[Page: S2792]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of S. 257, which the clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 257) to state the policy of the United States regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.
The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota--North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I am from one of those Dakotas.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, thank you very much for your generous description.
PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR
Mr. DORGAN. I ask unanimous consent, on behalf of a colleague, that the privileges of the floor be granted to the following member of Senator Biden's staff: Ms. Joan Wadelton, during the pendency of the National Missile Defense Act, S. 257. And the request is for each day the measure is pending and for rollcall votes thereon.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, thank you.
Mr. President we are now returning to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, which is a very important policy issue before the Senate. My expectation is we will complete work today. I had noticed two amendments; and I shall not offer the amendments today, to the relief of those who are counting the amendments that are ahead of us.
But I did want to take the floor to at least describe especially the substitute amendment, because while I will not offer it to this bill, this is really a debate about policy. This policy will not mean anything until it is funded.
The real debate will be on the appropriations, it seems to me. What is it we want to buy and pay for? We can talk until we are blue in the face, but if we are not willing in an appropriations process to pay for a policy, it is not going to be deployed.
Let me talk a bit about that. My substitute amendment will be something that I will likely offer during an appropriations debate and will wait until that day for a vote.
The proposition before the Senate offered by my colleague, Senator Cochran, is very simple. Yesterday, I was holding something from Senator Lott and when I was referring to Senator Cochran I called him Senator Lott, for which I apologized. I certainly know the difference, and I respect both of them immensely. Senator Cochran has offered a proposal on the floor of the Senate that says it shall be the policy of this country to deploy a national missile defense system as soon as technologically feasible. In other words, notwithstanding other issues, as soon as it is technologically feasible to put a national missile defense system in place, we should do so.
What is this national missile defense system? We had one once, 24 years ago, in my home State. This country built the only antiballistic missile system that was ever built in the free world. Members ought to see the concrete that was poured, this huge concrete building in northeastern North Dakota, a sparsely populated region of our State, where the ABM, antiballistic missile, system was built. In today's dollars it costs about $20 billion. It was declared operational 1 day and mothballed the very next day. It produced a lot of good jobs in northeastern North Dakota as a result, a lot of construction, a lot of building.
But what did we get for our money? And was a national ballistic missile defense system feasible 24 years ago? The answer, I suppose, is yes. We had a national ballistic missile site built and declared operational 24 years ago, so it was feasible. It used a different technology. The proposition was if we were attacked by some incoming missile from some hostile power, we would send up these antiballistic missiles with nuclear warheads on our missiles and we would shoot off a nuclear warhead somewhere in the heavens and we would destroy all the incoming missiles. That was the technology then, and we built it--paid a lot of money for it--and it was declared mothballed the day after it was operational.
Now the proposition is that the national missile defense is a different kind of technology. It has the ability to hit a bullet, a speeding bullet, with another bullet. That is the proposition. We have had a lot of tests--a few successful, most unsuccessful. It is a very difficult proposition.
The experts in the Department of Defense tell us that they have spent as much money as they can spend to pursue the technology to build a national missile defense system, but the technology does not yet exist. Now, when the technology does exist, what kind of consideration should exist in terms of its deployment?
Russia has a lot of weaponry; Russia, of course, is the dominant country in what was the old Soviet Union. Their weaponry consists of a great many nuclear warheads on top of intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers. We need to be concerned about those. As a result of that, we have engaged with the old Soviet Union and now Russia in a regime of arms reductions. Arms control talks resulted in START I and START II. The Russians, we hope, are prepared very soon to adopt START II. We have already done so.
As a result of all of that, yesterday I held up part of the wing of a Russian bomber. Last year, I held up a metal flange from the door of, I believe, an SS-19, an intercontinental ballistic missile that held a nuclear warhead, a missile aimed at the United States. Yesterday, I held up at this desk a wing strut from a Russian bomber; one would have expected in the cold war that the only way you would hold a piece of a Russian bomber in your hand is if somebody shot it down in hostile action. That wasn't the case. I held up a piece of a wing from a bomber from Russia that used to
carry nuclear weapons that would threaten our country because the wing was sawed off that bomber.
Who sawed the wing off of the bomber? Was a wing shot off in hostile aerial combat? No, not at all. It was sawed off as the bomber was on the ground, because part of the agreement between us and the Soviet Union is that they would reduce the number of missiles, reduce the number of warheads, reduce the number of bombers, and so would we. The result is these arms reductions have resulted in significant reductions in the number of nuclear warheads, the number of missiles, the number of bombers, the number of delivery systems. That is a success.
I also talked last fall about the Russian launch of a number of intercontinental ballistic missiles early in the morning, and as those Russian missiles lifted off in the early morning and pierced into the sky, one could have wondered what on Earth was happening in our world--a launch of significant numbers of ICBMs by the Russians. But it didn't worry the United States because those missiles were launched and destroyed in the area by prior agreement--part of arms control, something we agreed upon--that they destroy their missiles.
Isn't it much better to destroy their missiles by taking them apart, pinching the metal and putting them in a warehouse, or sawing the wings off their bombers? Isn't it better to destroy a weapon before it is used? That is precisely what arms control is all about.
The question I ask about this country's national missile defense policy is not whether we should have one--we likely will have a national missile defense system at some point, some day, when it is technologically feasible, when it is financially practical, when it will not injure our arms control agreements and not threaten future agreements. We will likely have some kind of national missile defense system. We will likely have it because many are worried that a rogue nation now--not Russia, but a rogue nation; Saddam Hussein or North Korea testing medium-range missiles--a rogue nation gets ahold of an ICBM and puts a nuclear weapon on top of an ICBM and aims it at this country and fires it. What kind of a catcher's mitt do we have to intercept it and prevent it from hitting our country? We do not have some sort of technological catcher's mitt that goes into the heavens and intercepts that missile. Therefore, we need to have it, we are told. We didn't have that kind of a catcher's mitt to intercept missiles all during the cold war.
How did we avoid having a missile fired at us by the Soviet Union? By an arsenal in the cold war that assured anyone who attacked us with nuclear weapons would be vaporized and destroyed immediately. That convinced virtually anyone who would have thought about launching a nuclear attack against this country, that convinced them it was very unwise to do so. No one would launch a nuclear attack against this country.
Some might say that might still be the case. But suppose a madman in charge of some rogue nation who gets one ICBM; ought we not have the capability of intercepting that? The answer is yes. That is one of the threats.
If you take a look at the kind of threats, one of the threats is that a rogue nation will get ahold of an ICBM--it is not likely but it could happen. They are more likely to get ahold of a cruise missile, which is much more prevalent--of course, the national missile defense system will not intercept a cruise missile--that could be launched off the coast about 20 or 50 miles, fly a few hundred feet above the ground. That is not what this is designed to protect against.
Another area of threat is a suitcase nuclear bomb stuck in the trunk of an old rusty car at a New York City dock to terrorize this country. It doesn't do much about that. Another threat of mass destruction is a vial of the deadliest biological threats put on a subway in a major city.
We have a variety of threats, not the least of which is that a foreign ruler, of a bizarre nation will get ahold of an intercontinental ballistic missile, but if that happens will we have a mechanism to intercept it? The answer is yes, I believe, we will. But we must do what we are doing now with substantial research and development into developing a technology that works, and then deploying it in a sensible way that says we are deploying a technology that works in a manner that is cost effective--not a blank check, not a break-the-bank approach--a technology that will work to offer real protection in a way that offers it at an affordable price and doing so in a way that will not jeopardize our arms control agreements that now reduce nuclear weapons.
The amendment I had intended to offer says:
[Page: S2793]
(A) It is the policy of the United States to develop for potential deployment an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).
(b) It is the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense system if that system--
(1) is well managed, proven under rigorous and repeated testing, and cost-effective when assessed within the context of the other requirements relating to the national security interest of the United States;
(2) is deployed in concert with a variety of additional measures to protect the United States against attack by weapons of mass destruction, including efforts toward arms reduction and weapons nonproliferation issues; and
(3) is deployed in a manner that contributes to a cooperative relationship between the United States and Russia with respect to a reduction in the dangers to both countries posed by weapons of mass destruction.
A final point: I want everybody to understand that I have supported and will continue to support substantial research and development on the issue of protecting against a missile attack against this country. That has never been the issue. The issue here is, when shall it be deployed and with what confidence will the American people feel they are protected?
