Should The Marine Corps Possess An Organic Tactical
Ballistic Missile Defense Capability?
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA National Security
SHOULD THE MARINE CORPS POSSESS AN
ORGANIC TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE CAPABILITY?
By
Keith Wilkes
Major, United States Marine Corps
United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Quantico, Virginia 22l34
ABSTRACT
AUTHOR: Keith R. Wilkes, Major, United States Marine Corps
TITLE: Should the Marine Corps Possess an Organic Tactical Ballistic
Missile Defense Capability?
FORMAT: Requirements of Masters of Military Studies Program
DATE: l9 April, l995 PAGES: 69 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
The rogue states of the world such as North Korea, Libya, and Iran as well
as third world nations, have increasingly viewed Tactical Ballistic Missiles as a weapon that provides strategic impact and capability. TBMs possess significant
capabilities in range, payload, and speed. TBM proliferation is a significant
problem and there are aggressive efforts underway to upgrade its lethality, range, and accuracy. The TBM has become the “poor man’s air force.”
The Department of Defense has had to address this threat, and Congress
has tasked DOD to develop and field capabilities to defend against it. TBM
defense capability has been pursued by each service, to include the USMC.
However, given downsizing, budget constraints, and the roles and missions
debate, the requirement for each service to develop and field its own TBM
capability has come into question.
This paper examines the threat, to include current TBM capabilities as well as future trends. It examines the PATRIOT and HAWK missile systems,
discussing the benefits and drawbacks of each in protecting USMC expeditionary
forces. It also discusses the TBM program for the USMC, highlighting its utility
and benefit for the Corps. The particular USMC requirements, as well as the
constraints the PATRIOT system has in adequately defending USMC expeditionary forces, dictates that the Marine Corps develop its own TBM defense capability.
Also, the paper briefly examines the other service TBM programs under
development. It also examines interface requirements to depict how best to
ensure that the USMC meshes its' TBM capability with the other service future
capabilities so that TBM defense operations are seamless in joint operations. In
conclusion, interfacing the ERINT missile with several Phase Ill HAWK end items
and the soon fielded Air Defense Communications Platform can provide a
significant capability.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii
SCENARIO 1
INTRODUCTION 4
THE THREAT 7
Why TBMs 7
TBM Proliferation 10
Capabilities---Now and in the Future 11
Range, Accuracy, and Payloads l2
Future Trends 15
DEPLOYMENT--- THREAT COUNTRIES l7
HAWK MISSILE SYSTEM 18
BMDO ORGANIZATION AND GOALS and HAWK SYSTEM
PLANNED UPGRADES 23
BMDO---Organization and Goals 23
HAWK System Upgrades 25
THESIS 29
ALTERNATIVE SERVICE SYSTEM: PATRIOT 3O
PATRIOT LIMITATIONS IN SUPPORTING USMC FORCES 3l
Equipment Constraints 3l
Resource Allocation 32
System Coverage Constraints 33
INTERFACING TBM CAPABLE HAWK WITH
OTHER SYSTEMS 36
PATRIOT PAC-3 36
THAAD and TMD-GBR 37
Sea-Based Area TBMD 37
Interfacing 38
ERINT--HAWK--ADCP INTEGRATION 39
SUMMARY 40
CONCLUSION 4l
ORGANIC TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE----
A USMC NECESSITY?
SCENARIO
The time period is March l997. There has been little calm in the continent
of Africa, especially North Africa. This hostile climate has manifested itself
primarily between the nations of Tunisia and Libya. Libya has been aggressively
disputing the oil facilities and oilfields of Tunisia. The Libyan’s hostile attitude and intentions are a result of their poor economy and backward world position caused by the continued economic embargo imposed by the United Nations.
This situation comes to a head when on April 1, 1997, the Libyans launch a major ground attack against Tunisia with two Corps of both mechanized and light infantry. The forces appear to be in pursuit of two objectives: controlling the Tunisian oil production facilities and possessing the oil fields in the northern and coastal regions of Tunisia.
The Tunisian government has asked for United Nations’ support and a world condemnation of the aggressive Libyan attack into their sovereign territory.
However, even in I 997, the world community is still smarting from the Tunisian refusal to support and participate against Iraq during the Gulf War of 1990-199l. The President of Tunisia has personally asked for help from the United States, specifically telephoning the President. In response and in preparation for possible hostilities in this unstable region, the President has asked the JCS to prepare for possible commitment of American forces into Tunisia. These
American forces may have to be committed unilaterally. The JCS have, in turn, tasked CINCEUR to prepare for deployment to the region, first to defend the
nation of Tunisia and then to restore stability to the region. The JCS has
dubbed the operation “African Aegis”.
As the next few days progress, the situation worsens with Libyan forces
pressing closer into the heartland of Tunisia, threatening to cut the nation in half. This effort will sever the capital and port facilities from the rest of the country. At this juncture, this action seriously threatens oil fields and oil production facilities. The heartland of Tunisia is in Libyan possession.
