The Strategic Defense Initiative: "Star Wars" Becoming A Reality
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The Strategic Defense Initiative: "Star Wars" Becoming A Reality
Author: LCDR Michael P. Kompanik
Thesis: The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) will provide the
United States with a viable means to defend itself, its allies,
and its forces overseas from limited ballistic missile attack.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a historical
analysis of SDI from its inception to the present, discussing its
origins, political perspectives, conceptual changes, system
architecture, and projected capabilities.
Background: By 1997 the United States will be in a position to
deploy the world's first truly effective ballistic missile
defense (BMD) system. Dubbed "Star Wars" by the media, SDI
represents an entirely new approach to strategic defense that is
more rational and tangible than the policy of deterrence and
adherence to mutual assured destruction.
Much has changed since SDI was first envisioned.
Technological advances have helped turn fantasy into reality.
Improvements in electronics, computers, and miniaturization have
helped make SDI more rapidly achievable at a cost far less than
first projected. The major technological breakthrough of
Brilliant Pebbles paved the way for affordable protection by the
end of this decade. This system, coupled with various
satellites, ground tracking and surveillance assets, and ground-
based interceptors comprises the deployable SDI system.
The world has also changed dramatically since the
Strategic Defense Initiative first began. The collapse of the
Soviet Union has virtually eliminated the threat of global
nuclear war. Political instability and ballistic missile arms
proliferation represent the new threat environment. Therefore,
in 1991, President Bush refocused the SDI effort to GPALS -
Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. GPALS' mission is to
provide protection against the deliberate, accidental, or
unauthorized attack from a limited number of ballistic missiles.
Regardless of how effective it is against the ballistic
missile threat, GPALS, however, cannot provide protection against
terrorists who may not rely on ballistic missiles to unleash
their destruction upon society. Until an effective strategy is
developed against such threats, we will never be completely
protected from weapons of mass destruction.
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: "STAR WARS-
BECOMING A REALITY
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement: SDI/GPALS will have the ability to defend the
United States, its allies, and its armed forces from limited ballistic missile attack.
I. Introduction
A. Scenerio demonstrating the need for SDI
B. President Reagan's speech challenges the nation and charts a new course for strategic defense
C. Skepticism against "Star Wars"
D. SDI provides an alternative to the prevailing doctrine of deterrence and reliance on mutual assured destruction
II. Origins
A. Findings of the Defensive Technologies Study
B. Establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)
C. Mission statement of SDIO
III. Controversy
A. Conflict between SDI and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty
1. "Broad" interpretation of Treaty permits SDI research and development
2. Analysis of the role of the 1972 ABM Treaty in SALT TALKS
3. Recent developments negate importance of Treaty
B. SDI and our allies
1. Lack of initial support
2. Fear of destabilizing effect
3. Improved relations through mutual cooperation and joint research
C. High cost of SDI
IV. Refocus to GPALS
A. Arms proliferaton among the third world nations
1. Persian Gulf War
2. Libya and other threats
B. Collapse of Communism, Warsaw Pact, and dissolution of the Soviet Union
1. Threat of global nuclear war diminishes
2. Instability heightens concern over security of nuclear weapons
C. President Bush refocuses SDI to GPALS
1. GPALS-new mission statement for SDI
2. Differnces between SDI Phase I and GPALS
3. Cost savings due to technological advances and refocus to GPALS
V. System Design
A. Early conceptual views versus GPALS
B. Phased concept of development and deployment
C. BMD functions and system elements
D. Layered defense system concept - advantages and disadvantages of each
1. Boost/Post-Boost layer
2. Midcourse layer
3. Terminal layer
E. GPALS Architecture
1. Theater level missile defense
2. Brilliant Pebbles space-based interceptors
3. Brilliant Eyes satellites
4. Phased Ground-Based Radar Terminals (GBRT)
5. Exo-endoatmospheric Interceptors (E2I)
6. Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI)
7. Optional Ground Surveillance and Tracking System (GSTS)
8. GPALS command center
VI. Conclusion
A. GPALS brings militarization to space
B. SDIO's mission must continue
C. SDI/GPALS follow-on systems
1. Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) and High Velocity Weapons
2. Simplified command and control requirements
D. Transition from R & D to command and control is required
E. SDI/GPALS will protect against NBC threat from ballistic missiles but will not protect against terrorists or other
Stateless organizations.
