• Forum
• SITREP
• Military
• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security

• Space

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Public Eye

Further Reading

Russia and Imagery Intelligence

Between 1962 and 1994 the USSR/Russian Federation placed more than 800 photo reconnaissance spacecraft into Earth orbit on dedicated military missions (another 25 spacecraft were lost in launch failures). These missions have ranged in length from only a few days to more than 400 days, a record set by Kosmos 2267 in 1994. Only seven dedicated military photo recons were launched during each of 1993 and 1994. However, on average more than two spacecraft were operational during the entire period, and no observation gaps appeared (Figure 6.2). Declassified photographs with resolutions of 2-30 m can now be purchased commercially, while resolutions on the order of one-third meter have been acknowledged.

Since the first Soviet photo spacecraft was successfully orbited (Kosmos 4 in 1962), a variety of specialized spacecraft have been developed. Today, four basic classes of the 6-7 metric-ton photo recons are operational, and a possible new generation spacecraft began flight testing in the second half of 1994 (Figure 6.3). All such spacecraft are now launched by the Soyuz-U/U2 launch vehicle from either the Baikonur or Plesetsk Cosmodromes. Whereas most spacecraft physically return film to Earth for development and processing, some, longer duration spacecraft possess either digital transmission or dual transmission/capsule capabilities.

Unlike many satellites designed to photograph the Earth, Russian photo recons fly in posigrade (normally 63 degree-83 degree) orbits rather than sun-synchronous trajectories. Consequently, when altitude restoration maneuvers are made every 7-10 days, the satellite's argument of perigee is normally adjusted to keep perigee phased with acceptable lighting conditions. For example, during a typical 2-month mission, the argument of perigee will be rotated progressively from ascending passes (first month) to descending passes (second month). Fifth-generation satellites are an exception with arguments of perigee normally maintained between 80 degrees and 110 degrees.

SOVIET MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES

By Charles S. Sheldon II*

1971-1975

RECOVERABLE MILITARY OBSERVATION FLIGHTS

In the 1950's, the United States gave some publicity in the trade press and before Congress that it was going to develop space reconnaissance systems of satellites which might survey the world photo graphically, and then permit the recovery of the resulting films on Earth. There was also talk of television pictures to give a first look. The principal one of these projects had several names—Big Brother, Pied Piper, Sentry, WS-117L, and Samos . Samos made some early test flights with rather uncertain results and obvious failures before it disappeared in 1961 under the blanket of rules limiting public information. A somewhat larger technology program which involved similar efforts of picture taking and recovery was called Discoverer, and the air snatching or the sea pickup of film-carrying recovery capsules was a regular feature of the news, until after Discoverer 38, when the name and activities, if any, disappeared in 1962 from official press releases and public testimony before Congress.

Since that time, the United States has made many military flights of unannounced purpose, but to this day will not describe on the record in public the purpose or the results of these registered but unnamed, unidentified flights. The United States and the Soviet Union in Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks do refer in their agreements to "national technical means" as a way of gathering information for each to insure compliance by the other to any agreements made. Annual posture statements before Congress by officials of the Department of Defense carry the implication that the United States has a good handle on the problem of keeping track of Soviet missile and ship construction and building of silos, and even of flights and tests. The "national technical means", not specified, may be made up of many kinds of sensors and sources of information, and this report will not try to deduce or define what all of these may be.

The Soviet Union also has "national technical means at its disposal, and it is a fair inference that these means include a strong program of surveillance from space, with recovery of photographic him a part of the larger whole. One can imagine many connections in technology, even of actual flight hardware as well as launch vehicles, between the Vostok,

Voskhod, and Soyuz programs, and what is one for unmanned military observation purposes. The technology shared may include not only use of the A-l and A-2 launch vehicles but possibly even the, same basic spacecraft structures. At the least, the experience of building stabilization, communications, power, recovery and instrumentation systems must have worked back and forth between the manned, Open programs and the unmanned, unacknowledged military programs.

Before 1962, almost all Soviet references to use of military photographic satellites were hostile, although lead times are such that they surely must have invested some years in development work toward their" own systems of this class. After such Soviet flights began, there continued a Soviet public official stance of innocence with regard to their own activities, and disapproval of U.S. flights which they believed were taking place. However, on at least two occasions some years ago in private conversations, there were informal high level probes into the possibility of exchanging picture information gained from space. Former Senator William Benton was asked whether the two countries could trade pictures. Both Khrushchev and his son-in-law made half-jocular, half-serious offers, with no U.S. response, the issue seems not to have come up again. What is significant is that for some years the one-time virulent campaign against purported U.S. space observation activities has been almost completely muted.