The NCA has tasked CINCEUR with moving forces immediately to Tunisia to defend the capital and oil facilities and then to prepare for follow-on operations to expel the Libyan forces from Tunisia. The CINC moves a US Army mechanized division and a USAF air wing into the region. The USAF air wing consists of fighters, fighter-bombers, tankers, and EIW assets. Lastly, the CINC commits a USMC MEF with an associated MPS offload. The US Army and most Marine Corps’ assets and personnel will use the port of Tunis for offloading.
Italy has approved the use of Sicilian airfields and port facilities to all US forces and the US Air Force will base most of its combat power in those facilities. The government of Tunisia has approved the use of all of national transportation and logistical infrastructure by US forces. This appears to set the stage for a possible repeat of Desert Shield/Storm, whereby US and coalition forces come to the aid of a sovereign nation, defend it, and then pursue offensive means to expel the aggressor.
The news media is reporting “live” the movement of forces into the region,
to include broadcasting from the actual logistical facilities in both Tunisia and Sicily. Through a press conference, the President has spoken to the nation,
conveying the intentions of the US Government and his rationale concerning the possible unilateral use of American forces. He states that “the US will defend
Tunisia, with possible follow-on operations to expel Libyan forces from Tunisia.
Tunisia is of vital interest to the stability of the region and the continued
stability of the US and World economy.”
The Marines are undergoing an administrative offload of the MPS at the port of Tunis. This follows an assessment that this region of Tunisia is under no immediate threat from the Libyan forces. Also, personnel of the MEF are flying into the airport at Tunis. The USAF is flying in equipment and personnel to Sicilian and Tunisian airfields. Thus far, the operation is going relatively smoothly with American combat power arriving in the AO as quickly as possible. The establishment of lodgment, staging, and operational facilities is also proceeding well.
Suddenly on April 6th, explosions and fallout from both high explosive and
chemically armed ballistic missiles engulf the port and airfield of Tunis. Similar attacks occur on the airfields in Sicily. The TBMs originate from well within Libyan territory and appear to be between thirty and forty in number.
Many casualties result, mostly from fragmentation and chemical fallout.
The attacks also damage many aircraft with several destroyed on the airfields.
They also sink one of the MPS ships at port, with several more severely damaged. The port area of Tunis is hit especially hard with many deaths associated with the sinking of the MPS ship while its offload was in progress.
The ballistic missile attack has placed operation “African Aegis” in serious jeopardy. The CINC has temporarily halted all operations until he can determine the gravity of the situation and can verify the extent of the damage. It is obvious that the Libyan TBM capability far exceeded what US forces expected. The ballistic missiles were much better in range and accuracy and had a tremendous impact upon the progress and success of operation “African Aegis”.
INTRODUCTION
Is the foregoing situation plausible? Could such a threat catch the US by surprise in an operation such as this? The tragedy described above is only imaginary, but I would emphasize, very plausible. The days of inaccurate TBMs
are rapidly coming to an end. There are many nations today who can field and employ a sophisticated TBM capability.
The environment today requires that US forces, especially Marines, prepare themselves to deploy into almost any type of contingency, in almost any place in the world. This will likely be the “modus operandi” for many years to come. Will Marines have to face such a threat? Is this type of threat going to become more sophisticated as the years progress?
The current fiscal situation in our country has caused our leaders to take a serious look at the composition, size, and capabilities of our armed forces. This reduction in size and capabilities will continue into the foreseeable future, barring some great world war or catastrophe. Given this downswing, many consider it improper for each service to employ a capability that is resident in any other service. Many Congressmen are asking questions concerning the cost
effectiveness of what appears to be similar capabilities in each service. This
environment has led to many concerns and discussions over reducing service
duplications in both capabilities and assets. In air defense for example, there has been a tremendous debate over whether to keep the HAWK system in the USMC. Also, given the TBM threat, should each service deploy an air defense capability to counter this threat, or should the services share this responsibility? More specifically, is it proper to expect the USMC to deploy some kind of organic TBM defense given the US Army possesses PATRIOT?
The US Army is out of the HAWK missile business and has passed on to the National Guard most of these assets. David Hughes stated in Aviation Week & Space Technology on April 4, 1994, that “... the US Army has deactivated the last of its HAWK missile battalions, leaving just four battalions in the Army
National Guard even though 2O Allied nations including South Korea continue to use the system”1 The US Army had even threatened to stop supporting the
weapon system entirely, to the consternation of both the USMC and the National Guard. However, as of December 16, l994, the US Army has decided to continue supporting the HAWK system in the National Guard.2 This means that if the Marine Corps and National Guard continue to possess the weapon system, the US Army will continue to support it.
Further, Joint Operations are here to stay, and the USMC will probably never deploy as a sole force in operations of any sufficient size and importance. Most operations that encompass the vital interests of this nation will require the use of forces and capabilities from all of our armed services. Given this, if and when there is a TBM threat, it is prudent to expect that the Patriot system will attempt to provide TBM defense for all US forces deployed. However, this begs the following question: Can PATRIOT provide TBM defense of USMC expeditionary forces? Will PATRIOTS go where Marines go?