Now, to make one point about the last issue, one Russian missile, an SS-18, with 10 reentry vehicles--or 10 warheads--will not be able to be blocked by this national missile defense system. One MIRVed SS-18 will be able to defeat this national missile defense system because this system is designed to provide some kind of technological catcher's mitt to go up and grab one, two, three, perhaps four or five incoming warheads--but not 10.
And so, as we proceed, we need to understand what we are doing, what the limits are, and how we should proceed in a manner designed to protect the efforts that now exist to destroy the SS-18s that Russia has in their silos through massive reductions in delivery systems and nuclear warheads. Anything we do in this country to upset that capability, to upset arms control regimes, to upset the progress we have made under Nunn-Lugar, the kind of stability that exists when you bring down the number of arms between the two major superpowers, anything we do to upset that, I think, would not be in this country's interest.
Let me end where I began and say I was intending to offer this amendment, but I don't think I will offer it today inasmuch as two amendments were accepted yesterday to the Cochran legislation. I don't necessarily view those amendments quite the same as others do. Nonetheless, the feeling is that some of those amendments offer the capability of saying, yes, deployment must also be consistent with our arms control issues with the Russians and others and must not injure those efforts. It must be consistent with something that relates to sensible costs. This cannot be a blank-check approach. So I understand that, and because of those two amendments, I think it is better to leave this issue at this point and come back another day on the appropriations side to further discuss this policy.
Now that the Senator from Mississippi, Senator Cochran, is on the floor, let me again say to him, I don't quarrel with the question of whether we ought to be aggressively pursuing this issue about a national missile defense. We should. We have had robust research and development. In fact, last fall, $1 billion was added--it wasn't asked for, but it was added--to DOD in the emergency legislation for national missile defense. I don't quarrel with a robust research and development effort. Nor would I quarrel with deployment. But deployment cannot stand alone. Deployment decisions by this country must be decisions made concurrent with issues about its impact on arms control, about not only the technological feasibility of being able to deploy a national missile defense system, but also the cost-effectiveness of it and a range of other issues.
So, Mr. President, I shall not offer the two amendments that I had protected. I thank the Senator from Michigan for his good work on this legislation. I thank the Senator from Mississippi for raising important questions and for his courtesy.
I yield the floor.
[Page: S2794]
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise with many in this Chamber who have risen and will rise to commend our distinguished colleague from Mississippi for his untiring leadership on this issue. It has been my privilege to work with him over these past months and to work with my distinguished colleague from Michigan, Mr. Levin, in having our committee address these issues and reporting the bill to the floor.
Mr. President, I wish to convey to the Senate my strong support for S. 257, which was introduced again by Senators Cochran and Inouye. This is a very important and timely bill which deserves overwhelming support in the U.S. Senate. S. 257 was referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee early this year, and after consideration, the bill was reported out of committee favorably on a bipartisan basis.
Mr. President, even once S. 257 is enacted, the
administration and Congress will decide, on an annual basis, how much to spend on NMD, pursuant to the normal authorization and appropriations process. Such spending decisions will be informed by the best information available each year regarding technical progress in the program and the status of the threat.
I also heard that S. 257 would make no contribution to the development or deployment of an NMD system. I do not agree, most respectfully. Commitment to the deployment of an NMD system will have two crucial impacts on the security of the United States.
First, it will signal to the nations that aspire to possess ballistic missiles with which to coerce or attack the United States that to pursue such capability is a waste of both time and resources of that nation. In this sense, commitment to an NMD system would have a deterrent effect on proliferation.
Second, if some aspiring states are not deterred and commit to deploy an NMD system, it would ensure that American citizens and their property are protected from limited missile attack, to the best of our capability. I use the word `ensure' the American citizens. We can only offer our best technical protection. I am not sure any ensurance absolutely can be devised.
In addition to convincing the rest of the world that we are serious about defending the U.S. against rogue missile threats, S. 257 will make it clear to the American people that we are truly serious about this undertaking. This is important, in particular, for those in Government and industry who are now working so hard to make an NMD system a reality. Nothing could be more important to them than a clear signal that we are seriously behind them and that this is not just another false start.
On August 31, 1998, North Korea tested the Taepo Dong 1 missile over Japan and demonstrated the capability to deliver a small payload to U.S. territory. Technically, that is feasible. This event demonstrated that the proliferation of technology expertise and hardware with which to build a long-range ballistic missile is accelerating rapidly.
As the Rumsfeld Commission reported:
The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the [greater] Intelligence Community [of our country].
To its credit, the administration has now acknowledged the existence of this threat and has taken significant steps to address it. I commend Secretary of Defense Cohen for his decision to increase funding for NMD by $6.6 billion over the Future Years Defense Program.
In my view, however, these developments fundamentally change the rationale supporting the `3+3' policy. This policy has been based on a perceived need to gather more information on the ballistic missile threat, on NMD program affordability, and on technology maturity, before making a deployment decision. The administration has now indicated that the threat is all but here.
It has also budgeted funds needed to implement the deployment decision, implicitly confirming that the program is affordable. The administration's only remaining decision criteria for which additional information is needed relates to technology development. S. 257 makes clear that the deployment would only proceed once the technology is mature. There is no apparent reason to further delay a deployment decision.
Although the United States must engage Russia with caution and respect--and I underline `with caution and respect'--I do not believe that postponing an NMD deployment decision will facilitate negotiations to change the ABM Treaty. Delay only perpetuates uncertainty about our position and creates the potential for misunderstanding. If Russia does not believe that we are serious about an NMD deployment, it will have no incentive to cooperate, in my judgment, in these talks. Once a firm commitment to NMD deployment has been announced, only then will Russia seriously engage in negotiations to modify the ABM Treaty.
We must never forget that treaty was between the United States and the then-Soviet Union, the only superpowers that had intercontinental ballistic missile technology. And it is against that background that we must review the revisions of this treaty. It is in the national interest of the United States of America. There are many places today in the world where other capabilities to develop these missiles are rapidly progressing. It is in our national interest to modify that treaty at this time. I do not say abolish it. I say carefully modify it.
The United States must make it clear that the decision to deploy an NMD decision is based on a threat not envisioned at the time the ABM Treaty was negotiated. I was then Secretary of the U.S. Navy, and I was in Moscow when the ABM Treaty was signed. I have a vivid recollection of that backdrop.
The United States, however, must make it equally clear that it will proceed with deployment of an NMD system whether or not Russia agrees to modify the ABM Treaty. The only way to clearly send such a signal is by a change in U.S. policy. In my view, the best way to send that signal is by enacting S. 257.
Mr. President, in summary, I believe the need for the deployment of NMD is compelling. I believe it is equally clear that we must modify our policies so everyone knows where we stand on NMD deployment. We must send this signal to our potential enemies, to Russia, and, indeed, to ourselves. And I do not put Russia in the context of a potential enemy; other nations I was referring to in that statement. The threat exists, and continues to grow. S. 257, which clearly indicates the commitment to deploy NMD, will ensure the United States is prepared to meet that threat.
Mr. President, I am going to pose a question or two to my good friend and distinguished colleague from Michigan, Mr. Levin, who is the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee on which we serve together. But over our 21 years in the Senate, it is interesting that Senator Levin, Senator Cochran, and I all came to the Senate at the sametime. Senator Cochran, however, is senior to me. I will always respect him for that, and he reminds me on a daily basis. But nevertheless, we came together. We have many, many times in those 21 years debated on this glorious floor of the U.S. Senate the issues relating to arms control. All too often, regrettably, Senator Cochran and I are on one side and Senator Levin on the other.
But I remember not so long ago in the context of the expansion of NATO that I tried as forcefully as I could to resist that expansion. That is history now. The decision was made by this body to go forward and accept three new nations. I stated from this very chair that I would support that. So the debate is over. But it is interesting to go back and look at some of the statements made in the context of NATO expansion and see how they relate to this very debate that we are having today.
Many of those who stood on this floor defending expansion--my good friend from Michigan was among them--now argue that we must not declare our policy to deploy a national missile defense system. I ask the question, Should the Senate be more concerned about Russia's opposition to NMD than we were to Russia's opposition to NATO expansion? It is a fair question.
I am reminded of the statements by Secretary of State Albright to the Foreign Relations Committee. And I happened to have been in the room at the time she made it. I quote:
[Page: S2795]
Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is real. But we should see it for what it is:
A very interesting statement, `But we should see it for what it is.'
a product of old misperceptions about NATO, and old ways of thinking. . . . Instead of changing our policies to accommodate Russia's outdated fears, we need to encourage Russia's more modern aspirations.
