FY 1995 BUDGET - DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL, 03/15/1994, Question and Answer
- Basis Date:
- 19950213
- Chairperson:
- T. Bevill
- Committee:
- House Appropriations
- Docfile Number:
- Q94AN301
- Hearing Date:
- 19940315
- DOE Lead Office:
- DP/NN
SUB
- Committee:
- Energy and Water Development
- Hearing Subject:
- FY 1995 BUDGET - DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND INTELLIGENCE AND
NATIONAL
- Witness Name:
- V. Reis/J. Keliher
-
Hearing Text:
-
PRODUCTION AND MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY
Mr. Bevill. Dr. Reis, how can DOE maintain a viable nuclear
weapons production and maintenance capability if there is no
requirement for new nuclear weapons and no nuclear testing?
Dr. Reis. Assuring our continuing production and maintenance
capability is one of the biggest challenges facing the Department as we
reduce the Nuclear Weapons Complex infrastructure in response to
declining budgets. There are two separate factors involved here,
production capability and production capacity. Production capability
reflects technical competence in essential manufacturing processes, but
not necessarily the capacity (personnel and production line equipment)
to produce large quantities of components. Production capacity implies
capability plus the capacity for quantity production. Maintenance of
the enduring stockpile is of paramount importance. We are attempting to
maintain the required production capacity to meet requirements through
the nonnuclear reconfiguration activity, by consolidating the
nonnuclear production infrastructure. Maintenance of our overall
production capability is even more difficult. In 1993, we implemented a
Production Capability Assurance Program, which allowed us to maintain
at least a minimum technical capability in essential production
processes. To date, the program has been successful, but further
personnel reductions planned for 1994 and 1995 will cause the loss, at
least temporarily, of some capabilities. We are attempting tb mitigate
the potential impact of these losses by ensuring the national
laboratories retain their competence in the basic technologies as part
of the Stockpile Stewardship program.
REPLICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON
Mr. Bevill. Dr. Reis, if it were necessary, would it be possible
to replicate a nuclear weapon and certify its capability and
performance within the existing resources of the DOE nuclear weapons
complex?
Dr. Reis. There are several caveats to this answer. The first is,
it would depend on the weapon requiring replication. Since we have no
current capability to produce new pits, the replicated design would
have to be an older one, for which we could reuse the pit (from storage
at Pantex). To achieve quantity production would require additional
fiscal resources. Today, except for the production of Limited Life
Components necessary to maintain the enduring stockpile, the nuclear
weapons complex is maintaining only the minimum capability to exercise
key production processes. To achieve quantity production capacity, we
would have to hire additional production personnel, process their
security clearances, and train and certify them; we would also have to
restore idled production equipment from its current standby condition
to production readiness. Obviously, we would not be able to replicate a
nuclear weapon until we completed the consolidation of nonnuclear
production facilities at Kansas City and the Los Alamos and Sandia
National Laboratories.
TRITIUM PRODUCTION STATUS
Mr. Bevill. Dr Reis, based on current stockpile requirements, when
must a decision be made to build a new tritium reactor?
Dr. Reis. There are several options for meeting tritium
requirements other than building a new tritium reactor. If one assumes,
however, that a new facility is to be built, then based on the current
stockpile plan and the conservative view that a new tritium production
source could take as long as 15 years to produce new tritium, a funding
decision would be necessary in Fiscal Year 1996. That would allow the
facility to be in production 3 years before strategic reserves of
tritium are exhausted. Currently, the Department of Energy is pursuing
four tritium production options in its Reconfiguration Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). These options include heavy
water, modular high-temperature gas, and light water reactors and a
proton accelerator. The draft PEIS will be available for review in
March 1995.
STATE OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES
Mr. Bevill. Can you describe the state of the Russian nuclear
weapons laboratories?
Dr. Keliher. Deleted
Deleted Deleted
DIVERSION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS
Mr. Bevill. How concerned should we be about the possible
diversion of Russian nuclear weapons scientists to other countries?
What can be done to mitigate the danger?
Dr. Keliher. Observations to date by the DOE's National
Laboratory scientists, as they interact on a project working level with
their counterparts in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), indicate that this
is not presently a major concern. However, economic conditions are
rapidly deteriorating and the desire of FSU weapons scientists to feed
themselves and their families will increase the probability that some
will leave.
Since early 1992, the Department of Energy has strongly
encouraged technical collaborations between its laboratories and FSU
weapons institutes. As of this date, initial technical exchange visits
in March 1992 have led to over $5,000,000 in direct contracts between
DOE and FSU weapons institutes. This contracting is employing thousands
of scientists, engineers and technicians in non-weapons related work
that maintains their professional integrity. Professional relationships
are being established that provide a continuing basis for education in
market economics. The success of direct laboratory-to-institute
contracting is now leading to other programs that include U.S.
industrial and academic participation, which will foster long- term
commercial enterprises. This direct contracting for goods and services
benefits Newly Independent States (NIS) institutes with employment and
education in western business practices and provides the U.S. access to
a large highly talented scientific pool of knowledge. These activities
should be strengthened and given long-term support so as to minimize
the developing proliferation risk and establish lasting economic
benefits.
In addition to these laboratory-to-institute exchanges, the DOE
is supporting the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in
Moscow. The Director of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
is the U.S. representative to the board of governors and two National
Laboratory scientists are providing technical support to the center.
The DOE strongly supports the nonproliferation goals of the ISTC and we
encourage enhanced support to the center.
CAPABILITIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES
Mr. Bevill. Dr. Reis, how can we maintain the capabilities of the
nuclear weapons laboratories in the absence of new weapons
requirements?
Dr. Reis. I have instituted a science-based Stockpile Stewardship
program at the weapons laboratories. Important elements of this program
are: (1) enhanced above-ground experimentation to retain and attract
the best and the brightest to the weapons program, (2) acquisition of
state-of-the-art computation capabilities, (3) programs to capture and
centralize more than 40 years of weapons research, design, and testing
experience, (4) a forward-looking facilities strategy, and (5) dual
use/technology transfer with U.S. industry.
Enhanced aboveground experimentation will increase our
understanding of the performance of nuclear weapons in the absence of
underground nuclear testing. The acquisition of state-of-the-art
computation capabilities focuses on the purchase of massively parallel
processor computers and the support to convert our existing weapons
design codes to operate oh these machines. Activities to capture
weapons experience are vital because much of this experience rests in
an aging cadre of scientific personnel. Also, the dual-use Technology
Transfer program in cooperation with U.S. industry is designed to
assist the nuclear weapons laboratories in maintaining their core
competencies while benefiting U.S. economic competitiveness.
DEPARTURE OF SCIENTISTS FROM THE WEAPONS LABORATORIES
Mr. Bevill. How many scientists have left the weapons laboratories
in the last 2 years and how many are expected to leave in FY 1994 and
FY 1995? What were the ages of these scientists?
Dr. Reis. In the interest of brevity, I have some information
from Los Alamos as an example. I will provide similar information from
Livermore and Sandia separately. It is difficult, if not impossible, to
predict who will leave the weapons programs at the national
laboratories in the next 2 years through retirement or for other
reasons. This is because of the many (unknown) variables involved in a
personal choice such as this. Based on the information that is
available, however, we can say who is eligible to retire in FY 1994 and
FY 1995.
The major portion of staff leaving the nuclear weapons program at
Los Alamos in the past 2 years occurred last year as a result of the
University of California's Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Program
(VERIP III). A total of 237 scientists, engineers, technicians, and
administrative support personnel took this retirement incentive.
Of the 1,948 Research, Development and Testing staff currently
employed, 550 or about 36 percent are over 50 years of age. Within the
next 2 years, another 155, or 8 percent of the current staff will
become eligible to retire, assuming no changes in this age group. It
is, however, expected that few staff will choose to retire at an early
age because of the strong incentives built into the retirement programs
to wait until one is 60 years or older to retire.
DEMOGRAPHICS OF LABORATORY WEAPONS SCIENTISTS
Mr. Bevill. Please provide for the record the demographics of the
laboratory weapons scientists showing the current age-of the work force
and the ages of those who have left recently.
Dr. Reis. I will use some information from Los Alamos. I will
provide similar information from Livermore and Sandia separately. The
age distribution of current staff at Los Alamos, which includes
scientists, engineers, technicians, and administrative support
personnel, is shown in Figure 1, entitled "Los Alamos FY 1993 Age
Distribution." The age distribution of the workers, including
scientists, engineers, technicians, and administrative support
personnel, who have left recently is shown in Figure 2, entitled "VERIP
III PARTICIPANTS." This shows that most of those who left were in the
55-60 age bracket. VERIP III was the voluntary early retirement
incentive program offered last year by the University of California
Retirement Plan. Retirements became effective October 29, 1993. I would
like to insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 into the record. (The information
follows:)
****Figure 1 Los Alamos FY 1993 Age Distribution and Figure 2 VERIP III
Participants charts are attached to original document****
CAPABILITIES REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE NATION NUCLEAR DETERRENT
Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, could you describe what DOD perceives to be
the capabilities which must be retained at the nuclear weapons labs to
maintain the Nation's nuclear deterrent?
Dr. Smith. We must be able, at a minimum, to maintain a safe,
reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. In order to accomplish this the DOE
nuclear weapons laboratories must maintain a capability second to none
to identify problems in weapons, repair those problems, certify the
repairs or replace warheads that cannot be repaired, all without
nuclear testing.
Even though not explicitly stated above, the ability to dismantle
weapons and dispose of the resulting hazardous materials in an
environmentally responsible manner is also critical as the U.S.
downsizes its nuclear arsenal.
In summary, the DOD must continue to rely on the DOE laboratories
to be the stewards of the nuclear weapons stockpile; provide the
expertise to design, engineer, provide surveillance, repair,
fabricate, and dismantle the nuclear arsenal. The labs have also
provided technical vision for the future in nuclear and many nonnuclear
areas and DOD expects that to continue.
NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS
Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, what is the current DOD thinking on the
most likely national security threat this Nation faces?
Dr. Smith. We believe that there are four new post-cold war
dangers faced by the Nation. These are: regional threats to U.S.
interests, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and possible
failure of democratic reforms (both in Russia and elsewhere in the
world,). The fourth, although not a traditional military threat, but
one that could have significant impact, is negative national economic
trends.
FUTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, what type of nuclear weapons is DOD looking
at for future development? How far in the future do you see the need to
produce a new nuclear weapons?
Dr. Smith. The DOD has no requirement to develop a new nuclear
weapon. However, we need to maintain the ability to produce nuclear
weapons. Based on past experience, we can expect to find problems with
weapons in the enduring stockpile. If the problem seriously degrades
weapons performance, we may need to remanufacture or replace that
weapon, thus requiring new production. We cannot predict when such a
need will occur. But as long as nuclear deterrence remains a vital part
of our national security, we must maintain the capability to produce
new weapons.