Even as long ago as 1967; Professor Kondrat'yev discussed in non-military terms the importance of understanding atmospheric optics as essential to successful reconnaissance. Although he talked to some extent about Earth resources work, his emphasis was upon high precision pictures. (11)

There appeared in 1968 a Soviet review of what were believed to be current and projected U.S. plans for military observation satellites, and whether accurate or not. it was written in factual terms without, editorializing or diatribes. (12)

On the occasion of the 300th Kosmos satellite, another article re-viewed the usefulness of such satellites for the most detailed reporting on both natural conditions and man-governed activities. Although the discussion was cast in economic terms, it claimed capabilities as already existing to do the most detailed synoptic measures on all activity on the Earth. (13)

With or without explicit acknowledgment, analysis to follow will demonstrate beyond all reasonable doubt that the Soviet Union flies the largest number of such military photographic payloads of any nation. (For example, a larger number of these Soviet missions than the second most active space operating nation has flights in its total space program, civil and military—the United States.) There is no-reason to suppose, given the high priority these satellites evidently enjoy, that the Russians are not getting back a dividend they believe makes the flights worth their cost. On at least two occasions, there have been suggestions to the United States that it use similar payloads rather than U-2 aircraft. Khrushchev suggested them as the way for the United States to surveil Cuba after an American aircraft was shot down by a missile over Cuba . More recently, the Russians suggested satellites as a better way to check on missile defenses near the Suez than to use aircraft. But at the same time, they have charged that satellite pictures have been passed by the United States to Israeli military authorities. (14)

In summary, one application of space technology is to collect electromagnetic radiation emitted or reflected from the Earth. When this is done at lowest resolution and from fairly high altitude, the results are thought of as primarily of use for reporting weather, with such data usually in the visible or infrared range. When done at intermediate altitude and with somewhat higher resolution, and often in many parts of the spectrum, such results feed the growing experimentation with Earth resources evaluation and management. When the flights are done at the lowest sustainable altitudes and presumably in still higher resolutions, the resulting data reveal human activities in considerable detail. Wavelengths of visible light are the most obvious of interest, because of the well developed state of the art with photo-graphic film able to accept vast amounts of data on small pieces of 1m which can be magnified for closer study. But selection of different sensitivities to various frequencies both in the range of visible light and beyond into infrared and ultraviolet, and use of color film all may extend the analytical opportunities. Here we find an area of application which blends together what is happening in Earth resources work and in military studies. For example, lower resolution multi spectral work may reveal geologic and tectonic features which are not otherwise apparent. But as one moves into detailed study of agricultural crops and forests, with an interest in crop kinds and their health plot by plot, or marking trees which may be diseased, the resolution requirement becomes more severe. The same is true in use of Earth resources satellites for application in urban land use studies. The task of measuring the economic status of housing or spotting those houses which have insufficient insulation in winter through their infrared signatures begins to be a technology not wholly distinguishable from what military users of space data might require. Photography in the visible range would reveal the gross outlines of major human activities on the ground, whether construction, or order of battle on placement of missiles, aircraft, tanks, and trucks. But one can also imagine it would be useful in some cases to couple what seems to be true in a photograph with synoptic data taken at other frequencies. For example, what appears to be an undisturbed forest in visible light might show in other frequencies that there was camouflage hiding activities, or that heat emissions disclosed what buildings were in use or unoccupied. Perhaps there could even be some spectral studies of exhaust smoke from a factory that would tell what materials were being processed in the furnaces. What shows up in stereo pairs may be much more revealing than single flat views. Basically, however, one supposes that the principal collection of data is possible only when there are no clouds interposed between satellite and the ground to be observed.

SOVIET MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES

By Charles S. Sheldon II*

ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FLIGHTS TO DISCOVER THE MILITARY COMPONENT

USE OF THE A-l AND A-2 LAUNCH VEHICLES FOR MILITARY

RECOVERABLE OBSERVATION MISSIONS

In effect, this section is the culmination of any analysis of Soviet military uses of space. Previous sections of the report have "disposed" of the myriad of other uses by all classes of Soviet launch vehicles. Had the Russians not stopped flying in 1971 their FOBS and their interceptors, these might have become the central, dominant part of the program, with degrees of escalation of rivalry which are almost better not contemplated. The many other uses have important contributions in toto. But the commitment of resources to large payloads of which the A-2 in particular is able to put up, and the fact that there are more of these flights each year than in any other category makes them very important.