If we simply deleted Secretary Albright's reference to `NATO enlargement,' and substitute the term `NMD,' I think we would have an interesting quote. If I may, I respectfully revise the statement of my good friend, the Secretary of State, to read: `Russian opposition to NMD is real. But we should see it for what it is: a product of old misconceptions about NMD and old ways of thinking. . . . Instead of changing our policies to accommodate Russia's outdated fears, we need to encourage Russia's more modern aspirations.'
Secretary Albright also indicated to the Foreign Relations Committee that NATO enlargement would in no way jeopardize START II, as some of my colleagues have argued the National Missile Defense Act would do. Once again, if we substitute the term `NMD' for the term `NATO enlargement,' I think it would be about right. I quote:
While I think this prospect [Duma ratification to START II] is by no means certain, it would be far less so if we gave the Duma any reason to think it would hold up [NMD] by holding up START II.
I just hope that at some point my good friend from Michigan might reply to the observations of his good friend, the Senator from Virginia.
I say with respect to the President, Secretary of State, and others that this is an example of the difficulty that we are having with continuing confrontations between this administration and the Congress of the United States, most particularly the Senate, on very, very serious foreign policy concerns.
Mr. President, today we are facing tremendous uncertainties in Kosovo, and trying to address major decisions as to whether to use force should the talks not be successful in Paris. The outcome of that situation could definitely relate to the future of our work and our commitment of over $9 billion in Bosnia.
We have a serious problem with China today as to the degree that we continue or not continue our relations with China given this tragic case of espionage, the allegations of which are being studied by this body with great care, and, indeed, by the committee over which I am privileged to be Chair.
I can count other serious foreign policy considerations. Here we are debating this missile defense legislation, and we are now seeing under the leadership of Senator Cochran, and, indeed, greater and greater bipartisanship which is evolving on the other side of the aisle, a consensus coming about to pass this critical piece of legislation.
I say to the administration that they have to select more carefully the battles they wish to wage with the Congress for fear of losing them all. This is a battle which should have been recognized by the administration months ago as one not to be waged with the intensity that this one has experienced. That same fervor and intensity should be applied to the other major issues before us, whether it is Kosovo, Bosnia, or China, and not have the attention of the U.S. Senate so reflected to resolve this.
But, nevertheless, I thank, again, the distinguished leader from Mississippi for his tireless work. I think that this bill will emerge with the strongest bipartisan support. To some extent I think the amendments have helped. But I have studied both of them carefully. Both of the votes were 99 to 0.
I think that that tells a story in and of itself, but nevertheless I wish our managers well.
I see my distinguished colleague from Michigan about to seek recognition. I just wonder if the Senator has a comment about my NATO observations, I say to my good friend from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, my good friend from Virginia is very wise and perceptive. Indeed, I do have a comment. He asked the question whether the Senate is more concerned about Russian reaction to national missile defense than about Russian reaction to NATO expansion. And, of course, there is a huge difference. In one case we have a treaty with Russia. It is called the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. And before we pull out of that treaty, or unilaterally act in a way that is in violation of that treaty, we ought to consider the ramifications.
The point is we have a treaty with Russia that has made possible significant nuclear arms reduction. We had no such treaty with Russia relative to NATO; quite the opposite--our NATO treaty was against the former Soviet Union. Russia wasn't part of any NATO treaty. Its predecessor, the Soviet Union, was the problem against which that NATO treaty was created. So this is a day-and-night comparison. Surely, when you have a treaty with someone, before you unilaterally breach it or threaten to breach it, you should consider the consequences of that. We have such a treaty with Russia. The opposite was true with NATO. So the difference is a 180-degree difference.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to remind my colleague that we had, in the course of that debate on expansion in the same time period, led the way for Russia to begin to work with NATO, and while it wasn't a formalized treaty as such, it was a very interesting and unique arrangement between Russia and NATO whereby Russia would have a forum in which it could express its concerns and hopefully work cooperatively.
Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is exactly correct. And that is precisely what we are now doing relative to our treaty with Russia, with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. We are sitting down with Russia now and seeing whether we can't negotiate a modification in that treaty which would permit two things to happen: 1, the deployment of a national missile defense should we decide to deploy it; and, 2, continuing nuclear arms reductions which have been provided for--in effect, permitted -- under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. So that is exactly what we are trying to do now.
But any comparison between the situation of having a treaty relationship with somebody and having a treaty which was aimed against that person, it seems to me, is an inapt comparison. I just wanted to briefly comment on it.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I may, did the Senator from Michigan have a chance to see a rather interesting comment by Mikhail Gorbachev and how he referred to the NATO expansion as being an act that was in contravention of his clearest of understandings with the leaders of this country, the United States, at that time?
Mr. LEVIN. I did. I believe that our leaders have denied such an agreement with Mr. Gorbachev, and we would be happy to dig up the difference relative to that.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could ask one other question of my distinguished colleague from Michigan, he refers to negotiations, and indeed I think those negotiations have been ably conducted by a former member of our Armed Services staff, Mr. Robert Bell, for whom the Senator from Michigan and I have respect, having worked with him through the years. But how many such negotiations have taken place over what period of time, I ask my friend?
Mr. LEVIN. I think those negotiations began just a few weeks ago. And I was urging the administration in the middle of last year to begin those discussions and those negotiations. So the actual preliminary discussions I think began in February. As far as I am concerned, it would have been better to begin those discussions before that, and I had urged the administration last
year to begin them. But as I understand it, there were informal discussions which had occurred before this recent visit that the Senator from Virginia, my good friend, has referred to.
[Page: S2796]
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, my recollection is that this had been going on for at least 2 years. Whether you caption it as informal versus today being formal, we will have to look at the record, but this has been going on for 2 years without any real, I think, `concrete'--and that is the famous word that the old Soviet Union and now Russia use--results. And I believe the initiative by the Senator from Mississippi and what I anticipate will be the passage of this bill by the Senate will give the proper incentive to get those negotiations completed in a mutually satisfactory way.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. I would agree that the bill as it now stands, with an amendment which adopts as a policy of the United States to continue to negotiate arms reductions with Russia, is indeed going to be an incentive to those discussions because it no longer threatens to just unilaterally breach a treaty between ourselves and Russia.
On the first point, however, I would disagree with my dear friend from Virginia. I believe the discussions with the Russians on our National Missile Defense program did not begin until last year, and the informal discussions relative to modifications in the ABM Treaty did not occur until February. I believe, in fact, I wrote the administration--and I think I shared my letter with my friend from Virginia--I wrote the administration I believe in August urging that these discussions and negotiations take place.
Mr. President, in 1993 the administration, the Clinton administration, just as it came into office, terminated the defense and space talks which dealt precisely with modifications of the ABM Treaty. I think we can produce a record how this debate on the ABM Treaty has gone on for a very, very long time without any productive or concrete results.
Mr. LEVIN. The debate on the ABM Treaty has gone on since before the treaty was up here for ratification.
Mr. WARNER. I am talking about, Mr. President, the negotiations between the administration and Russia on such modifications as we felt were necessary for various aspects of our missile defense program.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. The discussions between us and the Russians relative to the demarcation line, for instance, between a theater missile defense and strategic defense, the defense against strategic missiles has, indeed, been going on a long time.
Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
Mr. LEVIN. That is not the issue, though, that we have been discussing here this morning. The issue we have been discussing here this morning is whether or not we can work out with the Russians a modification of the ABM Treaty such as to permit us to deploy what is admittedly covered now by the treaty, namely a limited National Missile Defense system.
The discussions which have been referred to by my friend from Virginia had to do with the question of what is or is not covered by the treaty as it is currently written: What is the correct demarcation between those missile defenses which are covered by the treaty and those missile defenses which are not? And, indeed, he is correct; those demarcation discussions have been going on with the Russians, and indeed there was an agreement relative to the proper demarcation line. But the discussions relative to modifying the treaty so that we could deploy a limited national missile defense against what is admittedly covered by the treaty are discussions which have only begun in a preliminary manner in February of this year and informally began, I believe, last year.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to my good friend that is correct. An agreement was reached between Russia and the United States, and it is interesting that agreement has never been submitted to the Senate, although I and other Senators have repeatedly called for it. This is another example where I think the Senate needs to assert itself more strongly in areas of foreign policy, and this is one of those areas which is very clearly in need of a show of strength by the Congress, through the Senate, to assert its really coequal right under the Constitution to deal with issues of foreign policy. And that is why I so strongly support the legislation.