MEDICAL RADIATION EXPERIMENTS
Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, what is the status of DOD's review of
medical radiation experiments?
Dr. Smith. The services and DOD agencies are involved in an
on-going effort to aggressively search for records at archives,
libraries, record centers, laboratories, contractor organization,
government agencies, university facilities, medical centers, and
military installations. This is a time-intensive, cumbersome task;
however, DOD is committed to a full accounting of its role in this
matter. The Department has moved forward on a broad front to confront
the issues associated with human radiation experiments. DOD is an
active participant in the deliberations of the President's Human
Radiation Interagency Working Group; Department policies and procedures
are in place to guide our efforts; a Command Center that is the
Department's focal point for information is operational; and the
services and Department agencies have provided information that we are
in the process of collecting, reviewing and categorizing. By no means
an all inclusive description of the Department's actions, these
activities do highlight the priority with which we are treating -- and
continue to treat -- this issue.
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW
Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the NPR?
Dr. Smith. The DOD's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is not well
underway. It is examining the role of nuclear forces in the security
policy of the United States in light of the new and enduring dangers of
the post-cold war era. The NPR is the first study of nuclear policy in
15 years, the first in the post-cold war world, and the first study
ever to include policy, doctrine, force structure, command, and control
in a single review. The NPR will be ready to make recommendations to
the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
early summer.
Nuclear Safeguards and Security
COORDINATION WITH DOD ON DECLASSIFICATION
Mr. Bevill. How is DOE coordinating with DOD in its current
efforts to declassify information? Are there any instances of
disagreement between the two organizations on how the declassification
effort should proceed?
Dr. Keliher. DOE coordinates its declassification efforts with
two primary offices in the DOD: The Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Atomic Energy, and the Assistant Deputy to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Security Policy. DOE has notified DOD of
current declassification efforts thorough DOE's Defense Program Office.
DOD was also invited and participated in DOE's internal review of
declassification proposals on March 3, 1994. A formal memorandum of
recommended declassifications will be sent to DOD by April 1, 1994. We
anticipate a response from DOD by the end of April 1994. There have
been no disagreements between the two organizations on how the
declassification effort should proceed; however, there have been
disagreements on certain declassification proposals in the past.
COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA
Mr. Bevill. Please describe any programs in which the U.S. weapons
laboratories are cooperating with their counterparts in Russia. For
those programs using DOE funds, describe the specific agreement and the
source and amount of funding in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995.
Dr. Reis. The Department of Energy (DOE) weapons laboratories
are cooperating with institutes and laboratories in the Russian
Federation in several areas. These interactions include DOE funded
laboratory-to-laboratory efforts, safe, secure dismantlement effort&
using Department of Defense funding under the "Nunn-Lugar"
appropriations, industrial partnering activities funded through the
Department of State and the FY 1994 Foreign Operations Appropriation
Act, and proposed weapon surety technology exchanges yet unfunded. The
following are descriptions of each effort.
DOE FUNDED ACTIVITIES: The Department of Energy laboratories have
been encouraged to enter into contractual interactions with entities of
the Former Soviet Union (FSU) when these interactions.are in agreement
with the general policies of DOE and benefit DOE-programs. In this
regard, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) established
about 120 contracts with 35 FSU institutes for about $1 million in FY
1993. The major LLNL interactions were focused in the areas of
laser,technology, inertial fusion, and optics. Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL) also established interactions with FSU institutions.
Major LANL effort has been focused in the areas of explosively driven
pulse power and accelerator based conversion and accelerator
transmutation of waste. LANL recently completed joint pulsed power
experiments with Arzamas-16 scientists using one of the FSU's large
electromagnetic generators. These LANL efforts were funded at about
$325 thousand in FY 1993. Similarly, the Sandia National Laboratories
(SNL) has recently begun significant interactions with the FSU in the
areas of pulse power technology, materials technology, and surety
related technologies. These SNL efforts were funded at about $1.45
million in FY 1993. The projected expenditures of DOE funds by the
weapons laboratories to support expanded interactions with the FSU are
$6.5 million in FY 1994 and $8.6 million in FY 1995.
SAFE, SECURE DISMANTLEMENT (SSD) SUPPORT TO DOD: The DOE weapons
laboratories are providing support to the Department of Defense (DOD)
in the Nunn-Lugar funded program to assist the FSU in SSD efforts. The
DOE efforts fall into several categories: design support for
procurement of fissile material containers; fissile material storage
facility design and equipment assistance; railcar safety and security
modification; emergency response equipment; and soft armor blankets.
In FY 1993 approximately $38.6 million of DOD funds was expended in
support of these activities with the Russian Federation. The funding
distribution for the SSD efforts for FY 1994 and FY 1995 have not yet
been decided and amounts are not available at this time.
INDUSTRIAL PARTNERING EFFORT: The DOE laboratories (including the
weapons laboratories) expect to be initiating efforts with the
scientific and engineering institutes in the FSU under the program of
cooperation provided for in the FY 1994 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act. This effort, funded at $35 million in FY 1994
funds, will include qualified U.S. academic institutes and partners
from U.S. industry. These programs are intended to stabilize the
technology base in the cooperating states of the FSU and assist in the
prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The
proposal that has been accepted by the Department of State includes
three elements: a Stabilization Element with near term efforts between
DOE laboratories and FSU institutes; a Cost-Shared Industrial
Partnering Element to establish long term stability and
commercialization technologies converted from the FSU weapons
establishment; and the Academic Support Element to develop
telecommunications, and provide business training and administrative
support to the industry coalition. This effort is just beginning, and
specific efforts are being defined for funding within the $35 million
appropriation.
TECHNICAL INFORMATION EXCHANGES ON NUCLEAR WARHEAD SAFETY AND
SECURITY: The DOE and the weapons laboratories have recently begun
an effort to establish technical cooperation in the area of nuclear
warhead safety and security between the United States (DOE) and the
Russian Federation (Ministry of Atomic Energy). This DOE Defense
Programs led initiative will involve a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) in accordance with the formal State Department Circular 175
Process for negotiating international agreements.
We believe there are also numerous other activities funded by the
Offices of Energy Research and Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management and the laboratories.
STOCKPILE MEMORANDUM
Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the latest Nuclear Weapons
Stockpile Memorandum?
Dr. Reis. The FY 1994"1999 Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum
containing the stockpile plan was approved by the Secretaries of
Defense and Energy in late December 1993, and forwarded to the National
Security Council on January 4, 1994. This stockpile plan was approved
by President Clinton on March 1, 1994. Current scheduling calls for
submission of a new Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum forwarding a
new stockpile plan for the period FY 1995-2000 to President Clinton in
the fall of 1994.
UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING
Mr. Bevill. Under what conditions would the U.S. consider
performing an underground nuclear test?
Dr. Reis. The decision to resume underground nuclear testing will
be made by the President. Deleted
Deleted Deleted
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST BAN
Mr. Bevill: If the President chose to end the current nuclear
weapons test ban, what type of weapon would DOE test and why?
Dr. Reis: There has been no advance determination of the type of
weapon that would be first tested if the President decided that nuclear
testing should be resumed. Such a determination would depend on the
circumstances at the time and would be made in consultation with the
Department of Defense. Consistent with the Hatfield/Mitchell/Exon
legislation, the Congress would also be consulted.
OTHER COUNTRIES' NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAMS
Mr. Bevill. What is the status of other countries' nuclear testing
programs? Do you anticipate any countries performing nuclear tests in
FY 1994 and FY 1995?
Dr. Keliher. China is the only country among the five major
nuclear powers with an active nuclear testing program. China last
conducted a nuclear test in October 1993. Russia, however, has not
conducted a nuclear test within the past 3 years and has been a willing
participant in nuclear testing moratoria with France, the U.S. and the
U.K. since 1992. France and the UK last tested in 1991 and 1992
respectively.
Deleted
HYDRONUCLEAR EXPERIMENTS
Mr. Bevill: Please describe the role hydronuclear experiments
could play in ensuring the safety and reliability of the stockpile.
Dr. Reis: Hydronuclear experiments provide an experimental method
to directly measure the safety and reliability characteristics of a
nuclear weapon primary. These experiments, in which the nuclear energy
generated is much smaller than the chemical energy expended by the high
explosives, were used to address stockpile safety concerns during the
1958-1961 U.S. nuclear testing moratorium.
Historically, we have seen one to two defects per year that
require changes in the stockpile. As the smaller stockpile ages, we
expect to find changes that will require remanufacturing, replacement,
or substitution of stockpile components. Therefore, hydronuclear
experiments can provide valuable support to our stockpile surveillance
program. Near-term baseline experiments would provide standard data to
compare against data from future experiments to examine aging effects
and to verify corrections or changes made to the primary.
PLUTONIUM AND TRITIUM PRODUCTION
Mr. Bevill. Are any other nations still producing plutonium?
Dr. Keliher. Yes. Plutonium is produced as a result of normal
power reactor operation. Russia has three dual-purpose production
reactors still in operation, two at Tomsk and one at Krasnoyarsk, that
provide heat and electricity to their respective sites and nearby
communities. We believe these reactors are producing weapons grade
plutonium. However, we do not believe the recovered plutonium is being
used to produce additional nuclear weapons. On March 16, 1994, the
Department of Energy and the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) of the
Russian Federation agreed to work together to find ways to replace the
Tomsk reactors (by using gas turbines) and the reactor at Krasnoyarsk
(by finishing construction on a coal-fired plant).
COUNTRIES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Mr. Bevill. Please identify all countries known or suspected to
have nuclear weapons and include the number of strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons held by each.
Dr. Keliher. The countries known to have nuclear weapons are the
Former Soviet Union, China, France and the United Kingdom, as well as
the United States. Countries suspected of having nuclear weapons are
Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea. Estimates 'on the numbers of
weapons are classified.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS NEPA DOCUMENTS IN PREPARATION
Mr. Bevill. Provide a brief description and milestones for all
Defense Programs environmental impact statements and environmental
assessments currently being prepared by Defense Programs.
Dr. Reis. Listed below are all Defense Programs National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) actions (environmental impact
statements or environmental assessments) for which there has been a
formal determination to prepare one of the two documents. (The
information follows:)
PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS:
Programmatic EIS for Reconfiguration of the Nuclear Weapons
Complex
Description: To propose reconfiguration of the Nuclear
Weapons Complex to be smaller, less diverse, and less
expensive than that of today. The reconfigured complex would
have fewer individual sites, generally lower capacity
facilities, and would fully comply with applicable
environmental, safety and health laws, regulations and
orders. This will include the Department's preferred
alternative for the technology and location for a new
tritium supply.
Milestone: March 1995 Draft EIS for Public Review
(Secretarial Commitment).
SITE-WIDE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS:
Note:Consideration is ongoing for Site-wide EISs at a number of
Defense Programs sites where current NEPA coverage is
non-existent or out-dated.
