Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

FY 1995 BUDGET - DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL, 03/15/1994, Question and Answer

Basis Date:
19950213
Chairperson:
T. Bevill
Committee:
House Appropriations
Docfile Number:
Q94AN301
Hearing Date:
19940315
DOE Lead Office:
DP/NN SUB
Committee:
Energy and Water Development
Hearing Subject:
FY 1995 BUDGET - DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL
Witness Name:
V. Reis/J. Keliher
Hearing Text:

                     PRODUCTION AND MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY
      Mr. Bevill. Dr. Reis, how can DOE maintain a viable nuclear
 weapons production and maintenance capability if there is no
 requirement for new nuclear weapons and no nuclear testing?
      Dr. Reis. Assuring our continuing production and maintenance
 capability is one of the biggest challenges facing the Department as we
 reduce the Nuclear Weapons Complex infrastructure in response to
 declining budgets. There are two separate factors involved here,
 production capability and production capacity. Production capability
 reflects technical competence in essential manufacturing processes, but
 not necessarily the capacity (personnel and production line equipment)
 to produce large quantities of components. Production capacity implies
 capability plus the capacity for quantity production. Maintenance of
 the enduring stockpile is of paramount importance. We are attempting to
 maintain the required production capacity to meet requirements through
 the nonnuclear reconfiguration activity, by consolidating the
 nonnuclear production infrastructure. Maintenance of our overall
 production capability is even more difficult. In 1993, we implemented a
 Production Capability Assurance Program, which allowed us to maintain
 at least a minimum technical capability in essential production
 processes. To date, the program has been successful, but further
 personnel reductions planned for 1994 and 1995 will cause the loss, at
 least temporarily, of some capabilities. We are attempting tb mitigate
 the potential impact of these losses by ensuring the national
 laboratories retain their competence in the basic technologies as part
 of the Stockpile Stewardship program.
               REPLICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON
      Mr. Bevill. Dr. Reis, if it were necessary, would it be possible
 to replicate a nuclear weapon and certify its capability and
 performance within the existing resources of the DOE nuclear weapons
 complex?
      Dr. Reis. There are several caveats to this answer. The first is,
 it would depend on the weapon requiring replication. Since we have no
 current capability to produce new pits, the replicated design would
 have to be an older one, for which we could reuse the pit (from storage
 at Pantex). To achieve quantity production would require additional
 fiscal resources. Today, except for the production of Limited Life
 Components necessary to maintain the enduring stockpile, the nuclear
 weapons complex is maintaining only the minimum capability to exercise
 key production processes. To achieve quantity production capacity, we
 would have to hire additional production personnel, process their
 security clearances, and train and certify them; we would also have to
 restore idled production equipment from its current standby condition
 to production readiness. Obviously, we would not be able to replicate a
 nuclear weapon until we completed the consolidation of nonnuclear
 production facilities at Kansas City and the Los Alamos and Sandia
 National Laboratories.
                           TRITIUM PRODUCTION STATUS
      Mr. Bevill. Dr Reis, based on current stockpile requirements, when
 must a decision be made to build a new tritium reactor?
      Dr. Reis. There are several options for meeting tritium
 requirements other than building a new tritium reactor. If one assumes,
 however, that a new facility is to be built, then based on the current
 stockpile plan and the conservative view that a new tritium production
 source could take as long as 15 years to produce new tritium, a funding
 decision would be necessary in Fiscal Year 1996. That would allow the
 facility to be in production 3 years before strategic reserves of
 tritium are exhausted. Currently, the Department of Energy is pursuing
 four tritium production options in its Reconfiguration Programmatic
 Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). These options include heavy
 water, modular high-temperature gas, and light water reactors and a
 proton accelerator. The draft PEIS will be available for review in
 March 1995.
             STATE OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES
      Mr. Bevill. Can you describe the state of the Russian nuclear
 weapons laboratories?
      Dr. Keliher.               Deleted
      Deleted                                       Deleted
                DIVERSION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS
      Mr. Bevill.  How concerned should we be about the possible
 diversion of Russian nuclear weapons scientists to other countries?
 What can be done to mitigate the danger?
      Dr. Keliher. Observations to date by the DOE's National
 Laboratory scientists, as they interact on a project working level with
 their counterparts in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), indicate that this
 is not presently a major concern. However, economic conditions are
 rapidly deteriorating and the desire of FSU weapons scientists to feed
 themselves and their families will increase the probability that some
 will leave.
 Since early 1992, the Department of Energy has strongly
 encouraged technical collaborations between its laboratories and FSU
 weapons institutes. As of this date, initial technical exchange visits
 in March 1992 have led to over $5,000,000 in direct contracts between
 DOE and FSU weapons institutes. This contracting is employing thousands
 of scientists, engineers and technicians in non-weapons related work
 that maintains their professional integrity. Professional relationships
 are being established that provide a continuing basis for education in
 market economics. The success of direct laboratory-to-institute
 contracting is now leading to other programs that include U.S.
 industrial and academic participation, which will foster long- term
 commercial enterprises. This direct contracting for goods and services
 benefits Newly Independent States (NIS) institutes with employment and
 education in western business practices and provides the U.S. access to
 a large highly talented scientific pool of knowledge. These activities
 should be strengthened and given long-term support so as to minimize
 the developing proliferation risk and establish lasting economic
 benefits.
      In addition to these laboratory-to-institute exchanges, the DOE
 is supporting the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in
 Moscow. The Director of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
 is the U.S. representative to the board of governors and two National
 Laboratory scientists are providing technical support to the center.
 The DOE strongly supports the nonproliferation goals of the ISTC and we
 encourage enhanced support to the center.
                 CAPABILITIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES
      Mr. Bevill. Dr. Reis, how can we maintain the capabilities of the
 nuclear weapons laboratories in the absence of new weapons
 requirements?
      Dr. Reis. I have instituted a science-based Stockpile Stewardship
 program at the weapons laboratories. Important elements of this program
 are: (1) enhanced above-ground experimentation to retain and attract
 the best and the brightest to the weapons program, (2) acquisition of
 state-of-the-art computation capabilities, (3) programs to capture and
 centralize more than 40 years of weapons research, design, and testing
 experience, (4) a forward-looking facilities strategy, and (5) dual
 use/technology transfer with U.S. industry.
      Enhanced aboveground experimentation will increase our
 understanding of the performance of nuclear weapons in the absence of
 underground nuclear testing. The acquisition of state-of-the-art
 computation capabilities focuses on the purchase of massively parallel
 processor computers and the support to convert our existing weapons
 design codes to operate oh these machines. Activities to capture
 weapons experience are vital because much of this experience rests in
 an aging cadre of scientific personnel. Also, the dual-use Technology
 Transfer program in cooperation with U.S. industry is designed to
 assist the nuclear weapons laboratories in maintaining their core
 competencies while benefiting U.S. economic competitiveness.
         DEPARTURE OF SCIENTISTS FROM THE WEAPONS LABORATORIES
      Mr. Bevill. How many scientists have left the weapons laboratories
 in the last 2 years and how many are expected to leave in FY 1994 and
 FY 1995? What were the ages of these scientists?
       Dr. Reis. In the interest of brevity, I have some information
 from Los Alamos as an example. I will provide similar information from
 Livermore and Sandia separately. It is difficult, if not impossible, to
 predict who will leave the weapons programs at the national
 laboratories in the next 2 years through retirement or for other
 reasons. This is because of the many (unknown) variables involved in a
 personal choice such as this. Based on the information that is
 available, however, we can say who is eligible to retire in FY 1994 and
 FY 1995.
      The major portion of staff leaving the nuclear weapons program at
 Los Alamos in the past 2 years occurred last year as a result of the
 University of California's Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Program
 (VERIP III). A total of 237 scientists, engineers, technicians, and
 administrative support personnel took this retirement incentive.
      Of the 1,948 Research, Development and Testing staff currently
 employed, 550 or about 36 percent are over 50 years of age. Within the
 next 2 years, another 155, or 8 percent of the current staff will
 become eligible to retire, assuming no changes in this age group. It
 is, however, expected that few staff will choose to retire at an early
 age because of the strong incentives built into the retirement programs
 to wait until one is 60 years or older to retire.
              DEMOGRAPHICS OF LABORATORY WEAPONS SCIENTISTS
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide for the record the demographics of the
 laboratory weapons scientists showing the current age-of the work force
 and the ages of those who have left recently.
      Dr. Reis. I will use some information from Los Alamos. I will
 provide similar information from Livermore and Sandia separately. The
 age distribution of current staff at Los Alamos, which includes
 scientists, engineers, technicians, and administrative support
 personnel, is shown in Figure 1, entitled "Los Alamos FY 1993 Age
 Distribution." The age distribution of the workers, including
 scientists, engineers, technicians, and administrative support
 personnel, who have left recently is shown in Figure 2, entitled "VERIP
 III PARTICIPANTS." This shows that most of those who left were in the
 55-60 age bracket. VERIP III was the voluntary early retirement
 incentive program offered last year by the University of California
 Retirement Plan. Retirements became effective October 29, 1993. I would
 like to insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 into the record. (The information
 follows:)
 ****Figure 1 Los Alamos FY 1993 Age Distribution and Figure 2 VERIP III
 Participants charts are attached to original document****
        CAPABILITIES REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE NATION NUCLEAR DETERRENT
      Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, could you describe what DOD perceives to be
 the capabilities which must be retained at the nuclear weapons labs to
 maintain the Nation's nuclear deterrent?
      Dr. Smith. We must be able, at a minimum, to maintain a safe,
 reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. In order to accomplish this the DOE
 nuclear weapons laboratories must maintain a capability second to none
 to identify problems in weapons, repair those problems, certify the
 repairs or replace warheads that cannot be repaired, all without
 nuclear testing.
      Even though not explicitly stated above, the ability to dismantle
 weapons and dispose of the resulting hazardous materials in an
 environmentally responsible manner is also critical as the U.S.
 downsizes its nuclear arsenal.
      In summary, the DOD must continue to rely on the DOE laboratories
 to be the stewards of the nuclear weapons stockpile; provide the
 expertise to design, engineer, provide surveillance, repair,
 fabricate, and dismantle the nuclear arsenal. The labs have also
 provided technical vision for the future in nuclear and many nonnuclear
 areas and DOD expects that to continue.
                           NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS
      Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, what is the current DOD thinking on the
 most likely national security threat this Nation faces?
      Dr. Smith. We believe that there are four new post-cold war
 dangers faced by the Nation. These are: regional threats to U.S.
 interests, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and possible
 failure of democratic reforms (both in Russia and elsewhere in the
 world,). The fourth, although not a traditional military threat, but
 one that could have significant impact, is negative national economic
 trends.
                            FUTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
      Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, what type of nuclear weapons is DOD looking
 at for future development? How far in the future do you see the need to
 produce a new nuclear weapons?
      Dr. Smith. The DOD has no requirement to develop a new nuclear
 weapon. However, we need to maintain the ability to produce nuclear
 weapons. Based on past experience, we can expect to find problems with
 weapons in the enduring stockpile. If the problem seriously degrades
 weapons performance, we may need to remanufacture or replace that
 weapon, thus requiring new production. We cannot predict when such a
 need will occur. But as long as nuclear deterrence remains a vital part
 of our national security, we must maintain the capability to produce
 new weapons.
                         MEDICAL RADIATION EXPERIMENTS
       Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, what is the status of DOD's review of
 medical radiation experiments?
      Dr. Smith. The services and DOD agencies are involved in an
 on-going effort to aggressively search for records at archives,
 libraries, record centers, laboratories, contractor organization,
 government agencies, university facilities, medical centers, and
 military installations. This is a time-intensive, cumbersome task;
 however, DOD is committed to a full accounting of its role in this
 matter. The Department has moved forward on a broad front to confront
 the issues associated with human radiation experiments. DOD is an
 active participant in the deliberations of the President's Human
 Radiation Interagency Working Group; Department policies and procedures
 are in place to guide our efforts; a Command Center that is the
 Department's focal point for information is operational; and the
 services and  Department agencies have provided information that we are
 in the process of collecting, reviewing and categorizing. By no means
 an all inclusive description of the Department's actions, these
 activities do highlight the priority with which we are treating -- and
 continue to treat -- this issue.
                            NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW
      Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the NPR?
      Dr. Smith. The DOD's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is not well
 underway. It is examining the role of nuclear forces in the security
 policy of the United States in light of the new and enduring dangers of
 the post-cold war era. The NPR is the first study of nuclear policy in
 15 years, the first in the post-cold war world, and the first study
 ever to include policy, doctrine, force structure, command, and control
 in a single review. The NPR will be ready to make recommendations to
 the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
 early summer.
                        Nuclear Safeguards and Security
                   COORDINATION WITH DOD ON DECLASSIFICATION
      Mr. Bevill. How is DOE coordinating with DOD in its current
 efforts to declassify information? Are there any instances of
 disagreement between the two organizations on how the declassification
 effort should proceed?
      Dr. Keliher. DOE coordinates its declassification efforts with
 two primary offices in the DOD: The Assistant to the Secretary of
 Defense for Atomic Energy, and the Assistant Deputy to the Under
 Secretary of Defense for Security Policy. DOE has notified DOD of
 current declassification efforts thorough DOE's Defense Program Office.
 DOD was also invited and participated in DOE's internal review of
 declassification proposals on March 3, 1994. A formal memorandum of
 recommended declassifications will be sent to DOD by April 1, 1994. We
 anticipate a response from DOD by the end of April 1994. There have
 been no disagreements between the two organizations on how the
 declassification effort should proceed; however, there have been
 disagreements  on certain declassification proposals in the past.
                         COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe any programs in which the U.S. weapons
 laboratories are cooperating with their counterparts in Russia. For
 those programs using DOE funds, describe the specific agreement and the
 source and amount of funding in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995.
      Dr. Reis. The Department of Energy (DOE) weapons laboratories
 are cooperating with institutes and laboratories in the Russian
 Federation in several areas. These interactions include DOE funded
 laboratory-to-laboratory efforts, safe, secure dismantlement effort&
 using Department of Defense funding under the "Nunn-Lugar"
 appropriations, industrial partnering activities funded through the
 Department of State and the FY 1994 Foreign Operations Appropriation
 Act, and proposed weapon surety technology exchanges yet unfunded. The
 following are descriptions of each effort.
       DOE FUNDED ACTIVITIES: The Department of Energy laboratories have
 been encouraged to enter into contractual interactions with entities of
 the Former Soviet Union (FSU) when these interactions.are in agreement
 with the general policies of DOE and benefit DOE-programs. In this
 regard, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) established
 about 120 contracts with 35 FSU institutes for about $1 million in FY
 1993. The major LLNL interactions were focused in the areas of
 laser,technology, inertial fusion, and optics. Los Alamos National
 Laboratory (LANL) also established interactions with FSU institutions.
 Major LANL effort has been focused in the areas of explosively driven
 pulse power and accelerator based conversion and accelerator
 transmutation of waste. LANL recently completed joint pulsed power
 experiments with Arzamas-16 scientists using one of the FSU's large
 electromagnetic generators. These LANL efforts were funded at about
 $325 thousand in FY 1993. Similarly, the Sandia National Laboratories
 (SNL) has recently begun significant interactions with the FSU in the
 areas of pulse power technology, materials technology, and surety
 related technologies. These SNL efforts were funded at about $1.45
 million in FY 1993. The projected expenditures of DOE funds by the
 weapons laboratories to support expanded interactions with the FSU are
 $6.5 million in FY 1994 and $8.6 million in FY 1995.
      SAFE, SECURE DISMANTLEMENT (SSD) SUPPORT TO DOD: The DOE weapons
 laboratories are providing support to the Department of Defense (DOD)
 in the Nunn-Lugar funded program to assist the FSU in SSD efforts. The
 DOE efforts fall into several categories: design support for
 procurement of fissile material containers; fissile material storage
 facility design and equipment assistance; railcar safety and security
 modification; emergency response equipment; and soft armor blankets.
 In FY 1993 approximately $38.6 million of DOD funds was expended in
 support of these activities with the Russian Federation. The funding
 distribution for the SSD efforts for FY 1994 and FY 1995 have not yet
 been decided and amounts are not available at this time.
      INDUSTRIAL PARTNERING EFFORT: The DOE laboratories (including the
 weapons laboratories) expect to be initiating efforts with the
 scientific and engineering institutes in the FSU under the program of
 cooperation provided for in the FY 1994 Foreign Operations
 Appropriations Act. This effort, funded at $35 million in FY 1994
 funds, will include qualified U.S. academic institutes and partners
 from U.S. industry. These programs are intended to stabilize the
 technology base in the cooperating states of the FSU and assist in the
 prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The
 proposal that has been accepted by the Department of State includes
 three elements: a Stabilization Element with near term efforts between
 DOE laboratories and FSU institutes; a Cost-Shared Industrial
 Partnering Element to establish long term stability and
 commercialization technologies converted from the FSU weapons
 establishment; and the Academic Support Element to develop
 telecommunications, and provide business training and administrative
 support to the industry coalition. This effort is just beginning, and
 specific efforts are being defined for funding within the $35 million
 appropriation.
      TECHNICAL INFORMATION EXCHANGES ON NUCLEAR WARHEAD SAFETY AND
 SECURITY: The DOE and the weapons laboratories have recently begun
 an effort to establish technical cooperation in the area of nuclear
 warhead safety and security between the United States (DOE) and the
 Russian Federation (Ministry of Atomic Energy). This DOE Defense
 Programs led initiative will involve a Memorandum of Understanding
 (MOU) in accordance with the formal State Department Circular 175
 Process for negotiating international agreements.
 We believe there are also numerous other activities funded by the
 Offices of Energy Research and Environmental Restoration and Waste
 Management and the laboratories.
                              STOCKPILE MEMORANDUM
      Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the latest Nuclear Weapons
 Stockpile Memorandum?
      Dr. Reis. The FY 1994"1999 Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum
 containing the stockpile plan was approved by the Secretaries of
 Defense and Energy in late December 1993, and forwarded to the National
 Security Council on January 4, 1994. This stockpile plan was approved
 by President Clinton on March 1, 1994. Current scheduling calls for
 submission of a new Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum forwarding a
 new stockpile plan for the period FY 1995-2000 to President Clinton in
 the fall of 1994.
                       UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING
      Mr. Bevill. Under what conditions would the U.S. consider
 performing an underground nuclear test?
      Dr. Reis. The decision to resume underground nuclear testing will
 be made by the President.               Deleted
         Deleted                                      Deleted
                            NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST BAN
      Mr. Bevill: If the President chose to end the current nuclear
 weapons test ban, what type of weapon would DOE test and why?
       Dr. Reis: There has been no advance determination of the type of
 weapon that would be first tested if the President decided that nuclear
 testing should be resumed. Such a determination would depend on the
 circumstances at the time and would be made in consultation with the
 Department of Defense. Consistent with the Hatfield/Mitchell/Exon
 legislation, the Congress would also be consulted.
             OTHER COUNTRIES' NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAMS
      Mr. Bevill. What is the status of other countries' nuclear testing
 programs? Do you anticipate any countries performing nuclear tests in
 FY 1994 and FY 1995?
      Dr. Keliher. China is the only country among the five major
 nuclear powers with an active nuclear testing program. China last
 conducted a nuclear test in October 1993. Russia, however, has not
 conducted a nuclear test within the past 3 years and has been a willing
 participant in nuclear testing moratoria with France, the U.S. and the
 U.K. since 1992. France and the UK last tested in 1991 and 1992
 respectively.
                           Deleted
                            HYDRONUCLEAR EXPERIMENTS
      Mr. Bevill: Please describe the role hydronuclear experiments
 could play in ensuring the safety and reliability of the stockpile.
      Dr. Reis: Hydronuclear experiments provide an experimental method
 to directly measure the safety and reliability characteristics of a
 nuclear weapon primary. These experiments, in which the nuclear energy
 generated is much smaller than the chemical energy expended by the high
 explosives, were used to address stockpile safety concerns during the
 1958-1961 U.S. nuclear testing moratorium.
      Historically, we have seen one to two defects per year that
 require changes in the stockpile. As the smaller stockpile ages, we
 expect to find changes that will require remanufacturing, replacement,
 or substitution of stockpile components. Therefore, hydronuclear
 experiments can provide valuable support to our stockpile surveillance
 program. Near-term baseline experiments would provide standard data to
 compare against data from future experiments to examine aging effects
 and to verify corrections or changes made to the primary.
                 PLUTONIUM AND TRITIUM PRODUCTION
      Mr. Bevill. Are any other nations still producing plutonium?
      Dr. Keliher. Yes. Plutonium is produced as a result of normal
 power reactor operation. Russia has three dual-purpose production
 reactors still in operation, two at Tomsk and one at Krasnoyarsk, that
 provide heat and electricity to their respective sites and nearby
 communities. We believe these reactors are producing weapons grade
 plutonium. However, we do not believe the recovered plutonium is being
 used to produce additional nuclear weapons. On March 16, 1994, the
 Department of Energy and the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) of the
 Russian Federation agreed to work together to find ways to replace the
 Tomsk reactors (by using gas turbines) and the reactor at Krasnoyarsk
 (by finishing construction on a coal-fired plant).
                  COUNTRIES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
     Mr. Bevill. Please identify all countries known or suspected to
 have nuclear weapons and include the number of strategic and tactical
 nuclear weapons held by each.
     Dr. Keliher. The countries known to have nuclear weapons are the
 Former Soviet Union, China, France and the United Kingdom, as well as
 the United States. Countries suspected of having nuclear weapons are
 Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea. Estimates 'on the numbers of
 weapons are classified.
                DEFENSE PROGRAMS NEPA DOCUMENTS IN PREPARATION
      Mr. Bevill. Provide a brief description and milestones for all
 Defense Programs environmental impact statements and environmental
 assessments currently being prepared by Defense Programs.
      Dr. Reis. Listed below are all Defense Programs National
 Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) actions (environmental impact
 statements or environmental assessments) for which there has been a
 formal determination to prepare one of the two documents. (The
 information follows:)
 PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS:
      Programmatic EIS for Reconfiguration of the Nuclear Weapons
      Complex
           Description: To propose reconfiguration of the Nuclear
           Weapons Complex to be smaller, less diverse, and less
           expensive than that of today. The reconfigured complex would
           have fewer individual sites, generally lower capacity
           facilities, and would fully comply with applicable
           environmental, safety and health laws, regulations and
           orders. This will include the Department's preferred
           alternative for the technology and location for a new
           tritium supply.
           Milestone: March 1995 Draft EIS for Public Review
           (Secretarial Commitment).
 SITE-WIDE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS:
      Note:Consideration is ongoing for Site-wide EISs at a number of
           Defense Programs sites where current NEPA coverage is
           non-existent or out-dated.
      Pantex Site-wide EIS
           Description: To evaluate all current and proposed facilities
           and activities at Pantex including dismantlement and storage
           of the resulting nuclear materials and classified weapons
           components (pits).
           Milestone:Record of Decision, November 15, 1996 (Secretarial
                     Commitment).
 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS:
      Interim Management of Nuclear Materials at the Savannah River
      Site
           Description: To evaluate nuclear materials currently at the
           Savannah River Site. The nuclear materials would be placed
           into one of three categories: (1) materials that should be
           stabilized based on the risk they pose to workers, the public
           or the environment; (2) materials proposed to be converted to
           a useable form for a programmatic need; and (3) materials
           that are stable and not required for a programmatic need.
           Milestone: March 1995
      Upgrade of the F & H Canyon Exhaust Systems at the Savannah River
      Site
           Description: To evaluate the impacts of the upgrade of
           existing canyon ventilation exhaust systems for the F- and
           H-area chemical separations facilities.
           Milestone: July 1995
 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS:
 Total: 32
 Kansas City Plant (1)
      Separate Process Wastewaters, Part A, Contaminated Flow Collection
        and Treatment System
           Description: To construct and operate a collection and
           treatment system for contaminated wastewaters and
           groundwaters at the DOE operated Kansas City Plant.
           Milestone: July 1994 (expected completion)
 Pantex Plant (1)
      Construction and Operation of Environmental, Safety and Health
      Analytical
        Laboratory
           Description: To meet the need for increased testing and
           analysis capability of environmental, waste, and explosive
           samples by constructing and operating a new analytical
           laboratory at Pantex and subsequently demolishing the
           existing laboratory facility.
           Milestone: October 1994
      Pit Reuse Project
           Description: Develop and demonstrate the capability at
           Pantex to modify certain pits generated from the nuclear
           weapon dismantlement process to enhance safety and to allow
           reuse of pits by integrating existing technology at Pantex
           with new technology developed specially for this project.
           Milestone: January 1995
 Savannah River Site (4)
      D-Area Powerhouse Life Extension
           Description: Line #:95-D-157, to upgrade and renovate the
           existing SRS powerhouse in order to extend the facility
           life, upgrade system controls to current industry standards,
           and ensure production reliability.
           Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
      Domestic Water System Upgrades Phase I & II
           Description: Line #:93-D-147, to upgrade the existing 28
           SRS domestic water supply systems by improving.and
           consolidating them as necessary to cost-effectively comply
           with South Carolina primary drinking water regulations.
           Eleven of the existing systems would be consolidated and
           replaced by a central water supply treatment facility and a
           new 24-mile main distribution system.
           Milestone: July 1994
      Storage of Plutonium Metal in the Building 247-F Vault
           Description: To provide additional interim capacity to
           store plutonium at the SRS.
           Milestone: Under review
      Uranium Solidification Facility, Building 221 H
           Description: Line #:85-D-145, to provide the facilities to
           process liquid, highly-enriched uranyl nitrate for the
           production of solid uranium oxide.
           Milestone: Suspended pending outcome of the study to look
           at alternate methods to disposition uranyl nitrate
           hexahydrate.
 Oak Ridge Y-12 (2)
      Interim Storage of Excess Highly Enriched Uranium
           Description: To provide interim storage of nuclear weapons
           highly enriched uranium from weapons dismantlement at Pantex.
           In August 1994, the amount to be stored will exceed the
           previous historical high amount of material stored at OR/Y-12
           facility.
           Milestone: August 1994
      Hydrogen Fluoride Supply System in Building 9212
           Description: Line # 94-D-124, to update the current Anhydrous
           Hydrogen Fluoride Process at OR/Y-12.
           Milestone: Fiscal year 1995 (Construction starts the 1st
           Quarter, 1995).
 Los Alamos National Laboratory (9)
      Fire Resistant Pit Project
           Description: To provide an indoor bench-scale research
           project for Fire Resistant Pits. The project will involve
           heating weapons components (pits) under controlled conditions
           in a hot cell to determine the behavior of a weapon in an
           accidental fuel fire scenario.
              Milestone: Under review
      Chemistry Metallurgy Research Building Upgrades
           Description: Line #:95-D-102, to upgrade the Chemistry and
           Metallurgical Research (CMR) Building in order to meet
           current standards in the areas of health, safety,
           environmental protection, and security and safeguards.
           Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
           High Explosive Material Test Facility
           Description: Line #:94-D-102, to construct a new High
           Explosive Material Test Facility building. The facility will
           be used for mechanical and thermal tests on materials and
           assemblies containing high explosive materials.
           Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
      Isotope Separator Building
           Description: To relocate one isotope separator and to install
           a new one at TA-48. The isotope separators will be housed in
           a pre-engineered building.
           Milestone: Under review
 Low Level Waste Drum Staging Facility
           Description: To place a prefabricated storage building
           adjacent to the existing Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility
           at TA-16.  The building will be used as a staging site for
           sealed 55-gallon drums (up to eight) of noncompactible waste,
           contaminated with low levels of tritium classified as
           low-level waste, prior to moving the waste to TA-54.
           Milestone: June 1994
      Deactivate, Disassemble and Decontaminate, High Pressure Tritium
        Laboratory, at Building 86 at TA-33
           Description: To deactivate, disassemble, and decontaminate
           High Pressure Tritium Laboratory at TA-33. Programmatic
           operations in the building were suspended in 1990.
           Milestone: As soon as possible
      Accelerator Prototype Laboratory
           Description: To erect pre-engineered a building in an
           existing developed area within Technical Area (TA)-53 for
           research, development, and testing of accelerator components,
           primarily continuous ion source generators.
           Milestone: April 1994
      Weapons Component Testing Facility
           Description: To relocate an existing physical properties
           testing laboratory, without changing the scope of operations,
           from Building 450 to 207 within TA-16. A small enclosure will
           be built to house hydraulic pumps.
           Milestone: Under review
      Increase of Special Nuclear Material Storage Level at Nuclear
        Material Storage Facility
           Description: Original Line #:84-D-104, to replace and
           upgrade facility components to permit full operation of the
           Nuclear Material Storage Facility (NMSF).
           Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
 Sandia National Laboratory (7)
      Processing and Environmental Technology Laboratory
           Description: Line #:94-D-102/Subproject-06, to construct a
           laboratory to collocate activities dealing with materials
           and processes research; waste reduction; management of
           hazardous materials; and environment, safety, and health
           which are currently dispersed throughout Sandia National
           Laboratories.
           Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
      Robotic Manufacturing Science and Engineering Laboratory
           Description: Line #: 92-D-102, to construct and operate a
           new building that will provide office and laboratory
           facilities for robotics research and testing.
           Milestone: April 1994
      Technology Support Center/Gamma Irradiation Facility
           Description: Line #:90-D-102/Subproject-06, to design,
           construction, and operate a new Gamma Irradiation Facility
           located in Tech Area V, and the removal of the existing Gamma
           Irradiation Facility to consolidate gamma irradiation sources
           in a single, dedicated facility, reducing the potential for
           radiation exposure of personnel.
           Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
      Aerial Cable Site Facility Operation
           Description: To operate a facility consisting of steel cables
           suspended across Sol se Mete Canyon in the Coyote Test Field
           Area to provide a means of conducting air-to-ground tests of
           aircraft deliverable ordnance, ground-to-air missile, and
           other air defined material tests under controlled and
           instrumented conditions.
           Milestone: Under review
      Neutron Generator/Switch Tube Prototyping Relocation Project
           Description: To relocate the prototyping of neutron
           generators and switch tubes from Building 891 to the East
           Annex of Building 870, both within Technical Area I. New
           equipment will be purchased and set up in Building 870.
           Building 891 will be decommissioned for use in another
           project.
           Milestone: April 1994
      Coyote Canyon Test Complex Operation
           Description: To modify and expand activities within and
           adjacent to Technical Area III for Coyote Canyon Test Complex
           Operations. Testing programs will continue to involve the
           use of explosives and propellants to test the reliability,of
           weapons, weapons components, and support end articles.
           Milestone: Under review
      Modification and Operation of the Neutron Measurements Laboratory,
        Building 984
           Description: To modify and allow the operation of the
           Neutron Measurements Laboratory that was completed in
           February 1990.  Its primary purpose is to provide a location
           to conduct time-of-flight measurements of neutrons created by
           inertial confinement fusion target implosions in Particle
           Beam Fusion Accelerator II.
           Milestone: Under review
 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (3)
      Explosive Waste Storage Facility at Site 300
           Description: Line #:94-D-414, to construct a facility that
           would be used to store all explosive wastes generated by the
           Weapons Testing Programs at LLNL and Site 300 before
           treatment at Site 300 or shipment off site.
           Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
      Contained Firing Facility at Bunker 801, Site 300
           Description: Line #:94-D-102/Subproject-03, to enclose the
           firing operations at the principal Site 300 weapons test
           facility, Bunker 801, which would reduce the amount of
           hazardous and other wastes generated at the bunker, minimize
           emissions of noise and hazardous materials into the
           environment, and enhance the overall safety of the
           operations.
           Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
      General Atomics Target Fabrication and Technology Support of the
        Inertial Confinement Fusion Program
           Description: To create Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF)
           Target Fabrication and Tritium Handling Facilities to be
           operated by General Atomics (GA) in San Diego, California. GA
           would use these facilities to manufacture ICF targets under a
           contract for the Department of Energy. These targets would be
           used in laser or particle beam experiments performed by
           various U.S. Inertial Fusion Laboratories.
           Milestone: Under review
 Nevada Operations (2)
      North Las Vegas Facility Including the Proposed Construction of
        the Nevada Support Facility
           Description: Line #:93-0-102, to construct the Nevada
           Support Facility (NSF) at the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF)
           and to operate,and maintain the NLVF, which includes the
           implementation of the Five-Year Facilities Plan for the
           facilities owned by DOE and operated by EG&G.
           Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
      Opening and Operation of Combined Device Assembly Facility at the
        Nevada Test Site
           Description: Line #:85-D-105, to provide state-of-the art
           facilities for nuclear explosive operations that require
           the handling of high explosives (HE) in combination with
           Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), and to reduce the
           environmental impact and personnel exposure in the unlikely
           event of an accident.
           Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
 Fernald and Hanford (1)
      Sale of Excess Depleted, Normal, and Low Enriched Uranium
        Material
           Description: To study the sale, packaging, loading, and
           shipment of approximately 3,626 metric tons of depleted,
           normal, and low enriched uranium stored at the Fernald and
           Hanford sites.
           Milestone: April 1994 (to allow evaluation of contract
           based on bids received)
 University of Rochester (1)
      Tritium Filling Station at the Lab for Laser Energetics
           Description: To provide a facility capable of filling
           hollow microspheres with deuterium and tritium for use as
           targets on the existing UR/LLE OMEGA laser system.
           Milestone: As soon as possible
 Pinellas Plant (1)
      Leasing of Buildings and Facilities
           Description: To modify existing facilities for non-defense
           reuse applications. Utilization of existing technical
           personnel resources would be encouraged.
           Milestone: June 1994
                               LABORATORY FUNDING
      Mr. Bevill: Please provide a breakout by laboratory or site of DOE
 funding for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995.
      Dr. Reis: The breakout by laboratory or site of Weapons Activities
 funding for FY 1993, FY 1994, FY 1995 is shown in a table which I would
 like to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
                     WEAPONS ACTIVITIES BY LABORATORY/SITE
                        TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY
                            (Dollars in Millions)
                                 FY 1993         FY 1994        FY 1995
 Albuquerque                     $ 308.9         $ 303.0        $ 283.7
 Kansas City                       331.4           329.8          252.6
 LANL                              524.7           457.3          430.9
 LLNL                              476.8           410.3          357.0
 Mound                              97.6            73.9           30.3
 Nevada                            340.6           325.0          311.8
 Oak Ridge (Includes Y-12)         519.1           443.1          364.6
 Pantex                            238.7           240.7          253.5
 Pinellas                           96.5            87.3           30.9
 Rocky Flats                       505.0           253.6           67.5
 SNL                               665.6           632.4          686.3
 Savannah River                    129.6           108.1          106.8
 HQ/Other                          471.0           374.8          172.8
   TOTAL                        $4,705.5        $4,039.3       $3,348.7
              LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
      Mr. Bevill. By laboratory, identify.the number of FTE's funded
 in the weapons program for each year since 1980, al.so provide total
 laboratory funding for each laboratory by year.
      Dr. Reis. The FTE information and total laboratory funding for
 each laboratory by year is shown in a table which I would like to
 insert for the record. (The information follows:)
            LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
                   FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS
             LLNL          LANL           SNL          TOTAL
 1980        3,457         2,766          3,778        10,001
 1981        3,705         2,964          3,739        10,408
 1982        3,704         3,000          3,806        10,510
 1983        3,957         3,015          3,883        10,855
 1984        3,889         3,082          3,914        10,885
 1985        3,970         3,099          4,122        11,191
 1986        3,757         2,956          3,953        10,666
 1987        4,240         3,016          3,899        11,155
 1988        3,841         2,853          3,676        10,370
 1989        3,742         2,645          3,606         9,993
 1990        3,550         2,585          3,632         9,767
 1991        3,156         2,421          3,134         8,711
 1992        3,322         2,441          3,480         9,243
 1993        3,133         2,744          3,158         9,035
 1994  est.  2,872         1,850          2,899         7,621
 1995  est.  2,589         1,770          2,845         7,204
      LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
                      OPERATING FUNDING
                   (Dollars in Millions)
             LLNL          LANL           SNL          TOTAL
 1980       $145.1         $125.1        $213.3        $483.5
 1981        181.5         154.3          148.0         483.8
 1982        216.0         193.8          290.1         699.9
 1983        235.2         215.5          316.5         767.2
 19'84       310.6         283.1          378.1         971.8
 1985        356.2         309.9          421.4       1,087.6
 1986        373.5         304.3          427.2       1,105.0
 1987        319.8         292.0          433.8       1,045.6
 1988        314.6         287.8          444.0       1,046.4
 1989        342:0         291.2          464.6       1,097.8
 1990        366.1         307.7          467.0       1,140.8
 1991        347.4         291.7          465.8       1,104.9
 1992        374.8         323.6          506.1       1,204.5
 1993        386.0         364.4          472.2       1,222.6
 1994  est.  340.4         282.5          435.5       1,058.4
 1995  est.  318.9         270.6          402.4         991.9
                    RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a detailed breakout of activities
 and associated costs funded using DOD funds by individual DOE
 laboratory for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995.
      Dr. Reis: The DOE laboratories provide DOD technological support
 utilizing unique facilities and technical capabilities. Examples of
 activities include: defense systems research, advanced conventional
 munitions research, armor/anti-armor research, defense nuclear
 research, arms control and verification research, security systems
 development, weapons related experiments and tests, and environmental
 studies for restoration of facilities, subsurface detection technology
 research, computer code development and analysis, materials research,
 weapons related training materials, reentry vehicle technology, weapon
 trainers, miscellaneous weapons related hardware development, and
 advanced manufacturing technologies.
      DOD funding by laboratory is shown in a table which I would like
 to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
                                FY 1993       FY 1994       FY 1995
                                Actual       Estimated     Estimated
                              Obligations   Obligations   Obligations
 Los Alamos National          $ 137.5M       $ 116.6M      $ 100.0M
    Laboratory
 Sandia National              $ 315.2M       $ 285.7M      $ 285.7M
    Laboratories
 Lawrence Livermore           $ 149.6M       $  131.4M      $ 98.3M
    National Laboratory
 Total                        $ 602.3M       $  533.7M     $ 484.0M
                     RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
      Mr. Bevill: Provide a breakout by location of FY 1993, FY 1994
 and FY 1995 funding,for weapons RD&T by program element.
      Dr. Reis: A breakout by location of FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY 1995
 funding for Weapons Research, Development and Testing is shown in a
 table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information
 follows:)
 ****Research, Development & Testing FY 1993 by Site by Program Element
 chart is attached to original document****
                          WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe the system and explain the need for
 all weapons systems currently in Phase I and Phase 2 of weapons
 development.
      Dr. Reis. The Department of Energy is not participating in any
 Phase I studies. There are two Phase 2 studies, High Power Radio
 Frequency (HPRF) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)
 Replacement Warhead.
      The purpose of the HPRF study is to determine the feasibility
 of developing a non-lethal, ICBM-delivered, and nuclear-driven HPRF
 device intended to damage electronics and/or electrical components.
 This study was approved and requested by the Nuclear Weapons Council
 Standing Committee based on the results of the previous HPRF Phase I
 study. The Air Force was requested to lead the study with DOE as a
 participant. U.S. Air Force Space Command and U.S. Strategic Command
 are the intended customers for this device and fully support the Air
 Force and DOE in their efforts.
      The Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Replacement
 Warhead Phase 2 Study is essentially complete. The Navy Strategic
 Systems Program Office (SSP) will issue the final report after briefing
 the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing Committee.
      The Navy requested the SLBM study to identify and quantify
 technical alternatives to the MK4/W76 and MK5/W88 reentry systems. The
 Navy requested the study because of the expected long stockpile
 lifetime for SLBM warheads and to explore safety enhancements that may
 be desirable in the enduring stockpile. While both the W76 and the W88
 are safe, neither has the most modern safety features of Insensitive
 High Explosive (IHE) or Fire Resistant Pits (FRP).
                      NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list by type and number of warheads
 of the total nuclear weapons stockpile in FY 1993 and proposed for each
 year through FY 2003.
      Dr. Reis. The stockpile plan is approved only through Fiscal Year
 1999. The table below provides the information requested for this
 period.
                 NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE DATA (END OF FY)
                             FY93  FY94  FY95  FY96  FY97  FY98  FY99
 ACTIVE STOCKPILE
 B53 STRATEGIC BOMB
 B61-3 NONSTRAT BOMB
 B61-4 NONSTRAT BOMB
 B61-7 STRATEGIC BOMB            Deleted                    Deleted
 B61-10 NONSTRAT BOMB
 W62 MINUTEMAN III
 W69 SRAM A
 W76 TRIDENT C4
 W78 MINUTEMAN III
 W80-0 SUB CRUISE MSL
 W80-1 AIR CRUISE MSL
 B83 STRATEGIC BOMB
 W87 PEACEKEEPER
 W88 TRIDENT D5
 ACTIVE TOTAL
 INACTIVE STOCKPILE
                                    Deleted                  Deleted
                             NUCLEAR WEAPON RETIREMENTS
      Mr. Bevill. Describe the DOD nuclear weapons retirement program in
 FY 1994 and FY 1995. Provide a list showing the type and number of
 warhead systems proposed to be retired each year through 2003.
      Dr. Reis. The Department of Defense is planning to retire fewer
 weapons than in the recent past because many facets of previous
 Presidential nuclear initiatives (such as retirement of all
 ground-launched nuclear weapons) have been Implemented. However, the
 stockpile plan is approved only through Fiscal Year 1999. Thus, the
 table below provides information only for FY 1993-1999,
                    NUCLEAR WEAPON RETIREMENTS
                          FY93  FY94   FY95   FY96   FY97   FY98   FY99
 B53 STRATEGIC BOMB
 W56 MINUTEMAN II
 B57-2 NONSTRAT   BOMB
 B61-0 NONSTRAT   BOMB
 B61-2 NONSTRAT   BOMB                 Deleted           Deleted
 B61-3 NONSTRAT   BOMB
 B61-4 NONSTRAT   BOMB
 B61-5 NONSTRAT   BOMB
 B61-7 STRATEGIC  BOMB
 B61-10 NONSTRAT  BOMB
 W62 MINUTEMAN III
 W68 POSEIDON
 W69 SRAM A
 W76 TRIDENT C4
 W78 MINUTEMAN III
 W80-0 SUB CRUISE MSL
 W80-1 AIR CRUISE MSL                  Deleted            Deleted
 B83 STRATEGIC BOMB
 W84 GROUND CRUISE MSL
 W87 PEACEKEEPER
 W88 TRIDENT D5
 RETIREMENT TOTAL
                                 WEAPON DISMANTLEMENT
      Mr. Bevill. How many weapons have been disassembled at Pantex by
 year since FY 1988, and how many are scheduled for FY 1994 and FY 1995?
      Dr. Reis: Quantities of disassembled weapons by year are:
                       Fiscal Year                Disposals
                         1988                        581
                         1989                      1,208
                         1990                      1,154
                         1991                      1,595
                         1992                      1,856
                         1993                      1,556
 In FY 1994 and 1995, we plan to dismantle 2,000 weapons each year.
  