Mr. LEVIN. What is intriguing--Mr. President, I do not know who has the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, what is intriguing is, in fact, we did assert our position relative to the correct demarcation line, and indeed we put it in law, and indeed the demarcation line which was adopted by this administration and Russia followed what we had put into law. So we had asserted what our position was as the U.S. Senate and, if my memory is correct, as a Congress, because I believe the language ended up in the final authorization bill as to where that demarcation line should be. The agreement which was reached indeed--my understanding is and my recollection is--followed the demarcation line which the Congress had set forth in that authorization bill.
So it is nothing new for Congress to assert its involvement in these kinds of issues. We should. We have. We should be partners with the administration on this issue. I believe this bill as amended--I know it is now acceptable to the President with these amendments--represents the effort to come up with a more bipartisan approach to these critical national security issues.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I may, I say to my good friend, the Bush administration was close to changing the ABM Treaty pursuant to negotiations with Russia to deploy a limited NMD. I draw that to my colleague's attention. When the Clinton administration came in, it terminated these talks in 1993 and, indeed, downplayed significantly the need for an NMD system.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I wonder if my friend from Virginia would join in a colloquy, if possible, to try to flesh out a couple of issues.
Mr. WARNER. I will be happy to.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me begin my question to him by saying I, with many others here, am cognizant of the threat that has now been more realistically defined and is more present. I think most people feel a safety measure with the capacity that might save Hawaii or some other sector of the United States from some accidental, rogue, or unauthorized launch, makes sense in theory. And I certainly support that. But many people have expressed concerns. I know the Senator from Virginia has long been a member of the Arms Control Observer Group, long been involved in these issues, and has a great sensitivity to the perceptions of other countries which often drive arms races and the building of weapons.
I assume, based on that experience, the Senator from Virginia will acknowledge that if the United States proceeded in some way that altered the perception of another country--be it Russia or China or someone with whom we are currently trying to cooperate--that could, indeed, have an impact on the weapons they might build or, ultimately, on the security of the United States itself.
Is that a fair statement of how perceptions operate in arms races?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I readily concede that misconceptions can arise. But Russia today, while President Yeltsin still holds, let's say, the trappings of office, is largely guided by Mr. Primakov. I have had the opportunity to deal with him through the years, as has, I think, my good colleague from Massachusetts, likewise.
Let me tell you, Mr. Primakov is not a man who doesn't fully understand exactly the nature of this debate and the need for the United States of America to prepare for its defense, not necessarily against Russia, but against other nations emerging with this threat. I do not think, in the context of this debate on this amendment, a misconception could arise, given Mr. Primakov's extensive experience. He will soon be visiting the Nation's Capital as a guest of our President. I am hopeful that I, and
perhaps the Senator from Massachusetts and others, can have an opportunity to engage him, as we have in years past, in a colloquy on a wide range of issues. He is a very well informed and a very astute individual.
So in this particular instance, I do not believe that is a serious problem, I say to the Senator.
[Page: S2797]
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if I could further continue the colloquy--and I thank the Senator for his answer--I concur with his judgment about Mr. Primakov. I have had the pleasure of having a discourse or two with him. He is a very thoughtful and articulate person who understands the nature of this. But that is not to say that other politicians, other wings of other various ideologies, do not try to use these kinds of issues to play politics within their countries. Nor is to it say that conceivably--and I am only talking about the possibilities here, because it is important for us to put any deployment issue or any future procurement issue in the context of these realities --China could also make certain determinations with respect to this. Is that not also a fair judgment?
Mr. WARNER. Senator, as a generality, I think you speak with fairness on this issue. But, again, I wish to just try to limit my remarks as to this specific piece of legislation, although prior to coming on the floor I did make what I felt were some constructive criticisms. The administration should begin to pick its fights with the Congress on foreign policy issues. This is one that should have been reconciled some time back, quietly, and acknowledging that it was in the interests of the United States to proceed as we are now doing on this legislation, and save its full force and effect for other issues, whether they are Kosovo or China or Bosnia or whatever they may be.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, again, I appreciate the answer and I appreciate the sensitivity the Senator has shown, as to how we might have gotten here otherwise. I cannot disagree with him with respect to that. But, by the same token, there has been a push here to try to achieve certainty with respect to technology, technological feasibility governing an issue of deployment. There are a lot of questions about what kind of system we might or might not really be building.
The early concepts that surrounded this entire debate envisioned a system that did more than simply address the question of a rogue missile or an accidental launch or even a few individual missiles. The best estimate of the threat from North Korea, in 15 or 20 years, is still dealing with minimalist numbers. Always, when we are debating in the context of Russia or in the context of China, we are dealing with multiple numbers, and the system you need to deal, with any reality, with those kinds of potential adversaries--I underscore `potential'; we view neither of them that way today, as the Senator has said--but the kind of system that would be needed to deal with that is a system that most people make the judgment is technologically so expensive and so complicated--because it requires the SWIR intercept capacity at boost phase, it requires the capacity to go exoatmospheric for a certain phase, you have to hand off for the next phase for LWIR capacity for tracking, the capacity to distinguish between multiple decoys--all of this gets into such a zone of expense and of arms deterrence imbalance that a whole series of other questions have to be put on the table.
So what we are talking about, in terms of a system, is really a critical, critical component of what we might be willing to deploy and what might ultimately work and what we might even be able to afford realistically.
Mr. President, let me say also, if you developed a system that had all of the capacity I just defined--it could distinguish between decoys, it could actually hit at the level that gave you an assurance that you have the kind of protection you are trying to achieve--you have actually shifted the entire balance of power,
because you have created a near first strike capacity, if not a perfect first strike capacity. If you can shoot down anything that comes at you, then clearly you have changed the balance of power. So we are not making ourselves more secure necessarily. Plus, everyone in the business knows that we are talking, in that case, about intercontinental ballistic; they will simply go cruise missile, go underneath or any other alternatives. The notion that we are making ourselves, in the long run, somehow very significantly safer by building this larger system, I think, is a debate we put aside some time ago.
I come to the floor supportive of the notion that we are in a new world today. I appreciate what the Senator said about thinking about Madeleine Albright's language of how you perhaps change, together with other countries, to meet that new world. But that new world, to me, is quite delimited. It is a new world that seeks to protect us against a rogue, against accidental or unauthorized. That is a very limited kind of system. It is one that we ought to be able to negotiate, if we can develop it with China, with Russia, with other people, all of whom have a similar kind of threat to think about with respect to unauthorized or accidental or rogue launches.
I simply want to make it part of the record of this debate that that is my understanding of the direction we ought to be going in--and I hope and think it is the understanding of the Senator from Virginia--that we do not rush headlong into the building of a system that simply creates greater unrest, greater instability, greater question marks and, I might add, is measured against a $60 billion expenditure that to date, even in the THAAD program, has not shown success. There isn't anybody who won't tell you that when you are switching from THAAD into the intercontinental ballistic, you are moving into levels of complexity so much higher in terms of intercept and distinguishing capacity.
It is my judgment that while we ought to proceed, I hope the Senate is going to contemplate this in the context of really building stability in our relationships and also in trying, as diligently as we can, to negotiate with these other countries the process by which we will move forward.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have listened carefully to my colleague's remarks. I wish to make very clear, at the end of this colloquy, page 2 of the bill:
It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).
It is simply a system constrained to those particular threats. I think the Senator said those same threats face other nations, notably Russia and China. It seems to me in the common interest that this go forward.
I thank the Chair, and I thank my colleague.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.
I think, again, that the clarification here is important because, obviously, we come to this through the experience of a very large expenditure and a very different kind of concept than was contemplated. I think it is vital, as we proceed forward, that technological feasibility not be the only judgment which we will use as we proceed forward. I think the amendment which has thus far been accepted, the notion that the Senate now embraces the continued efforts to have negotiated reductions with Russia and that we do not want to upset that, is a very important statement that puts into context the down sides if we don't proceed with the sensitivity which most of us feel is so important here.
I thank the President, and I yield the floor.
Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the privilege of the floor be granted to Jacob Bylund, an intern in my office, for consideration of S. 257 today.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a member of my staff, Clint Crosier, be granted the privilege of the floor for the remainder of this debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I rise today to express my wholehearted, overwhelming, passionate, and unwavering support of the National Missile Defense Act of 1999.