Pantex Site-wide EIS
Description: To evaluate all current and proposed facilities
and activities at Pantex including dismantlement and storage
of the resulting nuclear materials and classified weapons
components (pits).
Milestone:Record of Decision, November 15, 1996 (Secretarial
Commitment).
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS:
Interim Management of Nuclear Materials at the Savannah River
Site
Description: To evaluate nuclear materials currently at the
Savannah River Site. The nuclear materials would be placed
into one of three categories: (1) materials that should be
stabilized based on the risk they pose to workers, the public
or the environment; (2) materials proposed to be converted to
a useable form for a programmatic need; and (3) materials
that are stable and not required for a programmatic need.
Milestone: March 1995
Upgrade of the F & H Canyon Exhaust Systems at the Savannah River
Site
Description: To evaluate the impacts of the upgrade of
existing canyon ventilation exhaust systems for the F- and
H-area chemical separations facilities.
Milestone: July 1995
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS:
Total: 32
Kansas City Plant (1)
Separate Process Wastewaters, Part A, Contaminated Flow Collection
and Treatment System
Description: To construct and operate a collection and
treatment system for contaminated wastewaters and
groundwaters at the DOE operated Kansas City Plant.
Milestone: July 1994 (expected completion)
Pantex Plant (1)
Construction and Operation of Environmental, Safety and Health
Analytical
Laboratory
Description: To meet the need for increased testing and
analysis capability of environmental, waste, and explosive
samples by constructing and operating a new analytical
laboratory at Pantex and subsequently demolishing the
existing laboratory facility.
Milestone: October 1994
Pit Reuse Project
Description: Develop and demonstrate the capability at
Pantex to modify certain pits generated from the nuclear
weapon dismantlement process to enhance safety and to allow
reuse of pits by integrating existing technology at Pantex
with new technology developed specially for this project.
Milestone: January 1995
Savannah River Site (4)
D-Area Powerhouse Life Extension
Description: Line #:95-D-157, to upgrade and renovate the
existing SRS powerhouse in order to extend the facility
life, upgrade system controls to current industry standards,
and ensure production reliability.
Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
Domestic Water System Upgrades Phase I & II
Description: Line #:93-D-147, to upgrade the existing 28
SRS domestic water supply systems by improving.and
consolidating them as necessary to cost-effectively comply
with South Carolina primary drinking water regulations.
Eleven of the existing systems would be consolidated and
replaced by a central water supply treatment facility and a
new 24-mile main distribution system.
Milestone: July 1994
Storage of Plutonium Metal in the Building 247-F Vault
Description: To provide additional interim capacity to
store plutonium at the SRS.
Milestone: Under review
Uranium Solidification Facility, Building 221 H
Description: Line #:85-D-145, to provide the facilities to
process liquid, highly-enriched uranyl nitrate for the
production of solid uranium oxide.
Milestone: Suspended pending outcome of the study to look
at alternate methods to disposition uranyl nitrate
hexahydrate.
Oak Ridge Y-12 (2)
Interim Storage of Excess Highly Enriched Uranium
Description: To provide interim storage of nuclear weapons
highly enriched uranium from weapons dismantlement at Pantex.
In August 1994, the amount to be stored will exceed the
previous historical high amount of material stored at OR/Y-12
facility.
Milestone: August 1994
Hydrogen Fluoride Supply System in Building 9212
Description: Line # 94-D-124, to update the current Anhydrous
Hydrogen Fluoride Process at OR/Y-12.
Milestone: Fiscal year 1995 (Construction starts the 1st
Quarter, 1995).
Los Alamos National Laboratory (9)
Fire Resistant Pit Project
Description: To provide an indoor bench-scale research
project for Fire Resistant Pits. The project will involve
heating weapons components (pits) under controlled conditions
in a hot cell to determine the behavior of a weapon in an
accidental fuel fire scenario.
Milestone: Under review
Chemistry Metallurgy Research Building Upgrades
Description: Line #:95-D-102, to upgrade the Chemistry and
Metallurgical Research (CMR) Building in order to meet
current standards in the areas of health, safety,
environmental protection, and security and safeguards.
Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
High Explosive Material Test Facility
Description: Line #:94-D-102, to construct a new High
Explosive Material Test Facility building. The facility will
be used for mechanical and thermal tests on materials and
assemblies containing high explosive materials.
Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
Isotope Separator Building
Description: To relocate one isotope separator and to install
a new one at TA-48. The isotope separators will be housed in
a pre-engineered building.
Milestone: Under review
Low Level Waste Drum Staging Facility
Description: To place a prefabricated storage building
adjacent to the existing Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility
at TA-16. The building will be used as a staging site for
sealed 55-gallon drums (up to eight) of noncompactible waste,
contaminated with low levels of tritium classified as
low-level waste, prior to moving the waste to TA-54.
Milestone: June 1994
Deactivate, Disassemble and Decontaminate, High Pressure Tritium
Laboratory, at Building 86 at TA-33
Description: To deactivate, disassemble, and decontaminate
High Pressure Tritium Laboratory at TA-33. Programmatic
operations in the building were suspended in 1990.
Milestone: As soon as possible
Accelerator Prototype Laboratory
Description: To erect pre-engineered a building in an
existing developed area within Technical Area (TA)-53 for
research, development, and testing of accelerator components,
primarily continuous ion source generators.
Milestone: April 1994
Weapons Component Testing Facility
Description: To relocate an existing physical properties
testing laboratory, without changing the scope of operations,
from Building 450 to 207 within TA-16. A small enclosure will
be built to house hydraulic pumps.
Milestone: Under review
Increase of Special Nuclear Material Storage Level at Nuclear
Material Storage Facility
Description: Original Line #:84-D-104, to replace and
upgrade facility components to permit full operation of the
Nuclear Material Storage Facility (NMSF).
Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
Sandia National Laboratory (7)
Processing and Environmental Technology Laboratory
Description: Line #:94-D-102/Subproject-06, to construct a
laboratory to collocate activities dealing with materials
and processes research; waste reduction; management of
hazardous materials; and environment, safety, and health
which are currently dispersed throughout Sandia National
Laboratories.
Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
Robotic Manufacturing Science and Engineering Laboratory
Description: Line #: 92-D-102, to construct and operate a
new building that will provide office and laboratory
facilities for robotics research and testing.
Milestone: April 1994
Technology Support Center/Gamma Irradiation Facility
Description: Line #:90-D-102/Subproject-06, to design,
construction, and operate a new Gamma Irradiation Facility
located in Tech Area V, and the removal of the existing Gamma
Irradiation Facility to consolidate gamma irradiation sources
in a single, dedicated facility, reducing the potential for
radiation exposure of personnel.
Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
Aerial Cable Site Facility Operation
Description: To operate a facility consisting of steel cables
suspended across Sol se Mete Canyon in the Coyote Test Field
Area to provide a means of conducting air-to-ground tests of
aircraft deliverable ordnance, ground-to-air missile, and
other air defined material tests under controlled and
instrumented conditions.
Milestone: Under review
Neutron Generator/Switch Tube Prototyping Relocation Project
Description: To relocate the prototyping of neutron
generators and switch tubes from Building 891 to the East
Annex of Building 870, both within Technical Area I. New
equipment will be purchased and set up in Building 870.
Building 891 will be decommissioned for use in another
project.
Milestone: April 1994
Coyote Canyon Test Complex Operation
Description: To modify and expand activities within and
adjacent to Technical Area III for Coyote Canyon Test Complex
Operations. Testing programs will continue to involve the
use of explosives and propellants to test the reliability,of
weapons, weapons components, and support end articles.
Milestone: Under review
Modification and Operation of the Neutron Measurements Laboratory,
Building 984
Description: To modify and allow the operation of the
Neutron Measurements Laboratory that was completed in
February 1990. Its primary purpose is to provide a location
to conduct time-of-flight measurements of neutrons created by
inertial confinement fusion target implosions in Particle
Beam Fusion Accelerator II.
Milestone: Under review
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (3)
Explosive Waste Storage Facility at Site 300
Description: Line #:94-D-414, to construct a facility that
would be used to store all explosive wastes generated by the
Weapons Testing Programs at LLNL and Site 300 before
treatment at Site 300 or shipment off site.
Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
Contained Firing Facility at Bunker 801, Site 300
Description: Line #:94-D-102/Subproject-03, to enclose the
firing operations at the principal Site 300 weapons test
facility, Bunker 801, which would reduce the amount of
hazardous and other wastes generated at the bunker, minimize
emissions of noise and hazardous materials into the
environment, and enhance the overall safety of the
operations.
Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
General Atomics Target Fabrication and Technology Support of the
Inertial Confinement Fusion Program
Description: To create Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF)
Target Fabrication and Tritium Handling Facilities to be
operated by General Atomics (GA) in San Diego, California. GA
would use these facilities to manufacture ICF targets under a
contract for the Department of Energy. These targets would be
used in laser or particle beam experiments performed by
various U.S. Inertial Fusion Laboratories.
Milestone: Under review
Nevada Operations (2)
North Las Vegas Facility Including the Proposed Construction of
the Nevada Support Facility
Description: Line #:93-0-102, to construct the Nevada
Support Facility (NSF) at the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF)
and to operate,and maintain the NLVF, which includes the
implementation of the Five-Year Facilities Plan for the
facilities owned by DOE and operated by EG&G.
Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
Opening and Operation of Combined Device Assembly Facility at the
Nevada Test Site
Description: Line #:85-D-105, to provide state-of-the art
facilities for nuclear explosive operations that require
the handling of high explosives (HE) in combination with
Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), and to reduce the
environmental impact and personnel exposure in the unlikely
event of an accident.
Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design
Fernald and Hanford (1)
Sale of Excess Depleted, Normal, and Low Enriched Uranium
Material
Description: To study the sale, packaging, loading, and
shipment of approximately 3,626 metric tons of depleted,
normal, and low enriched uranium stored at the Fernald and
Hanford sites.
Milestone: April 1994 (to allow evaluation of contract
based on bids received)
University of Rochester (1)
Tritium Filling Station at the Lab for Laser Energetics
Description: To provide a facility capable of filling
hollow microspheres with deuterium and tritium for use as
targets on the existing UR/LLE OMEGA laser system.
Milestone: As soon as possible
Pinellas Plant (1)
Leasing of Buildings and Facilities
Description: To modify existing facilities for non-defense
reuse applications. Utilization of existing technical
personnel resources would be encouraged.
Milestone: June 1994
LABORATORY FUNDING
Mr. Bevill: Please provide a breakout by laboratory or site of DOE
funding for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995.