                      PANTEX ANALYTICAL LABORATORY
      Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the proposed Pantex Analytical
 Laboratory? Are funds included in FY 1995 for this activity?
      Dr. Reis, The Department sees a real benefit in having a National
 Resource Center for Plutonium located in the Amarillo area to interpret
 for the public, and especially for the State of Texas, information on
 the environmental and biological effects of plutonium, high explosives,
 and hazardous materials generated from nuclear weapons assembly and
 dismantlement. Also, research on international controls of fissile
 material and evaluation of fission options for plutonium disposition.
 Currently, the Department is exploring the concept and approach for the
 establishment and operation of the Center, and we expect to reach a
 decision on the approach in the near future. We will advise the
 Committee when this occurs and the source of funding is identified.
                           VEHICLE REPLACEMENT
      Mr. Bevill. Justify the need for replacing 22 police-type
 vehicles.
      Dr. Reis. We are seeking to replace 22 vehicles configured with
 a Police Package for use by the Safeguards and Security Department,
 Protective Services Division, at the Lawrence Livermore National
 Laboratory. These units will replace Security Police Officer
 patrol/response vehicles that are currently under lease until the end
 of FY 1994. Due to the age and maintenance costs of the leased
 vehicles, it will be more efficient to purchase new vehicles than the
 currently leased vehicles. Police-type vehicles continue to be needed
 at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for the protection of
 Defense Programs assets at the facility.
                       RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
      Mr. Bevill. Describe the nonproliferation activities funded in
 this program and explain why they are not included in the Department's
 arms control and nonproliferation budget.
      Dr. Reis: As part of our effort to make the Research and
 Development budget justification more accurately descriptive of the
 work performed by the laboratories in support of the weapons program,
 certain high priority, high visibility programs were broken out as
 separate activities within Research and Development. Among these
 Programs and Initiatives is N-PACTA, Nonproliferation, Arms Control,
 and Threat Assessment.
      N-PACTA is a relatively small activity, $11.7 million in FY 1994
 and $6.4 million in FY 1995, but because of the high priority the
 Congress and the President are placing on nonproliferation activities
 we have chosen to highlight it. The activities collected within this
 category are not duplicative of the activities funded within the
 Materials Support and Other Defense Programs account. Rather, they are
 concentrated around nuclear weapons design-specific engineering and
 technology concepts and issues, and therefore a part of the R&D budget.
 In general, these activities are activities which are captured by
 the Department's Nonproliferation crosscut but which do not fall under
 the purview of the Office of NonProliferation and National Security
 because the requirement for these activities is driven by the.needs of
 the U.S. stockpile, as opposed to the need to monitor non-U.S. weapons
 activities.
      Specifically, the activities within the N-PACTA category either
 are activities that are necessary for the Weapons Research and
 Development program to meet its responsibilities and fit under a broad
 definition of nonproliferation, such as international device design
 assessments, military implication assessments, and limited R&D efforts
 to guard against technology surprise; or they are efforts in support of
 the Department's treaty negotiation efforts which utilize the weapons
 program's unique talents and capabilities, such as technical support
 for the nuclear test talks.
      In no case does this category support activities which should be,
 or are, funded through the Materials Support and Other Defense Programs
 account which is primarily involved in the monitoring of non-U.S.
 weapons stockpile activities.
                                 INERTIAL FUSION
      Mr. Bevill: Has the rationale for this program changed since the
 U.S. ceased nuclear weapons testing?
      Dr. Reis.: The rationale for the Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF)
 program has strengthened with the advent of the nuclear test
 moratorium. ICF offers a laboratory environment similar conceptually in
 many respects to nuclear weapons. The cessation of nuclear weapons
 testing has increased the importance of all types of aboveground
 experimental facilities in maintaining the stockpile. Further,
 cessation of U.S. nuclear testing has enhanced the role of the ICF
 program in supporting the National Security Strategic Plan (NSSP). The
 ICF program supports the NSSP by providing nuclear-weapon related data
 as well as helping to maintain and enhance nuclear weapon expertise.
                           INERTIAL FUSION
      Mr. Bevill: What is the status of the review of the classification
 policy as it pertains to the Inertial Fusion program?
      Dr. Reis: On December 7, 1993, Secretary O'Leary announced
 declassifications in several areas. One of these was the
 declassification of major parts of the Inertial Fusion program. Interim
 classification guidance has been sent to the participating
 laboratories, and a classification guide is nearing completion.
                            INERTIAL FUSION
      Mr. Bevill. What is the FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995 funding
 proposed for each laboratory and facility in the Inertial Fusion
 program? Please provide the breakout by program; i.e. glass laser, gas
 laser, and pulsed power.
  