F. True defensive protection will not be achieved until all NBC threats (non-missile) are effectively negated.
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE:
"STAR WARS" BECOMING A REALITY
INTRODUCTION
Three Chinese made CSS-1B ballistic missiles, each equipped
with a 15 KT thermonuclear warhead, lift off from a military
facility hidden in the mountains near Tabas, Iran. Fired by an
extremist Iranian government, the missiles streak skyward at
17,000 m.p.h. Their targets - 1) a U.S. Naval carrier task force
in the Indian Ocean 115 miles from Iranian coast; 2) Basra Iraq,
the last stronghold of Saddam Hussein - retaliation against his
inhumane Scud C missile attacks delivering nerve agents which
killed thousands of Iranian troops along the Iraqi border; 3) the
massive U.S. military base in Dhahran, used to project U.S.
military power into the region and prop up a weak Saudi
government, besieged by Islamic fundamentalist revolutionaries
backed by Iran.
The launches are detected immediately by two orbiting
surveillance satellites. In moments, the National Military
Command Center has alerted major subordinate commands along with
top military and civilian leadership. The U.S. Space Command
instantly goes into action using the recently deployed SDI/GPALS
system to locate the ballistic missiles and compute trajectories
and target information. Two hundred fifty miles above the earth,
the multi-sensor equipped Brilliant Pebbles space-based
interceptors automatically lock on to two of the missiles.
Tracking their targets from the infrared signatures during the
missiles' boost phase, the Brilliant Pebbles almost
instantaneously compute the trajectories of the missiles and plot
intercept courses.
Although no larger than a golf bag, these small, intelligent
interceptors spell certain doom for the massive 57,000 lb.
ballistic missiles. Two Brilliant Pebbles fire their rocket
motors and close their targets at speeds close to 8 miles per
second. The resultant collisions in space completely destroy the
ballistic missiles before they can discharge their lethal
payloads.
Meanwhile, high above the atmosphere, Brilliant Eyes
satellites observe the intercepts made by the two Brilliant
Pebbles and track the third missile. This missile's target, the
carrier task force, is closest to the launch point. The shorter
trajectory and the shorter boost phase of this missile renders it
unsuitable for interception by Brilliant Pebbles. Instead, a
ground-based terminal phased radar system, located near Dhahran
and data linked to the Brilliant Eyes satellites, provides
trajectory data to a battery of new Theater High Altitude Area-
Defense (THAAD) interceptors which have replaced the old Patriot
Missile System. Similarly, on board an Aegis Class cruiser
operating with the carrier task force, the new, improved Aegis II
missile system stands by to conduct an intercept mission.
As the CSS-IB ballistic missile achieves maximum trajectory
and begins to accelerate downward toward the task force, two
THAAD interceptors are launched from Dhahran. The interceptors
reach their target high in the upper layers of the atmosphere.
The closing impact of the interceptors and ballistic missile at
greater than 12 miles per second, utterly destroys this third and
final threat to the security of the United States and its armed
forces
The above scenario would have read like a science fiction
novel a mere decade ago. Today, thanks to the tremendous
technological advances in strategic defense research, the United
States stands on the verge of deploying the world's first truly
effective Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system. By 1997, the
Strategic Defense Initiative's Global Protection Against Limited
Strikes (SDI/GPALS) system will be fully operational and
available for deployment. As a completely integrated, multiple-
layered defensive system incorporating the latest technologies,
SDI/GPALS has the capability to defend the United States, its
allies, and its armed forces from limited ballistic missile
attack.
For more than a generation, the United States national
defense policy against nuclear ballistic missile attack rested
solely on the foundation of strategic deterrence. National
defense policy, however, took a bold, new direction in the early
1980's with the advent of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The
mandate for this new policy occurred on 23 March 1983 in a speech
by President Reagan. Just as President Kennedy challenged
American society and American technology to a goal of winning the
space race by putting a man on the moon within the decade,
President Reagan also challenged American science and technology:
I call upon the Scientific Community in our country,
those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great
talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to
give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons
impotent and obsolete. (13: 24)
President Reagan echoed these words again at his Inaugural
address on 21 January 1985 as he stated:
I have approved a research program to find, if we can,
a security shield that will destroy nuclear missiles
before they reach their target. It wouldn't kill
people; it would destroy weapons. It wouldn't
militarize space; it would help demilitarize the
arsenals of the earth. (11: 18)
These two speeches were met with a mixture of inspiration,
ridicule, and concern. To many, the goal of a viable, strategic
defense against ballistic missiles seemed like a pipe dream, a
lofty aspiration whose actual achievement scarcely seemed
feasible.