Analysis of these flights has taken much time, which is commensurate with their importance. The world leader in such work, as far as the public domain is concerned, is Geoffrey E. Perry whose name has come up in many other contexts in this study. Because his original international reputation was built on his ability to understand the variations in these Kosmos flights, he has been invited to make some direct contributions to this study, and two of these are offered as annexes to this chapter (as well as an additional study as an annex to a different chapter). The Kettering work grew out of observations of the Doppler shift of frequencies received from Soviet satellites as an instructional aid to the teaching of physics. The continuing work over lunch hours provided unconscious training in the "scientific method" to successive generations of pupils, some of whom are named in the annexes to this chapter for their specific contributions.

Table 6-11 summarizes Soviet military observation recoverable flights whose prime purpose is believed to be photographic reconnaissance, although other military data gathering and a variety of supplemental payloads may also be carried. Not unexpectedly for a large and high priority program, the Russians have lavished considerable attention on improving both hardware and flight operations. The Russians have barely acknowledged the program even exists, and then only obliquely; hence, it is not easy to understand everything about its character and subtleties. This table gives a comprehensive overview by sorting out the individual flights by years, by major hardware generations, by possible camera resolutions, and by telemetry patterns and recovery beacons, with further indications about supplemental payloads or experiments where known or suspected. The table also shows the duration of each flight until it was recalled to Soviet territory for recovery, or showing it was exploded if recovery seemed doubtful. The flights are listed by launch site and by general inclination. A rather long list of notes accompanies the table to point out special features and points in dispute about classifications.

Then follows Table 6-12 which summarizes the same information on a single page showing totals by year and by group characteristics, to make it easier to comprehend the trends than does the preceding more detailed complete listing. Finally, in the group, is Table 6-13, which takes the same flights and counts by years the number flown at each inclination announced by the Russians, since the first of the tables in inclination grouping was less precise. This precision reveals that choice of the A-l and A-2 launch vehicles (shown in the table separately) often matches the particular inclinations reported by the Russians and hence is another way of identifying some launch vehicles beyond the usual methods of making observations visually and by radar of the final stage in orbit.

1. Flight Durations

While during the first year, the average duration of flights was 4.6 days, this quickly stabilized for the next seven years at about 8 days. Then 12 and 13 day flights were phased in, and the average for all the more recent years has been around 12 days. A few flights stay up 14 days. Those brought back in shorter times in a few cases may reflect malfunctioning equipment, but more often seem to be associated with crisis situations where a quick look for order of battle makes it more important to have pictures in hand than to obtain maximum use from the payload. As explained earlier, if it is impossible to orient the flight for recovery or if retrofire fails, the payload is exploded to prevent its random decay in some place outside Soviet territory in nearly intact form.

2. Launch Sites

From 1962 on, flights have come from Tyuratam, and in 1966 Plesetsk was also brought into use, now being the more commonly used of the two sites. No obvious reason is evident, nor is there any regular pattern visible in the switch of launches back and forth between the two sites.

3. Inclinations

Tyuratam alone is used to send flights to inclinations around 52 degrees. Plesetsk alone is used to send flights to about 81 degrees. Now both sites come close to duplicating each other's coverage in the range from 62 to 73 degrees. .

Usually a pair of flights is sent each spring to about 81 degrees latitude, presumably to give coverage of the ice movement along the Northern Seas Route across the top of Eurasia . The Kettering Group has also demonstrated that sending summer flights at about 52 degrees will give some twice-daily coverage of northern hemisphere target areas of interest, during good daylight hours. (40)

Some of the other reasons for choice of inclination are to cover areas of interest either as soon as possible after launch, or with the right lighting conditions, or to be timed to match some ground event.

The immediately preceding table (6-13) showed that some of the slight differences in inclinations that are similar can be correlated with use of either the A-l or the A-2 launch vehicle. One can imagine that perhaps with a pair of launch pads at a given site, originally both intended for the A-l vehicle, that one was adapted first for use with the taller A-2 rocket, by adding extra service platforms at greater height, and this shift to a particular pad then showed up for a time in the inclinations attained because of the guidance techniques used during the launch phase. Later, the second pad was also adjusted, as the last of the A-l's was withdrawn from that part of the program, again reflected in inclinations as the A-2's came into greater use.