Finally, after years of fighting to get this legislation to a point where we can pass it, we appear to have succeeded. I sincerely hope it is not too late. The President had promised to veto this bill if we passed it. I was glad to hear last night that he has now dropped his veto threat. Unfortunately, his pledge comes a little late and still falls far short of the full support that we need to truly protect our citizens.
As Chairman of the Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, I have devoted myself wholeheartedly to the cause of missile defense for many years. It has always troubled me that the President of the United States has refused to engage us and help us to pass a bill to defend the United States of America and its citizens from ballistic missile attack. It has been especially troubling in recent days, with news that data on our most sophisticated nuclear warhead may have been stolen by China--which may have already used this information to perfect their own warheads on missiles aimed this very minute at the United States.
The President seems to believe we need to let Russia have a vote on whether or not we choose to protect ourselves from blackmail and coercion from China, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. With all due respect, I am not interested in having the Russians determine whether or not we should protect ourselves. I am more interested in having us determine whether or not we should protect ourselves.
The administration tells us that there are four critical criteria that must be met before we can decide whether to deploy a national missile defense: threat, technology, operational effectiveness, and cost. Let's look at these four issues; first, the threat. The Administration's national missile defense agenda is based upon, I believe, a false assumption that we will have plenty of warning to respond to the threat.
We can't base the security of the United States of America on our ability to detect and predict existing or emerging threats around the world. And we do not have to--it is here even as we speak. The administration can no longer ignore the threat. It is real, it is dangerous, and it is here now, today, this moment.
In May of 1998, India conducted three nuclear tests that shocked the world, and even worse, surprised our intelligence community. Ten days later, Pakistan conducted their own nuclear test.
In July of 1998, a bipartisan commission headed by Don Rumsfeld, former Defense Secretary, came to some very startling assertions. Here is what he said:
[Page: S2798]
Hostile nations such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq are making concerted efforts to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads that will be able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within five years of a decision to acquire such capability. And further, the U.S. might not even be aware if or when such a decision has been made.
That is a pretty sobering analysis, Mr. President.
He went on to say:
The threat from rogue countries is evolving more rapidly than U.S. intelligence has told us, and our ability to detect a threat is eroding because nations are increasingly able to conceal important elements of their missile programs. The U.S. faces a missile threat from hostile states with little or no warning.
The Rumsfeld Commission was bipartisan, and its conclusions were unanimous. Yet the entire report was downplayed by the administration. It was dismissed as paranoid, alarmist, and out of touch with current intelligence estimates. But only 2 months later, 2 months after the Rumsfeld report, the North Koreans shocked the world with the launch of a three-staged Taepo Dong missile over Japan.
This signaled their progress toward the Taepo Dong 2 that could hit the continental United States. Some in the Senate have been willing to write off Hawaii and Alaska because they are not continental. I notice that the Senators from Alaska and Hawaii were not willing to write themselves off, however. They were early advocates and supporters and cosponsors of this legislation in both political parties.
Not to be outdone, after North Korea, Iran tested their own new generation missile within weeks of the Rumsfeld report. On February 2 of this year, CIA Director George Tenet testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee:
I see a real possibility that a power hostile to the United States will acquire before too long the ability to strike the U.S. homeland with weapons of mass destruction.
In an interview with Defense Week on 23 February, Lieutenant General Lyles, Chief of the BMD organization, said:
We now have indications that the threat is growing, and certainly there is little doubt that this threat will be there around the year 2000.
The CIA recently reported that China has at least a dozen nuclear missiles aimed at U.S. cities right now.
I say to my colleagues, the threat is here. How much more warning do we need?
Let's go to the technology and the operational effectiveness issues that the President and some of this bill's critics have talked about. They say that this bill would require a deployment before the technology is ready. But technology and operational effectiveness are the cornerstones of this legislation. No one is suggesting we deploy a system before it is ready. How can we deploy something before it is ready? How can we deploy something that doesn't work? And yet we have had a big debate on this terminology. The Senator from Mississippi has done a good job, I think, in shooting holes in that false argument.
I honestly do not understand what the debate between `technologically possible' and `operationally effective' is all about. This is what the bill says:
. . . to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective national missile defense. . . .
It is pretty clear. When the technology allows us to build an effective system, we deploy it. Is that too much for the American people to expect from their elected leaders, who are sworn to protect and serve them? Are we going to build a system, know that it is effective, but then not deploy it? I do not think so. If we had something that was technologically possible and operationally effective and we didn't deploy it, I think our constituents would be a little upset with us.
There are also those who claim it is simply too hard to, as they say, hit a bullet with a bullet. If we all had that attitude, we would still be using bows and arrows to defend ourselves. We certainly would not have the technology that we have today in stealth and missiles and lasers if we adopted that `can't do' attitude.
Just 2 days ago at White Sands, we did successfully intercept a missile target with a Patriot-3 missile, proving we can hit a bullet with a bullet. The only problem is that when you hit the bullet with the Patriot, you are hitting it pretty close to you. What we want to do is hit that bullet long before it gets anywhere near us.
The third issue the administration wants to base a deployment decision on is affordable cost. Boy, there is a bureaucratic attitude if I ever heard one. That statement is--frankly, with all due respect to those who made it--unconscionable. On February 2, Director Tenet told the Senate Armed Services Committee:
North Korea's Taepo Dong 1 launch last August demonstrated technology that, if further developed, could give Pyongyang the ability to deliver a payload to the western edge of the United States of America.
To put it bluntly, North Korea will soon be able to strike San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons--and the President is telling us he is worried about the cost? He is worried about the cost? What is the cost of one of those missiles hitting one of those cities? What in the world is he talking about? I wish he had been as worried about having a spy continue to operate in one of our weapons labs for 3 years without doing anything about it.
I note that the combined population of just the five cities I mentioned is 30 million people. The total population from San Diego to Seattle is 50 million people. What is the cost of losing 30 to 50 million people to that kind of missile attack? With all due respect, is the President willing to go out there and look those 50 million people in the eye and say, `We're going to check this out to see if it is affordable'? I say, if we are worried about money, then let's take money out of someplace else in the budget and protect 50 million people along the western coast of the United States of America.
The President wants to tell U.S. citizens we cannot protect them from weapons of mass destruction until we figure out how much it might cost. I say it is the opposite. We have to defend our citizens, and worry later about the cost.
This is not an imagined threat. The CIA recently reported that China now has a dozen missiles aimed at the United States. We have all heard the reports of the Chinese general who, in 1996, warned that if we chose to defend Taiwan, we had better be willing to sacrifice Los Angeles. This, from a nation that the administration says we must engage. Those are pretty tough words from a country that we are supposed to be engaging. Maybe we ought to disengage a little bit from China when it threatens us with nuclear attack and steals our nuclear secrets from our lab at Los Alamos.
Cost is a matter of relative priorities, Mr. President. As Senator Sessions pointed out recently, the cost of a 3-year deployment to Kosovo could reach 50 percent of what this administration plans to spend on national missile defense. We have already spent as much in Bosnia in the past 3 years as an entire NMD program is estimated to cost. Priorities, I say to my colleagues, priorities. Kosovo, Bosnia or 50 million people along the coast of the United States? We know what the President has chosen as his priority. What is the Senate going to choose for its priority?
Let's go to the last issue, the ABM Treaty of 1972, the bible for some people in this body. The biggest fear is that we are going to undermine the ABM Treaty. What ABM Treaty? We signed the ABM Treaty with the U.S.S.R. The last time I looked, there was no U.S.S.R.
On the 20th anniversary of the ratification of the treaty, President Nixon said:
[Page: S2799]
The ABM Treaty has been overtaken by the cold war's end.
Dr. Kissinger, the primary architect of the treaty, said in 1995 in testimony before the Congress that the time had clearly come to:
. . . consider either amending the ABM Treaty or finding some other basis for regulating the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. The ABM Treaty now stands in the way of our ability to respond in an effective manner to the proliferation of ballistic missiles, one of the most significant post cold war threats.
That came from the architect of the treaty. He is saying that the treaty stands in the way of our ability to defend ourselves.
Even Secretary of Defense Cohen recently said before the Senate Armed Services Committee that we may have to consider withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.
I am not advocating withdrawing at this point. I am just insisting that we not let the treaty harm our national security.
How absurd would it be for us to continue to honor the treaty with Russia, preventing us from protecting ourselves from weapons of mass destruction, while all other nuclear-capable countries of the world would be free to develop their own missile defense? What would that do to American security if we could not defend ourselves, but our enemies could? Does that make sense? Am I missing something here? I just do not understand the foreign policy of this administration.
