Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on another and more important subject, on several occasions I have felt it necessary to criticize the administration for its overly accommodationist policy toward North Korea. Administration efforts to address the emerging North Korean nuclear threat, in my view, have been fundamentally flawed in two respects. First, administration approaches to North Korea have relied too heavily on the promise of rewards and too little on the prospect of punishment--giving the impression of weakness in our resolve. Second, administration policy seemed premised on the mistaken notion that time works to the advantage of the United States and not North Korea. Exacerbating these flaws, is a fault common to many other administration foreign policies--inconsistency.
Contemplating the terrible consequences which I believe may well ensue from what The New Republic described as a humiliating exercise in appeasement provoked my frequent, strong dissent from administration policy. But despite my past criticism, for a brief moment last week I had hoped that further dissent from the administration's Korea policy would no longer be necessary.
When the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, reported last Thursday that North Korea had removed some of the spent fuel from its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon before IAEA inspectors had arrived to monitor that process, I though that the administration would finally appreciate the futility of further accommodation and begin to show a little resolve in its dealing with the North Koreans. After all, the United States and the IAEA had insisted for weeks that North Korea not withdraw any spent fuel rods without IAEA inspectors present.
When earlier in the week Defense Secretary Perry had indicated his appreciation of the gravity and the urgency of the crisis, I began to believe that the administration had belatedly come to understand that negotiations or even IAEA inspections were not ends in themselves. I began to believe that the President's foreign policy team had finally embraced as the object of United States policy the directive the President issued last November when he declared: `North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb. We have to be very firm about it.'
Sadly, Mr. President, this was not the first time I underestimated the administration's almost limitless capacity for self deception. Nor, probably, will it be the last time.
Upon discovering North Korea's removal of the spent fuel rods, estimated in a South Korean report as up to 15 percent of the reactor's fuel, the IAEA immediately reported the North Korean action to the Security Council, condemning it as a `serious violation' of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, NPT.
IAEA's reaction was perfectly appropriate under the circumstances, but was apparently inconsistent with the administration's approach to grave national security problems--an approach which can be charitably described as procrastinating, irresolute and exceedingly dangerous.
Last Friday morning's headlines heralded the growing sense of crisis provoked by North Korea's latest violation of the NPT. The administration had no comment on the matter, however, until later in the afternoon, when it would attempt a dazzling display of reverse spin on the bad news coming from Pyongyang.
Mr. President, when spent fuel rods are removed from a nuclear reactor they must be placed in a cooling pond of distilled water for a minimum of 6 weeks before they can be used for any purpose. They cannot be withdrawn from the reactor and immediately reprocessed into weapons grade plutonium.
On Friday afternoon, administration officials reported that IAEA inspectors had determined that the fuel rods which had been removed prior to their arrival were all currently located in a cooling pond--as they must be--and had not yet been diverted for reprocessing. The administration greeted this information as if it were some sort of revelation. For good measure they identified as an additional cause for celebration reports that the specific fuel rods which the IAEA would use to measure past diversion of fuel for reprocessing remained in the reactor.
What then ensued was a full court administration press to downplay the significance of what the IAEA--an agency not noted for its inflammatory or belligerent rhetoric--condemned as a serious violation of the NPT meriting the immediate attention of the Security Council. Secretary Perry's recent characterization of the situation as a particularly grave, near-term crisis was replaced with his calming assurance that North Korea's action constituted only a procedural violation, giving the impression that their conduct barely warranted any U.S. interest.
Mr. President, the confirmation that spent fuel could not be immediately reprocessed hardly qualifies as a stunning disclosure. And the fact that certain fuel rods had not yet been removed from the reactor does not in any way mitigate this latest example of North Korea's complete disregard for its obligations under the NPT. In fact, North Korea's removal of the fuel rods without IAEA monitoring is a flagrant violation, of the treaty and a serious rebuke to U.S. diplomacy. That the administration would treat it as anything other than that constitutes yet another retreat from anything resembling a coherent, resolute, and honest approach to this crisis.
I was at first uncertain why the administration would reverse position so suddenly last Friday. I took it as just another indication that administration policy still suffered from a failure of nerve. It certainly was that, Mr. President, but I would not learn just how completely they had lost their nerve until the following day.