Dr. Reis: The breakout by laboratory or site of Weapons Activities
funding for FY 1993, FY 1994, FY 1995 is shown in a table which I would
like to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES BY LABORATORY/SITE
TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
Albuquerque $ 308.9 $ 303.0 $ 283.7
Kansas City 331.4 329.8 252.6
LANL 524.7 457.3 430.9
LLNL 476.8 410.3 357.0
Mound 97.6 73.9 30.3
Nevada 340.6 325.0 311.8
Oak Ridge (Includes Y-12) 519.1 443.1 364.6
Pantex 238.7 240.7 253.5
Pinellas 96.5 87.3 30.9
Rocky Flats 505.0 253.6 67.5
SNL 665.6 632.4 686.3
Savannah River 129.6 108.1 106.8
HQ/Other 471.0 374.8 172.8
TOTAL $4,705.5 $4,039.3 $3,348.7
LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
Mr. Bevill. By laboratory, identify.the number of FTE's funded
in the weapons program for each year since 1980, al.so provide total
laboratory funding for each laboratory by year.
Dr. Reis. The FTE information and total laboratory funding for
each laboratory by year is shown in a table which I would like to
insert for the record. (The information follows:)
LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS
LLNL LANL SNL TOTAL
1980 3,457 2,766 3,778 10,001
1981 3,705 2,964 3,739 10,408
1982 3,704 3,000 3,806 10,510
1983 3,957 3,015 3,883 10,855
1984 3,889 3,082 3,914 10,885
1985 3,970 3,099 4,122 11,191
1986 3,757 2,956 3,953 10,666
1987 4,240 3,016 3,899 11,155
1988 3,841 2,853 3,676 10,370
1989 3,742 2,645 3,606 9,993
1990 3,550 2,585 3,632 9,767
1991 3,156 2,421 3,134 8,711
1992 3,322 2,441 3,480 9,243
1993 3,133 2,744 3,158 9,035
1994 est. 2,872 1,850 2,899 7,621
1995 est. 2,589 1,770 2,845 7,204
LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
OPERATING FUNDING
(Dollars in Millions)
LLNL LANL SNL TOTAL
1980 $145.1 $125.1 $213.3 $483.5
1981 181.5 154.3 148.0 483.8
1982 216.0 193.8 290.1 699.9
1983 235.2 215.5 316.5 767.2
19'84 310.6 283.1 378.1 971.8
1985 356.2 309.9 421.4 1,087.6
1986 373.5 304.3 427.2 1,105.0
1987 319.8 292.0 433.8 1,045.6
1988 314.6 287.8 444.0 1,046.4
1989 342:0 291.2 464.6 1,097.8
1990 366.1 307.7 467.0 1,140.8
1991 347.4 291.7 465.8 1,104.9
1992 374.8 323.6 506.1 1,204.5
1993 386.0 364.4 472.2 1,222.6
1994 est. 340.4 282.5 435.5 1,058.4
1995 est. 318.9 270.6 402.4 991.9
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a detailed breakout of activities
and associated costs funded using DOD funds by individual DOE
laboratory for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995.
Dr. Reis: The DOE laboratories provide DOD technological support
utilizing unique facilities and technical capabilities. Examples of
activities include: defense systems research, advanced conventional
munitions research, armor/anti-armor research, defense nuclear
research, arms control and verification research, security systems
development, weapons related experiments and tests, and environmental
studies for restoration of facilities, subsurface detection technology
research, computer code development and analysis, materials research,
weapons related training materials, reentry vehicle technology, weapon
trainers, miscellaneous weapons related hardware development, and
advanced manufacturing technologies.
DOD funding by laboratory is shown in a table which I would like
to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
Actual Estimated Estimated
Obligations Obligations Obligations
Los Alamos National $ 137.5M $ 116.6M $ 100.0M
Laboratory
Sandia National $ 315.2M $ 285.7M $ 285.7M
Laboratories
Lawrence Livermore $ 149.6M $ 131.4M $ 98.3M
National Laboratory
Total $ 602.3M $ 533.7M $ 484.0M
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
Mr. Bevill: Provide a breakout by location of FY 1993, FY 1994
and FY 1995 funding,for weapons RD&T by program element.
Dr. Reis: A breakout by location of FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY 1995
funding for Weapons Research, Development and Testing is shown in a
table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information
follows:)
****Research, Development & Testing FY 1993 by Site by Program Element
chart is attached to original document****
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the system and explain the need for
all weapons systems currently in Phase I and Phase 2 of weapons
development.
Dr. Reis. The Department of Energy is not participating in any
Phase I studies. There are two Phase 2 studies, High Power Radio
Frequency (HPRF) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)
Replacement Warhead.
The purpose of the HPRF study is to determine the feasibility
of developing a non-lethal, ICBM-delivered, and nuclear-driven HPRF
device intended to damage electronics and/or electrical components.
This study was approved and requested by the Nuclear Weapons Council
Standing Committee based on the results of the previous HPRF Phase I
study. The Air Force was requested to lead the study with DOE as a
participant. U.S. Air Force Space Command and U.S. Strategic Command
are the intended customers for this device and fully support the Air
Force and DOE in their efforts.
The Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Replacement
Warhead Phase 2 Study is essentially complete. The Navy Strategic
Systems Program Office (SSP) will issue the final report after briefing
the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing Committee.
The Navy requested the SLBM study to identify and quantify
technical alternatives to the MK4/W76 and MK5/W88 reentry systems. The
Navy requested the study because of the expected long stockpile
lifetime for SLBM warheads and to explore safety enhancements that may
be desirable in the enduring stockpile. While both the W76 and the W88
are safe, neither has the most modern safety features of Insensitive
High Explosive (IHE) or Fire Resistant Pits (FRP).
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list by type and number of warheads
of the total nuclear weapons stockpile in FY 1993 and proposed for each
year through FY 2003.
Dr. Reis. The stockpile plan is approved only through Fiscal Year
1999. The table below provides the information requested for this
period.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE DATA (END OF FY)
FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99
ACTIVE STOCKPILE
B53 STRATEGIC BOMB
B61-3 NONSTRAT BOMB
B61-4 NONSTRAT BOMB
B61-7 STRATEGIC BOMB Deleted Deleted
B61-10 NONSTRAT BOMB
W62 MINUTEMAN III
W69 SRAM A
W76 TRIDENT C4
W78 MINUTEMAN III
W80-0 SUB CRUISE MSL
W80-1 AIR CRUISE MSL
B83 STRATEGIC BOMB
W87 PEACEKEEPER
W88 TRIDENT D5
ACTIVE TOTAL
INACTIVE STOCKPILE
Deleted Deleted
NUCLEAR WEAPON RETIREMENTS
Mr. Bevill. Describe the DOD nuclear weapons retirement program in
FY 1994 and FY 1995. Provide a list showing the type and number of
warhead systems proposed to be retired each year through 2003.
Dr. Reis. The Department of Defense is planning to retire fewer
weapons than in the recent past because many facets of previous
Presidential nuclear initiatives (such as retirement of all
ground-launched nuclear weapons) have been Implemented. However, the
stockpile plan is approved only through Fiscal Year 1999. Thus, the
table below provides information only for FY 1993-1999,
NUCLEAR WEAPON RETIREMENTS
FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99
B53 STRATEGIC BOMB
W56 MINUTEMAN II
B57-2 NONSTRAT BOMB
B61-0 NONSTRAT BOMB
B61-2 NONSTRAT BOMB Deleted Deleted
B61-3 NONSTRAT BOMB
B61-4 NONSTRAT BOMB
B61-5 NONSTRAT BOMB
B61-7 STRATEGIC BOMB
B61-10 NONSTRAT BOMB
W62 MINUTEMAN III
W68 POSEIDON
W69 SRAM A
W76 TRIDENT C4
W78 MINUTEMAN III
W80-0 SUB CRUISE MSL
W80-1 AIR CRUISE MSL Deleted Deleted
B83 STRATEGIC BOMB
W84 GROUND CRUISE MSL
W87 PEACEKEEPER
W88 TRIDENT D5
RETIREMENT TOTAL
WEAPON DISMANTLEMENT
Mr. Bevill. How many weapons have been disassembled at Pantex by
year since FY 1988, and how many are scheduled for FY 1994 and FY 1995?
Dr. Reis: Quantities of disassembled weapons by year are:
Fiscal Year Disposals
1988 581
1989 1,208
1990 1,154
1991 1,595
1992 1,856
1993 1,556
In FY 1994 and 1995, we plan to dismantle 2,000 weapons each year.
PANTEX ANALYTICAL LABORATORY
Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the proposed Pantex Analytical
Laboratory? Are funds included in FY 1995 for this activity?
Dr. Reis, The Department sees a real benefit in having a National
Resource Center for Plutonium located in the Amarillo area to interpret
for the public, and especially for the State of Texas, information on
the environmental and biological effects of plutonium, high explosives,
and hazardous materials generated from nuclear weapons assembly and
dismantlement. Also, research on international controls of fissile
material and evaluation of fission options for plutonium disposition.
Currently, the Department is exploring the concept and approach for the
establishment and operation of the Center, and we expect to reach a
decision on the approach in the near future. We will advise the
Committee when this occurs and the source of funding is identified.
VEHICLE REPLACEMENT
Mr. Bevill. Justify the need for replacing 22 police-type
vehicles.
Dr. Reis. We are seeking to replace 22 vehicles configured with
a Police Package for use by the Safeguards and Security Department,
Protective Services Division, at the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory. These units will replace Security Police Officer
patrol/response vehicles that are currently under lease until the end
of FY 1994. Due to the age and maintenance costs of the leased
vehicles, it will be more efficient to purchase new vehicles than the
currently leased vehicles. Police-type vehicles continue to be needed
at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for the protection of
Defense Programs assets at the facility.
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
Mr. Bevill. Describe the nonproliferation activities funded in
this program and explain why they are not included in the Department's
arms control and nonproliferation budget.
Dr. Reis: As part of our effort to make the Research and
Development budget justification more accurately descriptive of the
work performed by the laboratories in support of the weapons program,
certain high priority, high visibility programs were broken out as
separate activities within Research and Development. Among these
Programs and Initiatives is N-PACTA, Nonproliferation, Arms Control,
and Threat Assessment.
N-PACTA is a relatively small activity, $11.7 million in FY 1994
and $6.4 million in FY 1995, but because of the high priority the
Congress and the President are placing on nonproliferation activities
we have chosen to highlight it. The activities collected within this
category are not duplicative of the activities funded within the
Materials Support and Other Defense Programs account. Rather, they are
concentrated around nuclear weapons design-specific engineering and
technology concepts and issues, and therefore a part of the R&D budget.
In general, these activities are activities which are captured by
the Department's Nonproliferation crosscut but which do not fall under
the purview of the Office of NonProliferation and National Security
because the requirement for these activities is driven by the.needs of
the U.S. stockpile, as opposed to the need to monitor non-U.S. weapons
activities.
Specifically, the activities within the N-PACTA category either
are activities that are necessary for the Weapons Research and
Development program to meet its responsibilities and fit under a broad
definition of nonproliferation, such as international device design
assessments, military implication assessments, and limited R&D efforts
to guard against technology surprise; or they are efforts in support of
the Department's treaty negotiation efforts which utilize the weapons
program's unique talents and capabilities, such as technical support
for the nuclear test talks.