These several questions form the basis and also prepare the groundwork for my thesis: The Marine Corps should develop, test, and possess its own organic TBM capability. As you will see, these efforts involve upgrading the capabilities of the HAWK missile system, as well as the AN\TPS-59 radar and the development of the ADCP. And, the Corps should interface this capability into the other service systems such as Patriot, Aegis, and THAAD. Through my analysis in developing my thesis, I will also address the questions above concerning PATRIOT and its capability of protecting Marine expeditionary forces.
This will in part answer the question of the necessity for the USMC to possess
its own inherent TBM capability.
My approach in addressing the thesis will be as follows: First, I will
present and analyze the threat, in terms of weapon systems capabilities, the
nations involved, and the pursuit of future improvements in capability. I will
further discuss likely scenarios in which the USMC may find itself, to include the potential TBM threat for those scenarios. This will lead into a discussion of the PATRIOT system, the only real alternative weapon system besides HAWK
capable of some kind of TBM defense for US Marine forces. This discussion will
address several limitations of the PATRIOT system, specifically analyzing
particular applications for possibly supporting Expeditionary Marine Forces.
Further, I will discuss the capabilities of the HAWK system, especially
highlighting the system’s inherent capabilities against TBMs. I will also discuss the current program to upgrade the HAWK system in the USMC to make it more capable against a broader range of TBM threats. Then I will consider the thesis and the applicability of the HAWK system for Marine Corps TBM defense.
I will close with a discussion of the programs the other services either
possess or are pursuing to provide some kind of TBM defense capability. Also, I
will propose how the USMC can best integrate with these systems to provide the
most effective air defense effort against this type of threat. Finally, I will highlight an employment opportunity by combining the new ERINT missile and HAWK
which could provide an extremely effective and expeditionary TBM defense
capability.
THE THREAT
A discussion of the thesis would not be appropriate without an analysis of
the threat. Over the last thirty years or so, TBMs have been produced with
varying degrees of capability in range and payload. They have been traditionally
very crude in construction and design, but this aspect is changing. Several
nations have been at the forefront of their production, most notably the former
Soviet Union, China, and the U.S. The Soviet Union has produced many of the
ballistic missiles in use today. China has also been a major contributor and
exporter of this weapon. Also, the U.S. has produced several variants. The
ballistic missile weapon system has made significant gains as a military capability in the past ten or so years. The question becomes--- why has this system become so popular, especially among Third world countries? And, what are its several variants, capabilities, and planned improvements? I will begin with an analysis of why smaller nations consider TBMs worth possessing, followed by a
brief discussion of proliferation. I will also highlight both current and future
ballistic missile capabilities and trends. In these opening pages, I will also
discuss several countries that possess TBMs which could pose a threat to Marine
Corps expeditionary forces.
Why TBMs?
Ballistic missiles have existed for some time, beginning with the Second
World War. Throughout the Cold War period, their utility existed. The Soviets
produced these weapons for deployment in Eastern Europe. Why do TBMs possess an attraction as a popular weapon of choice of among third world nations and the rogue states in the world (Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya)?
We will begin by first considering one of the basic reasons for possessing
this weapon system: it provides the user strategic power and status. Third World nations are scrambling for both respect and status in the world community. In their view, they can best attain this position by obtaining military capability.
This respect must come through military exploits; however, it must come at the
least expense. For many nations, these missile systems have different symbolic
representations. “The type of chosen weapon for use may be considered tactical/operational to US planners, but is frequently strategic to a nation in the market for a deterrent weapon.”3 Also, the possession of TBM weapon systems
will provide the user in many cases with the feeling they are moving up in the world, and now the world will have to seriously consider them as a player. A
l99O Rand Note states that “Ballistic Missiles add several important new dimensions to the threat. Missiles are a symbol of modern military power,
seemingly providing a high level of prestige among developing nations.”4 Many nations view possession of these systems as a “... rite of national passage out of technological backwardness.”5 In this era of military dominance by the US, developing nations see the ballistic missile weapon system as one way to be
considered strategically viable. K. Subrahmanyam, the leading Indian strategic analyst, best encapsulates this concept following India’s testing of its new TBM, the Agni IRBM. He states, “ Its role as a weapon is the least of its roles. It is a confidence builder and a symbol of India’s assertion of self-reliance not merely in defense but in the broader international political arena as well.” TBMs are one way that a nation may receive better strategic consideration.
Developing nations also seek the TBM as a deterrent. Its capability to reach out across long distances, often throughout a large region, requires bordering nations to at least respect the sovereignty and intentions of a country possessing a TBM. The mere fact that a nation possesses this weapon will
provide some kind of deterrence against possible hostile intentions of a
bordering nation.