In conclusion, it would be indefensible to the American people to concede that the threat of rogue missile attacks is real and credible, but offer only a self-imposed weak defense against it. It is unconscionable. If the threat to the American people is real, then the defense against these attacks must be real; not only that, it must be aggressive, full-scale and monumental. Whatever resources are necessary, the American people deserve to be defended.
Some in the minority claim that the passage of this bill might lead to a new arms race with the Russians. But everyone knows that any missile defense currently in development would not upset the balance of power between Russia and the United States. NMD will provide defense against only limited and rogue attacks, not against incoming Russian missiles.
What about Russia's proliferation of missile technology to rogue states? Between technology transfers to Iran, India, and perhaps even China, Russia is a large part of the reason we are here debating this bill today, because they are selling their technology around the world. Proliferation is already a growing threat, independent of this bill.
Mr. President, we must pass this bill. This is not a partisan issue. It is an issue of national security. And the defense of the American homeland against a real and growing threat of ballistic missiles and our national security depends on it.
I urge my colleagues to pass this bill, and to do it today.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, thank you.
AMENDMENT NO. 74
Mr. BINGAMAN. I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman] proposes an amendment numbered 74.
On page 2, strike lines 7 through 11 and insert the following:
It is the policy of the United States that a decision to deploy a National Missile Defense system shall be made only after the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense, has determined that the system has demonstrated operational effectiveness.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me explain my amendment and then hopefully discuss with the two managers, the chief sponsor of the bill, my friend from Mississippi, and the manager on the Democratic side, my friend from Michigan, their understanding of what the underlying bill provides and the appropriateness of my amendment.
We had a hearing the other day in the Armed Services Committee. Mr. Gansler was there, and he testified that the administration's plan, with regard to this national missile defense program, is to handle this as they would handle other major weapons programs, weapons systems; that is, they would proceed with development, but they would not go the next step, they would not go into full production and deployment until they had done the necessary operations tests to determine the effectiveness of the system.
I have had some concerns, frankly, about this legislation. I opposed this in the last Congress because of those concerns, concerns that we were, in this legislation, changing those ground rules on the Department of Defense and saying to them, `No, you should not do the appropriate testing. In this case, you should go ahead and proceed to deploy the system regardless of how ready it is for prime time.'
I guess that has been the concern that has prompted me to offer this amendment. In private discussions with the manager of the bill, the sponsor of the bill, he has assured me that he does not see it that way. I want to just ask, if I could, the Senator from Mississippi if he could just respond to a question sort of directly on this.
I was encouraged, frankly, by the statements I just heard from the Senator from New Hampshire, where he said that it is
his understanding and his intention, clearly, by this legislation, that we would not be requiring the Department of Defense to do anything by way of full production or deployment until they were convinced that this weapons system was operationally effective. Is that the understanding of the Senator from Mississippi also?
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, if the Senator would yield, it seems to me clear from the language in the bill that we contemplate the development of a system that is effective. We use that word--an `effective' ballistic missile defense, and that the deployment would take place when it is technologically possible. So when the technology is matured, it is proven to work, and we know the missile system would be effective to defend against ballistic missile attack. That is what the sentiment is. That is the policy that is reflected in the language that is used in the bill.
So that is consistent with the intent that this Senator has, as an author of the bill. And in discussing it with other cosponsors, I think that is the sentiment of the Senate and would be reflected in future authorization and appropriations measures. That is another part to this as well. And one of the concerns, I think, with the amendment that the Senator has sent to the desk is that it could be construed, with a delegation of authority to the executive branch, to remove Congress from the decisionmaking process. We think Congress has a very important role to play in oversight and also in the authorization of deployment and the funding of deployment decisions that will be made in this weapons system development and deployment.
So those are my reactions, my sentiments. I hope that they are not inconsistent with the concerns of the Senator from New Mexico. And I really do not think they are.
[Page: S2800]
Mr. BINGAMAN. I thank the Senator from Mississippi very much for that explanation. I agree with him that clearly Congress needs to maintain its oversight of this program, as well as all other programs. And this is a very high priority for many of us here in Congress and everyone, I think, who is concerned about national security issues. So I would not want, by my amendment, to bring into question the ability of Congress to maintain that oversight. I do not believe the language of my amendment does that.
I am encouraged to hear that the Senator believes that operational effectiveness is an essential part of what has to be established before we go ahead and actually deploy something.
I want to just ask, in order to sort of complete the circle here, my good friend, the ranking member on the Armed Services Committee, which I have the privilege of serving on, Senator Levin, if he has any thoughts about the underlying bill.
Again, I guess the question is, Is there, in the language of the underlying bill, essentially a requirement that the Department of Defense treat this weapons system and this program the way it treats other major programs; and that is, to put them through the appropriate operational tests before they go forward with any deployment?
Mr. LEVIN. To my good friend from New Mexico, I say there is no prohibition in this bill against them using the regular procedures. So it is my assumption they would use those procedures given the absence of any prohibition.
Secondly, the word `effective' that is in the bill, it seems to me, does include the critical operational effectiveness concept which the Senator has referred to. Indeed, the word `effective' could cover a number of elements of effectiveness, but surely one of them is, I believe--and the sponsor of the bill has just confirmed this, I believe--that `operational effectiveness' would be included in the concept of `effectiveness.'
Mr. BINGAMAN. I appreciate that explanation as well.
The Senator from Mississippi, I see, is on the floor. If he has any additional comment, I would be anxious to hear it.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, if the Senator would yield, I appreciate his allowing me to comment further.
So the Record is complete, I would like to read into the Record some comments that I wrote down after considering the amendment of the Senator from New Mexico.
This bill is intended to establish a broad policy, stating the intent of the United States to defend itself against limited ballistic missile attack.
It does not seek to micromanage the Defense Department's conduct of the program. It gives the Department of Defense flexibility in determining whether the national missile defense system is effective and technologically ready for deployment. That decision will be made with congressional involvement and oversight provided by the appropriate committees.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology has stated in testimony before the Armed Services Committee that the criteria to be used by the Defense Department in making such determinations are tailored to the needs of individual programs and the urgency of the threat they are intended to address.
So I think with those further statements we show what we consider to be the meaning of the bill, the effect of the bill, and its relationship between the Congress and the administration.
Mr. BINGAMAN. I thank the Senator from Mississippi for that additional explanation.
Mr. President, in order that I not delay or further confuse the Record, let me take those assurances that I have heard from the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from Michigan and state that I do believe with those assurances the bill does provide for this requirement that operational effectiveness be demonstrated. That has been my primary concern as we considered this bill in the previous Congress, and I am glad to have that resolved.
AMENDMENT NO. 74 WITHDRAWN
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I will at this point withdraw the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 74) was withdrawn.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, let me just thank the Senator from New Mexico. He has raised a very important issue which was the subject of major discussion at the Armed Services Committee the other day; that is, the importance that any weapon system, before it is deployed, be shown to be operationally effective. I think his sensitivity to that issue has been longstanding, and I want to thank him for clarifying the Record relative to this bill.
So that it is clear to Senator Bingaman and to all of the Members, the word `effective' in the bill includes the concept of operational effectiveness. There are other elements of effectiveness which could also be covered, but surely it includes the operational effectiveness concept which the Senator has championed for so long.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. HAGEL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I rise today to support S. 257, the National Missile Defense Act, and to thank my friend and colleague, the distinguished senior Senator from Mississippi, for his continued leadership on this issue--not today, not last year, but over a sustained period of time--to help educate America as to why this issue is so important to our future. I thank the cosponsor of this bill, Senator Inouye from Hawaii, who has joined over the years with Senator Cochran in leading the debate and, hopefully, moving this body to a decisive action today on passing the National Missile Defense Act.
Mr. President, the security of the American people is the first and most important responsibility of the National Government. One of the primary threats facing our national security in the 21st century is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced, sophisticated missile technology.
Surveys show that many Americans think our Armed Forces can shoot down any missile fired at the United States today. As the debate has pointed out over the last few days, that, in fact, is not the case; it is a myth. We don't have a missile defense system today, we won't have a missile defense system tomorrow, and we won't have a missile defense system next year. Yet the nations who are developing their own weapons of mass destruction are not waiting. Last year, two new countries entered the nuclear club, India and Pakistan. Other nations whose motives are less than friendly toward the United States and our allies are aggressively pursuing these weapons and the ability to launch, the ability to deliver, a nuclear weapon.