In no case does this category support activities which should be,
or are, funded through the Materials Support and Other Defense Programs
account which is primarily involved in the monitoring of non-U.S.
weapons stockpile activities.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill: Has the rationale for this program changed since the
U.S. ceased nuclear weapons testing?
Dr. Reis.: The rationale for the Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF)
program has strengthened with the advent of the nuclear test
moratorium. ICF offers a laboratory environment similar conceptually in
many respects to nuclear weapons. The cessation of nuclear weapons
testing has increased the importance of all types of aboveground
experimental facilities in maintaining the stockpile. Further,
cessation of U.S. nuclear testing has enhanced the role of the ICF
program in supporting the National Security Strategic Plan (NSSP). The
ICF program supports the NSSP by providing nuclear-weapon related data
as well as helping to maintain and enhance nuclear weapon expertise.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill: What is the status of the review of the classification
policy as it pertains to the Inertial Fusion program?
Dr. Reis: On December 7, 1993, Secretary O'Leary announced
declassifications in several areas. One of these was the
declassification of major parts of the Inertial Fusion program. Interim
classification guidance has been sent to the participating
laboratories, and a classification guide is nearing completion.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill. What is the FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995 funding
proposed for each laboratory and facility in the Inertial Fusion
program? Please provide the breakout by program; i.e. glass laser, gas
laser, and pulsed power.
Dr. Reis. Funding proposed for each laboratory and facility in
the Inertial Fusion program is contained in the following table which
I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
INERTIAL FUSION
FUNDING BY PROGRAM
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1993 FY 1994
ADJ. ADJ. FY 1995
APPROP APPROP REQUEST
Operating Expenses
Indirect Drive (Glass Laser)
Oakland/NIF * 6,000 6,000
LLNL 89,928 77,627 79,267
LANL 18,078 16,546 16,692
SNL 840 1,500
Direct Drive (Glass Laser)
Oakland - University of Rochester 15,590 14,950 13,000
Total Glass 124,436 $115,123 $116,459
KrF Laser (Gas Laser)
LANL 2,462 1,800 0
Oakland/NRL 9,157 7,250 8,000
Total Gas $ 11,619 $ 9,050 $ 8,000
Light Ion Beams (Pulsed Power)
SNL 28,410 25,921 25,559
Capsule Fabrication & Development
Supporting Activities
LANL 4,260 3,973 4,087
SNL 645 900 1,550
Oakland Operations
General Atomics 9,519 9,000 9,000
KMS Fusion 3,838 **
Headquarters/Other 2,411 1,400 2,100
Total Supporting Activities 16,835 19,111 16,737
Total Operating Expenses $181,300 $169,205 $166,755
Capital Equipment
LLNL $ 3,500 $ 3,560 $ 3,800
LANL 800 400 400
SNL 1,400 900 700
Oakland/General Atomics 500 300 0
Naval Research Laboratory 400 450 0
University of Rochester 23,410 9,950 4,818
Oakland Operations Office 1,000 300 0
Total Capital Equipment $ 31,010 $ 15,860 $ 9,718
TOTAL INERTIAL FUSION $212,310 $185,065 $176,473
* NIF conceptual design funding distributed as follows in FY 1993:
LLNL, $4,000; LANL, $1,000; and SNL, $1,000.
** Includes Internal Reprogramming of $838,000 from the R&D program.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill. At the same level of detail as the previous question,
provide a chart showing for FY 1994 the original budget request, the
appropriated amount, the application of any general reduction, or use
of prior year balances, the application of any reduction of funding
used for the KMS settlement, the application of any reduction for NIF
conceptual design costs, and any other funding reductions.
Dr. Reis. The difference between the ICF budget request and the
appropriated amount was the realignment of funding to provide an
additional $1,000,000 for the University of Rochester, $3,000,000
associated with the KMS Fusion, Inc., settlement, and a reduction of
$4,186,000 for contractor salary savings. There was no use of prior
year balances and the funds for NIF conceptual design were included in
our budget request. The information is shown in a table which I would
like to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
****The FY 1994 INERTIAL CONFINEMENT FUSION FUNDING chart is attached
to original document****
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill. Describe the accomplishments of the Inertial Fusion
program in FY 1993, and describe program plans by individual laboratory
and facility for FY 1994 and FY 1995.
Dr. Reis. In FY 1993, ihe Inertial Fusion program (ICF) obtained
DOE approval of mission need (Key Decision 0) for the National Ignition
Facility (NIF) and began the Conceptual Design. Precision Nova
improvements to the Nova laser were completed allowing the beginning of
precision experiments of the Nova Technical Contract (NTC). The NTC
contributes to the scientific readiness to proceed with the NIF.
Further NTC experiments leading to scientific readiness have been
positive. Construction of the Omega Upgrade glass laser at the
University of Rochester and the Nike gas laser at the Naval Research
Laboratory proceeded in a timely manner. The light-ion program at
Sandia National Laboratories was reviewed by the Inertial Confinement
Fusion Advisory Committee (ICFAC) and subsequent milestones were
pursued.
A brief description of plans for FY 1994 and FY 1995 by laboratory
and facility is shown in a chart which I would like to insert in the
record. (The information follows:)
LLNL - Complete NTC and continue NIF target design work,
complete Beamlet laser, and complete NIF Conceptual
Design.
LANL - Complete NTC and continue NIF target design work.
Close out Mercury KrF laser project.
SNL - Continue light-ion beam focusing research on PBFA-II
and produce 100 eV hohlraum temperatures by March
1995. Continue efforts to demonstrate light-ion beam
accelerator as "target-qualified" driver.
UR/LLE - Complete Omega Upgrade laser and begin direct-drive
spherical implosion experiments.
NRL - Complete Nike KrF laser and begin direct-drive
planar-foil experiments.
GA/WJSA - Provide target-fabrication support to the ICF
laboratories. Develop cryogenic target fabrication
techniques.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the status of the National Ignition
Facility, including funding and milestones for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY
1995.
Dr. Reis. The Secretary of Energy, serving as the Acquisition
Executive for the Energy Systems Acquisition Advisory Board, approved
the Key Decision Zero (KD-O, Approval of Mission Need) for the National
Ignition Facility on January 15, 1993. In the approval letter, the
Secretary constrained the cost of the conceptual design effort to $12
million. The funding is planned as follows: FY 1993 ($6 million) and FY
1994 ($6 million). The Conceptual Design will be completed and a report
issued in April 1994. The next major milestone of the NIF is the
request for Key Decision One (KD-l, Approval of New Start), currently
scheduled for May 25, 1994. In FY 1994 and FY 1995, following approval
of KD-l, a modest advanced conceptual design effort, will proceed in
anticipation of a line item approval in FY 1996.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill: What is the status of the closeout of the KMS program?
Please describe the remaining issues to be resolved.
Dr. Reis: All of the property and facilities-related issues have
now been resolved with KMS Fusion, Inc., (KMS). On January 14, 1994,
KMS turned over to the Department occupancy and control of the KMS
facility in Ann Arbor, Michigan, along with all of the inertial
confinement fusion equipment, systems, and other property contained
within that facility. The Department paid KMS $2.2 million as part of
the settlement agreement.
The Department is proceeding with removal and redeployment of
the Government-owned equipment. This will be followed by
decontamination and decommissioning of the facility and its return to
the landlord for unrestricted use. The Department will also focus on
resolving the remaining administrative and contractual issues with KMS
in order to close out the KMS contract.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill: What performance measures should the Committee use
to evaluate the usefulness and effectiveness of this program?
Dr. Reis: The Congress should use performance measures related to
the accomplishment of the strategic goals of this program. For FY
1995, these would be (1) whether the DOE has made a decision to proceed
with the construction of the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and (2)
completion of the OMEGA Upgrade project on cost and schedule.
Within Defense Programs, we will use numerous other performance
measures in support of those major measures mentioned above. For
example, contributing to whether the DOE decides to proceed with the
NIF we will consider the following other performance measures:
operation of the NOVA laser and experimental results; operation of
PBFA-II and results; target fabrication techniques developed in support
of NIF regimes; and successes in computational codes. The NOVA
Technical Contract in place with LLNL is a good example of our approach
to performance measurement. Specific programmatic objectives and
milestones are negotiated and agreed between the contractor and the
program office, and are programmed and monitored over a number of
years. Technical contracts are also in place for Sandia and the
University of Rochester; we are currently developing technical
contracts for the other the participants in the inertial confinement
fusion program as well.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION
Mr. Bevill. What is the current status of the nuclear and
nonnuclear weapons complex reconfiguration?
Dr. Reis. The Reconfiguration Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement is being prepared. for the nuclear portion of the
reconfiguration program. The draft PEIS will be available for public
review by March 1995. This will include the Department's preferred
alternative for the technology and location for a new tritium supply.
A Finding of No Significant Impact was issued September 8, 1993,
on the Environmental Assessment for nonnuclear consolidation.
Implementation has proceeded with the donor sites working on inventory
builds to support the enduring stockpile and the transfer of equipment,
people, and records to the receiver sites. In FY 1995, process
qualification at the receiver sites will begin with all qualifications
to be completed by the end of FY 1999.
The engineering design work associated with the facility
modifications at the receiver sites is proceeding on schedule. We
expect to have about 40 percent of facilities design and construction
activity completed by the end of FY 1995.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION
Mr. Bevill. What funding is allocated to nuclear versus
nonnuclear reconfiguration activities in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY
1995?
Dr. Reis. Funding for reconfiguration activities for FY 1993, FY
1994, and FY 1995 is shown in a table which I would like to insert for
the record. (The information follows:)
Reconfiguration Activities
($ in thousands)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
Operating Expense
Program Direction $ 3,875 $ 3,850 $ 5,600
Program Support (PEIS Support) $ 66,131 $ 58,081 $ 9,671
Nonnuclear Consolidation $ 56,499 $ 65,100 $ 79,000
Nuclear Reconfiguration $ 20,555 $ 11,150 $ 0
Nuclear Material Disposition $ 0 $ 30,000 $ 0
Total Operating Expense $147,060 $168,181 $ 94,271
Construction
Nonnuclear Consolidation $ 26,000 $ 25,000 $ 58,000
Total Obligational Authority $173,060 $193,181 $152,271
Use of prior year balances $ 0 $-41,000 $ -6,765
New Budget Authority $173,060 $152,181 $145,506
NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current process for preparation
of the Programmatic EIS on the future nuclear weapons complex including
funding and milestones.
Dr. Reis. In preparing the Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (PEIS), the Department published a revised Notice of Intent
in the Federal Register in July 1993 describing the scope of the PEIS.
Twelve public scoping meetings were held near the weapons complex sites
in September and October 1993. A revised Reconfiguration PEIS
Implementation Plan will be issued this summer based on the public's
comments, budget realities, and workscope projections. The
environmental analysis and the Department's preferred alternatives will
be set forth in a draft PEIS by March 1995. Following a series of
public hearings held near each of the candidate sites, the PEIS will be
placed in final form by the end of the year. A Record of Decision will
be issued about 30 days following the issuance of the final PEIS.