4. Altitudes of the Flights

These summary tables did not include information on the altitudes of the flights, which details 'are carried, however, in Appendix A, the master log of all flights. One reason is that there seems no discernible pattern that ties variations in altitude to camera systems or stay time in orbit. Apogees have ranged from 236 kilometers to 415 kilometers, with 300 to 350 probably most typical. Perigees have ranged from 147 kilometers to 298 kilometers with 200 to 210 probably most typical.

The later generation maneuverable satellites now sometimes lower their perigees during flight which may be to improve resolution, and may require additional maneuvers to maintain the flight for its full length.

A probable reason for some differences in altitude is to supplement variations in flight inclination as a way of producing a ground trace which will pass close to targets of interest for observation.

5. Identification of Variants

The separation between the first and second generation flights was possible because the A-2 rocket is about three times as long as that of the A-l when this final stage is discarded in orbit. Optically, the difference in stellar magnitude makes it possible to distinguish the two

sizes, and radar analysis provides more specific measurements. (41) The inference has been that the second generation payloads which are put up by a more powerful upper stage probably have an improved camera system that would permit higher resolution pictures.

Among the second generation A-2 flights, two telemetry modes appeared, and the flights were intermixed. The tentative assumption was that there might be two different degrees of resolution, with perhaps the simpler camera systems leaving weight and space over for carrying other sensors to permit synoptic measurements of military interest. This hypothesis which at first was hard to prove from public evidence in time received added support when the third generation flights appeared. There were similar differences and cross links in telemetry patterns suggesting a continuity of function, and the third generation flights definitely could be sorted into maneuvering and non-maneuvering payloads, strengthening the implication that fine maneuvers were to position high resolution cameras, while absence

of maneuver was more likely to mean wider area coverage in search missions at lower resolution before the detailed study at high resolution.

As to the payloads themselves, they have not been put on display. From the general launch patterns and orbital behavior, the assumption has been that the first and second generation military observation flights were probably using essentially the same system as Vostok/Voskhod, which even though manned, operated either automatically or by ground control, so that a minimum change in the hardware for the vehicle bus and service module would be required in moving from the manned program to the unmanned military flights.

What is less clear is whether the third generation flights which typically stay up 12 or 13 days also use Vostok/Voskhod hardware, or whether the program has graduated to Soyuz-related hardware. The advantage of the Soyuz system would be greater ability to maneuver, and the development of some lift during the reentry phase, because of the change of shape of the reentry body. Since many of the third generation payloads cast loose a "capsule" (to use the RAE terminology), this may represent either a modification of the work compartment carried by Soyuz or more specialized hardware that fits in the same place. There have been no confirmed reports of gull-like solar panels on these third generation flights, so they may use chemical batteries as do the manned Soyuz ferry craft of the present period. However Geoffrey Perry and David Hawkins observed Kosmos 599 to be brighter than most earlier satellites of the recoverable series.

The first generation flights seemed to have only one basic family. The second generation flights had two basic types, of differing resolutions. All three of these families might on occasion carry a supplemental scientific or technical experiment. (These have been tabulated in Tables 2-4 and 6-11.) But the third generation flights have proliferated into at least five major families or subgroups, and a few additional flights either are anomalous or contradictory, and not enough evidence has been gathered to supply an adequate interpretation of the reasons for their differences.

While the third generation flights use the A-2 and may use a modified Soyuz, the identification of types can be approached several ways. General tracking evidence reveals whether or not they maneuver, and whether or not they cast loose late in the flight a portion of the payload which usually in a few days decays without any attempt at recovery in the Soviet Union . As suggested, maneuvering ships are more likely high resolution systems.

A second approach to sorting out the types relates to the frequencies on which they send back telemetry. A third approach has to do with the signal formats of the telemetry. A fourth approach relates to the recovery beacon code. Because data are not always available in the public domain in every one of these categories, it requires combining as many as possible and in most cases like identification from a partial fingerprint, it is possible to get a fairly positive identification of the mission. When a particular flight is anomalous in some degree, one has to ask whether data are being misinterpreted, or whether there has been a partial flight failure, or whether still another new variant has appeared on the scene.