Proponents of the policy of deterrence scoffed at the mere
notion of such an advanced, space-aged system, dubbing it "Star
Wars". This catchy appellation, eagerly embraced by the media,
also served, no doubt, to emphasize what some detractors felt was
the destabilizing effect of such a system. For years U.S
strategic defense policy was primarily based upon nuclear
deterrence supported by the doctrine of Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD). Massive nuclear forces were considered vital
to this doctrine to ensure the U.S. retained enough nuclear
strike capability to retaliate with complete and utter
destruction against a Soviet first strike. Defensive systems
which could neutralize ballistic missiles could upset the entire
delicate balance between U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear
forces. Supporters of "Star Wars" saw, for the first time, the
opportunity for shedding the shackles of deterrence for a
defensive system that would truly provide for the defense of our
county. This glimmer of hope, sparked by the American people's
confidence in our technological capabilities and American
ingenuity, was eagerly embraced by the entire nation.
ORIGINS
President Reagan's speech on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
was not mere rhetoric. Richard D. DeLauer, Undersecretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering revealed that:
Following his historic speech, the President directed
an intensive study to define the technologies necessary
for defending the United States and our allies from
ballistic missile attack. We collected over 50% of our
nation's top scientists and engineers and asked them to
assess the feasibility of achieving this goal and to
structure a research program to develop the
technologies that could provide an effective defense
against their missiles. (18: i)
The result of their effort was the Defense Technologies
Study (DTS), completed in April 1984. This study, headed by Dr.
James C. Fletcher, examined areas of surveillance, target
acquisition and tracking, directed energy weapons, conventional
weapons, battle management, communications, data processing,
system concepts, countermeasures, and tactics. The principal
finding of the DTS team was that, despite uncertainties, powerful
new technologies held great promise for developing a viable BMD
system.
Based upon the technical recommendations of this study,
President Reagan established the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization (SDIO). As a focused research and technology
development program of the highest priority, SDIO was given the
mission to pursue the various technological paths leading to a
viable, comprehensive, BMD system. SDIO has vigorously pursued
this mission, examining a wide variety of technological avenues
for BMD systems, from ground-based interceptor systems to space-
based directed energy weapons. Even though the principle
architecture of the first phase of a deployable BMD system has
already been developed, SDIO continues to conduct research for
future, more capable systems and add-on components.
CONTROVERSY
SDI quickly became a subject of controversy among our
political leaders and allies. Concerns over the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, the possible destabilization effects of
SDI, and its enormous cost became major issues.
The 1972 ABM Treaty prohibited both the Soviet Union and the
United States from developing, testing, or deploying an ABM
system or components whether sea-based, air-based, space-based,
or mobile land-based. Each nation was limited to one BMD site
containing 100 interceptors, 100 interceptor launchers, and a
handful of radars. (11: 160)
President Reagan's instructions to SDIO explicitly required
compliance to this treaty. It was only, however, through
broadest interpretation of this treaty, which permitted research
and experimental work prior to development, that conflict was
avoided. U.S. chose to define "development" as a phase which
began with field testing of full scale ABM systems or components.
In essence, this broad interpretation permitted development and
testing, but not deployment.
Many defense analysts felt the ratification of the 1972 ABM
treaty was merely a ploy by the United States to slow down the
arms race and wanted to abrogate the treaty in its entirety.
This treaty successfully culminated the first round of the
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT 1). At this time, the
Soviet Union had launched a massive expansion and upgrading of
its nuclear weapons inventory. Keeping up with the Soviets was
proving to be an insurmountable task. As Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown commiserated, "When we build, they build. When we
stop building, they build." (20: 206) The Soviets had developed
and deployed 3 new types of ICBM's and improved versions of
existing ICBM's, in addition to a new intercontinental strategic
bomber. The U.S. had no corresponding build up. The rapid
growth in U.S. strategic bombers and nuclear missiles during the
1960's had come to a screeching halt due to the enormous economic
drain of the Vietnam War.