Approximately $85 million will be costed in FY 1994 and although the
pending Reconfiguration budget request contains minimal funding for
these activities in FY 1995, it is expected that savings can be
achieved in FY 1994 to provide for a total of approximately $26 million
for environmental analysis, feasibility studies, and cost estimates of
the options to support the Record of Decision.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the process for nonnuclear
consolidation including activities to be performed in FY 1994 and FY
1995 and associated costs.
Dr. Reis. The donor sites are now working on inventory builds
required to support the enduring stockpile. When these are finished,
equipment, people, and records that are also required to support the
enduring stockpile will be transferred to the receiver sites. After the
transfer has been made, the equipment will undergo process
qualification to assure that it will operate within specifications.
The engineering design work associated with the facility
modifications at the receiver sites is proceeding on schedule.
Following design and construction modifications the equipment will be
placed in service. Twenty- five activity transfer groups were created
to develop the detailed plans. Each group will proceed as the plans and
modifications are ready, thus a combination of design, modifications,
transfer of equipment and people and process qualification will be
occurring within each of the next few years. All qualifications are
scheduled to be complete by the end of FY 1999.
The costs for FY 1994 are anticipated to be approximately $120
million. Part of this cost will be from FY 1993 funds that were carried
over due to the completion of the Environmental Assessment late in the
fiscal year. The requested funding for nonnuclear reconfiguration for
FY 1995 is $137 million.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION
Mr. Bevill. Describe the Defense Programs activities at Rocky
Flats, Mound, and Pinellas in FY,1994 and FY 1995.
Dr. Reis. Inventory builds in support of the enduring stockpile
are occurring at all three plants. All Defense Programs production will
cease not later than the end of FY 1994 at the three plants.
Preliminary work is underway for transferring the facilities from
Defense Programs to Environmental Restoration and Waste Management
within the Department. Following the completion of the production
activity the equipment will be prepared for transfer to the receiver
sites. Most of the transfer activity will occur in FY 1995.
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. Please list the technology transfer activities which
will be conducted by each laboratory in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995,
including funding for each task.
Dr. Reis. The attached sheets identify the Defense Programs
technology transfer activities that are being conducted at Defense
Programs laboratories and production facilities. Individual projects
are grouped into major technical activity categories that support
laboratory and facility core competencies. The FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY
1995 funding associated with the activities is shown in a table which I
would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
****DP TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ACTIVITIES Chart is attached to original
document****
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. Describe the performance measurements which the
Committee should use next year to evaluate the effectiveness of this
program?
Dr. Reis. Program effectiveness should be based upon the ability
to meet stated program objectives. The objectives listed below and
their respective program metrics should be used to evaluate the
effectiveness of the Defense Programs Technology Transfer Program.
1. Leveraged WR&D Dollars. An increase in leveraged weapons
research and development dollars from a baseline value at the
end of FY 1994.
2. Quality of Existing Partnerships. An improving trend in
customer (industry) satisfaction as measured by a customer
feedback survey.
3. R&D Investment. An increasing percentage of private sector
cost-share.
4. Access to Facilities. Increased ability to access
Defense Programs Laboratories and Facilities as evidenced by:
the establishment of new Deployment User Facilities; and,
increasing ease of access as reported by a customer feedback
survey.
5. Process Improvements. Continued improvements in the
technology transfer process as evidenced by: a reduction in
the time to negotiate and implement a technology transfer
activity; and increasing quality of the collaborative
processes as reported by a customer feedback survey.
6. Industrial Partner Impacts. Increasing positive impacts
reported by industrial,partners in areas such as:
productivity; profitability; job retention/creation; product
development; processes improvement; market share increases;
patents generated; licenses granted; and royalty income.
While the above shows actual program measurements to evaluate
program performance, a number of other activities are taking place in
the Department to measure the output of DOE's technology transfer
programs. The Secretary has established an inter-program group to
establish a process to measure the output of the broad range of DOE
technology transfer activities. A program has been developed and will
be implemented to collect technology transfer output and impacts data
from all of the Departments technology transfer programs.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FUNDS
Mr. Bevill. How do you ensure that these funds are not used to
fund projects which have been turned down by other DOE program
organizations?
Dr. Reis. Defense Programs has implemented a process to ensure
that projects which have been turned down by other DOE program
organizations are not funded. This process is implemented prior to the
actual selection of the project for funding. While the technical review
of the projects are being performed, the Office of Economic
Competitiveness assembles a review panel comprised of representatives
of other program offices. This includes representatives from Energy and
Efficiency, Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, Energy
Research, Nuclear Energy, and Fossil Energy. This review panel
evaluates the projects to determine whether the project was rejected by
that program office, or-complements or overlaps similar projects
currently being funded. This not only enables us to evaluate whether a
project has technical merit, but also allows us to coordinate the
project with other program offices where it makes sense.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER SUCCESS
Mr. Bevill. How would you characterize the success of this program
to date, and what lessons have been learned to improve future
partnerships?
Dr. Reis. The program has been very successful to date in benefits
accrued to both the private sector and the weapons complex. Over 200
dual benefit projects have been funded since this program began in FY
1990. During FY 1993, the National Security Economic Competitiveness
Program (NSECP) funded 88 new projects with a total cost sharing of
about $200 million. During FY 1994, the NSECP is using $218 million to
fund projects in Major Programs which include the American Textile
Industry Partnership, National Center for Manufacturing Sciences,
USCAR, SEMATEC and lithography, as well as partnerships with industry
at DP laboratories and facilities in the form of CRADAs, and other
technology transfer mechanisms. New Deployment User Facilities also
have recently been implemented including one at the Sandia National
Laboratory (Electronics Quality and Reliability Center) and one at the
Mound, Plant (Manufacturing Technology Deployment Center). These
centers will facilitate access by outside industry to available
technologies through the use of pre-approved user facility agreements
that can be implemented in days rather than months. A user facility
program previously approved by Defense Programs at the Y-12 facility
has allowed for assistance to over 700 small business and academia in
the past year of operation.
The following are examples of issues that have been addressed to
improve future partnerships. In the past, misunderstandings have arisen
between the Department of Energy, the laboratories, and our industrial
partners because issues regarding the technical, funding, and
conditions of the agreement had not been addressed early in the
process. Presently, great emphasis is being given to up-front
discussions with industry to allow for potential problems to be
identified and resolved early.
We have also learned that our partnership agreements will have
greatest leverage on U.S. competitiveness and more benefits to the
weapons complex if they are focused on specific technological areas.
Defense Programs will be targeting specific technical areas via focused
calls that will enhance the core competencies and technological
infrastructure necessary to meet the DOE National Security mission, and
will also advance industrial competitiveness- and economic security
through satisfying industry needs identified in industry specific
technology "road maps". A number of industrial advisory boards have
been created to provide an industrial focus to the technology transfer
program.
Another lesson learned has been that in many instances industry
does not distinguish between governmental agencies. They see the
federal government as a single entity. Consequently, better ties are
needed between similar programs within the federal government. To meet
this need, numerous joint partnerships with the Departments of Defense,
Energy and Commerce have been formed. An example of this is the
National Machine Tools Partnership which combines the Machine Tool
expertise of the Department of Energy with the manufacturing extension
capabilities of the Department of Commerce to reach out to those
business needing &his type of assistance. I have provided for the
record a number of more specific examples of technology transfer
program successes. (The information follows:)
EXAMPLES OF RECENT DP TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAM SUCCESSES
o During September 1993 approximately $5 million worth of technology
transfer projects from the Defense Programs weapons and materials
production facilities were approved. These twenty-two projects
from the Mound, Pinellas, Rocky Flats, Pantex, Nevada Test Site,
Kansas City Plant, and the Savannah River Site were selected from
51 submitted proposals.
o Defense Programs provided $12 million to support activities
that develop non-defense uses for the sites, technologies, and
workforces at Mound, Rocky Flats, and Pinellas production
facilities to help mitigate the effects of phasing out the weapons
missions. The funding was used to assist the community through
technology-based activities to promote local economic development,
with the goal to make new, innovative use of facilities,
equipment, employee skills, or deploy technologies to the local
area that create new commercial products, processes, or services.
o The weapons laboratories have implemented a program to provide
technical assistance to the machine tool industry under the
National Machine Tool Initiative. The objectives are to enhance
the research and development efforts and technical capabilities of
the machine tool industry. During FY 1993, approximately 900
companies made inquiries and approximately 500 projects were
initiated to provide technical assistance.
o An improved machining system which can cut hard-to-machine
materials to new levels of accuracy and precision has been
developed through a CRADA between the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory and a small business, Industrial Tools Inc. The system
can be used to slice materials such as ceramics, carbides, glass,
and plastics twice as accurately as the company's earlier
machining system. Manufacturers of computer disk drives will be
able to use the machine to more accurately manufacture disk-drive
heads made from carbide materials. The technology can also be used
by the U.S. semiconductor industry for slicing silicon wafers and
has applications in the defense and aerospace industries as well
as the medical equipment field. Industrial Tools Incorporated has
forecast about $25 million in revenue over the next five years
from the improved machining system. Six systems have already been
sold to computer disk-drive makers.
o Sandia National Laboratories and Rockwell International
Corporation have collaborated on a CRADA to develop sensor-based
controls to address methods of precisely locating workpiece
features in small lot manufacturing. The Rocketdyne Division of
Rockwell manufactures Delta rocket booster engines consisting of
hundreds of brazed tubes. Automation of the brazing process is
being developed. A non-contact sensor has been developed and
combined with software control algorithms to produce a successful
control solution to problems associated with the brazing process.
The automated process combines the precise motion control of a
robot with precision braze dispensing equipment. Based on the
success of the sensor and control system, Rocketdyne will begin to
move this technology to the production floor in FY 1994. Work is
underway to locate a commercial supplier to produce the sensor.