At this point, it is worth discussing several nations to analyze why they
possess this weapon as a deterrent. Israel, for example, has a clear need for
possessing weapons of deterrence, especially given its short borders and small
strategic depth. Israel clearly considers its Jericho missiles armed with nuclear warheads as a deterrence against aggression.6
The nation of India sees China as a chief adversary and also appears to
pursue possession of TBMs as a clear deterrent against hostile aggression. The
Chinese have long possessed this kind of capability and in response, the Indians
could use TBMs as a method of delivery.7
Also, the nation of Syria relies upon TBMs as a strategic deterrent against Israel. If armed with chemical warheads, these TBMs create for Israel a serious strategic challenge that they must carefully consider. The threat of such missiles may also deter Israeli conventional aircraft attacks against Syria.8 One can conclude from these examples that TBMs provide some level of strategic deterrence for the possessor of this system.
To continue the analysis of why nations opt for TBMs, one needs also to
consider the world’s air forces and military aircraft. It should be clear that one criteria of technological prowess and world power associates the possession of a sophisticated air force with power and prestige. The privileged nations of the world have this capability. It provides a nation with global reach and strategic power. However, to be effective, this type of capability requires a large investment in both material and manpower. It is in the ability to resource an air force where third world nations come up short. They do not have the funds to purchase sophisticated aircraft nor the capacity to train pilots and technicians. Thus, they turn to the option of TBMs. As seen in the discussion above, they provide strategic capability and powerful deterrence. As Seth Carus states, ”... missiles have operational military roles, substituting for small or ineffective air forces or acting as useful complements.”9 TBMs can become the poor man’s air force, taking the role that first rate air forces have traditionally filled. “In addition, missiles may put within range those targets that are beyond the range of combat aircraft.”10 Also, in contrast to aircraft, missiles do not place expensively trained air crews at the risk of being either killed or captured.11 TBMs provide terrific bang for the buck.
The military use of TBMs also provides a nation the capacity to engage
targets almost with impunity and absolute assurance that the missile will hit close to the intended target without fear of the missile’s destruction. Along with this comes the elements of speed and surprise, both of which enhance the strategic deterrence and power associated with these types of missiles. “The high speed for ballistic missiles enables an attacker to strike with little warning and makes it very difficult for the defender to destroy incoming missiles.”12 The type of weapon assures the possessing nation a capability to attack knowing, the missile will penetrate. The opposing nation will have little or no warning that an attack is taking place. This provides a serious military capability to any nation that possesses this weapon system, however backward or poor it may be.
TBM Proliferation
TBM proliferation is a complex and yet frightening aspect of this weapon
system that we must also examine in this analysis. A look at proliferation will
demonstrate the technology flowing worldwide and the sheer numbers of nations
involved. The recent fall of the Soviet Union and the global international
economy have fostered this interchange of both military and industrial
technologies that has helped fuel the development and improvement of the
capability of TBMs. Because of the need for hard cash to finance the
international technological boom, nations possessing the necessary technology have sold guidance, warhead, and missile technologies to many third world
countries. “Countries, firms, and individual scientists and engineers have often
provided developing countries with missile technology or even components.”13
This flow has not only been within the eastern bloc, but also to Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and Syria. Many of these technologically advanced countries have also helped North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Taiwan. China is also a culprit in this international technology proliferation.14 Third world nations are clearly exporting to others as well as receiving technology from the larger powers in the world. Also, the phenomena termed dual use technology exists. Nations currently involved in space programs have the capability and propensity to also involve themselves in rocket production and satellite systems guidance and development. These technologies have corresponding applicability to TBM development and production.15
As discussed above, the reasons for possessing TBMs are varied and somewhat complex, but they all lead to a global proliferation of this type of
technology. This weapon system will continue to see utility among third world
nations as long as it possesses military utility and a capability to provide dome semblance of strategic power. Chart I in the Appendix graphically depicts the significant interchange and intertwining of nations involved in this technology proliferation which have an impact on nations in the Middle East.
Capabilities---Now and in The Future
I would like to continue with a discussion of current TBM capabilities, as
well as what is in store in the foreseeable future. This is necessary in order to highlight just what these systems can do so that the reader will have a clear
understanding of TBM capabilities and as well, limitations. I will also present
future developments to provide an understanding on the improvements of the
TBMs versatility and capability.
Range, Accuracy, and Payloads
First, I would like to discuss the weapons’ range, accuracy, and payloads. A quick look at Chart 4 in the Appendix will suffice at this point. It is clear that there are many different derivatives of the basic SCUD missile first introduced by the Russians many years ago. Also should notice the accuracy and payloads associated with many of these systems. Range and accuracy are somewhat suspect on many systems, but utilizing unconventional warheads such as nuclear or chemical significantly improves their utility and impact. The following information from Rand Note N-2985-NOSD presents a synopsis of the information depicted in Chart 4:
* Current TBMs have:
-- Unitary conventional warheads
-- 3OOm CEP or greater
* Current technology may allow for:
-- Cluster munitions (Egyptian experiments)
-- 1OOm CEP (improved inertial guidance)
-- Chemical warheads
* Advanced technology would be required for:
-- 50m accuracy
-- Smart munitions l6
A brief discussion of the various warheads is appropriate. The more
conventional of these is the High Explosive or HE. These warheads come in
various weights and various effectiveness. They typically cause tremendous
damage on impact and also cause blast waves and debris which cover a large
area. “Modern high explosives, including those produced by Brazil and probably
other countries..., are many times more powerful than TNT (trinitrotoluene).”17
For example, the blast from a 1,000 pound HE warhead “...would generally
destroy buildings within a radius of llO-l4O feet from the explosion; would cause serious damage to buildings of standard construction within a radius of 150-18O feet; and would cause deaths and injuries from flying projectiles to double that distance.”18 Also, one must consider the supersonic speeds at which TBMs travel and the correlating damage from the impact of the missile because of sheer momentum. “The SCUD-B travels at three times the speed of sound when it
lands, not only exploding unexpended fuel but causing considerable damage with
the impact of its two-ton missile fuselage.”19
Chemical, biological, and nuclear
warheads add another entirely new dimension to this weapon.