      Dr. Reis. Funding proposed for each laboratory and facility in
 the Inertial Fusion program is contained in the following table which
 I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
                          INERTIAL FUSION
                         FUNDING BY PROGRAM
                       (Dollars in Thousands)
                                        FY 1993     FY 1994
                                         ADJ.         ADJ.     FY 1995
                                        APPROP      APPROP     REQUEST
 Operating Expenses
   Indirect Drive (Glass Laser)
     Oakland/NIF                            *        6,000       6,000
     LLNL                                89,928     77,627      79,267
     LANL                                18,078     16,546      16,692
     SNL                                    840                  1,500
 Direct Drive (Glass Laser)
   Oakland - University of Rochester     15,590     14,950      13,000
     Total Glass                        124,436   $115,123    $116,459
 KrF Laser (Gas Laser)
   LANL                                   2,462      1,800           0
   Oakland/NRL                            9,157      7,250       8,000
     Total Gas                         $ 11,619   $  9,050    $  8,000
 Light Ion Beams (Pulsed Power)
    SNL                                  28,410     25,921      25,559
 Capsule Fabrication & Development
 Supporting Activities
    LANL                                  4,260      3,973       4,087
    SNL                                     645        900       1,550
   Oakland Operations
     General Atomics                      9,519      9,000       9,000
       KMS Fusion                                    3,838 **
     Headquarters/Other                   2,411      1,400       2,100
      Total Supporting Activities        16,835     19,111      16,737
        Total Operating Expenses       $181,300   $169,205    $166,755
 Capital Equipment
    LLNL                                $ 3,500    $ 3,560    $  3,800
    LANL                                    800        400         400
    SNL                                   1,400        900         700
    Oakland/General Atomics                 500        300           0
    Naval Research Laboratory               400        450           0
    University of Rochester              23,410      9,950       4,818
    Oakland Operations Office             1,000        300           0
      Total Capital Equipment          $ 31,010   $ 15,860    $  9,718
 TOTAL INERTIAL FUSION                 $212,310   $185,065    $176,473
 *    NIF conceptual design funding distributed as follows in FY 1993:
      LLNL, $4,000; LANL, $1,000; and SNL, $1,000.
 **   Includes Internal Reprogramming of $838,000 from the R&D program.
                                INERTIAL FUSION
      Mr. Bevill. At the same level of detail as the previous question,
 provide a chart showing for FY 1994 the original budget request, the
 appropriated amount, the application of any general reduction, or use
 of prior year balances, the application of any reduction of funding
 used for the KMS settlement, the application of any reduction for NIF
 conceptual design costs, and any other funding reductions.
      Dr. Reis. The difference between the ICF budget request and the
 appropriated amount was the realignment of funding to provide an
 additional $1,000,000 for the University of Rochester, $3,000,000
 associated with the KMS Fusion, Inc., settlement, and a reduction of
 $4,186,000 for contractor salary savings. There was no use of prior
 year balances and the funds for NIF conceptual design were included in
 our budget request. The information is shown in a table which I would
 like to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
 ****The FY 1994 INERTIAL CONFINEMENT FUSION FUNDING chart is attached
 to original document****
                           INERTIAL FUSION
      Mr. Bevill. Describe the accomplishments of the Inertial Fusion
 program in FY 1993, and describe program plans by individual laboratory
 and facility for FY 1994 and FY 1995.
      Dr. Reis. In FY 1993, ihe Inertial Fusion program (ICF) obtained
 DOE approval of mission need (Key Decision 0) for the National Ignition
 Facility (NIF) and began the Conceptual Design. Precision Nova
 improvements to the Nova laser were completed allowing the beginning of
 precision experiments of the Nova Technical Contract (NTC). The NTC
 contributes to the scientific readiness to proceed with the NIF.
 Further NTC experiments leading to scientific readiness have been
 positive. Construction of the Omega Upgrade glass laser at the
 University of Rochester and the Nike gas laser at the Naval Research
 Laboratory proceeded in a timely manner. The light-ion program at
 Sandia National Laboratories was reviewed by the Inertial Confinement
 Fusion  Advisory Committee (ICFAC) and subsequent milestones were
 pursued.
      A brief description of plans for FY 1994 and FY 1995 by laboratory
 and facility is shown in a chart which I would like to insert in the
 record. (The information follows:)
      LLNL      - Complete NTC and continue NIF target design work,
                  complete Beamlet laser, and complete NIF Conceptual
                  Design.
      LANL      - Complete NTC and continue NIF target design work.
                  Close out Mercury KrF laser project.
      SNL       - Continue light-ion beam focusing research on PBFA-II
                  and produce 100 eV hohlraum temperatures by March
                  1995. Continue efforts to demonstrate light-ion beam
                  accelerator as "target-qualified" driver.
      UR/LLE    - Complete Omega Upgrade laser and begin direct-drive
                  spherical implosion experiments.
      NRL       - Complete Nike KrF laser and begin direct-drive
                  planar-foil experiments.
      GA/WJSA   - Provide target-fabrication support to the ICF
                  laboratories. Develop cryogenic target fabrication
                  techniques.
                           INERTIAL FUSION
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe the status of the National Ignition
 Facility, including funding and milestones for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY
 1995.
      Dr. Reis. The Secretary of Energy, serving as the Acquisition
 Executive for the Energy Systems Acquisition Advisory Board, approved
 the Key Decision Zero (KD-O, Approval of Mission Need) for the National
 Ignition Facility on January 15, 1993. In the approval letter, the
 Secretary constrained the cost of the conceptual design effort to $12
 million. The funding is planned as follows: FY 1993 ($6 million) and FY
 1994 ($6 million). The Conceptual Design will be completed and a report
 issued in April 1994. The next major milestone of the NIF is the
 request for Key Decision One (KD-l, Approval of New Start), currently
 scheduled for May 25, 1994. In FY 1994 and FY 1995, following approval
 of KD-l, a modest advanced conceptual design effort, will proceed in
 anticipation of a line item approval in FY 1996.
                                 INERTIAL FUSION
      Mr. Bevill: What is the status of the closeout of the KMS program?
 Please describe the remaining issues to be resolved.
      Dr. Reis: All of the property and facilities-related issues have
 now been resolved with KMS Fusion, Inc., (KMS). On January 14, 1994,
 KMS turned over to the Department occupancy and control of the KMS
 facility in Ann Arbor, Michigan, along with all of the inertial
 confinement fusion equipment, systems, and other property contained
 within that facility. The Department paid KMS $2.2 million as part of
 the settlement agreement.
      The Department is proceeding with removal and redeployment of
 the Government-owned equipment. This will be followed by
 decontamination and decommissioning of the facility and its return to
 the landlord for unrestricted use. The Department will also focus on
 resolving the remaining administrative and contractual issues with KMS
 in order to close out the KMS contract.
                              INERTIAL FUSION
      Mr. Bevill: What performance measures should the Committee use
 to evaluate the usefulness and effectiveness of this program?
      Dr. Reis: The Congress should use performance measures related to
 the accomplishment of the strategic goals of this program. For FY
 1995, these would be (1) whether the DOE has made a decision to proceed
 with the construction of the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and (2)
 completion of the OMEGA Upgrade project on cost and schedule.
      Within Defense Programs, we will use numerous other performance
 measures in support of those major measures mentioned above. For
 example, contributing to whether the DOE decides to proceed with the
 NIF we will consider the following other performance measures:
 operation of the NOVA laser and experimental results; operation of
 PBFA-II and results; target fabrication techniques developed in support
 of NIF regimes; and successes in computational codes. The NOVA
 Technical Contract in place with LLNL is a good example of our approach
 to performance measurement. Specific programmatic objectives and
 milestones are negotiated and agreed between the contractor and the
 program  office, and are programmed and monitored over a number of
 years. Technical contracts are also in place for Sandia and the
 University of Rochester; we are currently developing technical
 contracts for the other the participants in the inertial confinement
 fusion program as well.
                  NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION
      Mr. Bevill. What is the current status of the nuclear and
 nonnuclear weapons complex reconfiguration?
      Dr. Reis. The Reconfiguration Programmatic Environmental Impact
 Statement is being prepared. for the nuclear portion of the
 reconfiguration program. The draft PEIS will be available for public
 review by March 1995. This will include the Department's preferred
 alternative for the technology and location for a new tritium supply.
      A Finding of No Significant Impact was issued September 8, 1993,
 on the Environmental Assessment for nonnuclear consolidation.
 Implementation has proceeded with the donor sites working on inventory
 builds to support the enduring stockpile and the transfer of equipment,
 people, and records to the receiver sites. In FY 1995, process
 qualification at the receiver sites will begin with all qualifications
 to be completed by the end of FY 1999.
      The engineering design work associated with the facility
 modifications at the receiver sites is proceeding on schedule. We
 expect to have about 40 percent of facilities design and construction
 activity completed by the end of FY 1995.
                     NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION
      Mr. Bevill. What funding is allocated to nuclear versus
 nonnuclear reconfiguration activities in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY
 1995?
      Dr. Reis. Funding for reconfiguration activities for FY 1993, FY
 1994, and FY 1995 is shown in a table which I would like to insert for
 the record. (The information follows:)
                            Reconfiguration Activities
                                  ($ in thousands)
                                      FY 1993      FY 1994      FY 1995
 Operating Expense
 Program Direction                   $  3,875     $  3,850     $  5,600
 Program Support (PEIS Support)      $ 66,131     $ 58,081     $  9,671
 Nonnuclear Consolidation            $ 56,499     $ 65,100     $ 79,000
 Nuclear Reconfiguration             $ 20,555     $ 11,150     $      0
 Nuclear Material Disposition        $      0     $ 30,000     $      0
 Total Operating Expense             $147,060     $168,181     $ 94,271
 Construction
 Nonnuclear Consolidation            $ 26,000     $ 25,000     $ 58,000
 Total Obligational Authority        $173,060     $193,181     $152,271
 Use of prior year balances          $      0     $-41,000     $ -6,765
 New Budget Authority                $173,060     $152,181     $145,506
                    NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current process for preparation
 of the Programmatic EIS on the future nuclear weapons complex including
 funding and milestones.
  
      Dr. Reis. In preparing the Programmatic Environmental Impact
 Statement (PEIS), the Department published a revised Notice of Intent
 in the Federal Register in July 1993 describing the scope of the PEIS.
 Twelve public scoping meetings were held near the weapons complex sites
 in September and October 1993. A revised Reconfiguration PEIS
 Implementation Plan will be issued this summer based on the public's
 comments, budget realities, and workscope projections. The
 environmental analysis and the Department's preferred alternatives will
 be set forth in a draft PEIS by March 1995. Following a series of
 public hearings held near each of the candidate sites, the PEIS will be
 placed in final form by the end of the year. A Record of Decision will
 be issued about 30 days following the issuance of the final PEIS.
 Approximately $85 million will be costed in FY 1994 and although the
 pending Reconfiguration budget request contains minimal funding for
 these activities in FY 1995, it is expected that savings can be
 achieved in FY 1994 to provide for a total of approximately $26 million
 for environmental analysis, feasibility studies, and cost estimates of
 the options to support the Record of Decision.
                    NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe the process for nonnuclear
 consolidation including activities to be performed in FY 1994 and FY
 1995 and associated costs.
      Dr. Reis. The donor sites are now working on inventory builds
 required to support the enduring stockpile. When these are finished,
 equipment, people, and records that are also required to support the
 enduring stockpile will be transferred to the receiver sites. After the
 transfer has been made, the equipment will undergo process
 qualification to assure that it will operate within specifications.
      The engineering design work associated with the facility
 modifications at the receiver sites is proceeding on schedule.
 Following design and construction modifications the equipment will be
 placed in service. Twenty- five activity transfer groups were created
 to develop the detailed plans. Each group will proceed as the plans and
 modifications are ready, thus a combination of design, modifications,
 transfer of equipment and people and process qualification will be
 occurring within each of the next few years. All qualifications are
 scheduled to be complete by the end of FY 1999.
      The costs for FY 1994 are anticipated to be approximately $120
 million. Part of this cost will be from FY 1993 funds that were carried
 over due to the completion of the Environmental Assessment late in the
 fiscal year. The requested funding for nonnuclear reconfiguration for
 FY 1995 is $137 million.
                   NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION
      Mr. Bevill. Describe the Defense Programs activities at Rocky
 Flats, Mound, and Pinellas in FY,1994 and FY 1995.
      Dr. Reis. Inventory builds in support of the enduring stockpile
 are occurring at all three plants. All Defense Programs production will
 cease not later than the end of FY 1994 at the three plants.
 Preliminary work is underway for transferring the facilities from
 Defense Programs to Environmental Restoration and Waste Management
 within the Department. Following the completion of the production
 activity the equipment will be prepared for transfer to the receiver
 sites. Most of the transfer activity will occur in FY 1995.
           EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAM
      Mr. Bevill. Please list the technology transfer activities which
 will be conducted by each laboratory in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995,
 including funding for each task.
      Dr. Reis. The attached sheets identify the Defense Programs
 technology transfer activities that are being conducted at Defense
 Programs laboratories and production facilities. Individual projects
 are grouped into major technical activity categories that support
 laboratory and facility core competencies. The FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY
 1995 funding associated with the activities is shown in a table which I
 would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
 ****DP TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ACTIVITIES Chart is attached to original
 document****
             EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAM
      Mr. Bevill. Describe the performance measurements which the
 Committee should use next year to evaluate the effectiveness of this
 program?
      Dr. Reis. Program effectiveness should be based upon the ability
 to meet stated program objectives. The objectives listed below and
 their respective program metrics should be used to evaluate the
 effectiveness of the Defense Programs Technology Transfer Program.
      1.   Leveraged WR&D Dollars. An increase in leveraged weapons
           research and development dollars from a baseline value at the
           end of FY 1994.
      2.   Quality of Existing Partnerships. An improving trend in
           customer (industry) satisfaction as measured by a customer
           feedback survey.
      3.   R&D Investment. An increasing percentage of private sector
           cost-share.
      4.   Access to Facilities. Increased ability to access
           Defense Programs Laboratories and Facilities as evidenced by:
           the establishment of new Deployment User Facilities; and,
           increasing ease of access as reported by a customer feedback
           survey.
      5.   Process Improvements. Continued improvements in the
           technology transfer process as evidenced by: a reduction in
           the time to negotiate and implement a technology transfer
           activity; and increasing quality of the collaborative
           processes as reported by a customer feedback survey.
      6.   Industrial Partner Impacts. Increasing positive impacts
           reported by industrial,partners in areas such as:
           productivity; profitability; job retention/creation; product
           development; processes improvement; market share increases;
           patents generated; licenses granted; and royalty income.
      While the above shows actual program measurements to evaluate
 program performance, a number of other activities are taking place in
 the Department to measure the output of DOE's technology transfer
 programs. The Secretary has established an inter-program group to
 establish a process to measure the output of the broad range of DOE
 technology transfer activities. A program has been developed and will
 be implemented to collect technology transfer output and impacts data
 from all of the Departments technology transfer programs.
                           TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FUNDS
      Mr. Bevill. How do you ensure that these funds are not used to
 fund projects which have been turned down by other DOE program
 organizations?
      Dr. Reis. Defense Programs has implemented a process to ensure
 that projects which have been turned down by other DOE program
 organizations are not funded. This process is implemented prior to the
 actual selection of the project for funding. While the technical review
 of the projects are being performed, the Office of Economic
 Competitiveness assembles a review panel comprised of representatives
 of other program offices. This includes representatives from Energy and
 Efficiency, Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, Energy
 Research, Nuclear Energy, and Fossil Energy. This review panel
 evaluates the projects to determine whether the project was rejected by
 that program office, or-complements or overlaps similar projects
 currently being funded. This not only enables us to evaluate whether a
 project has technical merit, but also allows us to coordinate the
 project with other program offices where it makes sense.
                      TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER SUCCESS
      Mr. Bevill. How would you characterize the success of this program
 to date, and what lessons have been learned to improve future
 partnerships?
      Dr. Reis. The program has been very successful to date in benefits
 accrued to both the private sector and the weapons complex. Over 200
 dual benefit projects have been funded since this program began in FY
 1990. During FY 1993, the National Security Economic Competitiveness
 Program (NSECP) funded 88 new projects with a total cost sharing of
 about $200 million. During FY 1994, the NSECP is using $218 million to
 fund projects in Major Programs which include the American Textile
 Industry Partnership, National Center for Manufacturing Sciences,
 USCAR, SEMATEC and lithography, as well as partnerships with industry
 at DP laboratories and facilities in the form of  CRADAs, and other
 technology transfer mechanisms. New Deployment User Facilities also
 have recently been implemented including one at the Sandia National
 Laboratory (Electronics Quality and Reliability Center) and one at the
 Mound, Plant (Manufacturing Technology Deployment Center). These
 centers will facilitate access by outside industry to available
 technologies through the use of pre-approved user facility agreements
 that can be implemented in days rather than months. A user facility
 program previously approved by Defense Programs at the Y-12 facility
 has allowed for assistance to over 700 small business and academia in
 the past year of operation.
      The following are examples of issues that have been addressed to
 improve future partnerships. In the past, misunderstandings have arisen
 between the Department of Energy, the laboratories, and our industrial
 partners because issues regarding the technical, funding, and
 conditions of the agreement had not been addressed early in the
 process. Presently, great emphasis is being given to up-front
 discussions with industry to allow for potential problems to be
 identified and resolved early.
      We have also learned that our partnership agreements will have
 greatest leverage on U.S. competitiveness and more benefits to the
 weapons complex if they are focused on specific technological areas.
 Defense Programs will be targeting specific technical areas via focused
 calls that will enhance the core competencies and technological
 infrastructure necessary to meet the DOE National Security mission, and
 will also advance industrial competitiveness- and economic security
 through satisfying industry needs identified in industry specific
 technology "road maps". A number of industrial advisory boards have
 been created to provide an industrial focus to the technology transfer
 program.
      Another lesson learned has been that in many instances industry
 does not distinguish between governmental agencies. They see the
 federal government as a single entity. Consequently, better ties are
 needed between similar programs within the federal government. To meet
 this need, numerous joint partnerships with the Departments of Defense,
 Energy and Commerce have been formed. An example of this is the
 National Machine Tools Partnership which combines the Machine Tool
 expertise of the Department of Energy with the manufacturing extension
 capabilities of the Department of Commerce to reach out to those
 business needing &his type of assistance.   I have provided for the
 record a number of more specific examples of technology transfer
 program  successes. (The information follows:)
          EXAMPLES OF RECENT DP TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAM SUCCESSES
 o    During September 1993 approximately $5 million worth of technology
      transfer projects from the Defense Programs weapons and materials
      production facilities were approved. These twenty-two projects
      from the Mound, Pinellas, Rocky Flats, Pantex, Nevada Test Site,
      Kansas City Plant, and the Savannah River Site were selected from
      51 submitted proposals.
 o    Defense Programs provided $12 million to support activities
      that develop non-defense uses for the sites, technologies, and
      workforces at Mound, Rocky Flats, and Pinellas production
      facilities to help mitigate the effects of phasing out the weapons
      missions. The funding was used to assist the community through
      technology-based activities to promote local economic development,
      with the goal to make new, innovative use of facilities,
      equipment, employee skills, or deploy technologies to the local
      area that create new commercial products, processes, or services.
 o    The weapons laboratories have implemented a program to provide
      technical assistance to the machine tool industry under the
      National Machine Tool Initiative. The objectives are to enhance
      the research and development efforts and technical capabilities of
      the machine tool industry. During FY 1993, approximately 900
      companies made inquiries and approximately 500 projects were
      initiated to provide technical assistance.
 o    An improved machining system which can cut hard-to-machine
      materials to new levels of accuracy and precision has been
      developed through a CRADA between the Lawrence Livermore National
      Laboratory and a small business, Industrial Tools Inc. The system
      can be used to slice materials such as ceramics, carbides, glass,
      and plastics twice as accurately as the company's earlier
      machining system. Manufacturers of computer disk drives will be
      able to use the machine to more accurately manufacture disk-drive
      heads made from carbide materials. The technology can also be used
      by the U.S. semiconductor industry for slicing silicon wafers and
      has applications in the defense and aerospace industries as well
      as the medical equipment field.  Industrial Tools Incorporated has
      forecast about $25 million in revenue over the next five years
      from the improved machining system. Six systems have already been
      sold to computer disk-drive makers.
 o    Sandia National Laboratories and Rockwell International
      Corporation have collaborated on a CRADA to develop sensor-based
      controls to address methods of precisely locating workpiece
      features in small lot manufacturing. The Rocketdyne Division of
      Rockwell manufactures Delta rocket booster engines consisting of
      hundreds of brazed tubes. Automation of the brazing process is
      being developed. A non-contact sensor has been developed and
      combined with software control algorithms to produce a successful
      control solution to problems associated with the brazing process.
      The automated process combines the precise motion control of a
      robot with precision braze dispensing equipment. Based on the
      success of the sensor and control system, Rocketdyne will begin to
      move this technology to the production floor in FY 1994. Work is
      underway to locate a commercial supplier to produce the sensor.
      A patent application was filed in March 1993.
 o    Martin Marietta Energy Systems Y-12 Plant, in collaboration with
      Coors Ceramics Company, Caterpillar, Diacraft Corporation and
      Landis Corporation continued work to provide improved
      manufacturing methods, precision inspection techniques, and
      materials characterization for ceramic materials used in a variety
      of applications, particularly for internal combustion engine
      components. Improved machining and inspection techniques and
      improved substrate manufacturing processes have been developed and
      incorporated into the existing production processes.
 o    The DOE's Defense Programs and Allied Signal Corporation, Kansas
      City Division, have cooperated on a Regional Technology Outreach
      Development Program for small and medium-sized businesses. The
      program, which is designed to provide technical assistance to
      businesses in Kansas City and surrounding regions, helped more
      than 400 companies in FY,1993. A similar program with Martin
      Marietta Energy Systems Y-12 Plant has provided technical
      assistance to small and medium-sized businesses throughout
      Tennessee and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) region. Another
      agreement has been signed with the state of Florida which will
      provide technical assistance throughout that state in the near
      future.
 o    Federal law mandates the reduction of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and
      other pollutants caused by automobile exhaust. The National
      Laboratories at Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and Los Alamos
      together with Martin Marietta Energy Systems Y-12 Plant are
      participating in a maj,or effort to help GM, Chrysler, and Ford
      solve the "lean-burn" catalyst problem. Catalysts could easily be
      developed using very expensive metals which are resistant to
      corrosion, but the cost would be prohibitive. Technologies are
      being developed to make catalysts effective and rugged yet also
      affordable. Currently, both the materials and processes used to
      manufacture the final products are being studied.
 o    The weapons laboratories in partnership with industry are
      developing advanced lithography technology that will leapfrog
      foreign competition to help the U.S. recapture the integrated
      circuit (IC) production market. The program goals are to develop a
      compact, cost-effective soft x-ray (140 angstrom wavelength)
      projection lithography technology that is readily compatible with
      existing IC production systems. Soft x-ray lithography will extend
      the fabrication of IC feature sizes to less than 0.1 millionth of
      a meter. Decreasing IC feature size significantly increases the
      computing power of microprocessors and memory capacity of
      solid-state memories such as DRAMS. In Defense Programs'
      lithography program, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
      Sandia National Laboratories, and Los Alamos National Laboratory
      are teamed with a host of industrial partners -- AT&T, Grumman,
      Ultratech Stepper, KLA, Tropel, Intel, AMD, Micrion, and Jamar --
      representing the wide range of technologies needed to successfully
      develop and establish a premier x-ray projection lithography
      capability in the United States.
 o    The National Laboratories of DOE's Defense Programs, in
      partnership with industry, are developing advanced flat panel
      display (FPD) technology that will outpace foreign competition to
      help the U.S. gain a competitive position in the international
      flat panel display market. Projects at Lawrence Livermore National
      Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Los Alamos National
      Laboratory are addressing field emission, plasma, and
      electroluminescent display technologies and the associated
      manufacturing processes. Facilities and expertise resident in the
      laboratories provide indepth computer modeling, materials
      processes, and analysis capabilities that enable industry to
      proceed toward commercialization of FPD technologies at greatly
      reduced technical risk. Defense Programs' FPD program will be
      expanded in FY 1994 to include a greater segment of the industry
      and contribute more aggressively in the development of advanced
      phosphor and electroluminescent materials.
 o    To help meet the critical challenges facing the electronics
      industry, the Defense Programs' National Laboratories are working
      with industry to maintain, and in some areas to regain, a
      competitive U.S. position in the international electronics market.
      Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National
      Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Y-12
      Production Facility at Oak Ridge are working with industry in
      small feature size (less than 0.25 micrometer) integrated circuit
      fabrication processes and materials, high density
      interconnections, contamination-free manufacturing, modeling of
      semiconductor physics and manufacturing methods, and advanced
      opto-electronics technology. A key element of the Defense
      Programs' project is a joint program with SEMATECH. Defense
      Programs' activities in microelectronics and photonics are
      responsive to an Industry Advisory Board and adhere to the
      Semiconductor Industry Association and the Optoelectronics
      Industry Development Association (OIDA) Industry Roadmaps.
      Defense Programs coordinates with other government electronics
      programs, primarily the Advanced Research Project Agency
      and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, to ensure
      that its effort is well coordinated with the government's overall
      role in maintaining a strong U.S. position in microelectronics and
      photonics.
 o    Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos,, Sandia National Laboratories
      and the Martin Marietta Energy Systems Y-12 Plant have been
      working on an initiative to develop information technology
      critical to the National Information Infrastructure (NII).
      This,initiative consolidated ongoing technology transfer work that
      supports the NII and has also started work with the gas and oil
      industrial sector. The intent is to develop information
      technologies for the gas and oil industry that will be useful to
      other industrial sectors such as manufacturing, health care and
      financial services. The gas and oil NII initiative has established
      a testbed working on seven information technologies: networking,
      data security, visualization, mass data storage, computer
      input/output, distributed computing and collaborative tools. The
      first application to be used on the testbed will be the
      development of a synthetic, three-dimensional seismic data set
      usable across a network. Key facets of the project were
      demonstrated at the Supercomputer 1993 Conference. Industrial
      partners include Amoco, Schlumberger and the Society of
      Exploration Geophysicists.
 o    A collaboration between Sandia National Laboratories and a small
      business, BIOSYM Technologies, under the sponsorship of Defense
       Programs has developed a commercial software package to allow
      the molecular engineering of polymer alloys. This software models
      the molecular interaction of polymers thus providing accurate
      predictions of alloy performance. BIOSYM has released a
      preliminary version on the commercial software that won a 1992 R&D
      100 award.
 o    Los Alamos National Laboratory has established the Computational
      Testbed for Industry (CTI), a DOE user facility thai provides
      U.S. industry with convenient access to the world-class
      computational capabilities of the laboratory. The CTI allows
      industry and national laboratory interests to support one another
      in many disciplines such as applied mathematics, atomic and
      nuclear physics, seismology, fluid dynamics, and materials and
      structures, among others. A number of industrial partners have
      already signed agreements to use the CTI including Dow Chemical,
      Schlumberger, and BIOSYM.
 o    Sandia, Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories
      as well as the Y-12 Plant under the sponsorship of Defense
      Programs, are working on the development of technologies of the
      gigabit networks. One such activity recently installed desktop
      video teleconferencing capabilities at several AT&T XUNET sites.
      Desktop video teleconferencing utilizes Sandia National
      Laboratories' Distributed Audio Video Environment (DAVE). This
      environment allows video teleconferencing to be set up in a manner
      similar to installing a home stereo system by combining a variety
      of modules.
 o    Two major thrust areas were identified for the application of
      advanced materials to benefit both the Defense Programs' weapons
      research, development and test program, and key industrial
      sectors. A series of integrated CRADAs between the Martin Marietta
      Energy Systems Y-12 Plant, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and
      Sandia National Laboratories and the automobile industry were
      initiated to develop lightweight materials for automotive
      applications. A second series of CRADAs is being negotiated with
      aircraft engine manufacturers for the development and
      implementation of advanced materials for the aerospace industry.
      Based on the acknowledged expertise of the Defense Programs'
      national laboratories in metal alloy design, development and
      processing, several other CRADAs are under way in modeling and
      development of process control systems for metal forming, joining,
      heat-treating, and processing for primary and specialty metals.
 o    The Specialty Metals Processing Consortium continued another
      successful year of collaboration with the Sandia National
      Laboratories, conducting R&D at the Liquid Metal Processing
      Laboratory to improve process control technology for the melting
      processes for important defense- related metals such as titanium
      and nickel alloys. Using onboard computers and analytical
      equipment in a specially modified truck, formerly used to
      transport weapons, Sandia researchers also visited consortium
      members to gather research data to assist productivity
      improvements at member-owned production facilities.
 o    Sandia National Laboratories has been collaborating with a major
      U.S. manufacturer on an intelligent processing system to control
      distortion in thin-section welded assemblies. The system
      integrates material response and thermo-mechanical models,
      advanced sensors and image processing technology, and on-line
      controls to predict and provide real-time control for weld
      quality. Sandia also collaborated with a specialty metals producer
      to develop and test a commercially appropriate welding technology
      for advanced borated stainless steels used in structural
      applications. Although the technical objectives for the first
      phase of this CRADA were successfully accomplished, the industrial
      partner made a business-based decision not to commercialize this
      class of alloys. Despite the early termination, the
      accomplishments will be valuable to the weapons R&D program in the
      development of a welding process for advanced particulate-loaded
      metals.
 o    Through a CRADA with a U.S. manufacturer of electronic
      instrumentation and communication systems, the Los Alamos National
      Laboratory used unique materials characterization capabilities to
      perform low- temperature heat capacity measurements to assist the
      development of an advanced cryocooler. The success of this effort
      will contribute to advances in communications systems and
      instrumentation being pursued through other CRADAs with Defense
      Programs' laboratories. The CRADA also resulted in the transfer of
      materials measurement techniques to the graduate engineering
      department of a major university. Los Alamos also assisted a small
      manufacturer in the development an automated pulsed laser
      deposition system with superior processing performance and
      reproducibility. The system will provide the capability for
      thin-film deposition applicable to many advanced materials used in
      microelectronics devices.
 o    The Defense Programs Small Business Initiative (SBI) involves
      Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory,
      Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Y-12 Plant at Oak
      Ridge and focuses on the manufacturing and advanced-technology
      development segments of the small business community. For Fiscal
      Year 1993, the SBI was funded at $8 million.
      The SBI consists of the following four basic but interrelated
      program elements:
      -Technical Assistance
      While Technical Assistance can take a variety of forms, typically
      the DOE facilities respond to specific needs of small businesses
      by providing technical consultation, technical information, and/or
      access to specialized or unique facilities for evaluation of
      new processes or equipment. Technical Assistance may be provided
      by a one-on-one relationship with a small business, via a small
      business association or consortium, or through the use of an
      intermediary whose purpose is to assist with the technology
      transfer process. Technical assistance efforts expend less than
      $5K in DOE funds per request.
      -Partnership Agreements
      When requests for technical assistance from small businesses
      exceed the constraints of short-term assistance, it may be
      beneficial for the small business firm to enter into a
      collaborative Partnership Agreement with the DOE facility. These
      agreements can serve a variety of purposes and can include
      cooperative research and development agreements (CRADA),
      technology licensing, longer-term technical assistance, and user
      facility agreements. Partnership Agreements are limited to less
      than $50 K in DOE funding per agreement.
      -Relationships with Intermediaries
      Intermediaries can be organizations, such as state and local
      government, universities and community colleges, not-for-profit-
      economic development organizations, small business development
      centers, and business incubators. These intermediaries facilitate
      the process of transferring technology to small businesses by
      providing outreach to and needs-identification for small
      businesses. They link the small businesses and the DOE facilities
      by pre-qualifying requests for technical assistance and
      partnerships, forecasting and analyzing the requirements of small
      businesses and providing periodic feedback and evaluation of the
      effectiveness of program results and opportunities
      for,improvement. Less than 10 percent of the total program dollars
      shall be used for intermediary relationships.
      -Facility Utilization
      Facilities and equipment at the DOE locations involved in the SBI
      represent significant resources that can be utilized by small
      businesses for hands-on training to acquire special skills, for
      building one-of-a-kind prototype products, or for use in
      developing a special or unique technology or process that will
      help improve their economic competitiveness and survival. This
      component of the SBI encourages the establishment of such
      facilities by identifying existing infrastructure that could have
      commercial benefit.
                           PERCENTAGES OF FUNDS USED
      Mr. Bevill. What percentage of the funds in FY 1994 and FY 1995
 are used to fund mortgages and what percentage for new projects?
      Dr. Reis. The percentage of the FY 1994 funds estimated to be
 used for mortgages is 65 percent. The percentage used for new projects
 is 35 percent. The majority of the new project funds have been
 committed to an area such as National Machine Tool Initiative, Small
 Business, or Lithography.
 The percentage of the FY 1995 funds estimated to be used for mortgages
 is 80 percent. The percentage to be used for new projects is 20
 percent, all of which have been committed to an area such as National
 Machine Tool Initiative, Small Business, or Lithography.
               LABORATORY-DIRECTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (LDRD)
      Mr. Bevill. What amounts are included for the discretionary
 funding of the laboratory directors for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995?
 By laboratory, please provide the amount of funding provided and the
 percentage of total funding allowed for discretionary purpose.
      Dr. Reis. The amounts and percentages of funding for LDRD by each
 laboratory are shown in a table which I would like to insert for the
 record. (The information follows:)
                            FY 1993          FY 1994         FY 1995
 Lawrence Livermore       $58.5M (5.9%)    $52.7M (6.0%)  $52.2M (6.0%)
 Los Alamos               $63.4M (6.0%)    $62.0M (6.0%)  $60.0M (6.0%)
 Sandia                   $50.7M (4.0%)    $62.0M (4.7%)  $75.0M (5.6%)
           LABORATORY-DIRECTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (LDRD)
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a complete listing by laboratory of
 each task or project funded from the discretionary accounts for FY 1993
 and FY 1994 and the amount provided for each task. (Examples are not
 acceptable. It must be a complete listing.)
      Dr. Reis: Listings of LDRD projects giving project title and
 amount of funding for each of the laboratories for FY 1993 and FY 1994
 are attached. (The information follows:)
 ****The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Charts are attached to
                    RATIONALE FOR USING LABORATORY FUNDING
      Mr. Bevill. Please explain the rationale for using laboratory
 discretionary funding to fund work with Russian scientists.
      Dr. Reis. Of approximately 600 LDRD projects being conducted by
 the three laboratories, three involve-some work with Former Soviet
 Union (FSU) scientists. The projects are selected because of their
 value to the laboratory with no special consideration given to FSU
 involvement. When LDRD work involves the FSU it is because of unique
 capabilities that exist there, and such work is in the best technical
 interest of the laboratories. Lawrence Livermore has one LDRD project
 that involves collecting data on the Chernobyl disaster for study of
 iodine dosimetry. Los Alamos has two LDRD projects involving evaluation
 of advanced Russian technology: one in the area of high magnetic
 field/high energy density physics-for possible weapons application and
 another in accelerator-based conversion of plutonium. Sandia has no
 LDRD projects involving FSU scientists.
                             EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe all defense programs considered to
 be "emergency response or operations" including the location, number
 of FTES, and funding for each activity in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY
 1995.
      Dr. Reis. Emergency response activities that are funded by Defense
 Programs are consolidated under the Office of the Deputy Assistant
 Secretary for Military Application, Office of Emergency Response. The
 Emergency Response Program is composed of seven emergency response
 assets, representing the principal United States capability to respond
 to a nuclear weapon or civilian radiological accidents or incidents and
 are the technical teams which would be deployed to the incident site
 within the United States or worldwide. Staffing, location, and funding
 requirements for each of the emergency response assets is somewhat
 different than for other programs within Defense Programs. While each
 of the emergency response assets have a dedicated number  of FTES, the
 majority of scientific and technical personnel who staff the assets are
 volunteers from the weapons complex, having extensive expertise derived
 from their full-time positions as weapon physicists, engineers, and
 technical support staff.  Although day-to-day oversight of the
 deployable assets is conducted by our field offices, personnel and
 equipment are located at sites throughout the weapon complex, mostly at
 Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories.
         Consolidated Emergency Response Program Funding and FTES
                            FY 1993        FY 1994          FY 1995
                                    (Dollars in Millions)
 R&D FUNDING                $ 38.6         $ 51.5           $ 52.6
 Lab FTEs                     100            118              140
 STOCKPILE SUPPORT
 Emergency Response         $  9.1         $ 11.8           $ 13.4
 Emergency Operations          8.9            8.8              5.6
     Total                 $  18.0         $ 20.6           $ 19.0
     FTEs                      142            107               84
      *    Includes requirements associated with the planning,
 coordination, implementation, and conduct of the Emergency Response
 Program activities to include: the Accident Response Group,
 Radiological Assistance Program, and Radiation Emergency Assistance
 Center/Training Site.
 Accident Response Group
      The Accident Response Group (ARG) is the Department's main
 response to accidents or incidents involving United States nuclear
 weapons or components in a peacetime environment. The ARG is composed
 of weapons program scientists, engineers, and technicians, along with
 specialized equipment derived from the weapons complex. The ARG is
 responsible for advising the on- scene commander concerning weapon
 status, safety, stability, Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) and
 shipment, if necessary. The ARG might also be requested to assist a
 foreign nation in response to accidents/incidents involving their
 nuclear weapons or components.
      Field Program Management for ARG is performed by the Albuquerque
 Operations Office.
                                STOCKPILE SUPPORT
                             ACCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP
                                 FUNDING SUMMARY
                              (Dollars in Millions)
                       FY 1993     FY 1994     FY 1995
                        $ 6.6       $ 8.8       $ 10.0
 Aerial Measuring Systems
      The Aerial Measuring Systems (AMS) is composed of scientists,
 engineers and other technical personnel, along with unique equipment
 which collectively provide an aerial radiological survey and search
 capability for responding to radiological emergencies, and is also used
 to monitor the environment at Department of Energy and other Federal
 and commercial sites. Aerial radiological surveys are performed with
 large arrays of sodium iodide detectors linked to a geo-referenced,
 time-resolved, gamma spectrometry mounted on fixed- or rotary-wing
 aircraft. Specially designed air sampling and monitoring equipment
 incorporated onto AMS fixed-wing aircraft provide airborne air sampling
 and cloud tracking capabilities, which can detect and collect samples
 of airborne radioactive gas and particulates as a result of a release.
 AMS aircraft are maintained on emergency standby basis at both Nellis
 Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada and Andrews AFB, Maryland. Research and
 development activities are conducted at the Department's Remote Sensing
 Laboratory, Nellis AFB, and the Special Technologies Laboratory in
 Santa Barbara, California.
      Field Program Management for AMS is performed by the Nevada
 Operations Office.
                            RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
                            AERIAL MEASURING SYSTEMS
                                 FUNDING SUMMARY
                              (Dollars in Millions)
                      FY 1993          FY 1994          FY 1995
                       $ 8.9            $ 9.0            $ 8.8
 Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability
      The Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) is a
 centralized computer-based prediction system located at Lawrence
 Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California. It provides
 estimates of transport, diffusion, and deposition of radioactive
 material released into the atmosphere and associated dose projections.
 This predictive capability is based upon meteorological, topographical,
 and source-term data providing plume and footprint deposition
 information. In addition to DOE sites, ARAC is used by the Department
 of Defense at weapons storage locations worldwide and Naval nuclear
 reactor facilities. It is available to support emergency response
 requirements of DOE's NEST, ARG, and RAP assets and to support other
 Federal agencies or foreign governments for radiological emergencies.
      Field Program Management for ARAC is performed by the Oakland
 Operations Office.
                            RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
                     ATMOSPHERIC RELEASE ADVISORY CAPABILITY
                                 FUNDING SUMMARY
                              (Dollars in Millions)
  