On Saturday, we learned that the administration's contrived rationale for dismissing North Korea's latest violation was also intended to justify a new administration venture into vacillating diplomacy. The administration announced that it would resume high level negotiations with North Korea. Remember, Mr. President, that the administration had broken off the talks when North Korea had prevented IAEA inspectors from determining if reactor fuel had been diverted in the past for reprocessing and when North Korea withdrew from negotiations with South Korea.
Has North Korea succumbed to U.S. pressure and allowed the IAEA adequate access to nuclear facilities so that they can judge whether any fuel has been diverted? No, they have not. They have only agreed to discuss with the IAEA the terms under which the IAEA might be allowed, I repeat, might be allowed, to resume their inspections.
Has North Korea resumed dialogue with the South on a range of issues including the nuclear crisis and the prospect of reunification between north and south? No, they have not. They have, however, threatened to turn South Korea into a sea of fire.
In sum, Mr. President, the administration had decided in advance of the IAEA's report on Friday that it wanted to resume direct negotiations with North Korea--something the North Koreans have sought to achieve for 40 years--even though North Korea had done nothing to rescind the provocations that had led to the earlier disruption of the talks.
The IAEA's declaration of North Korea's serious violation of the NPT frustrated the administration's intention. So, administration officials attempted to intentionally deceive the American people into believing that Pyongyang had done something that warranted a resumption of the talks. That the administration would initiate such a deception knowing full well that North Korea would correctly recognize it as another sign of American weakness is as reckless an action as the administration has taken to date in this crisis.
At the moment, we have conflicting reports about whether North Korea is continuing to defuel the Yongbyon reactor. On Friday, the administration and the IAEA insisted that North Korea delay discharging any more of the fuel rods until an agreement had been concluded for IAEA inspectors to monitor their removal and measure the fuel level in the rods of interest.
Reports in the Defense Department indicate that the defueling has continued over our objections. The State Department is still hopeful that the defueling has not resumed.
Irrespective of whether North Korea has ignored our latest demand, the administration intends to resume direct talks with them. Administration officials claim that North Korea has met all the prerequisites for those talks. Whatever those prerequisites might be remain a mystery to the rest of us.
Mr. President, I assume that the administration hopes that its latest transparent attempt at appeasement will succeed where all their other attempts failed. Given the administration's unwavering devotion to carrots and gestures of friendship, surely the North Koreans will finally be overwhelmed by U.S. good will and graciously abandon their nuclear ambitions in return. What a surprise it must have been to administration officials yesterday when North Korea forgot its manners again and denounced a regularly scheduled U.S.-led naval exercise in the Pacific with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada and other of our allies as a hostile military action which North Korea is prepared to counter.
Mr. President, it has become exceedingly difficult to keep one's remarks free from cynicism when discussing administration diplomacy in this crisis. A brief review of the administration's record of failed appeasement over the last year illustrates why.
In January 1993, North Korea rejected an IAEA request to inspect 2 nuclear waste sites. In February, the IAEA set a March 31 deadline for North Korea to allow the requested inspection. North Korea responded by announcing its decision to withdraw from the NPT.
The Clinton administration responded by entering direct negotiations with North Korea on the issue. Its stated policy at the time was to persuade the Koreans to remain in the NPT; to assure them that we would not use nuclear weapons against North Korea; to convince them to allow inspections to ensure the continuity of safeguards, as defined by the United States, not the IAEA; and to use the talks or the cancellation of talks as a carrot and stick to induce North Korea's cooperation.
In June and July, two rounds of talks were held. Two joint statements were issued respectively containing North Korea's promise to suspend their withdrawal from the NPT; the United States promise not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea and not to interfere in their internal affairs. The first statement also specified an agreement on the impartial application of full scope safeguards and included North Korea's commitment to negotiate nuclear questions simultaneously with the United States, the IAEA and South Korea.
After the talks, North Korea continued to refuse special inspections or a resumption of regular inspections. They reneged on their commitment to negotiate with the IAEA. And they conditioned their discussions with South Korea on the termination of `nuclear war exercises' by South Korea and the United States.
In response, the Clinton administration scheduled a third round of direct talks.
In August, North Korea limited the IAEA to night time access during routine inspection. In September, North Korea refused to allow a follow-up inspection. They refused again in October.
The Clinton administration sent State Department officials to meet with the North Koreans at the United Nations. In November, they again dispatched those officials to New York.