First, nations are actively developing chemical
warheads and are, quite possibly, fielding them with TBMs. These warheads
provide a dramatic addition to the TBMs effectiveness, countering some of its
inherent inaccuracy by spreading contaminants over a large area. This will
render an area occupied by personnel and equipment ineffective for some time.
“In the third world, chemical weapons are seen as the ‘poor man’s nuclear
weapon.”20 This clearly depicts the perception of many small powers that chemical warheads and TBMs are a deadly, effective, and capable combination. However, the most profound aspect of chemical warheads is the correlation that exists between nations that have chemical weapons capability and also possess a TBM capability. “There are few countries with ballistic missiles that are not
seeking to develop a chemical capability and only a few countries with chemical
weapons not developing a ballistic missile capability.“2l These nations almost
assuredly have both the capability and desire to place chemical warheads on TBMs. Note Chart 2 in the Appendix for a further look at this correlation between TBMs and chemical weapon production.
Further, “the analysis shows that use of even today’s ballistic missile
systems with chemical weapons could represent a major military threat for which
the United States is relatively unprepared.”22 The use of this capability could be most damaging to USMC operations. Marine Corps operations are typically expeditionary and rely upon establishing a secure and safe lodgment area to
provide for the follow-on MPS offload. The same RAND Note states that “…chemical weapons may represent a particularly effective threat against rapid deployment forces.”23 Chart 5 in the appendix is quite enlightening and graphically depicts the capabilities of chemical agents.
Biological agents added to TBMs are equally as deadly and much less costly than even chemical agents. However, the biological agents themselves are somewhat difficult to produce, and at this time there is little evidence to support their proliferation for this intended purpose. However, this does not mean that there should be no fear of or preparation for this type of threat.
Nuclear warheads require little discussion. The fact that a nation possesses nuclear technology and a TBM program is enough evidence to concern the world community that the nation could also fit a TBM with a nuclear warhead. This technology is readily available and TBMs lend themselves quite adequately to being the launch vehicle for nuclear warheads. Further, the TBM becomes the only vehicle for transporting the nuclear warhead of a nation that possesses little or no air force to carry out this functional delivery. As already stated, India, with its nuclear capability, could be developing a nuclear warhead
for its TBMs because the TBM is the only vehicle that they possess with the
capability to deliver such a warhead.
Future Trends
Enhanced technology is adding tremendously to the following aspects of
ballistic missiles: accuracy, range, and firepower. There is and will be marked
improvements in accuracy because of guidance system improvements. The use and availability of GPS technology will be a key contributor to this improvement.
The application of GPS and the Soviet counterpart, GLONASS, will “...simplify
launch and guidance problems, greatly increasing the accuracy of future TBMs
and hence, their military value.”24 These technologies are openly available and any nation can apply and use them. Guidance systems for TBMs are improving and will continue to borrow from the latest in military and civilian applications and technologies.
Improvements in the accurate
positioning of the launcher as well as availability of accurate
position data of the target are readily available today. The using
nation must accurately emplace a launcher for the missile to be most effective.
The TBM launcher is no different. Also, knowing the accurate
position of the target makes the accurate launching of the missile easier. Nations can easily obtain current mapping data to better calculate the accurate
position of the target. This capability, combined with the above technologies,
provides an attainment of TBM impact accuracy as depicted in the information on
page l2 of this document. Space targeting is also available. As stated by
Colonel John O’Pray, “... one potential space targeting enhancement is the use
of radio navigation satellite data to significantly reduce the uncertainties in the positions of both the mobile missile launchers and the targets.”25
As mentioned better emplacement of the launch platform achieves improvement in TBM accuracy. There is technology available that will dramatically improve the capability to more accurately emplace the launcher thereby achieving much improvement in the intended impact accuracy of the missile. There are commercially available GPS receivers that are easily obtainable and relatively inexpensive. A using nation could easily adapt these types of receivers to the TEL to provide for more accurate emplacement. So,
“…launcher geolocation accuracy is not a significant constraint on overall RPBM targeting accuracy because either standard geodetic mapping data (for well surveyed regional powers) or available civilian GPS receivers can provide adequate positioning data.”26
Further, there are satellite capabilities and images available for anyone on the open market. The French government provides these products from their SPOT observation satellites to any buyer. The French government has an open policy towards the dissemination of this information.27 The SPOT data states that it can reduce geolocation accuracy to less than 3O meters. “Thus SPOT images will be available to potentially hostile powers either direct from France or through collaboration with non-hostile regional powers.”28 So, through the use of current technologies involving mapping data, GPS and satellite imaging, improvements in launcher emplacement will increase the accuracy of the TBM.