                            FY 1993    FY 1994    FY 1995
                             $ 2.4      $ 8.5,     $ 7.4
 Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
      To meet responsibilities for radiological monitoring and
 assessment as set forth in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response
 Plan, the Department of Energy is responsible for establishing and
 managing the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
 (FRMAC). The FRMAC is an operational center at or near the scene of a
 radiological incident, which provides a focal point for coordination
 and compilation of all offsite Federal radiological monitoring and
 assessment activities. All Federal, State, and local agencies concerned
 with the radiologic incident are represented in the Center. Information
 related to offsite radiological risks resulting from
 accidents/incidents is consolidated and analyzed in the FRMAC. This
 information is made available to the lead Federal agency, State, and/or
 local official(s) to aid in formulating policy decisions and for
 taking appropriate protective actions.
      Field Program Management for FRMAC is performed by the Nevada
 Operations Office.
                             RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
              FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT CENTER
                                  FUNDING SUMMARY
                               (Dollars in Millions)
                       FY 1993          FY 1994          FY 1995
                       $ 1.5            $ 1.0            $ 1.1
 Nuclear Emergency Search Team
      The Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) is a group of diverse
 and specially trained engineers, scientists, and technicians from the
 weapons complex, along with specialized equipment providing technical
 assistance in response to a malevolent nuclear threat. NEST provides
 the Department with the unique capability to assess communicated
 nuclear threats and to counter any attempts by terrorists or
 extortionists to achieve their objectives by utilization of stolen
 nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, or radioactive dispersal
 devices. Within the United States and its territories, the Federal
 Bureau of Investigation has primary responsibility for such incidents.
 In the event of deployment to a foreign country, the Department.of
 State would be the lead Federal agency for the United States. NEST
 assets are  located primarily at the Department's facility at Nellis
 AFB, Nevada, with a smaller initial response/advanced party capability
 located at Andrews AFB, Maryland.
      Field Program Management for NEST is performed by the Nevada
 Operations Office.
                            RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
                          NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM
                                 FUNDING SUMMARY
                              (Dollars in Millions)
                         FY 1993     FY 1994     FY 1995
                         $ 25.8      $ 33.0      $ 35.3
 Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
      The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS)
 provides direct or consultative assistance with medical and health
 physics support following radiation accidents. REAC/TS provides DOE
 with a core capability for handling the medical aspects of radiation
 accident/incident response, training of professional and technical
 personnel in related specialty areas, and in resolving medical-legal
 issues relating to alleged radiation exposure and subsequent health
 issues. REAC/TS is designated by World Health Organization as the World
 Collaboration Center for Radiation Accident Management. A comprehensive
 medical assistance/treatment course for accidents involving radiation,
 which is sponsored by DOE, is offered at the training site in Oak
 Ridge, Tennessee, and is open to all government agencies as well as the
 private sector.
      Field Program Management for REAC/TS is performed by the Oak
 Ridge Operations Office.
  
                                STOCKPILE SUPPORT
              RADIATION EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE CENTER/TRAINING SITE
                                 FUNDING SUMMARY
                              (Dollars in Millions)
                           FY 1993      FY 1994     FY 1995
                            $ 0.7        $ 0.7       $ 0.7
 Radiological Assistance Program
      The DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) provides a Federal
 emergency radiological response capability at the local level. Eight
 RAP regions provide initial "first responder" assistance, as they are
 located at DOE field or area offices, providing regional coordination
 and serving as the point of contact for providing the initial DOE
 response. RAP teams are usually staffed with certified health
 physicists and registered radiation protection technicians, providing
 an excellent resource to assist state, local, and tribal governments
 with expert advice and support for accidents involving radioactive
 materials. A RAP Team's assistance is scenario-dependent and consists
 typically of the ability to conduct localized searches with hand-held
 instruments to identify nature and extent of local contamination and to
 provide non-clinical advice on health affect
 of radiation.
        Field Program Management for the RAP is performed by
 geographical regions: Brookhaven Area Office (Region 1); Oak Ridge
 Operations Office (Region II); Savannah River Operations Office (Region
 III);,Albuquerque Operations Office (Region IV); Chicago Operations
 Office (Region V); Idaho Operations Office (Region VI); Oakland
 Operations Office (Region VII); and Richland Operations Office (Region
 VIII).
                                STOCKPILE SUPPORT
                         RADIOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
                                 FUNDING SUMMARY
                              (Dollars in Millions)
                        FY 1993         FY 1994         FY 1995
                         $ 1.8           $ 2.3           $ 2.7
                                  STOCKPILE SUPPORT
                                   FUNDING SUMMARY
                                (Dollars in Millions)
                                 FY 1993        FY 1994        FY 1995
 Field (Emergency
   Operations Center)             $ 8.4          $ 8.3          $ 5.1
 Field Emergency Preparedness       0.5            0.5            0.5
      The funding includes the Space Nuclear Power and Emergency
 Operations Center activities in support of Emergency Operations and
 continuity of Government activities reflected in the Stockpile Support
 Emergency Operations budget.
                                EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
      Mr. Bevill: What emergencies did NEST respond to in the past three
 years?
      Dr. Reis. Over the past 3 years, there has been one Nuclear
 Emergency Search Team (NEST) deployment in response to a suspected
 sophisticated improvised explosive device, in Sparks, Nevada. While
 this device had no nuclear component associated with it, DOE assisted
 the FBI and local authorities in characterizing the extortion threat,
 utilizing its technical capability to determine that the threat was
 indeed a hoax. In addition to the one deployment in August 1993, NEST
 has conducted seven threat assessments over the past three calendar
 years to alleged nuclear or radiation dispersal devices and
 participated regularly in exercises, in addition to its training and
 readiness requirements.
                             EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
      Mr. Bevill. How are these programs coordinated with the Office
 of Emergency Management?
      Dr. Reis. The "Emergency Management" activities funded under
 Atomic Energy Defense Activities maintain the Department's seven
 emergency response assets which include: the Accident Response Group;
 Aerial Measurement System; Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability;
 Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center; Radiation
 Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site; and eight Radiological
 Assistance Program Teams.
      These departmental assets represent the principal United States
 capability to deal with a nuclear weapon or civilian radiological
 accident or incident and are the teams which would be deployed to the
 incident site in the United States or worldwide. The physicists,
 engineers, and other technical personnel from the weapons complex
 constitute these all-volunteer teams. Because extensive expertise is
 derived from nuclear weapons technology, the organizational assignment
 is appropriate for Defense Programs.
      The other emergency management functions within the Department
 are the responsibility of the newly created Office of Nonproliferation
 and National Security, Office of Emergency Management, and are involved
 with certain aspects of all emergencies of concern to the Department.
 This organization operates the Headquarters Emergency Operations Center
 and ensures integration and compatibility of all Departmental emergency
 operations facilities.
      The management of Defense Programs' radiological response program
 is the responsibility of the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for
 Military Application and Stockpile Support. Coordination between
 Defense Programs and the Office of Nonproliferation and National
 Security takes place as required--primarily to assure the effective
 functioning of the operations centers to support radiological accidents
 or incidents.
                  GENERAL ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide by type of aircraft and location a
 table showing the inventory of aircraft funded by Atomic Energy Defense
 Activities appropriations. What additional purchases are planned in FY
 1994 and FY 1995.
      Dr. Reis. I would like to submit a table for the record which
 provides information regarding the type and location of aircraft funded
 by Atomic Energy Defense Activities. These aircraft are used for i
 number of missions, including hazardous materials transport, nuclear
 emergency response, and security patrol. The Department of Energy plans
 no aircraft purchases in fiscal year 1994 or fiscal year 1995 for
 Atomic Energy Defense Activities appropriations. (The information
 follows:)
             ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITY FUNDED AIRCRAFT
 AIRCRAFT TYPE                                  LOCATION
 DC-9 (N29AF)                              Albuquerque, New Mexico
 DC-9 (N66AF)                              Albuquerque, New Mexico
 DC-9 (N79SL)                              Albuquerque, New Mexico
 Lear 35A (Nl35DE)                         Albuquerque, New Mexico
 DHC-7 (N54026)                            Albuquerque, New Mexico
 B-200 (N7232R)                            Albuquerque, New Mexico
 DHC-6 (N35062)                            Albuquerque, New Mexico
 DHC-6 (N72348)                            Albuquerque, New Mexico
 DHC-6 (N229SA)                            Albuquerque, New Mexico
 F-27F (N768RL)                            Livermore, California
 CE-550 (N1OEG)                            Las Vegas, Nevada
 Convair 580 (N30EG)                       Las Vegas, Nevada
 BO-105 (N40EG)                            Suitland, Maryland
 BO-105 (N50EG)                            Las Vegas, Nevada
 BO-105 (N60EG)                            Las Vegas, Nevada
 BO-105 (N70EG)                            Las Vegas, Nevada
 BO-105 (N7EG)                             Las Vegas, Nevada
 B-200 (N654ID)                            Las Vegas, Nevada
 B-200  (Nl85XP)                           Las Vegas, Nevada
 MBB BK-117 (Nll6SR)                       Savannah River, Georgia
 MBB BK-117 (Nll7SR)                       Savannah River, Georgia
                     DEFENSE INDIRECT AND OVERHEAD EXPENSES
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing indirect and overhead
 expenses for this appropriation by activity and location for FY 1993,
 FY 1994 and FY 1995. Please show the components that comprise the
 indirect and overhead expense accounts and then provide the indirect
 and overhead expenses as a percent of the laboratory or site funding.
      Mrs. Smedley. Actual FY 1993 and projected FY 1994 and FY 1995
 overhead and organizational burden costs for this appropriation, shown
 by activity, location, and component, and as a percentage of total
 laboratory or site funding, are currently being submitted, collected,
 analyzed, and summarized. This information will be provided as soon as
 it is available.
                GENERAL ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
      Mr. Bevill. For each defense facility by appropriation account,
 please identify the amount of reimbursable work performed 1) for other
 Federal agencies and 2) other than Federal agencies in FY 1993, FY 1994
 and estimated for FY 1995.
      Dr. Reis. I would like to submit tables for the record which show
 the amount of reimbursable work performed for other Federal agencies
 and other than Federal agencies in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995 at
 the DOE defense facilities. (The information follows:)
                  REIMBURSABLE WORK PERFORMED - FEDERAL AGENCIES
                              Weapons Activities
                          (obligations in thousands)
                                         FY 1993    FY 1994     FY 1995
                                         Actual    Estimate    Estimate
 Amarillo Plant                         $ 1,625    $   501     $    831
 Ames Laboratory                            635        567          682
 Argonne National Laboratory             37,319     32,650       35,550
 Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory           4,622      5,200        5,200
 Brookhaven National Laboratory           4,142      6,938        6,882
 Idaho Natl Engineering Lab              34,827     51,550       63,550
 Kansas City Plant                        1,059      4,777       11,075
 Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory           5,900      7,000        7,000
 Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory            11,737     15,500       15,600
 Lawrence Livermore Laboratory          149,646    131,491       88,349
 Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory       137,510    138,280      144,140
 MMES-Oak Ridge Central                 269,679    198,142      171,616
 Mound Laboratory                         1,322        600          450
 National Renewable Energy Lab            1,633        313          313
 Nevada Test Site                       135,558    153,869      149,151
 Oak Ridge Institute for
 Science and Education                    6,198      3,193        3,061
 Pacific Northwest Laboratory            52,100     72,200       72,200
 Pinellas Plant                            (826)       878          255
 Rocky Flats Plant                            2      1,500        1,500
 Sandia Laboratories                    315,191    284,577      285,600
 Savannah River Laboratory                1,827      3,464        2,951
 TOTAL FEDERAL AGENCIES              $1,171,706 $1,113,190   $1,065,956
              REIMBURSABLE WORK PERFORMED - NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES
                            Weapons Activities
                        (obligations in thousands)
                                         FY 1993    FY 1994     FY 1995
                                         Actual     Estimate   Estimate
 Amarillo Plant                         $   155    $   100     $   100
 Idaho Natl Engineering Lab                 150        500         517
 Kansas City Plant                          205        550         550
 Lawrence Livermore Laboratory              495          0           0
 Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory         8,550     13,500      13,500
 Lovelace Biomed & Environmental
      Res Lab                               800          0           0
 MMES - Oak Ridge Central                     9        708         708
 Mound Laboratory                         1,000      2,000       2,000
 Nevada Test Site                        41,065     43,000      89,100
 Pinellas Plant                          12,000      6,100       5,100
 Rocky Flats Plant                        1,550        500         250
 Sandia Laboratories                     11,659     29,000      34,000
 TOTAL - NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES         $  77,638  $  95,958   $ 145,825
                    GENERAL ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing uncommitted obligations
 for each appropriation by program and location at the end of fiscal
 year 1992, 1993 and estimated for 1904.
      Dr. Reis. Prior to FY 1992, uncommitted operating expense
 obligations were not captured by the Department's accounting system.
 Beginning with the September 30, 1992 accounting reports, the
 Department now collects more definitive data on uncommitted obligations
 for the integrated management and operating (M&O) contractors by
 operating, capital, and construction funds. These reports are compiled
 three times a year; i.e., as of March 31, June 30, and September 30.
      I would like to submit tables for the record which provide
 uncommitted obligations for each appropriation at the end of fiscal
 year 1992 and fiscal year 1993. The Department has performed a thorough
 analysis of FY 1993 uncommitted obligations and significant portions
 have been applied to offset FY 1995 budget requirements or earmarked
 for proposed FY 1994 reprogrammings. While forecasted FY 1994 year end
 data is not available in this new reporting system, we are continuing
 to monitor the uncosted balances throughout the year and will do so
 again at year end to determine if uncommitted balances are sufficient
 to warrant further reductions. (The information follows:)
                       Uncommitted Obligations
                        (dollars in thousands)
                                                End of Year End of Year
 Appropriation Location       Program               FY 92        FY 93
 Weapons Activities
           Albuquerque    Research and Development $129,552    $102,483
                          Testing                     3,504         734
                          Stockpile Support         334,923     187,611
                          Program Direction           6,119      33,483
                          Other*                      1,234         828
                          TOTAL, AL                $475,332    $325,140
           Chicago        Research and Development     $142        $111
                          Testing                        56         313
                          Stockpile Support             523         793
                          Program Direction             241         705
                          TOTAL, CH                    $962      $1,923
           Idaho          Research and Development   $1,207        $978
                          Stockpile Support              92          18
                          Program Direction             995       1,250
                          TOTAL, ID                  $2,294      $2,245
  
           Nevada         Research and Development  $11,885      $3,558
                          Testing                    35,238      28,764
                          Program Direction           3,007       4,431
                          Other*                        588       1,460
                          TOTAL, NV                 $50,718     $38,213
           Oak Ridge      Research and Development   $7,279     $14,212
                          Stockpile Support         148,464      50,703
                          Program Direction           1,453       2,073
                          Other*                     (1,279)      1,856
                          TOTAL, 0R                $155,917     $68,844
  