Later that month, the IAEA declared that it could no longer monitor activities in North Korea's nuclear facilities because the film and batteries in its cameras had run out.
President Clinton made his infamous declaration stating without qualification that North Korea would not be allowed to possess a single nuclear weapon. The administration then proposed comprehensive negotiations with North Korea to include discussion of diplomatic relations, United States military exercises, and economic relations. Shortly thereafter, the administration canceled Operation Team Spirit.
Later in the month after meeting with South Korean President Kim, President Clinton announced a new policy which held that North Korea must be made to honor its NPT obligations; and must open talks with South Korea on the nuclear issue before the United States would hold another round of direct talks.
In December, the United States and North Korea reached an agreement which North Korea contends was limited to North Korea's permission for one restricted IAEA inspection. The administration first acknowledged, then denied that the agreement was limited to one inspection. The administration promised to cancel Team Spirit again and to resume direct talks if North Korea opened talks with the South.
In January, the IAEA refused to accept North Korea's terms for a limited inspection. The Clinton administration threatened economic sanctions if the IAEA reported that it could not longer monitor North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea then advised the IAEA that it will accept inspections.
The Clinton administration suspended Team Spirit and scheduled another round of direct talks for March 21.
Come March, North Korea blocked an IAEA inspection of its reprocessing facility, and refused to begin talks with South Korea.
The Clinton administration canceled the March 21 round of talks, and asked the Security Council to vote on a resolution condemning North Korea and threatening the future imposition of sanctions. Blocked by China, the administration fails to get a vote on its resolution, settling instead for a watered down Presidential statement which instructs the IAEA to continue to seek an inspection and report back to the council in May.
North Korea offered to allow the completion of the March inspection if the United States dropped its insistence on simultaneous talks with South Korea.
In April, at the urging of the Clinton administration, South Korea dropped its demand for talks with the North.
North Korea then disclosed its planned shut down and refueling of the reactor, and told the IAEA it could be present during the refueling. However, they rejected the IAEA's demand that inspectors be allowed to sample `fuel rods of interest' to determine whether fuel had been diverted in 1989.
This month, the United States and the IAEA instructed North Korea not to begin refueling until IAEA inspectors had arrived.
North Korea ignored the demand and began refueling, earning the IAEA's condemnation of the act as a serious violation of the NPT.
The Clinton administration responded by scheduling another round of high level direct negotiations with North Korea.
Mr. President, this abysmal record of failed appeasement speaks for itself without any further commentary by me.
In a few minutes I will enumerate what actions I believe the United States should take if we are to ever stop retreating in the face of international lawlessness and direct threats to the security of the United States and our allies. I intend to include in this summary a discussion of that action which the administration has virtually excluded as a response to North Korea's bad faith--to the great relief of Pyongyang--the military option.
Before I begin that discussion, Mr. President, I want to explain why I believe this situation is so grave that the United States must take whatever actions are required to force an end to North Korea's unlawful nuclear ambitions.
North Korea's nuclear program may be the defining crisis of the post-cold-war world. It represents a clear and present danger to our closest Asian allies and to the security of the United States itself. I am greatly concerned that the eventual outcome of North Korea's pursuit of nuclear status will be a world where the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction explodes exponentially; where in a never ending spiral of escalation all Asian powers capable of producing nuclear weapons do so and seriously undermine the stability of all Asia; where the most irresponsible, terrorist regimes in the world have the capacity to intimidate regional rivals into total submission or annihilate them; where the United States itself might be the victim of a terrorist attack like the bombing of the World Trade Center--only this time the weapon of choice will be a nuclear bomb.
From 1985 to 1992, North Korea exported more than $2.5 billion in arms. While most of the recipients of these sales are classified, CIA Director Woolsey has identified Syria, Iran, and Libya among the countries which have taken delivery of North Korean Scud C ballistic missiles.
To all those apologists for the administration's appeasement policy who argue that we must refrain from responses that might provoke the North into launching a military attack, I ask one question: Would an attack be more or less likely after North Korea acquires a nuclear arsenal and after it has completed its production of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads to Tokyo? I think the answer is obvious.
Armed with a sufficient arsenal to both export and use to their own ends, North Korea could soon be blackmailing South Korea, Japan, and even the United States into providing sufficient aid and diplomatic concessions in order to sustain their crumbling regime and earning hard currency from its nuclear sales abroad.
