B-1B aircraft) shall be retained, and any B-52H bombers transferred to Davis Monthan AFB before the date of this report shall be promptly returned to the Air Force Air Combat Command, for incorporation in an expanded B-52H attrition reserve. The committee understands that $18.0 million in operation and maintenance funds is required in fiscal year 1995 to retain all 47 B-52H aircraft in attrition reserve status. The committee adds O&M funds for this purpose. Second, although the Air Force plans to retain 26 B-1B bombers in attrition reserve status through the period of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), it has not funded the incorporation of either the conventional weapons upgrades or the new ECM system on those B-1s. Third, the Air Force has seriously under-funded the conventional improvements and ECM upgrades on the active inventory of B-1B bombers. This underfunding results in a one-year delay in the introduction of the JDAM family of weapons and a six-year delay in TSSAM capability on the B-1B, relative to their incorporation on B-52H bombers. The B-1B ECM program is also under-funded, resulting in a delay in installation until 2003. This, for the Air Force's self-proclaimed "backbone of the bomber force.'' In the next FYDP submission, the committee directs the Air Force to fully fund the bomber conventional munitions upgrade programs for both B-1 and B-52 bombers, including funds for full modifications to all bombers proposed to be retained, whether in the active inventory or in an attrition reserve category. The committee understands this requires no increase in fiscal year 1995 funding, but will increase FYDP funding requirements for the B-1B bomber by approximately $70 million, if all 95 B-1B bombers are retained. The committee recommends fully funding the respective budget requests for RDT&E and procurement for fiscal year 1995 for the B-52H, the B-1B, and the B-2 bomber programs. PRESERVING THE BOMBER INDUSTRIAL BASE The committee has received testimony from Air Force and other witnesses regarding the desirability of maintaining an industrial base for the production of bombers, as DOD already is implementing for submarines, naval nuclear propulsion, and the tank industrial base. The committee also is in receipt of testimony and recent studies on the contributions that additional B-2 bombers could provide in future conventional conflicts. The committee is also aware of a proposal by the Northrop Corporation to produce a variant of the B-2 bomber that would have only a conventional weapons capability. Deletion of items on the B-2 related to nuclear missions would reportedly reduce the unit flyaway cost of a conventional-only stealth bomber by some $25-30 million per aircraft. In view of the unsettled future requirements for heavy bombers, together with the additional studies and analyses of bomber force structure and industrial base options requested elsewhere in this report, the committee considers it prudent to recommend $150.0 million in order to preserve a portion of the bomber industrial base for one year. Funds appropriated pursuant to this authorization are to preserve tooling in ready status, preserve a production capability for spare parts within the lower-tier vendor structure, and develop detailed production plans for a conventional-capability-only B-2 bomber. Funds may not be used to procure any major structural B-2 item that would not be procured by the Air Force as an item of initial or sustaining spares. This recommendation would not authorize a twenty-second B-2 bomber; rather, it would allow DOD and the Congress time to gather further information on future bomber requirements, including industrial base requirements. Funds appropriated pursuant to this authorization would be exempt from section 131(d) of Public Law 103-160. FURTHER BOMBER FORCE ANALYSES The committee has directed bomber force structure questions to Department of Defense and other witnesses at more than a dozen hearings since the fiscal year 1995 budget request was submitted. The answers are, in totality, incomplete; many are inconsistent with others. The thrust of testimony from DOD witnesses is inconsistent with the published results of the Bottom-Up Review, as well as with the Air Force's 1992 "Bomber Roadmap'', and with recent detailed analyses carried out by major defense contractors such as Boeing and Rockwell, by "think tanks'' such as the RAND Corporation, and by respected independent analysts. DOD has not revealed its own detailed analyses supporting its decisions to sharply reduce the bomber force structure. Nor has it attempted to refute any of the studies noted above, all of which call for substantially larger bomber forces than proposed in the budget request. Results of several of the independent studies show that a heavy bomber force reduced to the size and composition that DOD proposes to fund would be inadequate to prevent major losses in the opening phases of a two-MRC scenario, and would run high risk of failure even in single-MRC scenarios. Given these substantial and unresolved differences between the new DOD bomber force levels and those derived in widely-available outside analyses, the committee is reluctant to make the irrevocable commitment to a smaller bomber force that would be brought about by approval of the current budget request for bombers. Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to reconstitute the independent review group originally mandated under section 121(e) of Public Law 101-189 for the purpose of reconciling the analyses of bomber forces conducted by the Department in support of the Bottom-Up Review and the recent analyses conducted by outside experts. The committee is seeking to understand how such striking differences in overall outcomes can arise-whether they are the result of different assumptions about numbers of targets, or about warning and deployment times available, or about munitions effectiveness. The review group should also pay particular attention to assumptions about the length of time required to establish full supply lines to theater-based forces in the presence of a theater ballistic missile threat. The committee directs the Secretary to ensure full access by the independent review group to models, personnel involved, and assumptions used in Bottom-Up Review analyses, including the illustrative scenario presented to this committee at a classified hearing on March 9, 1994. The independent review group should provide its analysis and results in both classified and unclassified form to the Secretary and the congressional defense committees not later than February 1, 1995. Second, the committee urges the Roles and Missions Commission established by subtitle E of title IX of Public Law 103-160 to review thoroughly the capabilities of bombers and carrier-based air forces in the early phases of a short-warning MRC when enemy actions may constrain our ability to provide land-based tactical air power and ground force reinforcements. The committee believes that an important early contribution by carriers to the defeat of an armored incursion may reside in Navy combat air patrols (CAP) and suppression of organic enemy air defense assets (SEAD), allowing non-stealthy Air Force bombers to deliver large weapons payloads with improved survivability. Traditional tactical air support missions, such as CAP, SEAD, and jamming, may only be available from carriers until land bases can be secured and supply lines to the theater established. The committee expects the Commission to also consider tradeoffs between more stealthy aircraft and fewer support assets such as those for CAP and SEAD, to reduce the deployment lift requirements, the personnel placed at risk in the theater of operations, and the extensive resupply requirements. The Commission should evaluate, in particular, the kinds of tradeoffs presented by the Air Force during testimony on the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (S. Hrg. 102-255, Pt. 7, p. 794). The committee looks forward with keen anticipation to the recommendations of the Roles and Missions Commission, and hopes its findings will shed additional light on future bomber requirements in time for action on the fiscal year 1996 request. To ensure the Commission has adequate independent expertise, the committee also recommends a provision that would authorize the Commission to draw upon the capabilities of the Department's federally funded research and development centers during fiscal years 1994 and 1995, for up to $20.0 million in assistance. Third, by the Secretary's own admission, the need to maintain some sort of bomber industrial base was not well-analyzed in the BUR. The Congress has, on several past occasions, relied upon the RAND Corporation to examine sensitive aspects of the B-2 bomber program. The committee believes that this background and RAND's long experience in acquisition and industrial base research warrant its directing the Secretary of Defense to ask the RAND Corporation to conduct an independent analysis of the need for the Defense Department to provide some industrial base protection for future bomber production requirements, as it has already determined to be necessary for the submarine and tank industrial bases. The RAND analysis and recommendations for whether, and, if so, how, to preserve an industrial base capability for bombers should be provided to the congressional defense committees not later than March 1, 1995. None of these outside efforts are intended to preclude the Secretary of Defense from continuing to evaluate bomber force structure and effectiveness options and tradeoffs; to the contrary, he is encouraged to do so. The committee hopes that the defense budget request for fiscal year 1996 and the accompanying FYDP will present a clear and coherent bomber roadmap to the Congress. "INTERIM'' CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS FOR BOMBERS There are several possibilities for adding interim precision weapons capabilities to existing bombers. All would be limited in numbers and higher in cost than the precision munitions-the JDAM family of weapons-now in development for deployment near the end of the decade. The initial JDAM weapon, a guided 2000 lb. bomb, will greatly improve bomber effectiveness against fixed targets. However, it is not well-suited to de