Thus, it is apparent from the above analysis that TBMs currently pose a significant threat to expeditionary forces as well as to any force that is within range of these assets. Also, the improvements mentioned above will greatly reduce the CEP of these weapons giving the TBM relative impunity in attacking a target, but also giving the weapon a much greater chance of hitting the intended target with relatively good accuracy. Further, the lethality and mix of warheads that the weapon can utilize, adds a frightening aspect to the strategic and military utility of this type of missile. Add to this the specter of chemical warheads and the TBM takes on a new gravity, most appalling in its application. The chemically armed TBM suddenly becomes the poor man’s nuclear weapon, as well as his strategic air force. This is significant military utility, and “... chemically armed ballistic missiles could represent a major threat to U.S. operations anywhere in the world. They could become a more serious problem than the threat of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.”29
DEPLOYMENT--- THREAT COUNTRIES
At this point I would like to discuss briefly some of the probable countries where USMC units may find themselves deployed. These countries may be in proximity to normal Marine deployments, or quite possibly a direct opponent in armed conflict. Chart 1 also depicts the nations that can pose a TBM threat to Maine expeditionary forces.
Chart 3 highlights the nations that possess not only ballistic missiles, but also those states that possess or are pursuing some kind of chemical capability and are also a declared nuclear weapon state. It is interesting to note that the nations possessing ballistic missiles are also pursuing chemical warhead. Consider that most of these nations are the current “flash-points” in the world or at the very least, areas of serious concern. US forces, specifically Marine forces, can and will find themselves deployed to any of these nations in the near future. We currently support operations in many regions that border these “rogue” states. The USMC is not currently prepared to defend itself against the ballistic missile threat in these regions. Are other Service assets such as PATRIOT going to be available to protect these Marine expeditionary forces? These missile threats will be a challenge to any US forces.
At this point, it is appropriate to discuss the USMC HAWK system and
highlight its capabilities and also look at current upgrades to the system which
will provide a better ballistic missile defense capability.
HAWK MISSILE SYSTEM
So that my description of the HAWK system does not become too laborious and intricate, I am going to assume that the reader has some rudimentary understanding of what the system is and some idea of its basic capabilities. I will keep all discussions of capabilities at the unclassified level. The USMC and the US Army have employed the HAWK system since the early l96O’s. The system has been the medium range, medium altitude air defense weapon for both of the services. Many foreign and NATO member nations have also purchased and employed the system as well. The system has evolved over time to improve mobility, reliability, and capability against evolving threats. These threats have included both manned and unmanned aircraft and missiles. Figure 1 that follows depicts the current Phase III configured HAWK platoon in the USMC with its associated major end items.
IMAGE 1
The HAWK system possesses a semi-active homing missile which is approximately 13 feet in length and weighs about 12OO lb. This missile has a semi-active radar on board and requires that a radar illuminate the target for the missile to home on the target. The missile’s radar becomes active as the missile approaches the target and proceeds to achieve a proximity detonation to better accomplish target destruction.
The systems has three primary radars. Think of the pieces of equipment as part of a system, not independent of each other. The first is the illuminator radar, or HIPIR. This radar illuminates the target, thereby providing guidance for the missile. There are two of these in each HAWK platoon in the USMC. The PAR is the medium range (l2OKM), medium altitude (5O,OOO ft.) acquisition radar for the system. There is one of these per HAWK platoon. The short range (2O KM), low altitude (40,000 ft) radar is the CWAR Radar. This radar provides excellent capability against low-level targets. There is one of these radars per HAWK platoon. The system has an IFF capability in the IFF transponder which provides the system the capability to challenge and receive various IFF signals including MODE IV (Mode IV is an international military coded IFF response which identifies an aircraft as a true friend).
A command and control van, called the BCP, manages the systems This van houses the launch control personnel (TCO and RO), consoles, computers, and the IFF to both command and control the system. Finally, the system possesses a launcher which holds three missiles when fully loaded. There are three launchers per HIPIR in the active USMC HAWK Platoon, and two launchers per HIPIR in the reserve HAWK platoon. The following point is extremely important. Each HIPIR can engage only one target therefore, the USMC HAWK platoon can engage no more than two targets at any given time. This can be a system limitation when trying to defend against a large raid of aircraft or missiles. Figure 2 graphically demonstrates this point.
IMAGE 2
As stated, the system has been in the inventory since the I 96Q’s, but has undergone several improvements in capabilities or technology, to include the latest Phase Ill upgrades. These latest improvements significantly enhance the reliability of the system and its capabilities against ECM threats. These upgrades have dramatically improved the HIPIR and the control van. The BCP is a new piece of equipment that significantly improves the management, computing capabilities, and control of the system. Overall, the Phase III improvements provide such dramatic changes to the equipment that renaming the system might have better reflected these new capabilities and improvements to the system.