Should the United States and our allies resist North Korea's threats, and take the necessary steps to prepare for a military confrontation, the North could be more inclined to strike first knowing that if their aggression was repelled, the United States and South Korea might be dissuaded from crossing the 38th parallel in a counterattack out of fear that it would trigger a nuclear war--a prospect more daunting that the artillery barrage it is currently capable of inflicting on Seoul. Unless, the administration completely squanders all credibility with Pyongyang, Kim Il-Song could not rule out today the possibility that an attack on the South might lead to the complete destruction of his regime.
What is the nature of the regime that currently threatens us? It is led by the same man today who over 40 years ago
misread American resolve and launched the Korean war--a war for which the United States was not prepared and which cost us dearly. It is a regime that in one 1983 incident assassinated most of South Korea's Government. It is a regime that captured the U.S.S. Pueblo, imprisoned and tortured its crew. It is a regime that in 1987 blew up a South Korean airliner carrying over 150 South Korean construction workers home from work in the Middle East. It is a regime that has committed numerous other terrorist acts so ruthless that they defy brief summarization.
Mr. President, North Korea has utterly impoverished its nation in order to finance its enormous military and its nuclear weapons programs. I find it difficult to accept that any number of economic and diplomatic rewards from the United States, by themselves, would sufficiently entice Pyongyang into abandoning the aspirations they have paid so dearly to achieve. Given the administration's appeasement policy's sorry record of accomplishment to date, it is abundantly clear to any rational person that the time for more forceful, coercive action is long overdue. Any further delay in hardening our policy would constitute administration negligence so gross as to damage our security interests for a generation or more.
Before describing the stronger action I have referred to, let me first quote Secretary Perry from remarks he made last week prior to the administration's latest change in policy.
Whatever risks we are facing by actions we take today, I believe they would be less than the risks we would face if we tried to face their program two years from now after they had developed a substantial inventory of nuclear bombs and missiles for their delivery vehicles.
Secretary Perry had it exactly right. North Korea's recent purchase of 60 submarines from Russia which, Janes Weekly contends, could be adapted to fire ballistic missiles underscores the urgency of the Secretary's remarks. So, let us now--at long last--consider those steps that would bring this expanding crisis to its earliest and most favorable conclusion.
The United States should once again inform North Korea that should they abandon their nuclear ambitions, we are prepared to normalize our economic and diplomatic relations with that isolated country. After we have reaffirmed that intention, we should talk no more of carrots. Any further discussion of the crisis should only detail the punitive measures we are prepared to take immediately to force their cooperation.
The United States should then quietly inform the Chinese that our policy of accommodation with North Korea has failed and we intend to seek a resolution of sanctions in the Security Council.
We should make clear to China, quietly but very forcefully, that there is no other issue involved in our relations of comparable importance. A mutually advantageous engagement between our two countries will simply not be possible absent their cooperation on the sanctions question. At the same time, we should inform the Chinese that we intend to pursue our advocacy of human rights through some means other than linking it to MFN. The administration must spare no effort to be persuasive in this endeavor. China must understand that should they decline to cooperate, we will have reached an insurmountable impasse in our own relations.
We should make the same representations to Russia.
Whether or not China or Russia indicate they are prepared to cooperate, we must still ask the Security Council to impose tough sanctions. In discussions with our allies before we go to the Security Council, we should make clear our expectations of Japan. Even if a sanctions resolution is vetoed, Japan must cut off all remittances from Korean-Japanese to North Korea.
Japanese Prime Minister Hata, when he still served as Foreign Minister, estimated that financial flows to North Korea from Koreans residing in Japan had reached $1.8 billion annually. Of that figure, $600-700 million is in the form of cash remittances. They account for 40 percent or more of North Korea's foreign exchange earnings, and a little more than 8 percent of its GNP. Depriving North Korea of this important source of hard currency will be sharply felt in Pyongyang as it struggles to keep the collapsing North Korean economy from plunging the entire society into chaos.
North Korea has threatened to go to war over the imposition of sanctions. I do not think they will, but I am not certain. Thus, it is critical that the United States prepare for such a contingency immediately for two obvious reasons. First, we have 37,000 American troops in Korea and we must take every measure to ensure that they are protected to the extent possible from North Korean attack and would prevail as quickly as possible in a conflict. Second, visibility improving our readiness to counter North Korean aggression will emphasize the seriousness of our intention to resolve this crisis on our terms.