A patent application was filed in March 1993.
o Martin Marietta Energy Systems Y-12 Plant, in collaboration with
Coors Ceramics Company, Caterpillar, Diacraft Corporation and
Landis Corporation continued work to provide improved
manufacturing methods, precision inspection techniques, and
materials characterization for ceramic materials used in a variety
of applications, particularly for internal combustion engine
components. Improved machining and inspection techniques and
improved substrate manufacturing processes have been developed and
incorporated into the existing production processes.
o The DOE's Defense Programs and Allied Signal Corporation, Kansas
City Division, have cooperated on a Regional Technology Outreach
Development Program for small and medium-sized businesses. The
program, which is designed to provide technical assistance to
businesses in Kansas City and surrounding regions, helped more
than 400 companies in FY,1993. A similar program with Martin
Marietta Energy Systems Y-12 Plant has provided technical
assistance to small and medium-sized businesses throughout
Tennessee and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) region. Another
agreement has been signed with the state of Florida which will
provide technical assistance throughout that state in the near
future.
o Federal law mandates the reduction of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and
other pollutants caused by automobile exhaust. The National
Laboratories at Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and Los Alamos
together with Martin Marietta Energy Systems Y-12 Plant are
participating in a maj,or effort to help GM, Chrysler, and Ford
solve the "lean-burn" catalyst problem. Catalysts could easily be
developed using very expensive metals which are resistant to
corrosion, but the cost would be prohibitive. Technologies are
being developed to make catalysts effective and rugged yet also
affordable. Currently, both the materials and processes used to
manufacture the final products are being studied.
o The weapons laboratories in partnership with industry are
developing advanced lithography technology that will leapfrog
foreign competition to help the U.S. recapture the integrated
circuit (IC) production market. The program goals are to develop a
compact, cost-effective soft x-ray (140 angstrom wavelength)
projection lithography technology that is readily compatible with
existing IC production systems. Soft x-ray lithography will extend
the fabrication of IC feature sizes to less than 0.1 millionth of
a meter. Decreasing IC feature size significantly increases the
computing power of microprocessors and memory capacity of
solid-state memories such as DRAMS. In Defense Programs'
lithography program, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Sandia National Laboratories, and Los Alamos National Laboratory
are teamed with a host of industrial partners -- AT&T, Grumman,
Ultratech Stepper, KLA, Tropel, Intel, AMD, Micrion, and Jamar --
representing the wide range of technologies needed to successfully
develop and establish a premier x-ray projection lithography
capability in the United States.
o The National Laboratories of DOE's Defense Programs, in
partnership with industry, are developing advanced flat panel
display (FPD) technology that will outpace foreign competition to
help the U.S. gain a competitive position in the international
flat panel display market. Projects at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Los Alamos National
Laboratory are addressing field emission, plasma, and
electroluminescent display technologies and the associated
manufacturing processes. Facilities and expertise resident in the
laboratories provide indepth computer modeling, materials
processes, and analysis capabilities that enable industry to
proceed toward commercialization of FPD technologies at greatly
reduced technical risk. Defense Programs' FPD program will be
expanded in FY 1994 to include a greater segment of the industry
and contribute more aggressively in the development of advanced
phosphor and electroluminescent materials.
o To help meet the critical challenges facing the electronics
industry, the Defense Programs' National Laboratories are working
with industry to maintain, and in some areas to regain, a
competitive U.S. position in the international electronics market.
Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Y-12
Production Facility at Oak Ridge are working with industry in
small feature size (less than 0.25 micrometer) integrated circuit
fabrication processes and materials, high density
interconnections, contamination-free manufacturing, modeling of
semiconductor physics and manufacturing methods, and advanced
opto-electronics technology. A key element of the Defense
Programs' project is a joint program with SEMATECH. Defense
Programs' activities in microelectronics and photonics are
responsive to an Industry Advisory Board and adhere to the
Semiconductor Industry Association and the Optoelectronics
Industry Development Association (OIDA) Industry Roadmaps.
Defense Programs coordinates with other government electronics
programs, primarily the Advanced Research Project Agency
and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, to ensure
that its effort is well coordinated with the government's overall
role in maintaining a strong U.S. position in microelectronics and
photonics.
o Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos,, Sandia National Laboratories
and the Martin Marietta Energy Systems Y-12 Plant have been
working on an initiative to develop information technology
critical to the National Information Infrastructure (NII).
This,initiative consolidated ongoing technology transfer work that
supports the NII and has also started work with the gas and oil
industrial sector. The intent is to develop information
technologies for the gas and oil industry that will be useful to
other industrial sectors such as manufacturing, health care and
financial services. The gas and oil NII initiative has established
a testbed working on seven information technologies: networking,
data security, visualization, mass data storage, computer
input/output, distributed computing and collaborative tools. The
first application to be used on the testbed will be the
development of a synthetic, three-dimensional seismic data set
usable across a network. Key facets of the project were
demonstrated at the Supercomputer 1993 Conference. Industrial
partners include Amoco, Schlumberger and the Society of
Exploration Geophysicists.
o A collaboration between Sandia National Laboratories and a small
business, BIOSYM Technologies, under the sponsorship of Defense
Programs has developed a commercial software package to allow
the molecular engineering of polymer alloys. This software models
the molecular interaction of polymers thus providing accurate
predictions of alloy performance. BIOSYM has released a
preliminary version on the commercial software that won a 1992 R&D
100 award.
o Los Alamos National Laboratory has established the Computational
Testbed for Industry (CTI), a DOE user facility thai provides
U.S. industry with convenient access to the world-class
computational capabilities of the laboratory. The CTI allows
industry and national laboratory interests to support one another
in many disciplines such as applied mathematics, atomic and
nuclear physics, seismology, fluid dynamics, and materials and
structures, among others. A number of industrial partners have
already signed agreements to use the CTI including Dow Chemical,
Schlumberger, and BIOSYM.
o Sandia, Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories
as well as the Y-12 Plant under the sponsorship of Defense
Programs, are working on the development of technologies of the
gigabit networks. One such activity recently installed desktop
video teleconferencing capabilities at several AT&T XUNET sites.
Desktop video teleconferencing utilizes Sandia National
Laboratories' Distributed Audio Video Environment (DAVE). This
environment allows video teleconferencing to be set up in a manner
similar to installing a home stereo system by combining a variety
of modules.
o Two major thrust areas were identified for the application of
advanced materials to benefit both the Defense Programs' weapons
research, development and test program, and key industrial
sectors. A series of integrated CRADAs between the Martin Marietta
Energy Systems Y-12 Plant, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and
Sandia National Laboratories and the automobile industry were
initiated to develop lightweight materials for automotive
applications. A second series of CRADAs is being negotiated with
aircraft engine manufacturers for the development and
implementation of advanced materials for the aerospace industry.
Based on the acknowledged expertise of the Defense Programs'
national laboratories in metal alloy design, development and
processing, several other CRADAs are under way in modeling and
development of process control systems for metal forming, joining,
heat-treating, and processing for primary and specialty metals.
o The Specialty Metals Processing Consortium continued another
successful year of collaboration with the Sandia National
Laboratories, conducting R&D at the Liquid Metal Processing
Laboratory to improve process control technology for the melting
processes for important defense- related metals such as titanium
and nickel alloys. Using onboard computers and analytical
equipment in a specially modified truck, formerly used to
transport weapons, Sandia researchers also visited consortium
members to gather research data to assist productivity
improvements at member-owned production facilities.
o Sandia National Laboratories has been collaborating with a major
U.S. manufacturer on an intelligent processing system to control
distortion in thin-section welded assemblies. The system
integrates material response and thermo-mechanical models,
advanced sensors and image processing technology, and on-line
controls to predict and provide real-time control for weld
quality. Sandia also collaborated with a specialty metals producer
to develop and test a commercially appropriate welding technology
for advanced borated stainless steels used in structural
applications. Although the technical objectives for the first
phase of this CRADA were successfully accomplished, the industrial
partner made a business-based decision not to commercialize this
class of alloys. Despite the early termination, the
accomplishments will be valuable to the weapons R&D program in the
development of a welding process for advanced particulate-loaded
metals.
o Through a CRADA with a U.S. manufacturer of electronic
instrumentation and communication systems, the Los Alamos National
Laboratory used unique materials characterization capabilities to
perform low- temperature heat capacity measurements to assist the
development of an advanced cryocooler. The success of this effort
will contribute to advances in communications systems and
instrumentation being pursued through other CRADAs with Defense
Programs' laboratories. The CRADA also resulted in the transfer of
materials measurement techniques to the graduate engineering
department of a major university. Los Alamos also assisted a small
manufacturer in the development an automated pulsed laser
deposition system with superior processing performance and
reproducibility. The system will provide the capability for
thin-film deposition applicable to many advanced materials used in
microelectronics devices.
o The Defense Programs Small Business Initiative (SBI) involves
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Y-12 Plant at Oak
Ridge and focuses on the manufacturing and advanced-technology
development segments of the small business community. For Fiscal
Year 1993, the SBI was funded at $8 million.
The SBI consists of the following four basic but interrelated
program elements:
-Technical Assistance
While Technical Assistance can take a variety of forms, typically
the DOE facilities respond to specific needs of small businesses
by providing technical consultation, technical information, and/or
access to specialized or unique facilities for evaluation of
new processes or equipment. Technical Assistance may be provided
by a one-on-one relationship with a small business, via a small
business association or consortium, or through the use of an
intermediary whose purpose is to assist with the technology
transfer process. Technical assistance efforts expend less than
$5K in DOE funds per request.
-Partnership Agreements
When requests for technical assistance from small businesses
exceed the constraints of short-term assistance, it may be
beneficial for the small business firm to enter into a
collaborative Partnership Agreement with the DOE facility. These
agreements can serve a variety of purposes and can include
cooperative research and development agreements (CRADA),
technology licensing, longer-term technical assistance, and user
facility agreements. Partnership Agreements are limited to less
than $50 K in DOE funding per agreement.
-Relationships with Intermediaries
Intermediaries can be organizations, such as state and local
government, universities and community colleges, not-for-profit-
economic development organizations, small business development
centers, and business incubators. These intermediaries facilitate
the process of transferring technology to small businesses by
providing outreach to and needs-identification for small
businesses. They link the small businesses and the DOE facilities
by pre-qualifying requests for technical assistance and
partnerships, forecasting and analyzing the requirements of small
businesses and providing periodic feedback and evaluation of the
effectiveness of program results and opportunities
for,improvement. Less than 10 percent of the total program dollars
shall be used for intermediary relationships.
-Facility Utilization
Facilities and equipment at the DOE locations involved in the SBI
represent significant resources that can be utilized by small
businesses for hands-on training to acquire special skills, for
building one-of-a-kind prototype products, or for use in
developing a special or unique technology or process that will
help improve their economic competitiveness and survival. This
component of the SBI encourages the establishment of such
facilities by identifying existing infrastructure that could have
commercial benefit.
PERCENTAGES OF FUNDS USED
Mr. Bevill. What percentage of the funds in FY 1994 and FY 1995
are used to fund mortgages and what percentage for new projects?
Dr. Reis. The percentage of the FY 1994 funds estimated to be
used for mortgages is 65 percent. The percentage used for new projects
is 35 percent. The majority of the new project funds have been
committed to an area such as National Machine Tool Initiative, Small
Business, or Lithography.
The percentage of the FY 1995 funds estimated to be used for mortgages
is 80 percent. The percentage to be used for new projects is 20
percent, all of which have been committed to an area such as National
Machine Tool Initiative, Small Business, or Lithography.
LABORATORY-DIRECTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (LDRD)
Mr. Bevill. What amounts are included for the discretionary
funding of the laboratory directors for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995?
By laboratory, please provide the amount of funding provided and the
percentage of total funding allowed for discretionary purpose.