BMD, however, was not an entirely new concept to the U.S.
defense establishment. In 1970, the United States deployed the
first BMD system, known as the Safeguard Strategic Defense
System. "Although this system did not work very well", James
Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense stated " it was vastly
better than anything the Soviets had at the time, and the Soviets
knew it." (14: 106) After the signing of the ABM Treaty, the
U.S. dismantled the Safeguard System. In return, the Soviets
signed the SALT 1 accords which reduced their nuclear stockpiles
and new weapons construction.
The Soviets strongly opposed U.S. involvement in the
Strategic Defense Initiative. Meanwhile, they continued to
upgrade their own ABM system outside Moscow and developed a large
phased-array radar facility near Krasnoyarsk, Siberia in direct
violation of the ABM Treaty.
The Soviet's negative reaction to SDI prompted many U.S.
officials to voice concerns over the potential destabilizing
effects of SDI. According to the tenants of deterrence and
mutual assured destruction, protection against massive nuclear
attack could only be maintained through mutual vulnerability.
The idea of an effective ABM system, many believed, would upset
the delicate strategic balance, and even encourage a devastating
pre-emptive strike prior to the deployment of an effective ABM
system. Recognizing the Soviet's fear of SDI, former Secretary
of Defense James Schlesinger and former National Security Advisor
Brent Scowcroft felt that SDI should be used strictly as a
powerful bargaining tool for major arms reductions. Others, such
as Robert McNamara and George Kennan, dismissed SDI as an issue
altogether, stating that the reality of such a system was so far
in the future that SDI would have no impact, whatsoever, in the
strategic arms situation.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, SDI's
compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty and concerns over its
destabilizing affects became dead issues. In a remarkable
turnabout, the Soviet's successor state, the Commonwealth of
Independent States, has expressed strong interest in a joint
venture, strategic defense system with the United States. This
new era of cooperation between military super-powers reflects,
more than anything, the world's rapidly changing threat
environment.
Political support of SDI from allies has, likewise, done a
turnabout in recent times. The Strategic Defense Initiative came
as a rude surprise to many NATO allies who were angry and
dismayed that the United States had not conducted negotiations or
informed its allies prior to President Reagan's bold public
announcement. NATO allies were fearful of the potential
destabilizing effect SDI would have on the strategic balance
between the superpowers. With the rapid changes sweeping Europe
since 1989, overseas opposition to SDI has greatly diminished.
SDIO has received vastly strengthened allied support through its
expansion into foreign markets for technological research and
development. To date, the United States has bilateral SDI
research memoranda of understanding with the United Kingdom,
Germany, Israel, Italy, and Japan. France is currently
considering joining in SDI research with the United States and
its allies. Consultations with allies on SDI have broadened and
deepened during the past two years. The United States now
consults its allies immediately following each round of the
Defense and Space talks in Geneva. Furthermore, senior
government and industry personnel from several allied countries
routinely visit the United States for detailed technical
discussions and updates on the SDI program. The net result has
been extremely strong allied support for both the development and
deployment of the SDI system.
SDI, like all defense programs, has been controversial to
many politicians, strictly on the basis of cost. Since 1985, SDI
funding has varied from $2.1 billion to $4.3 billion per year.
While these figures represent a massive investment in strategic
defense, SDI funding has amounted to only 10-15% of the overall
strategic forces (offensive and defensive) budget and less than
2% of the overall defense spending during these years (See
Figure 1).
Due to the innovative technologies of systems such as
Brilliant Pebbles, the SDI BMD system is now expected to cost
less than the continued development and modernization of existing
strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
REFOCUS TO GPALS
Today's threat environment radically differs from the threat
of global nuclear war and the strategic nuclear arms race of a
mere decade ago. With the sudden collapse of communism in the
Eastern bloc, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the "Evil Empire" no longer exists.
But arms proliferation among Third World nations, exposes a
new, ever expanding threat to world peace and stability. By the
year 2000, the CIA reports, 15-20 developing nations will be able