Again, let me quote Secretary Perry:
The North Koreans have stated that they would consider the imposition of sanctions to be equivalent to a declaration of war. * * * We may believe, and I do believe, that this is rhetoric on their part, but we cannot act on that belief. We have to act on the prudent assumption that there will be some increase in the risk of war if we go to a sanction regime.
Once more, the Secretary had it exactly right. Unfortunately, the administration has done nothing to act on his prudent assumption. With the exception of the very slow deployment of the Patriot missile batteries the United States has done nothing to prepare for a possible attack from the North.
U.S. forces in Korea number approximately 37,000. South Korean forces number approximately 500,000. Much of these forces are deployed north of Seoul. American capabilities include 2 mechanized light brigades, with Bradley and M-1 tanks.
North Korean forces number approximately 1.2 million men, most of whom are deployed within 20 to 30 miles of the DMZ. Long range North Korean artillery is deployed all along the DMZ with the capability of striking all of Seoul. Deployed SCUD missiles, possibly armed with chemical warheads, could hit almost any point on the southern peninsula.
The American commander in South Korea, General Luck, was reported to have estimated that war on the Korean peninsula would last no longer than 90 days. I do not have sufficient information to support or contradict the general's estimation. Suffice it to say, that should it come to war, it will be a very difficult experience, and we should be prepared to bring it to a very rapid conclusion, well short of the general's 90 days if possible.
Mr. President, the objects of U.S. military policy in Korea should be to deter a North Korean attack; to ensure a decisive win and the least lost of life possible if deterrence fails; to compel North Korea to terminate its nuclear weapons program; and to enforce any economic embargo which might be imposed.
In order to ensure the readiness of U.S. and South Korean forces to serve those ends, the administration should have already ordered the following action. Unfortunately, they have not yet seen fit do so. Lack of adequate strategic lift, Mr. President, makes it imperative that the following deployments occur well ahead of any anticipated military action.
First, increase the readiness and alert posture of U.S. and South Korean forces; second, deploy to South Korea additional troops from the United States; third, deploy additional fighter aircraft squadrons and Apache helicopters to South Korea; fourth, deploy a carrier battle group to the area; fifth, preposition bombers and tankers in the region;
sixth, preposition stocks in South Korea; since, again, significant lack of strategic lift precludes the timely sustainment of our forces during the crisis; seventh, enhance intelligence collection and sharing with South Korea, focusing increased intelligence assets, both satellites and aircraft systems, in the theater; eighth, enhance South Korean defenses with Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), counter-artillery radars, and precision-guided munitions; and ninth, neither American and South Korean forces nor the population of Seoul have effective defenses against a chemical or biological attack from the North. This failing should be quickly remedied.
Mr. President, these are but a few of the actions which the United States should quickly take in accordance with Secretary Perry's prudent assumption directive. That none of them have yet been ordered exposes the administration's considerable negligence.
Mr. President, I have not outlined these few steps because I am eager for a confrontation in Korea. I contemplate such a contingency with great dread. I know well the full terrible measure of war, and appreciate its consequences for the people of South Korea and the Americans stationed there. I ask that the administration act on these recommendations because I believe they will have a deterrent value--they will better acquaint North Korea with the futility of any attempt to conquer the South.
I also appreciate how difficult it might be for Pyongyang to interpret the extraordinarily confused signals they receive from the administration. Accordingly, I think the administration should take pains to inform North Korea that these actions are purely defensive. But should they decide to make a fight of it nevertheless, we should also have informed them in unmistakable terms that any war they begin on the Korean peninsula will end in Pyongyang. They must be made to understand that the United States intends to make their regime the last casualty of a second Korean War.
I hope they will heed that warning, Mr. President. But if they do not, we must not be dissuaded from our commitment to prepare for the prospect of North Korean aggression, and to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis on our terms by whatever means necessary.
Mr. President, I have opposed the use of American force in Beirut, in Bosnia, in Somalia, and in Haiti. I am not such a hawk that I favor using force to resolve problems in places where vital U.S. interests are not threatened. But for the reasons I have provided, I believe those interests are very gravely threatened in Korea.
Therefore, I believe the United States must consider taking stronger measures should we further fail to persuade North Korea to end this crisis. I do not believe that we should resort to offensive military actions immediately. The imposition of sanctions should be attempted and the necessary improvements to our readiness should be affected before we embrace such a serious option. But we should not exclude it from consideration. It should be considered very carefully.