           Richland       Research and Development     $148          $2
                          Stockpile Support             375         361
                          Program Direction              12         554
                          Other*                        231         262
                          TOTAL, RL                    $766      $1,179
           San Francisco  Research and Development  $96,984    $111,723
                          Testing                       220         454
                          Stockpile Support             240         256
                          Program Direction             793         984
                          Other*                          0         595
                          TOTAL, SF                 $98,237    $114,013
           Savannah River Research and Development       $0        $501
                          Stockpile Support          42,828      16,886
                          Program Direction             340       4,214
                          Other*                      1,365           0
                          TOTAL, SR                 $44,533     $21,601
 TOTAL, Weapons Activities                         $828,759    $573,156
 "Other" primarily includes interoffice reconciling transfers.
                          Uncommitted Obligations
                          (dollars in thousands)
                                               End of Year  End of Year
 Appropriation Location       Program              FY 92       FY 93
 New Production Reactor
           Albuquerque    NPR                          $739         $38
                          Other*                         98          11
                          TOTAL, AL                    $837         $49
           Chicago        NPR                          $830         $48
                          Other*                         66         740
                          TOTAL, CH                    $896        $788
           Idaho          NPR                       $13,711     $13,441
                          Other*                     (2,523)     (1,401)
                          TOTAL, ID                 $11,188     $12,039
           Oak Ridge      NPR                        $1,776        $173
                          Other*                      1,886       1,880
                          TOTAL, OR                  $3,662      $2,053
           Richland       NPR                        $1,959        $390
           San Francisco  NPR                          $107          $3
                          Other*                         22         920
                          TOTAL, OR                    $129         923
           Savannah River NPR                          $444      $1,170
                          Other*                          0          97
                          TOTAL, SR                    $444      $1,267
 TOTAL, New Production Reactor                      $19,115     $17,509
 * "Other" primarily includes interoffice reconciling transfers.
                        Uncommitted Obligations
                        (dollars in thousands)
                                               End of Year  End of Year
 Appropriation Location       Program             FY 92        FY 93
 Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management
      Albuquerque    Corrective Activities          $18,984     $23,359
                     Environmental Restoration       30,921      43,172
                     Waste Management                54,962      82,855
                     Technology Development           9,456      10,852
                     Transportation Management          278          17
                     Program Direction                   63          22
                     Facility Transition                  0       3,506
                     Other*                           1,275         (24)
                     TOTAL, AL                     $115,939    $163,758
      Chicago        Corrective Activities               $9          $0
                     Environmental Restoration        3,423       3,462
                     Waste Management                 8,274       8,229
                     Technology Development           5,223       4,070
                     Transportation Management          351          39
                     Program Direction                  302         378
                     Facility Transition                  0          29
                     TOTAL, CH                      $17,582     $16,207
      Idaho          Corrective Activities           $6,147      $2,042
                     Environmental Restoration       20,452       5,994
                     Waste Management               185,690     212,940
                     Technology Development           6,060       6,436
                     Transportation Management            3           3
                     Program Direction                    0          35
                     Facility Transition                  0         165
                     Other*                              34           0
                     TOTAL, ID                     $218,386    $227,615
      Nevada         Corrective Activities           $1,963        $188
                     Environmental Restoration        7,089         540
                     Waste Management                 3,735       2,677
                     Technology Development           1,303         773
                     Transportation Management            5          30
                     Other*                             218         566
                     TOTAL, NV                      $14,313      $4,775
      Oak Ridge      Corrective Activities           $7,525      $2,592
                     Environmental Restoration      147,059       6,449
                     Waste Management                48,513      42,604
                     Technology Development          15,847       9,932
                     Transportation Management          560         457
                     Program Direction                  283       1,746
                     Facility Transition                  0         616
                     Other*                          (2,069)          0
                     TOTAL, OR                     $217,718     $64,398
      Richland       Corrective Activities           $4,363      $3,563
                     Environmental Restoration        9,254      13,878
                     Waste Management               183,936     281,372
                     Technology Development          18,988      36,475
                     Transportation Management          537       1,157
                     Program Direction                  457         288
                     Facility Transition                  0         348
                     Other*                             247           0
                     TOTAL, RL                     $217,782    $337,082
      San Francisco  Corrective Activities           $6,746     $20,451
                     Environmental Restoration          754         322
                     Waste Management                 6,333      14,427
                     Technology Development             (65)      1,933
                     Facility Transition                  0          15
                     TOTAL, SF                      $13,768     $37,148
      Savannah River Corrective Activities           $8,888        $107
                     Environmental Restoration        7,675      12,575
                     Waste Management               146,643     122,429
                     Technology Development           6,352       6,852
                     Program Direction                   55          50
                     Facility Transition                  0         635
                     TOTAL, SR                     $169,613    $142,648
 TOTAL, Defense Environmental Restoration and
   Waste Mgmt.                                     $985,101    $993,631
 * "Other" primarily includes interoffice reconciling transfers.
                         Uncommitted Obligations
                         (dollars in thousands)
                                               End of Year  End of Year
 Appropriation Location       Program              FY 92       FY 93
 Materials Support and Other Defense Programs
      Albuquerque    Materials Support               $6,479      $3,891
                     Verification and Control Tech   12,945       7,499
                     Nuclear Safeguards & Security    1,061         390
                     Office of Intelligence           1,329       1,447
                     Education                          327         321
                     Nuclear Safety                       0          58
                     Other*                            (314)        117
                     TOTAL, AL                      $21,827     $13,723
      Chicago        Materials Support               $1,115      $1,491
                     Verification and Control Tech    1,635       5,453
                     Nuclear Safeguards & Security      680         337
                     Office of Intelligence             152          82
                     Education                          212         747
                     Nuclear Safety                       0         933
                     Other*                               88         89
                     TOTAL, CH                        $3,882     $9,132
      Idaho          Materials Support              $139,414    $37,209
                     Verification and Control Tech     2,490      2,399
                     Nuclear Safeguards & Security       196        166
                     Office of Intelligence              652        555
                     Naval Reactors                   13,249      9,316
                     Education                            67        227
                     Nuclear Safety                        0         41
                     Other*                            1,718        607
                     TOTAL, ID                      $157,786    $50,519
      Nevada         Materials Support                  $432         $7
                     Verification and Control Tech       988      2,716
                     Nuclear Safeguards & Security       107          9
                     Security Evaluation                 571         34
                     Office of Intelligence               55      1,090
                     Naval Reactors                        1          0
                     Other*                              (11)         0
                     TOTAL, NV                        $2,143     $3,856
      Oak Ridge      Materials Support               $46,158    $44,148
                     Verification and Control Tech     1,275      5,044
                     Nuclear Safeguards & Security       821      1,195
                     Security Evaluation                   4          0
                     Office of Intelligence              827      1,495
                     Naval Reactors                        2          6
                     Education                           551        982
                     Nuclear Safety                        0      1,676
                     Other*                           (1,520)       169
                     TOTAL, OR                       $48,118    $54,715
      Pittsburgh     Naval Reactors                  $26,306    $19,636
                     Other*                           (1,724)        $0
                     TOTAL, PITTSBURGH               $24,582    $19,636
      Richland       Materials Support                $8,161    $15,685
                     Verification and Control Tech     2,361      8,504
                     Nuclear Safeguards & Security       501        460
                     Security Evaluation               3,087        639
                     Office of Intelligence              384      1,428
                     Education                             0        395
                     Nuclear Safety                        0         37
                     Other*                              294          1
                     TOTAL, RL                        $14,788   $27,149
      San Francisco  Materials Support                   $361      $305
                     Verification and Control Tech      1,296     7,910
                     Nuclear Safeguards & Security        761       488
                     Security Evaluation                    7         2
                     Office of Intelligence               381       921
                     Naval Reactors                        14        19
                     Education                            340       295
                     Other*                                37         0
                     TOTAL, SF                         $3,197    $9,941
      Savannah River Materials Support               $315,150  $450,602
                     Verification and Control Tech         15       935
                     Nuclear Safeguards & Security          8        12
                     Office of Intelligence                87       116
                     Education                             97        27
                     Nuclear Safety                         0        15
                     Other*                             7,579       (82)
                     TOTAL, SR                       $322,936  $451,624
      Schenectady    Naval Reactors                   $27,969   $17,733
 TOTAL, Materials Support and Other Defense Programs $627 228  $658,029
 * "Other" primarily includes interoffice reconciling transfers.
  
                        USE OF PRIOR YEAR BALANCES
      Mr. Bevill: Provide a table showing the source of the prior year
 balances proposed to offset FY 1995 funding requirements.
      Dr. Reis: The prior year balances which are proposed to offset the
 FY 1995 funding requirements are shown in a table which I would like to
 insert for the record. (The information follows:)
                              DEFENSE PROGRAMS
                         USE OF PRIOR YEAR BALANCES
                            (Dollars in Thousands)
                                Offsets to FY 1995 Funding Requirements
 Research & Development
   Operating Expenses
     Core R&D                                           $ -27,840
     Technology Transfer                                  -12,549
     Inertial Fusion                                      - 3,300
   Capital Equipment                                      - 2,272
   Construction
     90-D-102, RD&T Revitalization, Phase III             - 2,028
 Testing
   Operating Expenses                                     -12,323
 Reconfiguration
   Operating Expenses                                     - 6,765
 Weapons Program Direction
   Operating Expenses                                     -10,000
 Total Weapons Activities                                 -77,077
 Materials Support:
   Operating Expenses                                    -158,500
   Capital Equipment                                     - 49,600
   Construction                                          - 61,000
 Total Materials Support                                 -269,100
 Total Defense Programs                                 $-346,177
            NUCLEAR MATERIALS REACTORS AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE
      Mr. Bevill: Please describe the status of each of the nuclear
 materials reactors at the Savannah River Site.
      Dr. Reis: I would like to summarize the status of the five
 nuclear materials production reactors at the Savannah River Site. The
 K-Reactor has been placed in a cold standby condition, with no planned
 provision for restart. Cold standby is a minimum cost, low maintenance
 condition which maintains systems important to public and worker health
 and safety, but does not maintain other systems. It is estimated that
 an attempt to restart K-Reactor at this point would take 4-5 years and
 would cost $300-$350 million per year which would be $1.2-$1.4 billion
 total. The P, L, C, and R Reactors have been placed in cold shutdown,
 with no capability for restart. The majority of activities at these
 reactors involve preparations to transfer these reactors to the DOE
 Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management for
 decontamination and decommissioning in FY 1994.
                           NUCLEAR MATERIALS SUPPORT
      Mr. Bevill. The existing inventory of tritium will support
 weapons stockpile requirements through what year? How many weapons does
 that assume in the stockpile?
      Dr. Reis. The current tritium supply is sufficient to meet all
 requirements (stockpile, reserves, sales, R&D, etc.) through Fiscal
 Year 2008. The tritium supply and demand calculations assume a stable,
 post-START II stockpile of     Deleted     weapons.
                      PU-238 MISSION AT SAVANNAH RIVER
      Mr. Bevill: Please describe the status of the Pu-238 mission at
 Savannah River. What is the total program cost of the Pu-238 program by
 year? How is the funding split by program and appropriation account?
      Dr. Reis: Phases I and III of the HB-Line facility and the Frames
 Waste portion of the H-Canyon facility are operating to process Pu-238
 for NASA's Cassini mission. This operation recovers scrap Pu-238 left
 from the manufacture of heat sources from previous missions, and
 processes it to make it suitable to be used in the manufacture of new
 heat sources. Processing for the Cassini mission is expected to
 continue until early CY 1995. The Department is conducting an
 environmental assessment in,preparation for continuing operations
 following the Cassini campaign to process 5 kilograms (kg) of Pu-238
 purchased from Russia (on hand now at Savannah River) and the remaining
 U.S. civilian inventory (approximately 35 kg). This post-Cassini
 campaign would last about 1 1/2 years and the material would be used to
 meet future NASA needs. Detailed outyear projections are not yet
 available but similar funding levels would be required to complete the
 Pu-238 processing in FY 1996 and to support cleanout and
 decontamination and dismantlement activities through the late 1990s.
 The funding split by program and appropriation account is shown in a
 table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information
 follows:)
                          PU-238 MISSION AT SAVANNAH RIVER
                                   FUNDING SUMMARY
                                (Dollars in Millions)
                                          FY 1994           FY 1995
 Atomic Energy Defense Activities,
 Defense Programs                          $ 19.7            $ 20.6
 Energy Supply Research and Development
 Nuclear Energy                            $ 12.8            $ 11.8
 Total                                     $ 32.5            $ 32.4
                              Pu-238 REQUIREMENTS
      Mr. Bevill. Please identify total Pu-238 requirements by year and
 customer through the foreseeable future and the available inventory
 of material. Will any material be purchased from Russia to meet NASA
 needs?
      Dr. Reis. Mission requirements through the year 2000 are estimated
 to be 53.5 kgs. for flight units. An additional 24 kgs. is also
 required to cover fuel fabrication pipeline requirements, safety test
 units, processing losses, and annual decay to support fabrication of
 the flight units. Most of this additional material is recycled and used
 in subsequent program operations. These Pu-238 requirements are based
 upon NASA's most recent projection of potential missions as provided to
 DOE in 1993. The missions identified include: Cassini, Pluto Flyby, and
 Mars Environmental Survey Network.
      The Pu-238 inventory available for use to support these mission
 requirements total 68 kgs. This includes 4.9 kgs. recently received
 from Russia under our contract with the Mayak Production Association.
      This foreign source of Pu-238 was arranged since requirements
 exceed available inventory. It permits the purchase of up to 40 kg of
 Pu-238, the first 4.9 kg. of which was delivered in February 1994. DOE
 has the option to order Pu-238 in 5 kg. increments subject to
 availability of funds and need for material. The purchased material
 supplements the available U.S. inventory of fuel and will also be used
 to blend up the assay value (concentration of Pu- 238) to levels
 specified as necessary for the proper functioning of radioisotope
 thermoelectric generators.
  
                        DEFENSE PROGRAMS HEALTH STUDIES
      Mr. Bevill: What health studies and associated funding are
 included in this request, but are managed by the Office of Environment,
 Safety and Health?
      Dr. Reis: The health studies managed by the Office of Environment,
 Safety and Health but funded in the Defense Programs budget request
 include $6,100,000 for Marshall Islands resettlement activities, and a
 total of $2,888,000 for dose reconstruction activities. These dote
 reconstruction efforts are comprised of $200,000 for the Nevada Test
 Site; $1,000,000 for the Rocky Flats and $560,000 for the Oak Ridge
 Y-12 Plant's enhanced medical surveillance for chronic beryllium
 disease effort; and $1,128,000 for a State agreement with Colorado for
 dose reconstruction, toxicological review, and possible epidemiological
 studies. The Weapons Activities Appropriation Account provides the
 funding for these activities.
                    MATERIALS PRODUCTION SITES - EMPLOYMENT
      Mr. Bevill: Please provide the employment levels at all Materials
 Production sites in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995.
      Dr. Reis: The employment levels funded by the Materials Support
 program for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995 are shown in a table which I
 would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
       CONTRACTOR EMPLOYMENT FOR SITES FUNDED BY MATERIALS SUPPORT
 SITE                           FY 1993      FY 1994       FY 1995
 Idaho                             922           50            50
 LANL                               63           60            60
 Oak Ridge (Includes Y-12)         144          130           120
 Richland                          398          380           380
 Savannah River                 11,230       10,030         8,590
 All Other                          39           40            30
 Total Materials Support        12,796       10,690         9,230
 The FY 1994 and FY 1995 columns reflect end-of-year estimates rounded
 to the nearest multiple of ten.
                   SAFETY MEASURES AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE
      Mr. Bevill: A recent report by the Office of Security Evaluations
 was critical of current security measures at the Savannah River Site.
 What steps have been taken to address these concerns.
      Dr. Reis: The comprehensive inspection of the Savannah River
 Operations Office (SR) and its contractors, Westinghouse Savannah River
 Company and Wackenhut Services Incorporated, was conducted by Security
 Evaluations (SE) during the period of August 2-18, 1993. The inspection
 identified 30 findings within 14 inspection areas of safeguards and
 security. The protection of nuclear material located at the site,
 however, was not found by SE to be at risk due to the findings. The
 Savannah River Operations Office has responded to all identified
 findings with an aggressive schedule for correction and has indicated
 that they have implemented corrective action for all but three
 findings. The three remaining findings are to have corrective actions
 completed by July 30, 1994. They include assuring all SR safeguards and
 security operations are carried out consistent with departmental
 policy, completion and approval of facility specific planning
 documents, and development of a system for secure distribution of
 passwords.
                NONPROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
      Mr. Bevill: Why is funding for nonproliferation activities
 contained in the weapons program? How does that work differ from the
 work funded by this program?
      Dr. Keliher: The Weapons Research and Development program has a
 budget element they call "Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Threat
 Assessment." Broadly speaking, these Weapons R&D activities are
 nonproliferation activities that do not fall within the
 responsibilities of my office, but under the Assistant Secretary for
 Defense Programs. Whereas our activities are designed to monitor and
 verify non-U.S. weapons activities, the Weapons R&D activities insure
 that the U.S. stockpile is not endangered by those activities. For
 example, while we work to insure non-U.S. compliance with nuclear
 weapons  treaties, Weapons R&D works to insure that any potential
 non-compliance does not place the deterrence value of the U.S.
 stockpile at risk.
                   TOTAL AMOUNT OF DOE FUNDING FOR ASSISTANCE
                       TO STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
                         IN FY 1993, FY 1994, AND FY 1995
      Mr. Bevill. By type of funding, what is the total amount of DOE
 funding for assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union in FY
 1993, FY 1994 and FY 1995?
      Dr. Keliher. The total amount of DOE funding for assistance to
 the states of the former Soviet Union was $8,700,000 for FY 1993. For
 FY 1994, the total amount of DOE funding is $12,631,000. For FY 1995,
 we estimate the total amount of DOE funding will be $15,668,000. Of
 these totals, the Defense Programs' amounts are $2,775,000 in FY 1993;
 $6,500,000 in FY 1994, and $8,600,000 in FY 1995. These amounts are
 reflected in the Analytical Support Category for lab-to-lab
 interaction. The remainder of the funds are provided by the Office of
 Nonproliferation and National Security.
      The break-down by activity is as follows:
           International Safeguards (assistance to states of the former
           Soviet Union to develop effective national material control
           and accountability systems):
                FY 1993             $2,705,000
                FY 1994             $1,992,000
                FY 1995             $3,000,000
           Analytical Support (weapon dismantlement,
           Laboratory-to-Laboratory interactions, International Science
           and Technology Center in Russia and Science and Technology
           Center in Ukraine, HEU Purchase Contract):
                  FY 1993           $4,752,000
                  FY 1994           $8,574,000
                  FY 1995          $10,713,000
           Export Control Operations (assistance to the states of the
           former Soviet Union to develop effective national export
           control systems):
                  FY 1993           $ 833,000
                  FY 1994          $1,430,000
                  FY 1995          $1,430,000
           Technology Research and Development (employing world class
           scientists in nonproliferation technology development):
                  FY 1993           $ 410,000
                  FY 1994           $ 635,000
                  FY 1995           $ 525,000
      CHANGE IN FOCUS OF VERIFICATION AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
                SINCE THE BREAKUP OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
      Mr. Bevill. How has the focus of this program changed since the
 breakup of the former Soviet Union?
      Dr. Keliher. As a result of the dissolution of the former Soviet
 Union, the Verification and Control Technology Program has shifted its
 focus from the verification of arms control agreements primarily with
 the USSR to activities to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
 destruction on a global scale. The threat of proliferation had always
 existed, but events of the past few years have brought the subject to
 the top of the arms control agenda. With the collapse of Communism and
 the break-up of the former Soviet bloc, we can confront the ambitions
 which fuel proliferation not through the prism of Cold War alliances,
 but through the examination of regional tensions which cause such
 ambitions.
      The program has adapted significantly to confront the
 proliferation threat from successor states of the former Soviet Union
 themselves, which has resulted from decades of militarized economies
 and is worsened now by economic hard times. As a result, the program
 has extended its training programs to encourage consolidation of
 residual nuclear weapons and materials in Russia and to help selected
 states of the former Soviet Union develop improved nuclear material
 control and accountability and export control systems. These new types
 of assistance were initiated through intensive diplomatic bilateral
 dialogue in 1992, approximately one year after the dissolution of the
 U.S.S.R.. As such, the focus of this assistance program to enhance or
 establish national export control and nuclear material and
 accountability  systems in all of the former republics has remained
 constant, with workplan adjustments found primarily in funding levels
 and project priorities as articulated by each recipient country,
 (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan).
      In addition, since the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., the program
 has been active in the effort to establish the International Science
 and Technology Center (ISTC) in Russia and the Science and Technology
 Center in Ukraine (STCU) and to facilitate direct U.S.-Russian
 Laboratory-to-Laboratory interactions. The purpose of these three
 activities is to provide non-weapons collaborative research projects to
 former Soviet weapons scientists to prevent "brain drain" to
 proliferant states.
      It should be mentioned that technical support for negotiations to
 verify arms control agreements with the primary successor state of the
 former Soviet nuclear arsenal, Russia, remains a high priority in the
 Verification and Control Technology Program.  Partly a nonproliferation
 and partly an arms control measure, the U.S. purchase of 500 metric
 tons of Russia highly-enriched uranium and its corresponding
 revenue-sharing agreement with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan continue
 to be subject for negotiation and supported by the program.
 Transparency measures between the U.S. and the Russians have been
 agreed upon to ensure that HEU being purchased is actually derived
 from dismantled nuclear weapons.  The program also supports negotiation
 of transparency measures relating to the entire nuclear weapon
 dismantlement process. The program is now exploring new technology
 Which will allow our dismantlement process at Pantex to be more
 transparent without revealing sensitive nuclear weapon design
 information. The program has supported efforts to provide more direct
 assistance to the Russians on dismantlement., including assistance for
 the design of a storage facility for fissile material derived from
 dismantled weapons.
                 NONPROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
      Mr. Bevill.  Please describe your current role with respect to
 control, storage, and dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons and
 nuclear materials.
      Dr. Keliher. In November 1991, a Soviet Union delegation was
 invited to Washington to discuss measures for cooperation and
 assistance in control, storage, and dismantlement of Soviet nuclear
 weapons.  DOE participated in the delegation meetings, as well as in a
 technical working group meeting. At this first U.S./Soviet meeting on
 such technical issues, the U.S. presented an overview of how the U.S.
 manages nuclear weapons, with particular emphasis on control, storage,
 and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. In this meeting, as well as in
 all following meetings, Soviet (and subsequently, Russian) delegations
 insisted that direct assistance in control, storage, and dismantlement
 of their nuclear weapons was neither necessary nor desired. The
 sensitivity of weapon design information, as well as the reluctance to
 reveal any possible weakness with respect to nuclear weapons issues,
 were believed to be the basis for this Russian position.
      The Soviet delegation informed the U.S. that the most important
 way in which the U.S. could help the Soviet Union achieve its goal of
 dismantling tactical, INF, and START nuclear warheads by the year 2000
 was to support construction of a specially designed storage facility
 and procurement of containers for nuclear materials removed from
 dismantled weapons. The U.S. is providing assistance in both these
 areas. This assistance includes a design of the system of control,
 accounting, and physical protection of fissile material stored in the
 facility. Many Department of Energy and national laboratory staff
 members are working to apply the very best technical expertise to these
 problems. Since November 1991, DOE has provided technical and
 analytical support for several U.S. follow-up visits to Russia and has
 participated in technical information exchanges both in Russia and in
 the U.S. to discuss related issues (on average of at least monthly). An
 agreement between the U.S. and the Russian Federation in the field of
 Nuclear Warhead Safety and Security is in the final negotiating.stage.
 This agreement will provide a framework for controlled and supervised
 technical exchanges between the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories and
 the Russian nuclear weapon institutes on subjects pertaining to safe
 secure transport, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. These
 exchanges may include conferences, meetings, seminars, workshops, joint
 studies, projects, and experiments.
      In all these interactions, we have placed emphasis on providing
 assistance which will help Russia to maintain control, safeguard
 stored weapons, and perform safe and ecologically sound dismantlement
 of their nuclear warheads. As our technical dialogue with nuclear
 weapon states develop, and we are able to become increasingly open with
 each other in addressing these problems of mutual concern, it is
 realistic to expect further initiatives in these areas.
 Agreements with Russia that directly involve DOE include:
      - Technical assistance in design of a fissile material storage
        facility (now being implemented)
      - Fissile material storage containers (now being implemented)
      - Flexible armor blankets for secure transport/storage of
        nuclear warheads (delivered)
      - Security upgrade kits for nuclear weapons railcars (now being
        implemented)
      - Nuclear weapons/material accident response equipment (now
        being implemented)
      - International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow
        to engage FSU nuclear weapon scientists in non-nuclear weapon
        research (now being implemented)
      - Purchase of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled FSU
        nuclear weapons (agreement signed, cont?act being negotiated)
      - Equipment for the nuclear storage facility (now being
        implemented)
      - Technical assistance for establishing a state system for nuclear
        material control, accounting, and physical protection (now being
        implemented)
 Agreements with Belarus that directly involve DOE:
      - Nuclear weapon/material emergency response equipment (now
        being implemented)
      - Assistance with nuclear material export control regime (now
        being implemented)
  