As technology spreads throughout the world, the threat increases not only from rogue states but also from terrorist organizations. For years, America was assured by our intelligence agencies that the ability to strike the U.S. mainland by any rogue state was years away and that we would easily have enough time to develop a new missile defense system before that possibility would occur.
Last July, a bipartisan commission headed by the distinguished former Secretary of Defense, former Chief of Staff to the President, former Member of the House of Representatives, Don Rumsfeld, sounded an alarm: All was not quiet on the ballistic missile front. The Rumsfeld Commission examined the emerging and current ballistic missile threat to the United States. As Secretary Rumsfeld testified last October before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
[Page: S2801]
We concluded unanimously that we are now in an environment of little or no warning.
The Rumsfeld Commission report contains several alarming conclusions.
One, Russia and China continue to pose threats. Both possess intercontinental ballistic missile capability of reaching the United States mainland. We must be prepared for the possibility of an accidental launch--an accidental launch. In addition, and even more deadly in terms of the threat it poses, both Russia and China have emerged as major suppliers of technology to a number of rogue nations and other countries.
Two, the Rumsfeld Commission found that North Korea and Iran could each pose a threat to the United States within 5 years of a decision to do so.
Three, Iraq was estimated to be certainly within 10 years
of posing a threat. Whether we have been effective at limiting this development with our airstrikes is unknown in Iraq because Iraq is now able to continue its work without the oversight of UNSCOM inspectors. These nations are not isolated; they work together. As Secretary Rumsfeld stated with regard to North Korea:
They are very, very active marketing ballistic missile technologies.
Iran alone received technology assistance from Russia, China, and North Korea, which gives it a wider array of options.
And perhaps one of most striking comments made by Secretary Rumsfeld in his testimony in October was one that rang true with plain, straightforward common sense. Again I quote Secretary Rumsfeld:
We have concluded that there will be surprises [deadly surprises]. It is a big world, it is a complicated world, and deception and denial are extensive. The surprise to me is not that there are and will be surprises, but that we are surprised that there are surprises.
The Rumsfeld Commission report was greeted with some skepticism by the intelligence community. Then on October 31 of last year, the myth that technology was years away was shattered when North Korea launched a Taepo Dong I missile, a three-stage rocket, over Japan and into the Pacific. This is a missile that, with upgrades, could have delivered a small payload, a nuclear payload, to Hawaii or Alaska. We know that the North Koreans are in the advanced stage of developing a Taepo Dong I intercontinental missile with the capability of delivering a nuclear payload to the American interior.
Finally, last month the CIA reversed itself saying the threat was real, imminent, and very dangerous. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Director George Tenet stated:
I can hardly overstate my concern about North Korea. In nearly all respects, the situation there has become more volatile and more unpredictable.
Why has it taken us this long to wake up to the threats facing our Nation? How many more intelligence reports and missile test firings do we need?
Vast oceans in time protected America at the beginning of World War II. Oceans in time will not protect America today. Time has run out.
I was very pleased to see news reports this morning, Mr. President, that President Clinton has dropped his threat now to veto this bill. However, the administration continues to raise concerns about whether a national missile defense system fits within the framework of the 1972 ABM Treaty with the old Soviet Union--the imploded Soviet Union, a country that no longer exists.
Much has been made by the opponents of this bill on how Russia would perceive our development of a national missile defense. I visited Russia in December. I spent 10 days in Russia and met with leaders throughout Russia. I was in Siberia. I asked about this question. This question is about the relevancy of our national interest, as all questions of national security are about the relevancy of our national interest, as Russia's questions are about their national interest. The Foreign Relations Committee will hold a hearing on the ABM Treaty in April, and a continued set of hearings on into May, leading up to the June 1 deadline by which Chairman Helms has asked the administration to submit the ABM Treaty amendments.
It is completely inconsistent for the administration to raise concerns about building a national missile defense system under this current 1972 treaty and then not submit the ABM Treaty amendments to the Senate. This administration has yet to send amendments to the ABM Treaty, nor has it given any indication that it will. The President should submit amendments and allow the Senate to debate this issue. We need to determine whether this 1972 treaty is still relevant to America's security in the 21st century. The security of our people cannot be held hostage to an outdated treaty with a country that no longer exists. The most fundamental responsibility of this Government, of each of us who have the privilege to serve in this body, is to assure the freedom and security of this Nation; to do less not only abrogates our responsibility, but makes us less than worthy of serving the people of this country.
As Secretary Rumsfeld stated:
The new reality makes threats such as terrorism, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles more attractive to dictators. They are cheaper than armies and air forces and navies. They are attainable. And ballistic missiles have the advantage of being able to arrive at their destination undefended.
We need an effective missile defense system, and we need to get at it now.
I conclude with what President Reagan said in 1983. He said:
If history teaches anything, it teaches simple-minded appeasement or wishful thinking about our adversaries is folly--it means the betrayal of our past, the squandering of our future, and the squandering of our freedom.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the National Missile Defense Act, S. 257.
I yield the floor.
Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.
AMENDMENT NO. 75
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment that I will offer and then I will engage in a colloquy with the distinguished Senator from Mississippi. I send the amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Iowa [Mr. Harkin] proposes an amendment numbered 75.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end, add the following:
SEC. 4. COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELEVANT NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS.
(a) Requirement for Study: Not later than January 1, 2001, the President shall submit to Congress the comparative study described in subsection (b).
(b) Content of Study: (1) The study required under subsection (a) is a study that provides a quantitative analysis of the relevant risks and likelihood of the full range of current and emerging national security threats to the territory of the United States. The study shall be carried out in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of all other departments and agencies of the Federal Government that have responsibilities, expertise, and interests that the President considers relevant to the comparison.
(2) The threats compared in the study shall include threats by the following means:
(A) Long-range ballistic missiles.
(B) Bombers and other aircraft.
(C) Cruise missiles.
(D) Submarines.
(E) Surface ships.
(F) Biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
(G) Any other weapons of mass destruction that are delivered by means other than missiles, including covert means and commercial methods such as cargo aircraft, cargo ships, and trucks.
(H) Deliberate contamination or poisoning of food and water supplies.
(I) Any other means.
(3) In addition to the comparison of the threats, the report shall include the following:
(A) The status of the developed and deployed responses and preparations to meet the threats.
(B) A comparison of the costs of developing and deploying responses and preparations to meet the threats.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, again, for the information of Senators, I intend to withdraw this amendment after talking about it and engaging in somewhat of a colloquy with Senator Cochran, and I think Senator Levin also wanted to speak on this.
Basically, let me describe what the amendment does. It requires that not later than January 1 of 2001, the President will submit to Congress a comparative study. It is a study that would provide a quantitative analysis of the relevant risks and the likelihood of the full range of current and emerging national security threats to the territory of the United States.
This says:
[Page: S2802]
It shall be carried out in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of all other departments and agencies of the Federal Government that have responsibilities, expertise, and interests that the President considers relevant to the comparison.
Then I listed a number of items, including long-range ballistic missiles; bombers and other aircraft; cruise missiles; submarines; surface ships; biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons; and any other weapons of mass destruction that are delivered by means other than missiles, including covert means and commercial methods, such as cargo aircraft, cargo ships, trucks, and any other means.
I would like to describe what I am getting at here. As we look at the bill before us, S. 257, which is kind of narrowly drawn in terms of ballistic missile defense, we seem to be getting kind of overfocus on this, a focus that if only we build some kind of a ballistic missile defense system, it will secure us from the weapons of mass destruction that threaten us. But I am not so certain that is really the major threat that we face, and whether or not all of the money put into that, all of our eggs into that basket, so to speak, really would protect us from what I consider to be more viable and determinable threats to our national security.
For example, what about some of the key threats we hear about every day? Well, I have a chart that lists some of the typical types of national security threats facing our Nation today.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print the chart in the Record.
There being no objection, the chart was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE: NO SOLUTION TO KEY THREATS
Theater missile defense solution Theater missile defense solution
Truck bomb attack on U.S Ineffective Ineffective.
Chemical weapons attack in U.S ......do Do.
Biological weapons attack in U.S ......do Do.
Cruise missile attack on U.S ......do Do.
Bomber attack on U.S ......do Do.
Loose nukes in former Soviet Union ......do Do.
Mr. HARKIN. For example, a national missile defense system would be ineffective against a truck-bomb attack on the United States. Of course, we have had some experience, regrettably, in that area. It would not be effective against a chemical weapons attack in the United States. Now, we haven't had that, but Japan has. What about biological weapons that would be delivered by a terrorist? No small threat. It seems like there is an anthrax incident every week here in the country. Again, if there is an anthrax scare, the first line of defense is going to be the local police and firefighters struggling to deal with the threat, and our State and local public health officials, and other health care people.