Dr. Reis. The amounts and percentages of funding for LDRD by each
laboratory are shown in a table which I would like to insert for the
record. (The information follows:)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
Lawrence Livermore $58.5M (5.9%) $52.7M (6.0%) $52.2M (6.0%)
Los Alamos $63.4M (6.0%) $62.0M (6.0%) $60.0M (6.0%)
Sandia $50.7M (4.0%) $62.0M (4.7%) $75.0M (5.6%)
LABORATORY-DIRECTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (LDRD)
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a complete listing by laboratory of
each task or project funded from the discretionary accounts for FY 1993
and FY 1994 and the amount provided for each task. (Examples are not
acceptable. It must be a complete listing.)
Dr. Reis: Listings of LDRD projects giving project title and
amount of funding for each of the laboratories for FY 1993 and FY 1994
are attached. (The information follows:)
****The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Charts are attached to
RATIONALE FOR USING LABORATORY FUNDING
Mr. Bevill. Please explain the rationale for using laboratory
discretionary funding to fund work with Russian scientists.
Dr. Reis. Of approximately 600 LDRD projects being conducted by
the three laboratories, three involve-some work with Former Soviet
Union (FSU) scientists. The projects are selected because of their
value to the laboratory with no special consideration given to FSU
involvement. When LDRD work involves the FSU it is because of unique
capabilities that exist there, and such work is in the best technical
interest of the laboratories. Lawrence Livermore has one LDRD project
that involves collecting data on the Chernobyl disaster for study of
iodine dosimetry. Los Alamos has two LDRD projects involving evaluation
of advanced Russian technology: one in the area of high magnetic
field/high energy density physics-for possible weapons application and
another in accelerator-based conversion of plutonium. Sandia has no
LDRD projects involving FSU scientists.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
Mr. Bevill. Please describe all defense programs considered to
be "emergency response or operations" including the location, number
of FTES, and funding for each activity in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY
1995.
Dr. Reis. Emergency response activities that are funded by Defense
Programs are consolidated under the Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Military Application, Office of Emergency Response. The
Emergency Response Program is composed of seven emergency response
assets, representing the principal United States capability to respond
to a nuclear weapon or civilian radiological accidents or incidents and
are the technical teams which would be deployed to the incident site
within the United States or worldwide. Staffing, location, and funding
requirements for each of the emergency response assets is somewhat
different than for other programs within Defense Programs. While each
of the emergency response assets have a dedicated number of FTES, the
majority of scientific and technical personnel who staff the assets are
volunteers from the weapons complex, having extensive expertise derived
from their full-time positions as weapon physicists, engineers, and
technical support staff. Although day-to-day oversight of the
deployable assets is conducted by our field offices, personnel and
equipment are located at sites throughout the weapon complex, mostly at
Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories.
Consolidated Emergency Response Program Funding and FTES
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
(Dollars in Millions)
R&D FUNDING $ 38.6 $ 51.5 $ 52.6
Lab FTEs 100 118 140
STOCKPILE SUPPORT
Emergency Response $ 9.1 $ 11.8 $ 13.4
Emergency Operations 8.9 8.8 5.6
Total $ 18.0 $ 20.6 $ 19.0
FTEs 142 107 84
* Includes requirements associated with the planning,
coordination, implementation, and conduct of the Emergency Response
Program activities to include: the Accident Response Group,
Radiological Assistance Program, and Radiation Emergency Assistance
Center/Training Site.
Accident Response Group
The Accident Response Group (ARG) is the Department's main
response to accidents or incidents involving United States nuclear
weapons or components in a peacetime environment. The ARG is composed
of weapons program scientists, engineers, and technicians, along with
specialized equipment derived from the weapons complex. The ARG is
responsible for advising the on- scene commander concerning weapon
status, safety, stability, Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) and
shipment, if necessary. The ARG might also be requested to assist a
foreign nation in response to accidents/incidents involving their
nuclear weapons or components.
Field Program Management for ARG is performed by the Albuquerque
Operations Office.
STOCKPILE SUPPORT
ACCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
$ 6.6 $ 8.8 $ 10.0
Aerial Measuring Systems
The Aerial Measuring Systems (AMS) is composed of scientists,
engineers and other technical personnel, along with unique equipment
which collectively provide an aerial radiological survey and search
capability for responding to radiological emergencies, and is also used
to monitor the environment at Department of Energy and other Federal
and commercial sites. Aerial radiological surveys are performed with
large arrays of sodium iodide detectors linked to a geo-referenced,
time-resolved, gamma spectrometry mounted on fixed- or rotary-wing
aircraft. Specially designed air sampling and monitoring equipment
incorporated onto AMS fixed-wing aircraft provide airborne air sampling
and cloud tracking capabilities, which can detect and collect samples
of airborne radioactive gas and particulates as a result of a release.
AMS aircraft are maintained on emergency standby basis at both Nellis
Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada and Andrews AFB, Maryland. Research and
development activities are conducted at the Department's Remote Sensing
Laboratory, Nellis AFB, and the Special Technologies Laboratory in
Santa Barbara, California.
Field Program Management for AMS is performed by the Nevada
Operations Office.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
AERIAL MEASURING SYSTEMS
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
$ 8.9 $ 9.0 $ 8.8
Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability
The Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) is a
centralized computer-based prediction system located at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California. It provides
estimates of transport, diffusion, and deposition of radioactive
material released into the atmosphere and associated dose projections.
This predictive capability is based upon meteorological, topographical,
and source-term data providing plume and footprint deposition
information. In addition to DOE sites, ARAC is used by the Department
of Defense at weapons storage locations worldwide and Naval nuclear
reactor facilities. It is available to support emergency response
requirements of DOE's NEST, ARG, and RAP assets and to support other
Federal agencies or foreign governments for radiological emergencies.
Field Program Management for ARAC is performed by the Oakland
Operations Office.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
ATMOSPHERIC RELEASE ADVISORY CAPABILITY
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
$ 2.4 $ 8.5, $ 7.4
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
To meet responsibilities for radiological monitoring and
assessment as set forth in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response
Plan, the Department of Energy is responsible for establishing and
managing the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
(FRMAC). The FRMAC is an operational center at or near the scene of a
radiological incident, which provides a focal point for coordination
and compilation of all offsite Federal radiological monitoring and
assessment activities. All Federal, State, and local agencies concerned
with the radiologic incident are represented in the Center. Information
related to offsite radiological risks resulting from
accidents/incidents is consolidated and analyzed in the FRMAC. This
information is made available to the lead Federal agency, State, and/or
local official(s) to aid in formulating policy decisions and for
taking appropriate protective actions.
Field Program Management for FRMAC is performed by the Nevada
Operations Office.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT CENTER
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
$ 1.5 $ 1.0 $ 1.1
Nuclear Emergency Search Team
The Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) is a group of diverse
and specially trained engineers, scientists, and technicians from the
weapons complex, along with specialized equipment providing technical
assistance in response to a malevolent nuclear threat. NEST provides
the Department with the unique capability to assess communicated
nuclear threats and to counter any attempts by terrorists or
extortionists to achieve their objectives by utilization of stolen
nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, or radioactive dispersal
devices. Within the United States and its territories, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has primary responsibility for such incidents.
In the event of deployment to a foreign country, the Department.of
State would be the lead Federal agency for the United States. NEST
assets are located primarily at the Department's facility at Nellis
AFB, Nevada, with a smaller initial response/advanced party capability
located at Andrews AFB, Maryland.
Field Program Management for NEST is performed by the Nevada
Operations Office.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
$ 25.8 $ 33.0 $ 35.3
Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS)
provides direct or consultative assistance with medical and health
physics support following radiation accidents. REAC/TS provides DOE
with a core capability for handling the medical aspects of radiation
accident/incident response, training of professional and technical
personnel in related specialty areas, and in resolving medical-legal
issues relating to alleged radiation exposure and subsequent health
issues. REAC/TS is designated by World Health Organization as the World
Collaboration Center for Radiation Accident Management. A comprehensive
medical assistance/treatment course for accidents involving radiation,
which is sponsored by DOE, is offered at the training site in Oak
Ridge, Tennessee, and is open to all government agencies as well as the
private sector.
Field Program Management for REAC/TS is performed by the Oak
Ridge Operations Office.
STOCKPILE SUPPORT
RADIATION EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE CENTER/TRAINING SITE
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
$ 0.7 $ 0.7 $ 0.7
Radiological Assistance Program
The DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) provides a Federal
emergency radiological response capability at the local level. Eight
RAP regions provide initial "first responder" assistance, as they are
located at DOE field or area offices, providing regional coordination
and serving as the point of contact for providing the initial DOE
response. RAP teams are usually staffed with certified health
physicists and registered radiation protection technicians, providing
an excellent resource to assist state, local, and tribal governments
with expert advice and support for accidents involving radioactive
materials. A RAP Team's assistance is scenario-dependent and consists
typically of the ability to conduct localized searches with hand-held
instruments to identify nature and extent of local contamination and to
provide non-clinical advice on health affect
of radiation.
Field Program Management for the RAP is performed by
geographical regions: Brookhaven Area Office (Region 1); Oak Ridge
Operations Office (Region II); Savannah River Operations Office (Region
III);,Albuquerque Operations Office (Region IV); Chicago Operations
Office (Region V); Idaho Operations Office (Region VI); Oakland
Operations Office (Region VII); and Richland Operations Office (Region
VIII).
STOCKPILE SUPPORT
RADIOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
$ 1.8 $ 2.3 $ 2.7
STOCKPILE SUPPORT
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
Field (Emergency
Operations Center) $ 8.4 $ 8.3 $ 5.1
Field Emergency Preparedness 0.5 0.5 0.5
The funding includes the Space Nuclear Power and Emergency
Operations Center activities in support of Emergency Operations and
continuity of Government activities reflected in the Stockpile Support
Emergency Operations budget.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
Mr. Bevill: What emergencies did NEST respond to in the past three
years?
Dr. Reis. Over the past 3 years, there has been one Nuclear
Emergency Search Team (NEST) deployment in response to a suspected
sophisticated improvised explosive device, in Sparks, Nevada. While
this device had no nuclear component associated with it, DOE assisted
the FBI and local authorities in characterizing the extortion threat,
utilizing its technical capability to determine that the threat was
indeed a hoax. In addition to the one deployment in August 1993, NEST
has conducted seven threat assessments over the past three calendar
years to alleged nuclear or radiation dispersal devices and
participated regularly in exercises, in addition to its training and
readiness requirements.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
Mr. Bevill. How are these programs coordinated with the Office
of Emergency Management?
Dr. Reis. The "Emergency Management" activities funded under
Atomic Energy Defense Activities maintain the Department's seven
emergency response assets which include: the Accident Response Group;
Aerial Measurement System; Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability;
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center; Radiation
Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site; and eight Radiological
Assistance Program Teams.
These departmental assets represent the principal United States
capability to deal with a nuclear wea 