 Agreements with Ukraine that directly involve DOE:
      - Nuclear weapon/material emergency response equipment (now being
        implemented)
      - Assistance in nuclear material control, accounting, and physical
         protection (now being implemented)
      - Assistance with nuclear material export control regime (now
        being implemented)
      - Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU) in Kiev to
        engage FSU nuclear weapon scientists in non-nuclear research
        (awaiting Ukrainian approval)
 Agreements with Kazakhstan that directly involve DOE:
      - Nuclear weapon/material emergency response equipment (now being
        implemented)
      - Assistance in nuclear material control, accounting, and physical
        protection (now being implemented)
      - Assistance with nuclear material export control regime (now
        being implemented)
                                    TREATIES
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of treaties under negotiation
 and anticipated treaties through the 1990's in which DOE will be
 involved.
      Dr. Keliher.  DOE is involved in support of treaties, agreements,
 and reciprocal unilateral initiatives either under negotiation or
 anticipated. Treaties that are in effect include:
      - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) (awaiting Ukrainian
        ratification)
      - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) (awaiting both
        U.S. and Russian ratification)
      - Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
      - Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
      - Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
      - Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)
      - Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)
      - Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
  
      - Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
      - Bilateral U.S./Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement
        (awaiting both U.S. and Russian signature)
      - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
      - Wyoming MOU and BOA
      - Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
      - Open Skies Treaty
 Treaties and agreements that are under negotiation include:
      - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
      - Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission
      - African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
 Treaties, agreements, and initiatives we expect to come to fruition
 through the 1990's include:
      - Global Ban on the Production of Fissionable Material for Nuclear
        Weapons Purposes
       - U.S. voluntary offer to place fissile materials no longer
         needed for nuclear deterrence under international safeguards
             RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PERFORMANCE MEASURES
      Mr. Bevill. What performance measurements can be used to measure
 the effectiveness of the research and development program?
      Dr. Keliher. The performance measures useful to gauge the
 effectiveness of our technology research and development programs
 include:
      o    Upon annual assessment, the percentage of technology
           prototypes developed over the previous five years which are
           in use
      o    The number of favorable external peer reviews over the past
           year of our ongoing research and development activities
           relative to any unfavorable assessments
      o    Upon annual assessment, the percentage of technology
           development programs which are completed and documented
      o    The long-term quality of the technologies and systems
           delivered to customers as quantified by abnormally good or
           abnormally poor failure rates
      o    Upon annual assessment, the number of technology development
           efforts which are good candidates for transfer to industry
           as indicated by the number of Cooperative Research and
           Development Agreements (CRADAS) or other formal or informal
           industrial partnerships, or patents issued under the auspices
           of the National Laboratories
      o    The monies directed on an annual basis from the Verification
           and Control Technology (V&CT) Program into the Department of
           Energy's Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Business
           Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program, and the return
           on this investment to the V&CT effort.
                IMPACT OF PROPOSED DECLASSIFICATION
      Mr. Bevill. How has the proposed declassification of some of the
 U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear materials information impacted this
 program?
      Dr. Keliher. There have been no impacts to date.
              IMPACT OF THE ARREST OF A SUSPECTED SPY
      Mr. Bevill. Has the arrest of a suspected spy at the CIA impacted
 this program?
      Dr. Keliher. The arrest of the CIA employee and the subsequent
 media coverage has made the foreign intelligence service threat message
 more credible to DOE employees and contractors. While the end of the
 Cold War caused many employees to become skeptical concerning the
 existence of an espionage threat, employees are now more receptive to
 the message of the Department's counterintelligence awareness
 program. No other impacts have been observed.
        INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE
           AND SPECIAL ACCESS WORK-FOR-OTHERS PROJECTS
      Mr. Bevill. The Inspector General issued a report criticizing the
 Department's classified intelligence and special access work-for-others
 projects. What steps has the Department taken to address these
 concerns?
      Dr. Keliher. The Office of Nonproliferation and National Security
 has coordinated a Departmental position and Action Plan to implement
 the Inspector General's recommendations. The Departmental position
 concurs with the 46 Inspector General recommendations. All
 recommendations have been accepted and assigned Target Completion
 Dates. Eleven recommendations have already been implemented.
           PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS
      Mr. Bevill. What performance measures can be used to measure the
 effectiveness of intelligence programs?
      Dr. Keliher. There are four primary measures of the effectiveness
 of intelligence programs: "timeliness, accuracy, impact," and the
 "cost/benefit ratio." For strategic warning and finished intelligence,
 the measures should be applied to the products each program produces.
 For current intelligence, the measures should be applied to the
 aggregated function. "Timeliness" addresses the receipt by the customer
 in time to influence a targeted decision. "Accuracy" examines whether
 the correct issue was addressed in the analysis; if the appropriate
 analytic  approach was applied; if the research appears to be
 exhaustive and if appropriate data was located and incorporated; and,
 if the answer was correct (if validated by events). "Impact" measures
 the level of influence the product had on a customer's decision, asking
 if actions were taken that otherwise would not have been and assessing
 the outcomes of those actions. "Cost to benefit ratio" addresses
 whether  or not the impact (benefit) justifies the cost.
                  REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR
      Mr. Bevill. How many foreign research reactors are still using
 highly enriched uranium (HEU)?
      Dr. Keliher. There are 52 operating foreign research reactors
 that use HEU of US origin as of March 1994. Twenty-eight of which have
 a power level greater than I mw with the remaining twenty-four being
 below 1 mw.
      Of the twenty-eight operating foreign research reactors with a
 power level above 1 mw; six have partially converted or have ordered
 LEU fuel for conversion; for fifteen reactors, conversion is feasible;
 three cannot be converted and the remaining four have either a lifetime
 core or plan to shut down. For the twenty-four reactors with a power
 level below 1 mw, conversion is feasible and in fact two have started
 conversion.
                  REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR
      Mr. Bevill. What is the status of Russian research reactors using
 HEU? Have any research reactors been converted?
      Dr. Keliher. There are twenty-seven soviet-built research reactors
 using HEU fuels as of March 1994. No soviet-built reactors have been
 converted to LEU fuels at this time. However, three reactors (1 in
 North Korea, I in Poland and I in the Czech Republic) have been
 converted from 80% to 36% enriched uranium fuel under the Soviet RERTR
 Program in the 1980s'.
                  REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR
      Mr. Bevill. Describe the total cost and schedule necessary to
 design low enriched uranium fuels for the remaining foreign reactors
 using HEU.
      Dr. Keliher. Argonne National Laboratory estimates that the total
 cost of a program to develop and demonstrate an improved type of highly
 loaded LEU fuel plate for research reactors with a uranium loading
 equivalent to the highest currently used HEU plate types (the three
 remaining reactors) would be about $19,650,000 over a period of 6
 years.
                  REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR
      Mr. Bevill. What type of research effort is currently being
 conducted at what cost and which DOE site?
      Dr. Keliher. Argonne currently is conducting a research and
 development program for using LEU instead of HEU in targets for
 production of fission product molybdenum-99 for use in medical
 applications in cooperation with current commercial producers. Current
 plans are to allocate $765,000 to this activity during FY 1994,
 followed by comparable amounts,during the next two years.
      Discussions are under way with Argonne National Laboratory
 regarding proposals to restart development of high-density LEU fuels
 for possible use in the three remaining foreign research reactors and
 in HEU reactors built and supplied by the former Soviet Union. In
 addition, new high flux reactors being designed in the U.S., Germany,
 Russia, and China could require these new fuels to operate with.
                        PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
      Mr. Bevill. What performance measurements should be used to
 measure the effectiveness of this program?
      Dr. Keliher. The following list can be used to measure the
 effectiveness of the program:
    - Zero incidents of theft of nuclear materials and/or nuclear
      weapons or nuclear weapons design information.
    - Zero public health and safety problems encountered as a result of
      theft, sabotage, and terrorist activity.
    - Minimum accountability problems and Special Nuclear Materials
      domestic violations are encountered.
    - Zero penetration of nuclear facilities by terrorist groups.
    - Zero fatalities as a result of terrorist attack or hostage
      situations.
    - Zero theft or diversion of nuclear weapons, and/or special nuclear
      materials.
    - Review of approximately 650,000 documents for the declassification
      program.
    - Central Training Academy will conduct 112 courses with 176
      iterations in support of a trained and qualified workforce.
    - Technology and Systems development activities address
      approximately 60 percent of customers' needs.
    - Program analysis activities should result in a 7-10 percent
      crosscut savings and cost avoidance consistent with cost-effective
      policy implementation.
                      SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY THREAT POLICY
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current threat assessment. Have
 any DOE facilities experienced any threat in the past five years that
 approaches the threat guidance now in effect?
      Dr. Keliher. The current Department of Energy (DOE) threat policy
 is founded on a January 31, 1992, DOE/Department of Defense, (DOD)
 "Memorandum of Agreement on the Security Threats to DOE and DOD Nuclear
 Weapons Programs and Facilities." The Memorandum of Agreement was based
 on a Defense Intelligence Agency review of worldwide threats to United
 States Government interests. The 'Design Basis Threat Policy for
 Department of Energy Programs and Facilities" dated July 28, 1993
 describes a spectrum of threats to DOE Programs and activities ranging
 from terrorist threats to Departmental nuclear weapons and production
 programs to the threats posed by criminals, psychotics, radical
 environmentalists, foreign agents, and other insiders. The Design Basis
 Threat Policy, classified Confidential, National Security Information,
 provides guidance on the characteristics of the various threats types
 and describes the capabilities of the adversary. The Design Basis
 Threat Policy also describes Safeguards and Security Program strategies
 for addressing the threat spectrum. It requires the development of site
 specific considerations in mitigating threats. The Office of Security
 Affairs performs an annual review of the threat policy for validity and
 currency. The current policy replaces an April 1, 1992 version. These
 revisions replaced the 1983 Generic Threat Statement. Both the April
 1992 and July 1993 versions are consistent with the January 1992
 interagency Memorandum of Agreement. Currently, the Office of Security
 Affairs is working with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to draft a
 document similar to the 1992 agreement with the Department of Defense.
      A review of incidents at DOE facilities since 1990 indicates that
 several events categorized as insider threat activity have occurred.
 These incidents vary from tampering with systems, vandalism and threats
 directed against other personnel. A series of incidents at one facility
 were believed to have been caused by disgruntled employees resulting
 from labor/management disputes. Because of the significant insider
 controls, these incidents were quickly identified, investigated and
 resolved with no significant negative or adverse impact to the
 safeguard and security systems of the facility or the public's health
 and safety. These incidents were referred to the Federal Bureau of
 Investigation for further action.
      Threats of violence to individuals have occurred at several DOE
 facilities. To the best of our knowledge, however, none have been
 carried out.
  
      There are also clear indications that the Department continues
 to be actively targeted by foreign interests in the areas of nuclear
 proliferation and advance technology.- The Department maintains active
 security and counter intelligence programs that protect against such
 threats. There have been no incidents of terrorism directed at DOE
 facilities. There is a growing concern for terrorism in the United
 States, particularly in light of the World Trade Center terrorist
 bombing. The ability and readiness of safeguards and security programs
 at field and Headquarters facilities to detect and respond to terrorist
 events continues to be frequently tested and certainly provides a
 deterrence to any group considering such an act. One of the objective's
 of the program is to provide a high degree of assurance of the
 programs' ability to successfully respond to the spectrum of threats to
 include terrorism.
      The strategy to guard against threats to facilities emphasizes
 providing a high degree of assurance of a capability to detect, assess,
 delay, and inhibit unauthorized access to nuclear materials, nuclear
 weapons, and nuclear weapons design information. Safeguards and
 security measures are also designed to prevent acts of sabotage.
                      THREATS TO DOE FACILITIES
      Mr. Bevill. What is the most likely threat to DOE facilities and
 what is the least likely?
      Dr. Keliher. Notwithstanding the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
 attack, terrorist acts directed against DOE programs and facilities,
 while potentially resulting in catastrophic consequences, are the least
 likely to occur partly due to the,deterrence in place. The threat posed
 by cleared and authorized insiders is perhaps the most likely and
 includes theft of material and equipment, espionage and sabotage. The
 threat posed by insiders is also potentially exacerbated by the current
 downsizing of some Departmental programs, as well as other major
 changes in our programs. Some Departmental locations have also been
 targeted by anti-nuclear and/or radical environmental extremist groups.
 Those actions have resulted in demonstrations, acts of civil
 disobedience and trespass.
                         DECLASSIFICATION EFFORT
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current effort to declassify
 information including the funding for each year and milestones.
      Dr. Keliher. As a followup to the Secretary's December 7, 1993
 press conference, the Office of Declassification issued a second call
 for information declassification proposals at the end of December 1993.
 The first joint DOE/DOD meeting to discuss these new proposed
 declassifications was completed on March 3. A new call will be issued
 for additional information declassification proposals by July 1994.
      Additionally, we are involved in a comprehensive, fundamental
 review of DOE classification policy to determine what information is
 still truly sensitive and requires protection. This review is scheduled
 to be completed within 12 months after initiation. To assist in
 accomplishing this review, four additional full-time employees and four
 additional contractor support personnel have been selected and should
 be on the job within the next 45 days. This policy review will be
 followed by a review and revision of DOE classification guidance,
 scheduled to be completed at the end of one additional year. This
 classification guidance consists of detailed instructions describing
 what is classified and is used as the basis for the declassification
 review of documents.
      To accelerate the review and declassification of documents,
 additional derivative declassifies must be trained.  Therefore, a
 substantial increase in the number of authorized derivative
 declassifies required to support this initiative in the field are in
 the process of being trained (as many as 300 more). Each authorized
 derivative declassifier must attend a training course conducted by DOE
 Headquarters. Funding for the declassifies is not included in this
 budget request; they are funded by the program offices. In addition,
 there will be a substantial increase in the number of Headquarters
 Office of Declassification Federal positions as well as support
 contractors who will require training as derivative declassifies.
      Current program expectations for declassifying documents in the
 following areas are as follows:
      Responses to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Requests - At the
 end of FY 1993, the backlog in FOIA classified documents was
 approximately 2 years. By the end of FY 1994, provided the public
 demand for access does not increase, the backlog should be reduced to
 18 months, and by the end of FY 1995 and future years the backlog
 should be less than 1 year.
      Support to Declassify Historical Documents at the National
 Archives and Records Administration (NARA) - In FY 1994, we will hire
 and train six qualified document reviewers. By mid-March 1994, we plan
 to have an average of three document reviewers to directly support NARA
 in the review of DOE and predecessor agency documents. During FY 1995,
 the target is to support NARA with six fully qualified and trained
 document reviewers.
      Other Document Reviews (includes documents involved in litigation,
 congressional testimony, draft documents intended for public release,
 etc.) Maintain the close support of operational needs of our clients.
      Funding to support the information declassification initiative is
 as follows: FY 1994 - $5,900,000 and FY 1995 $6,536,000.
                  CENTRAL TRAINING ACADEMY OPERATING COSTS
      Mr. Bevill. What is the total cost of operating the Central.
 Training Academy and the FTEs in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995? Are
 funds provided from any sources other than this budget?
      Dr. Keliher. The costs for the Central Training Academy (CTA) are
 as follows:
                                      FY 1993    FY 1994   FY 1995
                                        (In Thousands of Dollars)
 Program                              $ 7,323    $ 7,933   $ 8,867
 Program  Direction/Other Services        393*       700       709
   Total Central Training Academy     $ 7,716    $ 8,633   $ 9,576
 FTEs                                       5          5         5
 *In FY 1993, the funding for Program Direction was provided by the
 Weapons Production and Surveillance budget. In FY 1994, Program
 Direction funding increases due to the funding of janitorial services
 and costs associated with replacement of mechanical systems.
      In addition to the above funding, CTA receives approximately
 $200,000 annually from other Departmental programs to cover CTA staff
 travel and adjunct costs related to specially requested Mobile Training
 Team activities. These Mobile Training Teams are in addition to
 normally scheduled and budgeted CTA classes.
      Since the establishment of the CTA, the Albuquerque Operations
 Office has provided funding for CTA's rent, electricity, etc. (it is
 estimated that approximately $500,000 is expended annually).
      In FY 1993, the CTA received $2,000,000 in General Plant Project
 funding. The CTA in FY 1994 and FY 1995 has zero General Plant Project
 funding.
                             GUARD OVERTIME COSTS
      Mr. Bevill. There have been reports of excessive overtime costs
 for guards at several facilities. Can you discuss this issue?
      Dr. Keliher. Based upon data from the Rocky Flats Operations
 Office, there are indications that protective force personnel at this
 location are working excessive overtime hours based upon existing
 protective force contract allowances. Based on Fiscal Year 1992 data,
 in some instances, the annual wage of an armed guard is supplemented in
 excess of 90 percent by overtime compensation.
      Based upon data compilation, information analysis, and research by
 Department of Energy Headquarters staff personnel and an independent
 research group, the following working hour guidelines are being
 examined to help standardize duty hour application:
   -  No more than 12 total hours worked per continuous 24 hour period,
      inclusive of shift change briefings and uniform and equipment
      outfitting.
   -  No more than 60 total hours worked per seven day week.
      These guidelines are intended as a tool that can assist managers
 and contract officers in future negotiations dealing with protective
 forces. It is believed that cost savings can be realized from the
 enactment of these guidelines.
                     RESOURCE REVIEW INITIATIVES
      Mr. Bevill. Describe the actions taken to date to reduce
 Department-wide Safeguards and Security (S&S) costs.
      Dr. Keliher. In fiscal year 1993, DOE mandated a complex-wide
 S&S resource review designed to identify opportunities for program
 savings while ensuring appropriate and effective security for DOE
 assets and personnel. This effort was coordinated by the Office
 of Security Affairs.
      This effort identified over 400 cost saving initiatives.  These
 initiatives offer a potential estimated cost-savings of approximately
 $200M in FY 1995 when compared to the original FY 1992 cost estimate
 for complex-wide expenditures of $1.2B. Estimated complex-wide S&S
 expenditures for FY 1995 are approximately $62M below actual FY 1993
 expenditures.
      In addition to the 400 specific initiatives submitted by the
 Operations Offices, the Office of Security Affairs resource review
 identified consolidation of special nuclear materials as a significant
 opportunity for resource savings. Examples are:
      - fewer hardened storage facilities.
      - reduced equipment and accountability requirements.
      - smaller number of protective force personnel.
      The Office of Security Affairs has instituted measures to
 assure the continuation of an ongoing system to identify and pursue
 cost saving activities.
                        SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY CROSSCUT
      Mr. Bevill. Provide a crosscut by location of all Safeguards and
 Security funding throughout the Department for FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY
 1995. Dr. Keliher. The following information is provided:
                         DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
                     FY 1995 Congressional Budget
              Safeguards and Security Crosscut Estimates
                              BY FACILITY
                             (in thousands)
                                          FY 1993    FY 1994    FY 1995
 Organization/Facility                    Actuals    Estimate   Request
 ---------------------------------------- ---------  ---------  --------
 Albuquerque
      Albuquerque Direct                  83,911      86,676     85,954
      Allied (Kansas City)                 6,994       7,516      6,203
      Central Training Academy             9,186       8,857      9,639
      Grand Junction Project Off.            932       1,055      1,091
      Los Alamos Natl. Lab.               66,934      74,385     74,677
      Mound                                8,603       6,885      5,673
      Pantex                              34,356      56,284     54,858
      Pinellas                             4,974       4,450      1,523
      Rocky Flats                         76,661      75,129     65,820
      Sandia Natl. Lab.                   52,768      64,443     63,452
                                        ---------    --------  ---------
        Total, Albuquerque               344,629     385,680    368,890
 Chicago
      Chicago Direct                       1,493       1,445      1,532
      Ames Natl. Lab.                        448         215        223
      Argonne Natl. Lab.                  13,390      14,098     14,839
      Brookhaven Natl. Lab.                7,016       7,518      7,766
      Fermi National Lab.                  2,065       2,365      3,351
      New Brunswick Lab.                   4,253       4,215      4,295
      Princeton Plasma Physics Lab.        1,213       1,212      1,291
                                         --------- --------  ---------
        Total, Chicago                    29,878      31,068     33,297
  
 National Renewable Energy Laboratory        675       1,000      1,049
 Superconducting Super Collider            1,300       1,400      1,446
 Idaho                                    40,093      39,141     43,148
 Nevada                                   68,434      73,083     67,081
 Naval Petroleum Reserves                  1,180       1,245      1,269
 Oak Ridge
      Oak Ridge                           24,271      25,975     25,952
      Cont. Electron Beam Accelerator Fac.   330         345        355
      FERMCO                               3,025       2,788      2,644
      Oak Ridge Institute for Sci. & Ed.     851         714        925
      Oak Ridge Natl. Lab.                 6,950       7,726      7,304
      Paducah Gaseous Diffusion           11,560       3,888      1,323
      Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion        22,532      22,059     10,463
      Y- 12                               40,905      27,921     29,344
                                         ---------  --------    --------
      Total Oak Ridge                    110,424      91,416     78,310
 Pittsburgh Naval Reactors                12,342      12,223     10,774
 File Name: BYSITE95.WK3
                           DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
                       FY 1995 Congressional Budget
                Safeguards and Security Crosscut Estimates
                               BY FACILITY
                              (in thousands)
                                          FY 1993   FY 1994    FY 1995
 Organization/Facility                    Actuals   Estimate   Request
 --------------------------------------  ---------  ---------- ---------
 Richland                                60,865      56,311      39,693
 San Francisco
      San Francisco (Oakland Ops Office)  8,014        7,617      8,158
      Lawrence Livermore Natl, Lab.      37,370       34,842     35,177
      Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory        1,137        1,033      1,062
      Stanford Linear Accelerator           834          812        852
                                         ---------   --------- ---------
         Total, San Francisco            47,355       44,304     45,249
 Savannah River                         140,331      110,781    125,567
 Schenectady Naval Reactors              13,208       13,534     14,182
 Bartlesville Project Office                 61          232        239
 Office of Scientific & Tech. Infor.        635          725        760
 Strategic Petroleum Reserve Off.        19,468       16,801     16,250
 Western Area Power Admin.                  870          870        890
 Morgantown Energy Tech. Ctr.               499          725        529
 Pittsburgh Energy Tech. Ctr.             1,600        1,600      1,515
 Headquarters                           101,640       93,629     83,012
                                      ---------     --------   -------
 Total DOE Safeguards & Security        995,487      975,768    933,150
 File Name:BYSITE95.WK3
                        GUARD FORCE SIZE AND EXPENDITURE
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing the size of guard
 forces and expenditures for guard forces by location for FY 1993, FY
 1994 and FY 1995.
      Dr. Keliher. The following information is provided:
 ****PROTECTIVE FORCES LEVELS AND OPERATING BUDGETS chart is attached to
 original document****
                         ADDITIONAL SUPPORT DETAIL
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a breakdown of the specific tasks and
 funding associated with the "Additional Support" activity in FY 1993,
 FY 1994, and FY 1995.
      Dr. Keliher. The "Additional Support" breakdown is as follows:
                    ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TASKS AND FUNDING
                          (In Thousands of Dollars)
                                        FY 1993     FY 1994    FY 1995
 Chicago Field Office S&S Staff         $ 1,445     $ 1,503    $ 1,532
 Headquarters Physical Security Upgrade
   Technical Assistance                     313         313        313
 Technical Support to Headquarters and
   Field Assistance                       2,825       3,054      2,946
 Support Services Contracts               7,174       9,165      7,695
 AOSS Modernization                           0         900      1,200
 Maintenance of HQ Security Alarm             0         290        350
 Total Additional Support               $11,757     $15,225    $14,036
                            Security Investigations
                         SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS
      Mr. Bevill. What attempts are being made to reduce the number and
 level of clearances throughout the Department?
      Dr. Keliher. As a result of the general downsizing of classified
 activities within the Department, particularly in the nuclear weapons
 program, the number of active security clearances were reduced during
 the interval of April 1993 to March 1994 from about 166,000 to about
 154,000. Additional reductions will be realized again this year
 consistent with the national laboratories' direction to eliminate
 corporate policies that require all employees to be cleared as a
 condition of employment at a Department of Energy owned site. As in the
 past year, the Department's contractor employees will be processed for
 a DOE clearance only when such an action can be justified based upon
 the duties of the employee's position. Efforts continue at DOE
 contractor sites to consolidate classified and special nuclear material
 inventories, which will result in the need for fewer clearances by
 their employees.
                      SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - STATISTICS
      Mr. Bevill. Provide by field office and facility the number and
 types of clearances held by DOE employees, contractors, and other
 Federal employees in FY 1993 and FY 1994.
      Dr. Keliher. There are just under 154,000 clearances currently
 held by DOE Employees, contractors, and other Federal employees.
 Current information will be provided for the record.
 ****CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1994 chart is attached to original
 document****
                          PERSONNEL CLEARANCE PROGRAM
      Mr. Bevill. How will the change in mission at Rocky Flats, Mound
 and Pinellas impact the number of security clearances in FY 1995?
      Dr. Keliher. I would like to submit the following information
 for the record.
    - Rocky Flats. Mission change will have very little impact in FY
      1995 due to the continued need to consolidate material and
      classified matter.
    - Mound. Mission change will result in the downgrading of a
      significant portion of the work force from "Q" to "L" but current
      estimates do not indicate that the total number of security
      clearances will be affected.
    - Pinellas. Mission changes will result in a 25 percent reduction in
      the number of security clearances in FY 1995 (400 clearances).
                           SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
      Mr. Bevill. What were the number, by type and performing agency,
 of investigations and reinvestigations performed for FY 1993, FY 1994,
 and FY 1995? Describe the reasons for the increases or decreases.
      Dr. Keliher. The following data on investigations and
 reinvestigations is inserted for the record: (The information
 follows:)
                  INVESTIGATIONS AND REINVESTIGATIONS
                                          FY 1993    FY 1994    FY 1995
                                          ACTUAL    ESTIMATED   REQUEST
 FBI    Initial Investigations              21          18         15
  