Also, there have been major efforts by the MARCORSYSCOM and system developers during the period 1988 through l99O to test and field a capability to deploy a smaller and lighter package of HAWK equipment. These developments revolve around using rugged lap-top computers mixed with line-of-sight VHF radios to allow remote emplacement of the HAWK HIPIR and CWAR. Also, these developments have provided the capability to remote a launcher and HIPIR away from the acquisition radars and the BCP. The additional equipment in the form of lap-top computers and radios allows the system to deploy in much smaller packages and allows much greater distances in emplacement and remoting of fire units. Now you can have a HAWK capability with as little as four end items, greatly reducing footprint and greatly increasing responsiveness to movements and deployments. Figure 3 graphically depicts this capability.
IMAGE 3
Throughout the years, the system has demonstrated significant capabilities against a vast array of threats, and system developers have consciously upgraded it to keep up with the improvements in aircraft, missile, and ECCM technologies. For purposes of this discussion, the system has always possessed some capability to defend against short range ballistic missiles. This capability dates back to tests conducted in I 96l. Also, both in 1988 and again in 199O, the HAWK system completed successful tests against ballistic missile targets include SS-2l surrogates. This is significant because both the US Army and USMC have often overlooked this capability. The system has a proven track record of providing a good defensive capability against short range missiles of various types. The Phase III system also has a good capability to defend against cruise missiles. This is also significant, because the services do not have an adequate defense against this type of threat and cruise missiles are growing in proliferation, as are ballistic missiles.
I will now examine what the Marine Corps has currently planned, researched, and developed to improve the USMC HAWK system’s capabilities against a broader range of ballistic missile threats. To do this, I will first discuss the BMDO, and how this organization is currently managing many of the TBM programs in all of the services. BMDO is financing the majority of the ex5enses associated with the upgrades to the HAWK system in the Marine Corps, as well as financing a good portion of the TBM program for the Corps.
BMDO ORGANIZATION AND GOALS AND
HAWK SYSTEM PLANNED UPGRADES
BMDO-- Organization and goals
The threat of ballistic missiles prompted the MARCORSYSCOM to pursue improvements to the HAWK system against a wider range of ballistic missile threats. Governmental interest, beginning with former Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger and his concern over the proliferation of ballistic missiles in l988 prompted this pursuit. He directed DOD efforts to determine the impact and seriousness of this threat. Congressional interest followed these efforts,
specifically culminating in the TMDI of l99O.
The conference report on FY9l appropriations directed that:
…A U.S. Tactical Ballistic Missile system with the necessary capabilities should be fielded as soon as technologically and fiscally feasible as appropriate.., the Navy and the Air Force requirements for Tactical Ballistic Defense systems and programs. The Authorization Act (Sec 225) for FY9l further stated that: It is the sense of Congress to ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps are involved in development programs for future ATBM systems suitable for deployment with their projection and expeditionary forces.
The bottom line is this. Congress desires that all the services pursue ATBM systems befitting their own requirements, but that these systems be interoperable and provide for a seamless, integrated system. Also, the Navy/Marine Corps should develop systems capable of responding to the requirements for force projection and expeditionary operations. In particular, the Navy’s system should be commensurate with their deployment and force projection capabilities, and the USMC should develop a system that is light,
deployable, and responsive to the peculiar requirements for expeditionary Operations
Congress gave DOD supervision of these efforts which DOD further passed on to the SDIO. Following Desert Storm, Congress provided further guidance. This resulted in the Missile Defense Act of l99l, which dubbed the program, Theater Missile Defense (TMD). This act further applied the following goal:
The development of deployable and rapidly relocatable advanced theater missile defenses capable of defending forward-deployed and expeditionary elements of the Armed Forces of the United States, to be carried out with the objective of selecting and deploying more capable theater missile defense systems by the mid-199O’s.3l
SDIO restructured itself in l99l based primarily on limited funding in the out-years. Entitled GPALS, this restructure has three major elements, with the first piece responding to Congressional guidance to deploy TMD systems as soon as possible. SDIO defined the TMD element as “...defense against short range ballistic missiles within a theater. …The other elements or pieces are ‘National defense’ and ‘Global defense’.”32 All three elements taken together will form a defensive shield against the full spectrum of TBM threats.