The administration would have us believe that a military response to Pyongyang's intransigence would be ineffective. That is not true, Mr. President. Air or cruise missile strikes on North Korea's nuclear facilities would not completely destroy their nuclear program, but they could damage it severely over both the near and long term. There are risks involved, of course, that must be minimized to the greatest extent possible.
Disabling or limiting North Korea's near-term nuclear capability poses the most difficulties. However, those difficulties are not insurmountable.
Since the reactor's shut down, only a small percentage of its fuel rods have been removed. Discharge of all the rods, refueling and restart may take as long as 60 to 90 days, meaning that the reactor could be operational as early as late July or August. Most, if not all, of the spent rods will be stored in the reactor's cooling pond, although some may be moved later to the reprocessing plant about 1000 meters from the reactor or stored in other hidden locations. Reprocessing the plutonium in the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon could provide a three to four-fold increase in North Korea's nuclear weapons capability.
A significant portion of the reprocessing plant is underground and is reinforced with concrete and earthworks. In addition, there is a fuel rod assembly facility located in this region. The facilities have independent power sources.
Strikes using high-performance aircraft would be required to eliminate these facilities, since they are so heavily reinforced and cruise missiles would not be effective. Because of heavy air defenses around these facilities, the risk to our pilots would be considerable. However, we should have a pretty detailed understanding of the facilities' interior and exterior design and defenses.
Timing is critical in targeting these facilities. Extensive bombing of the reactor or reprocessing plant could cause the release of nuclear radiation which might be carried by prevailing winds to South Korea. Precision targeting could effectively damage the capabilities of both facilities without requiring that they be reduced to rubble, and with little or no radiation release.
It would be preferable to strike the reactor while it is not operational. But even if it is fully refueled and has been restarted, I am told that the radiation release would be minimal with a new fuel load. Strikes could be targeted in such a way as to cause the building to collapse in on itself without seriously damaging any fuel rods in the core.
If no spent fuel rods are moved to the reprocessing facility, it could be hit without risk of a radiation release. Even if a small number have been stored there, a precision strike on the building, designed to disrupt future operations for some period of time, would not result in a significant release of radiation. Again, with precision targeting, a hit could be designed to cause the building to collapse in on itself with virtually no radiation release.
Less difficult options--if also less effective against North Korea's near-term threat--would be strikes against North Korea's huge new 250 megawatt reactor which is scheduled to become operational by the end of the year, another even larger reactor which will be operational in 1996, and an associated reprocessing plant that will begin operations in about 6 months. Since these facilities are not on-line, and have no nuclear fuel on site at this time, there would be no risk of radiation release.
The objective of the strikes would be to irreparably damage the facilities and surrounding support structures, including power plants. High-performance aircraft or Tomahawk cruise missile strikes targeted on these three facilities might effectively eliminate North Korea's planned expansion of their nuclear program. Cruise missiles would eliminate the direct risk of death or capture of any American pilots.
Mr. President, I have just described in dry, technical terms what would be a very serious, and dangerous undertaking by the United States. I would not want my colleagues to think that I take such matters lightly. But I felt it important to refute claims that we have no viable military options in this situation. We do have several very considerable options available to us today. We should not utilize them hastily or without careful consideration. But we should be considering them, and ultimately prepared to implement them if that is what is required to meet the President's correctly stated objective that the United States will not tolerate their nuclear program, period.
I began these lengthy remarks by stating how I had hoped that the administration and I were finally in accordance on how to resolve this crisis. Regrettably, that is not the case. I have heard reports that the administration has used my previous statements on this problem to show the North Koreans that there are some Americans who would be less accommodating in their approach to them. That is fine by me, Mr. President. But I hope today that I have a larger audience. I hope today the administration is listening to me.
I would leave them with a final warning which I have given before by paraphrasing Winston Churchill. Let it not be said of this administration that in a defining crisis of the post-cold-war world, they faced a choice between dishonorable appeasement and war, they chose appeasement first and got war later.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from California [Mrs. Feinstein].
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I would like to commend the Senator from Arizona on his very thoughtful remarks about what is a very difficult and challenging world problem and thank him.
I had the pleasure of listening to him and learned a great deal.
So I would just like to extend my thanks.
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