 OPM    Initial Investigations
           Single Scope Background       9,456       7,144      4,600
           Background                       45          50         50
           Limited Background              936         550        300
 OPM    Reinvestigations
           Periodic - Single Scope      13,517      16,978     13,345
           Limited Background            7,809           0          0
 OPM    National Agency Checks
           Initial                       3,551       5,210      5,500
           Reinvestigations              5,460       7,635      7,900
 TOTAL INVESTIGATIONS                   40,895      37,585     31,710
      FBI investigations have decreased as that agency is now being
 used strictly for initial investigations for individuals who occupy
 positions of a high degree of importance or sensitivity (150 positions
 have such designations within the Department).
      The number of Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBI's)
 continues to decline as the Department emphasizes the need to reduce
 the number and levels of DOE access authorizations to a minimum
 consistent with operating requirements.
      OPM Background Investigations (BI's) decreased beginning in FY
 1993 when the SSBI became available. Currently a BI is only conducted
 on DOE employees who occupy critical sensitive positions, but do not
 require access to classified material in order to perform their
 official duties.
      OPM Limited Background Investigations (LBI's) conducted for
 reinvestigations have been discontinued as a result of the adoption of
 the Periodic Reinvestigation - Single Scope Background Investigation
 (PRIS) in December 1992. LBI's are currently used only for initial L
 and Secret clearances for DOE employees or if the PRIS must be expanded
 due to special circumstances.
      OPM National Agency Checks with Credit (NACC) will increase as the
 need for the number of initial Q clearances is reduced.
                           PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM
      Mr. Bevill. Describe the effort to develop an electronic transfer
 program for security clearances, including the timetable for completion
 and cost by year.
      Dr. Keliher. The current time between the DOE request for a
 background investigation and receipt of the completed product from the
 investigative agency (Office of Personnel Management (OPM)) is
 approximately 75 days. However, depending on the geographic location,
 it takes another 15 to 30 days in mail time to send and receive the
 case papers and completed investigation.
      This project will implement an electronic transfer system
 (including appropriate safeguards of data) between each of the DOE
 Operations Offices and the OPM's Office of Federal Investigations in
 Boyers, Pennsylvania, which will allow DOE to electronically
 transfer the paperwork requesting a background investigation (including
 fingerprints) to OPM, and when the background investigation is
 completed, to have it electronically transferred to the appropriate DOE
 Operations Office for adjudication. This will also allow transfer of
 security files between DOE Operations Offices. The electronic transfer
 system will eliminate the mail time between DOE and OPM.
      The FY 1995  Security Investigations budget includes $2,200,000
 for this project.
                          SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET,
      Mr. Bevill. Provide an analysis of security investigation programs
 showing the funds for defense and other than defense programs.
      Dr. Keliher. There is approximately a 50/50 split of the FY 1995
 Security Investigations budget allocation between defense and other
 than defense activities, as shown below in the table which I would like
 to insert into the record. (The information follows:)
                            SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
                                   FY 1995
           Defense/Environmental Activities        $19,801,770
           Other than Defense/Environmental         19,025,230
                Total SI Budget                     38,827,000
                     Use of Prior-Year-Funds        -4,000,000
                FY 1995 REQUEST                    $34,827,000
                      SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
      Mr. Bevill. Provide a breakout, by activity, of the $3.6 million
 requested for Related Security Investigations Activities.
      Dr. Keliher. The breakout of our request for Related Security
 Investigations Activities is shown on a table which I would like to
 insert in the record. (The information follows:)
                 RELATED SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITIES
                                 FY 1995
      Electronic Transfer Program                  $2,200,000
      Implementation of Accelerated Access
        Authorization Program (AAAP)                1,300,000
      National Industrial Security Program
        (NISP) support                                 50,000
         TOTAL - Related SI Activities             $3,550,000
               EFFECTIVENESS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe how this office has increased the
 effectiveness of emergency response activities throughout the
 Department.
      Dr. Keliher. The Office of Emergency Planning and Operations has
 been re-organized into the Office of Emergency Management within the
 Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The Office of
 Emergency Management has retained the responsibilities for the
 Department's Emergency Management System, which is the framework for
 all the Department's emergency planning, preparedness, and readiness
 assurance activities.
      The Office of Emergency Management has increased the effectiveness
 of emergency response activities throughout the Department by providing
 a consistent framework for emergency planning, preparedness, and
 response activities for multiple hazards which threaten workers, the
 public, the environment, and national security. Effectiveness of
 emergency response activities has been increased through: (1)
 standardization of terminology and concepts, most importantly the
 development of specific hazards assessments to be used to define
 emergency management programs; (2) development of detailed guidance for
 appropriateness and consistency in the implementation of Departmental
 requirements for emergency management activities; (3) development of an
 active training program for emergency management activities, ranging
 from introduction to the Emergency Management System to specific
 courses on hazards assessments and event classification; and, (4) an
 aggressive readiness assurance program which includes reviews of
 emergency plans, evaluations of emergency response exercises,
 appraisals of site-specific emergency management programs, and the
 development of a performance test program for all components of the
 Emergency Management System.
           COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND OPERATIONS
      Mr Bevill. How are efforts of this office coordinated with the
 emergency response and operations funded in the defense programmatic
 areas?
      Dr. Keliher.  The Office of Emergency Planning and operations has
 been re-organized into the office of Emergency Management within the
 Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The Office of
 Emergency Management has retained the responsibilities for the
 Department's Emergency Management System, which is the framework for
 all the Department's emergency planning, preparedness, and readiness
 assurance activities.
      The Emergency Management System has been established to ensure a
 fully coordinated and integrated emergency preparedness program is
 maintained by the Department.
      Emergency response and operations activities funded in the defense
 programmatic area include the unique radiological emergency response
 assets (i.e., the Nuclear Emergency Search Team, the Accident Response
 Group, the Aerial Measuring System, the Atmospheric Release Advisory
 Capability, the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center,
 the Radiological Assistance Program, and the Radiation Emergency
 Assistance Center/Training Site) managed by the Department for its
 defense-related facilities, operations, and activities. Program
 management responsibilities for the response assets are solely within
 the defense programmatic purview, subject to periodic review,
 appraisal, and evaluation by the Office of Emergency Management, as are
 the emergency management programs for the Department's defense-related
 facilities, operations, and activities.
      Coordination is accomplished by the Office of Emergency Management
 through a number of mechanisms and activities, including: chairing the
 Department's. Emergency Management Advisory Committee, which is
 comprised of representatives of all Departmental elements with
 emergency preparedness responsibilities and interests; participation in
 the directives development process which sets Departmental
 responsibilities, authorities, and requirements; review and concurrence
 on emergency readiness assurance plans; and, concurrence in
 selection of Departmental representatives to interagency and
 international committees, work groups, and task forces.
  
               OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING AND OPERATIONS
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a Department-wide crosscut of
 emergency preparedness funding and associated FTEs for FY 1993, FY 1994
 and FY 1995.
      Dr. Keliher. I would like to provide tables for the record which
 list the funding and associated FTEs for the Department's emergency
 response and preparedness programs. The individual program descriptions
 and associated funding levels are also provided. (The information
 follows:)
 ****Department of Energy Emergency Crosscut Table Charts is attached to
 original document****
 ORGANIZATION:   Defense Programs
 PROGRAM:        Research and Development
 APPROPRIATION:  Weapons Activities
 EMERGENCY RESPONSE *($52.6M)
 Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) provides a capability to
 effectively address counterterrorist or extortionist attempts to
 utilize stolen nuclear Weapons, improvised nuclear devices, or
 radioactive dispersal devices to achieve their objectives. The NEST
 responsibility was mandated by Executive Order. ($35.3M)
 Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) provides
 assistance to state and local governments to counter the offsite
 consequences of all types of nuclear or radiological accidents and
 relies heavily on equipment and systems developed by other weapons
 program emergency response capabilities. FRMAC was established by the
 Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. ($1.1M)
 Aerial Measurements System (AMS) provides an airborne, remote sensing
 capability to be used to monitor short and long-term environmental
 impacts at major DOE installations, to track plumes and map radiation
 deposited in the event of an accident, and to conduct routine surveys
 for the Nation's nuclear facilities. ($8.8M)
 Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) is a centralized
 computer-based system that is used for both emergency planning and
 response, provides estimates of transport, diffusion, and deposition of
 radioactive and other hazardous material released into the atmosphere
 and assists in developing dose projections. ($7.4M)
 *    includes operating expenses and capital equipment
 ORGANIZATION:  Defense Programs
 PROGRAM:       Stockpile Support
 APPROPRIATION: Weapons Activities
 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS *($13.4M)
  
 Accident Response Group (ARG) is specifically designed to address an
 emergency involving a U.S. nuclear weapon in the custody of the DOE or
 DOD. The ARG is staffed with scientist;, engineers, and other technical
 personnel from the Department's national laboratories and Management
 and Operating (M&O) contractors. ($10.0M)
 Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) provides immediate regional
 radiological emergency response support throughout the U.S. and its
 territories. The RAP teams are divided into eight RAP Regional
 Coordinating Offices and are made up of highly qualified and trained
 personnel from DOE field elements and its M&O contractors. ($2.7M)
 Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) is a
 recognized World Health Organization center located in Oak Ridge,
 Tennessee, providing medical training and advice regarding radiological
 injuries and is capable of treating radiation related injuries at its
 Oak Ridge center or at the site of the emergency. ($0.7M)
 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS *($5.6M)
 Field Emergency Operations Center includes the,operations and
 maintenance of the Albuquerque EOC, the development and installation of
 enhanced EOC capabilities, the training of EOC personnel and
 management oversight of production plant EOCs. ($5.lM)
 Field Emergency Preparedness includes management oversight of emergency
 preparedness and crisis management capabilities at all production
 sites, emergency preparedness appraisal and training activities, EOC
 exercises, the development of plans and procedures, and the management
 of the emergency operations vital records protection program. ($0.5M)
 * includes operating expenses and capital equipment
 ORGANIZATION:   Nonproliferation and National Security
 PROGRAM:         Program Direction
 APPROPRIATION:  Weapons Activities
 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ($17.3M)
 o    Program serves as Department's focal point and interagency
      point-of-contact for emergency preparedness and response
      activities.
 o    Principal mission is to assure an integrated and coordinated
      DOE response to all emergencies.
 * includes operating expenses and capital equipment
 ORGANIZATION:, Nonproliferation and National Security
 PROGRAM:         Emergency Preparedness
 APPROPRIATION:   Emergency Preparedness
 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ($ 4.6M)
  
 o    The Emergency Preparedness Program leads the Department's efforts
      to develop and direct energy emergency preparedness and
      operational programs to minimize the adverse impacts of supply
      disruptions on national security, public safety and the energy
      infrastructure.
 o    Principal activities:
      o    Use management information and support systems to anticipate
           and assess energy emergencies and shortages of energy
           supplies, inform senior management, and execute responses.
      o    Exchange information among all responsible groups (media,
           Congress, Federal agencies, States and industry) in the
           event of an emergency affecting the Nation's energy supplies.
      o    Test plans, procedures and capabilities to respond to
           energy emergencies.
 ORGANIZATION:     Policy, Planning and Program Evaluation
 PROGRAM:          Emergency Planning
 APPROPRIATION:    Emergency Preparedness
 EMERGENCY PLANNING ($3.6M)
 Insure nation,al preparedness to prevent, mitigate, and/or respond to
 energy emergencies.
 Preparation for a test of the IEA's Coordinated Emergency Response
 Measure (CERM). In conjunction with the IEA, conduct a full scale CERM
 test.
 Expand review of natural gas monitoring, with emphasis on gas trade and
 potential disruptions. Support full review and modification of the IEA
 emergency response mechanisms.
 ORGANIZATION:      Office of Nuclear Energy
 PROGRAM:           Nuclear Energy Research and Development
                    Oak Ridge Landlord
 APPROPRIATION:     Energy Supply Research and Development
 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER   ($1.65M)
 The Emergency Operations Center is responsible for emergency management
 at Oak Ridge Operations Office required by orders, federal laws, and
 regulations such as development of plans and procedures necessary for
 emergency management activities; development of training programs;
 design/development/ implementation of drills and exercises; integration
 of plans and procedures with offsite authorities;
 installation/maintenance/test/operation of radios, alarms telephones,
 video telecommunications, etc.; assessment of impacts of airborne
 releases of hazardous, toxic, and radioactive materials for all Oak
 Ridge sites, etc.
  
 ORGANIZATION:      Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
 PROGRAM:           Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act Section 180(c)
                    Implementation
 APPROPRIATION:     Nuclear Waste Fund
 TRAINING ($0.2M)
 Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, Section
 180 (c), the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management is
 conducting a program to "provide technical assistance and funds to
 States for training for public safety officials of appropriate units of
 local government and Indian tribes through whose jurisdiction the
 Secretary plans to transport spent nuclear fuel or high-level
 radioactive waste under subtitle A or under subtitle C. Training shall
 cover procedures required for safe routine transportation of these
 materials, as well as procedures for dealing with emergency response
 situations. The Waste Fund shall be the source of funds for work
 carried out under this subsection."
  