The SDIO organization became the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
in l993 and has reflected the current Presidents’ “... emphasis on developing
ground-based defenses against regional ballistic missile threats.”33
BMDO sees the evolving TMD architecture as a multi-tiered defense of population centers, high-value assets, and critical mobile military targets. The upper tier will be a long range, high altitude system capable of defending a large area, complemented by a lower tier of point defense weapons. The major anti-tactical (theater) ballistic missile (ATBM) systems currently in development include improved Patriot; Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT); Corps-SAM; and Aegis/Standard Missile modifications.34
In their report to Congress, dated July 1994, BMDO states that the goals
for TMD defense involve five areas: (1). A lower tier capability. (2). An upper
tier capability. (3). Enhanced warning and surveillance capabilities. (4). Battle Management/Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (BMC3I)
capabilities. (5). Capabilities for boost phase intercepts.35 The following best
describes the BMDO plans and approach to fulfilling Congressional intent to
counter the TBM threat:
In the near term, an enhanced lower tier intercept capability will be provided by the PATRIOT Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) with Quick
Response Program (QRP) enhancements and improvements to the AN/TPS-59 Radar and HAWK Weapon System. In the core program, lower tier intercept capability will be bolstered by PATRIOT PAC-3 and modifications to the AEGIS system, including the SPY-1 Radar and the Standard Missile 2 (SM-2) Block IVA; and an upper tier intercept capability will be established with the THAAD missile and the TMD-GBR. Concepts for Corps SAM to further improve and extend to maneuver forces the lower tier intercept capability to protect mobile ground forces; Sea Based Theater Wide Defense systems; and Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) are being considered and the deployment of one or more of these systems will occur after completion of the core program development.36
Also, note Chart 9 in the Appendix for a graphical representation of these efforts. This information clearly depicts our government’s interest in countering the TBM threat, the organization responsible for executing this effort, and the goals of BMDO as presented to Congress in their report dated July, 1994.
HAWK System Upgrades
As stated above, MARCORSYSCOM is developing improvements to USMC weapon systems in response to the threat and BMDO requirements. I will discuss the improvements to the HAWK system first, followed by a brief discussion of the other developments to Marine Corps equipment that are part of this TBM defense program for the Corps.
As mentioned, the HAWK system in the Marine Corps is undergoing several improvements to provide a better capability to defend against a broader range of tactical ballistic missile threats. Charts 6 and 11 provide an appreciation of the threats the HAWK system is capable of defeating.
Further improvements to the missile include improving the fuse so that it
will have a better chance of a mission kill or even better, a warhead kill against a ballistic missile (mission kill is defined as preventing the TBM from hitting its intended target---warhead kill actually destroys the TBM warhead). This new fuse will not alter the missile’s capability against aircraft and will only require a minor upgrade. Also, the upgrade will alter the missile warhead, changing the size of the detonated warhead fragments. The warhead will weigh the same, but the explosive fragments will be larger to have a better chance of taking out the ballistic missile’s warhead. Again, this should bear no impact upon the missile’s capability against aircraft.
Lastly, the developers will improve software in the BCP to provide better performance against a broader range of ballistic missile threats. This software will improve system performance in both tracking and engagement of ballistic missiles. But, as Chart 6 notes, these improvements to the system will not give HAWK an “all ballistic missile” defense capability. The system will see dramatic improvement in its capability against the divisional and tactical ballistic missile threat, precisely the threat that Marine Forces will most likely face.
Thus far, I have briefly described the improvements to the HAWK system
and I must also discuss the associated improvements and developments to two
other pieces of equipment that are part of the TBM defense program for the
Marine Corps. Chart 7 depicts and describes the three pieces of equipment involved in the USMC TBM program. First, the AN/TPS-59 radar, the long range surveillance radar for the MACS, will receive several improvements. This radar will provide the long range cueing of TBMs for the HAWK system. These improvements will significantly enhance the radar’s altitude and range capability to provide better surveillance tracking, and cueing of the ballistic missiles. These improvements will also decrease the footprint of the system, reducing command and control facility requirements as well as improving computer
performance and maintenance requirements. This radar will be the Marine Corps’ “eyes”, so to speak, in defending against TBMs. These improvements should not impact the radar’s requirement to provide for air surveillance against aircraft and missiles, its primary mission for the USMC.
The second part of the TBM program is the development of an ADCP. This HHMMWV based shelter will house resident communications and computer assets to provide the interface between the AN/TPS-59 radar and the HAWK system. The ADCP will also provide via J-TIDS, the TBM target data that the AN/TPS-59 provides. All the services will participate on the J-TIDS WAS. This net will carry command and control data as well as target quality data on any TBMs. The Marine Corps is not currently modifying the TAOC, the facility that controls aircraft and missiles, to provide for the interface between the AN/TPS-59 and the HAWK for the hand-off and engagement of TBMs. The USMC hopes to accomplish this modification sometime in FY’s 97-99. So, the ADCP will become, in at least the near term, the interface between the AN/TPS-59 and the HAWK Platoon. Consequently, the ADCP will be a pivotal piece of equipment for the TBM defense system in the USMC and will also provide the rest of the services the TBM data that the AN\TPS-59 has acquired and is processing. Given the fact that the services will go to war jointly, the ADCP becomes critical for providing
TBM data from the AN/TPS-59 to the other services via the J-TIDS WAS net.
These systems taken together will comprise the USMC TBM defense capability. With the current configuration of an active HAWK battalion, it will be able to defend (Figures 1 and 2) twelve point targets against ballistic missile threats. The number of HIPIR’s limits the number of targets to engage, not the number of missiles available. Again, the system can