Russia and Anti-Satellite Programs
In 1963-1964 the Soviet Troops of Defense (PVO) established two new commands: PRO and PKO. PRO, meaning antimissile defense, was charged with detecting, intercepting, and destroying enemy ballistic rockets, while the PKO, meaning anti-space defense, was responsible for "destroying the enemy's cosmic means of fighting" (Reference 106). In 1992 the USSR Space Units which include PRO and PKO were essentially transferred to the CIS United Armed Forces. However, on 7 May 1992 the armed forces of the Russian Federation were established with specific air and space defense missions.
To implement a space control regime and to fulfill its space defense obligation, the PKO began developing ASAT capabilities. Today, the Russian Federation is commonly believed to have acquired four basic ASAT systems with varying degrees of effectiveness. However, the operational status of these systems is a topic of considerable debate.
THE FIRST MANEUVERABLE SATELLITES
By Dr. Charles S. Sheldon II
1971-1975
On November 1, 1963 , Polet 1 was placed in Earth orbit. Khrushchev himself pointed to the designation of it as being the first, of a series, saying that a whole new era was opening for craft able to maneuver after attaining orbit. The flight entered an initial orbit with an apogee of 592 kilometers and a perigee of 339 kilometers. It was announced to have made many maneuvers of a lateral nature and of altitude, so that the final orbit was 1.437 by 343 kilometers, and the inclination was 58° 55'. Little more was said of the specifics of the flights, although there were many comments on the importance of being able to maneuver.
On April 12, 1964 , Polet 2 was also placed in Earth orbit. Again, the Russians stressed its ability to maneuver repeatedly, but they did not publish the details on these maneuvers. The final orbit was 'described as 500 by 310 kilometers, at an inclination of 58.06 degrees.
As discussed earlier in this report, we can describe the launch vehicle used as an A-m combination. Strangely, the program was never again identified, and one may speculate that it served its purpose, that. The technology was incorporated into some other classes of vehicles as a subsystem.
Precursor Technology Demonstration
[We now know that the “m” stage was in fact the Polet payload as a proof of principal ASAT stage flight test demonstration flown on the basic “A” booster that would later appear in the coming years as a revised larger F-1-m Tsyklon-2 payload third last stage of the Soviet ASAT program. The ASAT last stage was a separate enlarged payload different from the RORSAT payload and was really a derivation of the Tsyklon-2 with third stage being the payload last stage. Both ASAT and RORSAT required a longer Tsyklon second stage than that utilized by the standard SS-9/R-36 ICBM from which the Tsyklon/R-36K was derived.]
MILITARY INTERCEPTOR/INSPECTOR/DESTRUCTOR SATELLITES
The record shows that particularly in the early years there was a Soviet hostility to all military flights operated by or attributed to the United States , whether these were for purposes of communication, weather reporting, navigation, early warning, or observation. At times, the Soviet authorities accused the United States also of plotting to put weapons in orbit, an activity subsequently banned by treaty.
One can imagine that Soviet military planners would see as a necessary ingredient in any stable of military space systems an ability to identify what the United States was really up to in space, and to have the option of destroying that payload if need be. Such actions could be motivated either by defensive considerations such as to neutralize bombs, or as aggressive by blinding the eyes which might be used by the United States to give it warning of changes in Soviet order of battle, or navigation for U.S. submarines, or post damage assessment if the two nations had come to a partial use of their weapons in a nuclear exchange.
The United States at one time put funding support into a protect called Saint which was to have the capability of inspecting satellites whose missions were unknown. The project was later terminated before any flights were made. The kinds of questions raised included political: How would another nation react to having a U.S. payload go into a co-orbit with one of theirs? Would we really be able to judge the full function of the unknown satellite by a study of its configuration, its antenna lengths, its behavior? Could we determine whether it had a weapon on board either from its inertial mass if nudged or its reaction to a neutron pulse sent its way? If we were to consider direct interference with the unknown payload by painting its lenses, or breaking its antennas, or attaching extra propulsion to send it elsewhere, what would be the reactions of its owners? What if it were booby trapped in some fashion? The questions are multiple, and one then weighs the possible advantages of an inspector system which co-orbits against other options such as better sensors on Earth, or vertical probe inspectors which might or might not be able to make a surreptitious inspection in a remote part of the world without having to co-orbit with the satellite.
In any case, the United States withdrew from construction of hardware, while in the Soviet program, actual flight tests of an inspection system have been conducted.
References
1. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1971-75, OVERVIEW, FACILITIES AND HARDWARE MANNED AND UNMANNED FLIGHT PROGRAMS, BIOASTRONAUTICS CIVIL AND MILITARY APPLICATIONS PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE PLANS, STAFF REPORT , THE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE .SCIENCES, UNITED STATES SENATE, BY THE SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, VOLUME – I, AUGUST 30, 1976, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON : 1976.