 ORGANIZATION:     Fossil Energy
 PROGRAM:          Strategic Petroleum Reserve
 APPROPRIATION:    Strategic Petroleum Reserve
 Emergency Response ($244.0M)
 The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is the Nation's front line of defense
 incase of an oil supply disruption. That being the case the  entire SPR
 budget of $244 million and 166 FTE's is considered an emergency
 response area.
 ORGANIZATION:     Fossil Energy
 PROGRAM:          Fossil Energy Research & Development
 APPROPRIATION:    Fossil Energy Research & Development
 Emergency Response ($0.4M)
 METC Emergency Responses/Preparedness Program provides the teams,
 training, equipment, and interface agreements to respond to hazardous
 situations which could credibly occur on the Morgantown Energy
 Technology Center (METC) site. The purpose of the Program is both to
 protect Government personnel/equipment and also to protect the
 surrounding community from any hazard propagation.
 PETC Emergency Responses/Preparedness Program provides the teams,
 training, equipment, and interface agreements to respond to hazardous
 situations  which could credibly occur on the Pittsburgh Energy
 Technology Center (PETC) site. The purpose of the Program is both to
 protect Government personnel/equipment and also to protect the
 surrounding community from any hazard propagation.
 BPO Emergency Responses/Preparedness provides the teams, training,
 equipment, and interface agreements to respond to hazardous situations
 which could occur on the Bartlesville Project Office. The purpose of
 the Program is both to protect Government personnel/equipment and also
 to protect the surrounding community from any hazard propagation.
 ORGANIZATION:     Fossil Energy
 PROGRAM:          Naval Petroleum Reserves
 APPROPRIATION:    Naval Petroleum Reserves
 Emergency Response ($0.3M)
 NPR Emergency Response/Preparedness Program provides the teams,
 training, equipment, and interface agreements to respond to hazardous
 situations which could credibly occur on the Naval Petroleum Reserves
 (NPR) site. The purpose of the Program is both to protect Government
 personnel/equipment and also to protect the surrounding community from
 any hazard propagation.
 ORGANIZATION:     Environmental Management
 PROGRAM:          Waste Management
 APPROPRIATION:    Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste
                   Management
 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant ($1.9M)
 The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Program budget in FY 1995
 includes $1.9 million for emergency response activities including
 exercises and training of Local, State, and Indian tribe response
 personnel. Funding and equipment are provided through the Western
 Governor's Association, through the Stipulated Agreement with New
 Mexico, and through REAC/TS and other training from Westinghouse, the
 WIPP, management and operating contractor.
 ORGANIZATION:     Environmental Management
 PROGRAM:          Environmental Restoration'
 APPROPRIATION:    Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste
                   Management
 Fernald ($1.6M)
 Emergency Preparedness at Fernald Maintains an emergency preparedness
 and management program at the Fernald Environmental Management Project
 in Fernald, Ohio, in compliance with all applicable DOE Orders and
 Federal and State Regulations. Conducts monthly cooperative planning
 and training committee meetings and coordinates monthly tests of the
 Offsite Emergency Warning System. Attends Butler/Hamilton County Local
 Emergency Planning Committee meetings each quarter; conducts annual
 Emergency Duty Officer (EDO) training, conduct emergency drills and
 exercise,s, including bi-annual backshift drills, annual building
 evacuation drills, annual criticality response drills, and Joint
 Response Drill conducted annually. ($1.6M)
 ORGANIZATION:     Environmental Management
 PROGRAM:          Technology Development
 APPROPRIATION:    Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste
                   Management
 Emergency Management ($23.0M)
 Emergency Management provides for a comprehensive program to plan for,
 respond to, and mitigate incidents and emergency situations which occur
 at Environmental Management facilities or during DOE-wide
 transportation activities. This includes an occurrence notification and
 reporting program to track and analyze off normal, unusual, and
 emergency occurrences at EM-managed facilities and activities to
 include DOE-wide transportation activities. It also includes the
 development and maintenance of emergency plans, systems, and
 capabilities including an Emergency Management Team, emergency training
 emergency exercises, and a Readiness Assurance Program. The overall
 program has three major components; (1) Transportation Emergency
 Preparedness, (2) Environmental Management Facility Emergency
 Preparedness, and (3) Environmental Management Occurrence Reporting and
 Processing. A major activity, started in FY 1994, is the evaluation of
 a program to manage hazardous materials and hazardous materials
 emergency response (Hazardous Materials Training Program). Management
 of this program will transfer to the EM Office of Oversight and Self
 Assessment in mid-FY 1994. ($23.0)
 ORGANIZATION:     Environmental Management
 PROGRAM:          Facility Transition and Management
 APPROPRIATION:    Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste
                   Management
 Idaho Operations Office *($8.7M)
 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) Emergency Preparedness
 provides for the review and update of hazard assessments, emergency
 planning zones, and emergency actions levels; review and update of
 Emergency Preparedness (EP) training; review and update of EP drills
 and exercises; and procurement of incident response team materials.
 ($0.5M)
 INEL Emergency Response Facility Project will complete Title II design
 activities for the Central Facilities Area Fire Station; bid and
 award construction subcontract; and initiate construction activities.
 ($6.7M)
 INEL Firefighters will provide structure and wildland fire fighting
 services, emergency medical services, hazardous material incident
 response, heavy and confined space rescue services, and mutual aid to
 surrounding communities. (This project is funded by indirects.) ($0.lM)
 Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) Emergency Preparedness will
 administer the formal emergency management program assuring that the
 procedures and the emergency manual are kept up to date and provide
 for adequate protection of ICPP personnel and equipment in emergency
 situations; maintain the emergency control center and the emergency
 vans and associated equipment; conduct emergency drills, exercises, and
 training to assure ICPP personnel are capable of handling emergency
 situations; and direct the multi-year plan for the implementation of
 the DOE Order 5500, emergency preparedness series. ($1.4M)
 * Includes operating expenses and construction.
 ORGANIZATION:     Environmental Management
 PROGRAM:          Facility Transition and Management
 APPROPRIATION:    Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste
                   Management
 Richland Operations Office *($4.6M)
 Field Emergency Operations Center and Field Emergency Preparedness
 includes the operations and maintenance of the Hanford site and Joint
 Information Center and the management oversite of the information
 center. It also includes the management of emergency preparedness and
 crisis management capabilities at the site. Emergency exercises, the
 development of plans and procedures, and the management of the
 emergency operations vital records protection is also included. (This
 project is funded by indirects.) ($4.6M)
 * Includes operating expenses.
 ORGANIZATION:     Environmental Management
 PROGRAM:          Facility Transition and Management
 APPROPRIATION:    Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste
                   Management
 Rocky Flats Office *($1.0M)
 Emergency Operations Center includes the operation and maintenance of
 the site Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the development and
 installation of enhanced EOC capabilities, and the training of EOC
 personnel and management oversight. (This project is funded by
 indirects.) ($0.3M)
 On-Site Emergency Preparedness includes the support for the development
 of building emergency procedures, building emergency plans, building
 emergency drills, and hazard assessments. (This project is funded by
 indirects.) ($0.4M)
 Off-Site Emergency Preparedness includes all off-site interfaces,
 development of plans and procedures for state and local emergency
 response coordination, and emergency planning zone studies. (This
 project is funded by indirects.) ($0.3M)
 *  Includes operating expenses.
 ORGANIZATION:     Environmental Management
 PROGRAM:          Facility Transition and Management
 APPROPRIATION:    Energy Supply, Research and Development
 Richland Operations Office *($1.0M)
 Field Emergency Operations Center and Field Emergency Preparedness
 includes the operations and maintenance of the Hanford site and Joint
 Information Center and the management oversite of the information
 center. It also includes the management of emergency preparedness and
 crisis management capabilities at the site. Emergency exercises, the
 development of plans and procedures, and the management of the
 emergency operations vital records protection is also included. (This
 project is funded by indirects.) ($l.0M)
 *  Includes operating expenses.
                WORKER TRAINING AND TRANSITION PROGRAM
      Mr. Bevill: Please describe the Worker Training and Adjustment
 Program.
      Dr. Reis: This program has been renamed the Worker and Community
 Transition Program. In April 1993, the Secretary established a Task
 Force on Worker and Community Transition to manage this program which
 implements section 3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
 Fiscal Year 1993. Section 3161 requires the Secretary to consult with
 stakeholders on the development of a work force restructuring plan for
 a defense facility whenever there is a change in the work force, and to
 submit the plan to Congress. The work force restructuring plans include
 initiatives that respond to objectives in section 3161 including
 minimizing layoffs through early retirement and other benefits,
 retraining assistance, preference to displaced workers in any hiring by
 the Department and relocation assistance, outplacement assistance, and
 local community impact assistance through economic development. These
 initiatives are worked out by the Department's applicable field
 organization in consultation with the local stakeholders. For FY 1994,
 the Department estimated budget requirements based on a reduction of
 8,000 jobs at an average cost of $25,000 per job, for a total of $200
 million. The program was funded in two accounts: $100 million in the
 Worker and Community Transition Program account, and $100 million was
 set aside in the Weapons Program Direction account. For FY 1995, the
 Department has requested a total of $140 million, with $125 million in
 the Worker and Community Transition account, and $15 million from the
 Environmental Restoration and Waste Management program.
         APPROVED WORK FORCE RESTRUCTURING PLANS THROUGH FEBRUARY 1994
      Mr. Bevill: Provide a chart showing by site the number of employee
 reductions in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995, the costs of the program,
 and the average cost per employee.
      Dr. Reis: To date, the Department has approved and sent to
 Congress seven work force restructuring plans. The job reductions per
 site, the costs per fiscal year, and the average cost per job lost are
 shown on the attached chart. Currently, work force restructuring plans
 are in various stages of development at several sites, and the
 Department is developing estimates of costs for these plans. The
 approved work force restructuring plans through February 1994 is shown
 in a table which I would like to insert in the record. (The information
 follows:)
 ****Worker and Community Transition Program Approved Work Force
 Restructuring Plans Through February 1994 chart is attached to original
 document****
                 FUNDING FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES
      Mr. Bevill: Describe the project and the amount of funding
 provided for each economic development initiative funded in FY 1993, FY
 1994, and FY 1995.
      Dr. Reis: The project and amount of funding provided for each
 economic development initiative are shown in a summary which I would
 like to insert for the record. Please note that the FY 1993 funding
 came from the applicable Defense Programs account for a site since the
 Worker and Training Adjustment account did not exist. (The information
 follows:)
               Economic Development Initiatives Summary
 Funding to help mitigate the phasing out of non-nuclear defense
 activities at Mound, Pinellas and Rocky Flats. With the decision to
 phase out the mission at Pinellas and Mound, and the nonnuclear mission
 at Rocky Flats, the Department committed to provide $500 thousand to
 each of these three sites to match $3 for $1 provided by the respective
 community for economic development planning. The Department also agreed
 to provide $4 million to each of these sites or a total of $12 million
 to develop non-defense uses for the sites aimed at self-sufficiency.,
 To date, during FY 1994 the full $4.5 million reserved for Pinellas has
 been authorized, $4 million was authorized for Mound, and $1 million
 was authorized for Rocky Flats.
 Planning Grant to Establish and Support the Tampa Bay Defense
 Transition Task Force. The Department provided $110 thousand in FY 1993
 Defense Programs funds to support this Task Force which represents all
 economic development stakeholders surrounding the Pinellas Plant.
 Commercialization Study of the Mound Facility. The Department provided
 $200 thousand in FY 1993 Defense Programs funding to support phase II
 of a commercialization study of Mound.
 Planning Grant to the East Tennessee Economic Council (formerly Roane-
 Anderson). The Council serves as a liaison between regional
 stakeholders, Martin Marietta Energy Systems and the Department of
 Energy (DOE) to develop plans and programs relating to the changing
 missions of DOE facilities and the impact on communities in the region.
 The Council received $150 thousand in FY 1993 to support its
 establishment and planning activities.
 Oak Ridge Manufacturing Skills Campus. This proposal was included in
 the Oak Ridge Work Force Restructuring P,lan which was submitted to
 Congress August 31, 1993. The skills campus develops highly qualified
 trainers from the existing work force on advanced manufacturing skills
 and technologies. The trainers will then train workers at Oak Ridge for
 new missions at the site as well as for private sector companies who
 would send their own operators or trainers to the campus. Local
 academic institutions would. also be customers of the campus as well as
 participate in the training. Estimated cost: $10.8 million, with $427
 thousand in FY 1993, $7.3 million in FY 1994, and $3.1 million in FY
 1995.
 Oak Ridge Technology 2020. This project will develop three integrated
 business units to: utilize telecommunications to transfer unique
 technological resources in the region to interested partners, help
 businesses apply emerging telecommunications technology and to create
 new partnerships to create new technologies and applications, and
 establish an innovative business incubator to stimulate the creation of
 new, technology-oriented businesses. Local stakeholders committed $2.9
 million to the project including building a Technology 2020 facility.
 The Department contributed $1.5 million in FY 1994 as our share of
 support for the project.
 Planning Grant to establish the Savannah River Regional Diversification
 Initiative. In FY 1993, a $100 thousand grant was issued to the Lower
 Savannah Council of Governments to establish the Savannah River
 Regional Diversification Initiative. The Initiative is composed of a
 regional group of community, business, education and government leaders
 formed to develop an economic development plan to focus Department of
 Energy and regional efforts on the impacts of defense restructuring.
 The group was assembled under the leadership of regional members of
 Congress: Butler Derrick (SC), Floyd Spence (SC), Don Johnson (GA) and
 Cynthia McKinney (GA).
 Support for the Savannah River Regional Diversification Initiative
 (SRRDI). This proposal was included in the Savannah River Work Force
 Restructuring Plan which was sent to Congress on August 31, 1993. The
 SRRDI will develop a regional economic development plan, then solicit
 and fund proposals with the highest potential to achieve the vision in
 the plan. Estimated cost: $4.2 million, with $1.4 million in FY 1993,
 and $2.8 million in FY 1994.
 Congress identified $6 million in the FY 1994 Defense Authorization Act
 (Worker Training and Adjustment Account) for economic assistance and
 development funding for five counties adjacent to the Savannah River
 Site, with $1 million targeted for economic development planning and $5
 million for funding partnership proposals with designated state
 agencies, educational institutions and other entities for economic
 expansion based on site technologies and technology-based programs.
 Reclamation and Reduction of Nuclear Residuals Program at the Savannah
 River Site. This proposal was developed by the non-profit South
 Carolina Research Authority to provide a technical assessment of a
 concept for comprehensive management of the residues from the use and
 production of nuclear materials in South Carolina. The assessment is
 the first phase of a potential multi-phase project to define a nuclear
 materials management program at the Savannah River Site that greatly
 improves nuclear materials storage and disposal. The Department
 provided a grant for $298,602 for the assessment which is funded from
 FY 1993 carryover funds designated for economic development activities.
 Nevada Economic Development Communication Network. This communications
 network will facilitate communications and coordination among economic
 development activities in Nevada. The Department provided $200 thousand
 as a $3 to $1 match with Nevada stakeholders.
 Hanford Agribusiness Technology Commercialization and Development
 (ATCD) Center. This project establishes a facility in Richland,
 Washington, to support agricultural research and stimulate creation of
 new businesses in the communities surrounding the Hanford Plant. The
 Department provided $100 thousand in FY 1994 in support of this
 project, and expects a request for another $100 thousand in FY 1995.
                        NUCLEAR MATERIALS DISPOSITION
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe the Department's nuclear materials
 disposition project.
      Dr. Reis. The Nuclear Materials Disposition project is a
 departmentwide effort, reporting directly to the Under Secretary, with
 responsibility for developing departmental recommendations and
 implementing decisions concerning control and disposition of excess
 nuclear materials. The project's objective is to help provide for the
 safe, secure, and environmentally sound control, storage, and ultimate
 disposition of surplus fissile materials in a manner that promotes
 effective nonproliferation policies and sets an example for other
 nations to follow. The project coordinates the Department's
 participation on nuclear materials issues being addressed by a subgroup
 of the President's Interagency Working Group. The Department's project
 will operate in an open manner and assure stakeholder participation in
 the decisionmaking process.
                          FISSILE MATERIAL INVENTORIES
      Mr. Bevill. Please provide a chart showing the inventory of
 fissile materials by site and type of material.
      Dr. Reis. The attached charts provide information on the following
 materials: americium-241, neptunium-237, plutonium-239, uranium-233,
 and uranium-235.
 ****Inventory of Americium-241 (gm AM-241), Inventory of Neptunium-237
 (gm Np) Inventory of Plutonium-239 (kg Pu), Inventory of Uranium-233
 (kg U-233), Inventory of Highly Enriched Uranium (kg U) charts are
 attached to original document****
                  NUCLEAR MATERIALS DISPOSITION FUNDING
      Mr. Bevill. No funding has been requested for this activity in FY
 1995. Will funding be required?
      Dr. Reis. Yes, funding will be required. The Department's budget
 request submitted to Congress for FY 1995 does not specifically
 identify funds for the Department's surplus nuclear materials control
 and disposition efforts. However, a number of such efforts are covered
 within the amounts requested for individual programs. Additional
 control and disposition activities, identified subsequent to the FY
 1995 budget submission, are under consideration. The Department is
 reviewing the FY 1995 budget submission to identify the range of funds
 which would contribute to these efforts from within the proposed FY
 1995 levels.
                     NUCLEAR MATERIALS DISPOSITION FUNDING
      Mr. Bevill. Describe how the Department has used the funding
 provided for this activity in FY 1993 and FY 1994.
      Dr. Reis. The Department's Office of Nuclear Energy used FY 1993
 funds to complete an-initial phase of studies to evaluate the
 feasibility of using Advanced Light Water and Modular High Temperature
 Gas Reactors to dispose of plutonium, produce tritium if needed, and
 produce electricity. In addition, the Liquid Metal Reactor was
 evaluated using a separate source of funds. This was done in order to
 have an assessment of all the advanced reactor technologies for
 purposes of burning plutonium.
      The Department has expended approximately $16 million through
 March 1994 of the $19 million planned for these activities. DOE is in
 the process of identifying additional light water and gas reactor
 evaluation activities that will be conducted in FY 1994 and FY 1995
 with the remaining funds of approximately $12 million. The detailed
 funding allocations are shown in a table which I would like to insert
 for the record. (The information follows:)
 ****FY 1993 PU Disposition Funds chart is attached to original
 document****
      For FY 1994, $30 million was.provided to the Department's Defense
 Programs for research and evaluation activities related to the
 production of tritium and to initiate a systematic review of options
 for plutonium disposition. These funds were also provided to examine
 storage issues. The Department's plutonium disposition review
 activities will include a full range of reactor and nonreactor
 technologies as well as disposal options for plutonium such as
 vitrification.  The Department is using these funds to complete work on
 tritium production under its Weapons Complex Reconfiguration program.
 In addition, this funding is being used to perform a vulnerability
 assessment of plutonium inventories; environmental and technical
 analysis of long-term storage and disposition options; and to obtain
 independent evaluations of these efforts. The Department is in the
 process of identifying additional plutonium storage and disposition
 activities that will be undertaken with the remaining funds and the
 related FY 1995 and outyear funding needs for this effort.
                    NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION
      Mr. Bevill. Please describe the accelerator production of tritium
 program including funding by year and milestones.
      Dr. Reis. The goals of the project are to quantify the safety and
 environmental characteristics of a linear proton accelerator used for
 producing tritium, develop the life cycle cost estimate, and
 demonstrate the technical feasibility of the system.
      In FY 1992 $21 million was provided for the development of a
 preconceptual design. An additional $9 million was made available in FY
 1994. This brings the total funding through FY 1994 to $30 million.
      The major areas of interest have been accelerator design,
 lithium-aluminum target design, helium 3 target design, balance of
 plant design, confirmatory experiments, and an environmental safety and
 health assessment. These areas of interest continue during this year
 with emphasis on the analysis of data collected during physics and
 material experiments conducted last year.
      While other development work could be useful, with the conclusion
 of the work scheduled through FY 1994, sufficient information will be
 available for comparison with the reactor technologies for producing
 tritium.
                            INERTIAL FUSION
      Mr. Fazio. The National Ignition Facility (NIF), constructed
 through the Department's Inertial Confinement Fusion Program in Defense
 Programs, would be such an experimental facility. Can you describe its
 role in the scientifically based stockpile stewardship program?
      Dr. Reis. The National Ignition Facility will be an aboveground
 facility which will provide the capability to conduct thermonuclear
 ignition and burn experiments in the laboratory. As such it will
 provide an unsurpassed capability for studying many phenomena that
 occur in nuclear weapons. It will supply experimental data relevant to
 nuclear weapons in the areas of weapon physics and weapon effects. Some
 of this data cannot be obtained at any other facility except through
 underground tests. Furthermore, the NIF will help to improve computer
 modeling of nuclear weapons, transfer sophisticated technologies to the
 weapons program, and help to maintain and enhance our nuclear weapon
 expertise. It will provide a state-of-the-art technology capability in
 high-energy-density physics and will, therefore, enhance our capability
 to research advanced nuclear weapons should that become necessary.
                            INERTIAL FUSION
      Mr. Fazio. What additional implications has the National Ignition
 Facility (NIF) for energy production and basic science? For the
 boosting of the U.S. laser and optics industry?
      Dr. Reis. Recent studies of potential inertial fusion power plants
 funded by the Department of Energy have shown that inertial fusion
 energy has the potential to be a clean, economical source of energy in
 the future. The National Ignition Facility will provide the single most
 important demonstration in support of inertial fusion energy - the
 demonstration of fusion ignition in the laboratory. In addition, NiF is
 prototypical of an inertial fusion energy power plant in size,
 radiation field spectra, and intensity.  Thus, NIF will provide a
 testbed for inertial fusion energy research in technical areas such as
 materials research, target design, target fabrication, and target
 chamber engineering.
      Basic science will clearly benefit from the information gained in
 a wide spectrum of areas such as laser-plasma interaction physics,
 atomic and radiation physics, hydrodynamics, and high energy density
 physics, as well as providing basic science information on the physics
 of ignition and fusion burn. Other indirect benefits will result from
 the "cutting-edge" technology that is inherent in this project.
      The design and construction of the NIF will drive advances and
 improvements in: electro-optics and fiber optic applications;
 flashlamp design and optimization; power conditioning and capacitor
 technology; and high power/energy laser beam control and diagnostics.
 The optics industry will also directly benefit from additional
 development of high damage threshold coatings and high production rate,
 high quality, large optics.
                           INERTIAL FUSION
      Mr. Fazio. In addition to its role in the stockpile stewardship
 program, is the National Ignition Facility (NIF) also needed to achieve
 these other purposes?
      Dr. Reis. Yes, NIF is a unique facility that in addition to its
 role in stockpile stewardship, energy production, and basic science
 contributes to other areas highlighted in the draft National Security
 Strategic Plan. In the drawdown and disposition of nuclear weapons, the
 NIF will help to encourage international collaboration, particularly
 with Russia, that should reduce the spread of nuclear weapons expertise
 to other countries. In the technology infrastructure and core
 competencies focus area, NIF design, construction, and operation will
 help keep the fabrication, optics, and other industries competitive.
 Finally, in the nonproliferation and arms control focus area, NIF will
 help keep the Department of Energy as a preeminent research and
 development organization, capable of anticipating nonproliferation,
 counterproliferation, and arms control needs.
      In terms of need, the NIF is essential to inertial fusion energy
 and contributes in a manner unequaled by other current or proposed
 facilities. The demonstration of laboratory fusion ignition is a basic
 requirement for inertial fusion energy success. The high power/high
 energy density afforded by the facility is likewise required for
 several classes of basic science experiments, as well as weapons
 physics and weapons effects testing.
            DEFENSE PROGRAMS' ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP LEGACY
      Mrs. Meek. Previous testimony has concerned the environmental
 cleanup at various Department nuclear weapons facilities and
 laboratories. About $6 billion is being requested for FY 1995 and there
 will be comparable requests for many years to come. If the nuclear
 material had been handled properly in the first place, the taxpayers
 would not be facing these bills. Will we be facing future bills for
 environmental cleanup from current activities and, if so, how much and
 why?
      Dr. Reis. The enormity of the cleanup effort is due to the fact
 that hundreds of metric tons of special nuclear materials and hazardous
 and toxic chemicals were either produced, or processed, or stored at
 DOE sites for nearly 50 years. The sheer volume of these materials and
 the complexity of the processes used in the weapons program at many
 facilities that are outdated has contributed to the need for a massive
 cleanup and restoration effort. Over the past 30 years, there have been
 many changes in legislation and regulations at both the Federal and
 local levels to protect the environment, the public, and the workers at
 and around Federal facilities. In order to comply with these laws and
 regulations, and to protect the environment, the Department has
 embraced source reduction as the national strategy of first choice to
 reduce the generation of pollution. Pursuant to the Pollution
 Prevention Act of 1990, the Department has implemented innumerable
 enhancements to its current operations that will minimize, and in some
 instances obliterate, the generation of hazardous waste. For example,
 the Department is no longer using toxic chemicals in its machinery
 cutting oils at the Kansas City Plant and has constructed effluent
 treatment facilities to purify liquid discharges from the separations
 and fuel fabrication facilities at the Savannah River Site.
      Therefore, we foresee nominal, prospective environmental cleanup
 costs relevant to current operations of the Department's nuclear
 weapons facilities and laboratories.
                 DEFENSE PROGRAMS' ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP LEGACY
      Mrs. Meek. What steps are being taken to prevent future
 environmental restoration costs?
      Dr. Reis. One of the pivotal principles the Department endorses in
 its operational enhancements is waste minimization and pollution
 prevention.  Our aggressive waste minimization and pollution prevention
 program will minimize the impact of our operations on the environment,
 as well as improving safety of operations and energy efficiencies. The
 Department also supports the priority that the President has given
 pollution prevention by his issuance-of several Executive Orders
 pertinent to pollution prevention, such as Executive Order 12856,
 "Federal Compliance with Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention
 Requirements;" Executive Order 12843, "Procurement Requirements and
 Policies for Federal Agencies for Ozone-Depleting Substances," and
 Executive Order 12873, "Federal Acquisition, Recycling, and Waste
 Prevention." This action will diminish and/or render unnecessary,
 certain future environmental restoration costs.
                WOMEN AND MINORITY HIRING AND CONTRACTING
      Mrs. Meek. I have been asking each witness questions concerning
 women or minority hiring and contracting. Due to the classified nature
 of your work, a contractor must meet rigorous security scrutiny which
 is expensive. Many of the contractors operate governmental owned
 facilities which are contractor operated -- the so-called "GOCOs." What
 percentage of the employees at GOCOS under your jurisdiction are women
 or minorities? (List by GOCO.)
      Dr. Reis. Each GOCO must have an affirmative action plan that
 addresses their manifest imbalance and/or conspicuous absence of women
 and minorities at their site. For example at Wackenhut (Savannah River
 Field Office site) they have begun a tuition reimbursement program to
 enhance the growth and development of women and minorities. Allied
 Signal implemented a new training program, "Effectively Managing
 Diversity" to address myths and stereotypes which serve as barriers to
 full and effective use of all human resources. Pie charts by GOCO are
 shown in the attachment which I would like to insert for the record.
 (The information follows:)
 ****Department of Energy Defense Programs GOCOs Albuquerque Field
 Office, GOCOs Men and Women Albuquerque Field Office, GOCOs Savannah
 River Field Office, GOCOs Men and Women Savannah River Field Office,
 GOCOs Nevada Field Office, GOCOs Men and Women Nevada Field Office,
 GOCOs Oak Ridge Field Office, GOCOs Men and Women Oak Ridge Field
 Office charts are attached to original document****
                    WOMEN AND MINORITY HIRING AND CONTRACTING
      Mrs. Meek. I assume that the percentage will be somewhat low.
 What steps are you taking to insure that the percentages increase at
 these GOCOS?
      Dr. Reis. The Department monitors the employment profile of GOCOS.
 Since June 1992, Defense Programs began to review the affirmative
 action initiatives and request an update on each contractor initiative
 toward alleviating discriminating barriers. Defense Programs began such
 reviews through a departmental initiative that published the report on
 the Advancement of the Status of Women. This booklet outlines the
 successful benefits to women and minorities, as well as the barriers of
 the Agency. In addition, the Department requires each GOCO to submit an
 affirmative action plan each year. All problematic areas must be
 identified and appropriate action items must accompany each identified
 barrier.
      Scheduled program reviews are conducted at each major field site.
 During the months of January and February, 1994, the Director of the
 Office of Economic Impact and Diversity, together with the Acting
 Director of Civil Rights, visited DOE field installations and met with
 all of DOE's contractors to help them develop diversity plans.
        PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES AT THE LABORATORIES
      Mrs. Meek.  Since there are son laboratories under your
 jurisdiction, what is the percentage of women or minorities in
 positions requiring at least the equivalent of a baccalaureate degree
 at each laboratory?
      Dr. Reis.  Total percentages of women or minorities in positions
 requiring at least the equivalent of a baccalaureate degree at each
 laboratory are listed below:
                                       Percent of        Percent of
                                         Women           Minorities
 Los Alamos National Laboratory            21%               15%
 Lawrence Livermore National Lab.          28%               05%
 Sandia National Laboratories              17%               17%
              INCREASING WOMEN AND MINORITIES AT THE LABORATORIES
      Mrs. Meek. I suspect that this percentage will also be rather low.
 What steps are you taking to increase these numbers at each laboratory?
      Dr. Reis. Several actions have been taken by the laboratories
 to enhance representation of women and minority employees. For example,
 the University Recruiting Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory
 contacts minority students' and women's organizations to increase their
 applicant base. During the first thirty months of the program, 96 job
 offers were made, 64 for regular staff member positions and 32 for
 postdoctoral and graduate research assistants. Women received 28
 percent of the regular staff member offers and minority members
 received 20 percent.
      Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's supports special
 employment programs to assist managers in achieving affirmative action
 goals, by providing training and work experience. A recent study shows
 that these programs have been effective in increasing the number of
 women and minorities in representative job groups and in encouraging
 the pursuit of careers in technical fields. Of all hires during FY
 1993, 49 percent were women and 25 percent were minorities. Women and
 minorities comprised 23 percent and 17 percent respectively, of the
 total technical job hires during this period. This includes
 classifications that do not require four year degrees or equivalency.
      Sandia National laboratories conducts or participates in several
 minority education development and support programs. Some examples are:
 DOE's Science and Technology Alliance, the University of New Mexico
 Minority Engineering Program, and "Expanding Your Horizons in Science
 and Mathematics", targeted for high school aged women.  Although
 statistics on minority group participation are not collected, the scope
 of Sandia's math and science outreach program in New Mexico and
 California grows annually, both in numbers or programs and individuals
 who benefit.
                   WOMEN AND MINORITY HIRING AND CONTRACTING
      Mrs. Meek. Will a laboratory chief receive a lower evaluation if
 the number of women or minorities in professional positions dogs not
 increase?
      Dr. Reis, The laboratory directors are evaluated by the governing
 board of the Management and Operating Contractor. One of the elements
 against which they are rated is equal employment opportunity, an
 element which has recently been strengthened. The laboratory directors
 performance against this element will certainly have a bearing on the
 overall rating.
                    WOMEN AND MINORITY HIRING AND CONTRACTING
        Mrs. Meek. What action will you take against a GOCO contractor
 who does not increase the number of women or minorities at its
 facility?
        Dr. Reis. It is the policy of this Agency that if a contractor
 intentionally engages in discriminatory practices, the Department
 would terminate the contract. Defense Programs is committed to equal
 employment opportunity and intends to carry out the full intent of the
 Department's policies as well as abide by all Federal employment rules
 and regulations.
                            USE OF THE NEVADA TEST SITE
      Mr. Myers. A press release put out by the Department last week
 indicated that a DPE-sponsored study to turn the Nuclear Test Site into
 a solar energy facility, mandated by the 1993 Defense Authorization
 bill, has led to a DOE-sponsored task force to further study this
 proposal. If any area of the Test Site is used for another purpose, how
 can there be a capability to fully resume testing if necessary? In your
 opinion, is this a wise use of the site? Were you consulted in this
 study?
      Dr. Reis. The Nevada Test Site is very large -- larger in area
 than the State of Rhode Island. If the Nevada Test Site can be used as
 a resource for solar energy without precluding its use for nuclear
 testing, it would be a very wise use of the Site. One of the purposes
 of the DOE study is to examine the details of this notion and to
 determine whether or not use of the Site for solar energy is in the
 overall national interest. Mr. Nick C. Aquilina, Manager of the DOE's
 Nevada Operations Office, is in charge of the readiness capability. Mr.
 Aquilina will be a member of the national task group and will assure
 that compatibility exists in any proposed future actions. After the
 study is finished, I will be happy to report on the findings.
  
                             NUCLEAR TEST READINESS
       Mr. Myers. The 1995 budget request contains no funding for
 testing. Should the need for testing be determined, how long would it
 take to conduct a full underground nuclear test?
      Dr. Reis. The Department's FY 1995 budget contains funding to
 maintain a readiness capability to conduct a simple underground nuclear
 test within six months of an order by the President to do so. Resuming
 a full scale underground testing program would require a lead time of
 2-3 years and redirection of funds from other programs.
                    COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
      Mr. Myers. The 1994 E&W Conference Report included language
 directing the Department to consider developing a cooperative agreement
 with Russia to explore methods of plutonium disposal and power
 production. Have any actions on that directive taken place?
      Dr. Reis. A delegation from the Russian Federation visited DOE
 March 14-16, 1994, for discussions on the shutdown of Russia's three
 remaining plutonium production reactors.
      Russia continues to produce plutonium because it needs the heat
 and power generated by the reactors to service the Tomsk and
 Krasnoyarsk areas. The purpose of this week's meetings was to examine
 opportunities to assure the speediest possible replacement of the
 reactors' heat and power, in order to allow the shutdown of the
 reactors.
      The protocol of the meeting, a report of the working group on
 nuclear reactors, the working group report on Krasnoyarsk, the
 U.S./Russian Plutonium Production Reactor Replacement Study, and the
 joint statement on inspection of facilities containing fissile
 materials are shown in the attachments, which I would like to insert
 for the record. (The information follows:)
 ****Protocol of Meeting Between The United States and The Russian
 Federation on the Replacement of Russian Plutonium Production Reactors
 is attached to original document****
                             WEAPON DISMANTLEMENT
      Mr. Myers. Your stockpile support plan supports a level of 1500
 to 2000 nuclear warhead dismantlements a year through 1996. How many
 warheads will be dismantled this year? Is 2000 the goal or the actual
 amount that will be dismantled?
      Dr. Reis: We plan to dismantle 2000 warheads this year, and in
 1995 and 1996. 2000 warheads per year is our goal, but the actual
 number dismantled may be slightly larger or slightly smaller.
                         NUCLEAR WEAPON DISMANTLEMENTS
  
      Mr. Myers. How much of a backlog in dismantling weapons currently
 exists and when will the backlog be eliminated?
        Dr. Reis. At the end of Fiscal Year 1993, there were Deleted
 weapons awaiting dismantlement. Our current plans call for the
 elimination of this backlog in Fiscal Year 1997.
                     LABORATORY SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR TESTING
      Mr. Myers. Since the President has announced a moratorium on
 underground nuclear testing, are any activities taking place at the
 laboratories that would support the testing program?
      Dr. Reis. In accordance with Presidential direction, the
 Department is maintaining a readiness capability to conduct an
 underground nuclear test within six months of an order by the President
 to do so. An essential element for the maintenance of this capability
 is the retention of scientists and engineers with the necessary and
 sometimes unique expertise required to design and field nuclear tests.
 At the laboratories, this includes staff and facilities for the design
 and manufacture of nuclear devices, for design and fabrication of the
 diagnostic rack assemblies, for diagnostic instrumentation fabrication
 and calibration, for nuclear chemistry, and for data acquisition and
 analysis. Test readiness exercises are planned to maintain the skills
 of  the machinists, mechanical engineers, radiochemists, experimental
 physicists, and weapon designers involved. Work at the laboratories to
 preserve and further analyze data from past nuclear tests is also
 planned.
                          ABILITY TO CARRY OUT MISSION
      Mr. Myers. Dr. Keliher, your request for intelligence activities
 is decreased by $2.3 million from the 1994 level of $45.4 million. What
 impact will this decrease have on your ability to carry out your
 mission?
      Dr. Keliher. The FY 1995 Request will enable the Office of
 Nonproliferation and National Security to meet its intelligence
 responsibilities to the Department in its objectives of ensuring the
 continued credibility of the Nation's nuclear deterrent, assessing
 conditions that pose a nuclear threat, and executing its
 responsibilities for nonproliferation., Although the FY 1995 Request is
 about five percent below our current year funding level, I am confident
 that we can fulfill our intelligence responsibilities within expected
 fiscal constraints by satisfying high priority Departmental
 intelligence needs through effective interaction with the intelligence
 Community.
              SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS/CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
      Mr. Myers. Is your decrease in requested funding for security
 clearances due to less information needing to be.classified? Are you
 still doing updates on existing clearances?
  
      Dr. Keliher. No, the FY 1995 request is not lower due to less
 information being classified. Information declassification involves
 declassifying the facts, data, or knowledge itself. We are involved in
 a comprehensive, fundamental review of the Department of Energy's
 classification policy. The decrease is a result of reduced numbers of
 clearance requirements, facility consolidation efforts, low turnover
 rates, and elimination of the reinvestigations backlog. The Department
 is continuing to do updates (reinvestigations) on existing clearances.
                        DECLASSIFICATION FUNDING
      Mr. Myers: Is any of the funding for nuclear safeguards and
 security activities being used to declassify material? If so, how much?
      Dr. Keliher: Funds within the nuclear safeguards and security
 budget which directly support the declassification of material are as
 follows: FY 1994 $5,900,000 and FY 1995 $6,536,000.
  
                   OTHER CABINET-LEVEL AGENCIES
      Mr. Bevill. How does the size and funding for this activity within
 the Department of Energy compare to that of other Cabinet-level
 agencies in FY 1994 and FY 1995?
      Dr. Keliher. The Department of Energy, in comparison with other
 Cabinet-level agencies, ranks a distant third in funding behind the
 Departments of Defense and Justice/FBI, respectively.  Regarding this
 Department's personnel strength, it ranks a distant fourth behind the
 Departments of Defense, Justice/FBI, and State.
      



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