Subject: Re: AFP-731/1990-019B/NORAD-20516 Where Are You? From: thomsona@netcom.com (Allen Thomson) Date: 1995/08/21 Message-Id: <thomsonaDDoKHv.DnH@netcom.com> Newsgroups: sci.astro,sci.space.policy,alt.politics.org.cia,alt.war In article <david-1908951607350001@192.0.2.1>, david@sternlight.com (David Sternlight) wrote: >1. Suppose John Pike were cleared to examine "black" programs after the >government satisfied itself that he wouldn't reveal classified details, >but simply comment on effectiveness and the appropriateness of funding >levels. Then what about the next "John Pike" and the next, and the next? The question of how to ensure believably independent and technically competent oversight of classified programs is an important one, and deserves to be discussed here. My current opinion is that an oversight board composed of both substantive experts (preferably with no strong institutional ties to the national security world) and citizen representatives would be the best solution. Similar boards have been set up to oversee, for example, genetic engineering programs at universities, and seem to work acceptably well. (It's a pity there aren't any more Richard Feynmans around -- he'd be perfect.) Short of that, it would be desirable to eliminate the waived programs, and make it mandatory that all programs be briefed to the full oversight committees. Enlisting OTA (if it survives) to provide technical input would help, but would mean that the staff would have to be cleared in a timely manner -- something that won't happen as long as the program offices control the clearances. Finally, ombudsmen within the committee staffs should be designated as the approved and legal channel for reporting suspected abuse, no matter what the level of classification. >That approach won't work as long as the effectiveness of such programs >depends on secrecy. The need for secrecy in those programs is much less than the program offices would have you believe. General characteristics and missions of reconnaissance satellites have been known for many years, all the more so after Desert Storm. As then-DDCI Adm. Studeman wrote in the Nov 1994 issue of Aerospace America, "The good news is that we were able to use reconnaissance satellites effectively as a force multiplier; the bad news is that everyone else, including potential adversaries, knows it." The orbital elements of U.S. reconnaissance satellites have been routinely derived and reported by amateur visual observers, mostly outside the United States, for many years. Indeed, it isn't apparent that the U.S. has _ever_ launched a LEO reconnaissance satellite that wasn't tracked by that community. To think that the Iraqs of the world couldn't duplicate this binoculars-and-stopwatch work is giving them less credit than they deserve, IMHO. We are, after all, worried about them building nuclear weapons production facilities, and it's possible that people who are at that level of technical ability could move a step or two beyond binoculars. Even if we did manage to make a satellite disappear (returning the discussion to the missing AFP-731), it would probably make little difference to people planning to do Wicked Things: they would assume that they were under constant overhead observation and design their concealment and deception programs accordingly. It may be relevant to note that the U.S. has made current orbital elements of Russian, Chinese, and now European spysats publicly available for many years. None of those entities seem to be particularly upset about such disclosure, even though the U.S. professes to believe that to reveal similar information about its own satellites imperils the national security. It's only when we get to the level of system technical specifications that a reasonable case can be made for keeping some secrets (exactly as we keep some things secret about F-15s, MXs, submarines, etc., and for the same reasons). Even then, it's necessary to consider what can be kept secret vs what might be desirable if possible. The usual example is the resolving power of photoreconnaissance satellites: while we might wish to keep this secret, it can be derived from the diameter of the optics, and this can be deduced to within a factor of two by a variety of means, such as observing shrouds on launch vehicles or direct imaging once the satellite is on orbit. In bringing this overly long post to a close, I'll point to a subtle danger which excessive reliance on secrecy can create: we could fool ourselves into believing that we've been successful in hiding our capabilities, plan accordingly, and thus set ourselves up for catastrophic surprises if the opponent discovers our secrets but doesn't let on until the shooting starts. Given the number of spies with TS/SCI/whatever clearances we know have been active over the past decades and rapidly advancing technical intelligence capabilities in the rest of the world, dependence on total, long-term secrecy for a program's success doesn't seem to be a good idea. (I've often wondered how much Aldrich Ames told the Russians about our satellite programs; it could have been a lot.)