On the basis of these several indicators, the third generation flights seem to divide up as follows: (1) Those whose telemetry is usually of the PDM (pulse duration modulation) type, most typically broadcasting on 19.994 MHz, and whose recovery beacon is typically the Morse signal, "TG". These typically 12-day duration flights do not maneuver. If word 7 of the telemetry close to the time of launch is short, and suddenly lengthens, then the main satellite releases a supplemental payload toward the end of the flight, which supplemental payload decays in a few days. If word 7 is very long from the outset, there is not a supplemental payload separated. (2) Those whose telemetry is usually of "Morse code" in a series of three "letters" which actually are quantitative data in binary form, and these most typically broadcast in 19.150 MHz, and their recovery beacons send back the Morse letters "TK", either on 19.995 or 20.005 MHz. These flights maneuver, and cast loose the maneuvering engine late in the flight which usually last 13 days. These flights have now been phased out. (3) Those which emit two-tone signals on about 19.989 MHz, but have no detectable telemetry at this frequency. When these are recovered, their beacon broadcasts the letters "TF". These flights maneuver, and typically last 13 days. An additional class are flights which also use two-tone signals without telemetry, but do not maneuver. They broadcast on 19.994 MHz like the PDM flights and have a TL recovery beacon. They cast loose an object toward the end of the flight, so the assumption is they are low resolution with some kind of science payload.

Every PDM payload which separated a pickaback with a Kosmos number up through all of the 400 series has subsequently been identified by the Russians as conducting scientific work, but all such numbered 500 and above have not. Of the two-tone, non-maneuvering flights using the PDM frequency, and casting loose a pickaback, the first was Kosmos 470, and it has not been identified by the Russians as doing scientific work; nor have they identified any others of this subset with numbers above 500 as 'doing scientific work.

Finally, there have been a few flights, not yet well enough understood to label conclusively, which fit classes listed above, but they seem to have associated with them during the flight "TK" signals as if they were about to be recovered, yet they fly on for their full appointed number of days. This raises the question of whether like Salyut 3 they are making an early return of a film carrying capsule which is recovered, in contrast to the pickabacks which are cast loose merely to decay through air drag. If this is so, it would make sense to permit a quick look at early coverage without terminating the whole mission which could continue for additional days to photograph other targets.

Three remaining observations: (1) A reminder that labeling a supplemental or pickaback "scientific" in the context of these flights is only to reflect the fact that for the first years after 1968 when such extra experiments appeared they were identified by the Russians as geophysical or biological. However, since mid-1972, not a single additional identification has been supplied, so the label may be a misnomer if their function has become military. (2) Flights identified on the basis of having a frequency of 19.994 or 19.995 MHz may suddenly switch to 19.989 or 19.990 MHz to clear the first frequency for a second launch which is about to go up before the former one has been recovered, so that identification of group by frequency requires finding the frequency at the right time during the flight before conclusions can be drawn about categorizing the mission. And (3), a word about two main families of supplemental experiments: From the earliest days of the military observation recoverable flights, a number of them carried extra experiments, but cast loose no pickaback. Presumably, if these were using the Vostok/Voskhod hardware, the experiment was probably contained within the recoverable cabin. Today, most but not all supplemental experiments seem to be linked with a separate compartment which is cast loose, and this is a factor strengthening the notion that the Soyuz hardware is being used, but this is anything but conclusive. Even now, some supplemental experiments may be carried by the same third generation hardware which may be Soyuz related, and yet what most often is cast loose is a maneuvering engine. This suggests that as with the early flights, the supplemental experiments are returned to Earth in the main cabin, rather than cast off in orbit to decay through air drag. However, these interpretations are only speculative.

References:

A. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1971-75, OVERVIEW, FACILITIES AND HARDWARE MANNED AND UNMANNED FLIGHT PROGRAMS, BIOASTRONAUTICS CIVIL AND MILITARY APPLICATIONS PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE PLANS, STAFF REPORT , THE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE .SCIENCES, UNITED STATES SENATE, BY THE SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, VOLUME – I, AUGUST 30, 1976, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON : 1976,

11. Kondrat'yev. K. Ya. Earthly concerns of the cosmos, Komsomol'skaya Pravda, Moscow , December 23, 1967 , p. 4.

12. Khozin, Major G. Second generation of space spies. Aviatslya i Kosmonavtika, Moscow , No. 7, 1968, pp. 91-92.

13. Borisov, T. Space reconnaissance, Trud, Moscow , September 25, 1969 , p. 3.

14. Moscow Radio, July 14, 1970 , 1900 GMT.

40. Perry, G. B., Spaceflight, London , 14 May 1972 , p. 184.

41. Pilkington, J. A., Flight International. London , 86 October 1, 1964 , 605-607.

* Dr. Sheldon, is Chief, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.