However, a national missile defense system is no solution to combat this very viable threat. The list goes on with a cruise missile attack. It is much cheaper for a country to engage in; it would be launched offshore. Yet, a national missile defense would be ineffective. Even a bomber attack, coming in under our radar screens, would be ineffective for missile defense; and even some of the `loose nukes' in the former Soviet Union, if in fact there were to be warheads smuggled out of the Soviet Union and enter the country by boat, plane, or truck across our borders. A missile defense is totally ineffective. Also listed is the theater missile defense, which would also be ineffective against those threats.
General Shelton of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agrees and has said:
There are other serious threats out there in addition to that posed by ballistic missiles. We know, for example, that there are adversaries with chemical and biological weapons that can attack the United States today. They could do it with a briefcase--by infiltrating our territory across our shores or through our airports.
I am just concerned that we are focusing so much on this national ballistic missile defense that we are forgetting about these other more determinable and viable threats.
My amendment seeks to provide for a study, sort of a comparative study, and a quantitative analysis of these risks: What is the risk of a ballistic missile attack on the United States? What is that? And what is the risk of, say, a biological weapons attack on the United States? What do we have, either deployed or in development, to protect against each one of those?--thinking about the relative risk. I wanted this study to be done by January 1, 2001, before we go rushing down the road investing more billions of dollars into a ballistic missile defense that would prove absolutely defenseless against these other viable threats.
That is what I was seeking to do with this amendment.
I have had some conversations with the Senator from Mississippi about this. I yield for any colloquy that we might engage in on this.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, with respect to the amendment of the Senator from Iowa, I thank him for discussing the amendment with managers before offering it. As I understand the amendment, it calls for a report on a wide variety of threats facing the United States. S. 257, the pending legislation, is intended to address one of these threats--a limited ballistic missile attack against us for which we have no defense.
While these other threats are important, they are not the subject of this bill. We have tried to keep this bill focused on a specific policy question--whether the United States will defend itself against ballistic missile attack. We have tried not to entangle this question in the details of other defense issues, however important they may be.
If a report on the many other threats from weapons of mass destruction would be useful, the defense authorization or appropriations bills would be appropriate vehicles for directing such reporting requirements. As a matter of fact, it is our understanding that a similar requirement for a study is being conducted and is being complied with in response to a directive in the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 1999.
In conclusion, just because there are some threats that we cannot defend against perfectly doesn't mean we should not defend against others.
So, while being sympathetic with the suggestion that the Senator is making, we think this can be accomplished; the goal can be accomplished that he has pointed out by using the vehicles of the Intelligence Committee authorization, as is now being done to some extent, and the authorization and appropriations bills that will later be considered by the Senate this year.
Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of my friend from Mississippi. I understand that in the intelligence community that they only look at possible threats but they don't make a comparative analysis, nor do they deal with the status of how the United States counters the threats.
Again, I am saying we need also to engage those agencies on the front line, not just the Pentagon. But I am talking about the Department of Justice, FBI, and HHS--all of these agencies that handle biological, chemical threats. We need to engage them in this comparative quantitative analysis.
Again, I want to make it clear to my friend from Mississippi that I basically was not going to support the bill because I felt that the words `technologically feasible' in the bill and saying that we should deploy as soon as technologically possible--that that was kind of putting the cart before the horse.
I was also concerned a little bit about what this might mean for further negotiations on arms control, our START II and possibly the START III, and the ABM Treaty. But with the adoption of the Landrieu amendment last night, I think that puts a balance here. I don't mind the research and stuff that goes into looking at a possible ballistic missile defense. I think we have to examine all of these. But it has to be done in a balanced way and in a way that sort of takes into account what those threats are to our national security on kind of a quantitative basis without putting everything in just sort of one basket, so to speak.
But I think with the adoption of the Landrieu amendment that it is much more balanced. And I therefore support the bill. I wanted to offer this amendment to try to again put that balance in the bill while looking at these other possible threats. I understand what the Senator says--that perhaps this is more amenable, or a more likely prospect for the armed services authorization bill. I take that in good faith.
I spoke with the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, and also ranking member, Senator Levin, about this. I think I can represent that Senator Warner was open to the idea, without knowing more about it and without having had an opportunity to really fully look at it.
[Page: S2803]
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. HARKIN. I am delighted to yield.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I would like to briefly make a statement before asking the question, so he doesn't lose his right to the floor.
The Senator has put his finger on a very significant issue--and it is one that all of us should struggle with, and many of us have struggled with. His effort here is to focus the attention of this body on a range of threats that we face. And to attempt to see if we can't get a better handle on the likelihood of those threats actually emerging is a very important action on his part. The chart he has used demonstrates what the problem is. There are many threats which are much more likely than a ballistic missile attack against us for which we have no defense. Perhaps we should devote resources to those, and then what would be the relationship between the costs of defending against those more likely threats compared to the cost of defending against a missile attack of the kind that could come from North Korea, theoretically.
General Shelton phrased the issue this way. This was on January 5. He said:
there are two aspects of the National Missile Defense [issue] that we have to be concerned with. Number one is: is the technology that allows us to deploy one that is an effective system, and within the means of this country money-wise?
This is General Shelton, Chairman of our Joint Chiefs saying this.
Secondly is the threat and whether or not the threat, when measured against all the other threats that we face, justifies the expenditure of that type of money for that particular system at the time when the technology will allow us to field it?
Those are the factors that the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs wants to consider, and those are some of the issues which the good Senator from Iowa is addressing our attention to.
I asked General Shelton to give us what we call a `threat spectrum' and asked him to try to give us a continuum of threats in terms of the most likely and less likely.
The least likely is in the upper right-hand corner, strategic missile attack, 6,000 Russian warheads. The next least likely is the rogue missile. The next least likely, major theater wars, such as in Korea. The next least likely is information wars, attacks on our satellites, or our power systems, or similar assets. The next least likely, but now becoming more and more likely, are terrorist attacks in the United States, some of which for instance the Senator from Iowa is talking about, and then terror attacks abroad, regional conflicts, and so forth.
This is the issue which the Senator from Iowa is really focusing our attention on today. But his amendment goes significantly beyond this chart, which, by the way, was prepared by General Shelton.
The amendment of the Senator from Iowa would get us into a greater element of comparative risk in terms of trying to get a range of likelihood of the risks, not just whether one risk is more likely than another. But his amendment, the way it is drafted, would consider how much more or how much less likely is one threat than another.
That is very valuable information, and General Shelton is attempting to work on that issue now. But the amendment of the Senator from Iowa puts it in a very precise and useful form.
In addition, it would be very helpful for us to know what would the range of costs be to defend against the various threats, if we can do so. And all I can do is assure my good friend from Iowa that we on the Armed Services Committee will take a good look at his amendment. It has my very strong support, and as he mentioned, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee said he would be open to such an amendment on the defense authorization bill.
I think that is a very appropriate place for the amendment to go, and I think he would find, hopefully, bipartisan support on the committee for this kind of a study, because it really addresses an issue which I think every Member of this body would like to see addressed.
I thank him for his effort and assure him of my support on the armed services bill. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I would support an expansion of what we are doing to include the kind of factual analyses for which his amendment would call.
I thank him for the amendment and just assure him, if he does not offer it here, there will be a major effort to get it or something very close to it on the authorization bill.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Michigan, the ranking member on the Armed Services Committee, a leader in this area and, obviously, way ahead of me on this topic, who has done a lot of research and work on this. I appreciate that and the kind of information he has given out with this chart he has developed. In taking that assurance, I would withdraw my amendment.
How much more time do I have, Mr. President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 15 minutes.
Mr. HARKIN. I will just take about 5 more minutes.
I cannot resist the opportunity to talk a little bit about this concept of the ballistic missile defense system. I was just reading the history of what happened in France prior to World War II. I got to thinking; someone described this ballistic missile defense as sort of our new Maginot Line, so I said I want to find out about the Maginot Line, really what it was.
Louis Snyder wrote the `Historical Guide to World War II.' It is a basic reference work for anyone studying the history of World War II. I recommend that my colleagues read through this volume of history, especially the story of the Maginot Line.
In the late 1920s and 1930s, France constructed a huge series of fortifications on its border with Germany. It was named after Andre Maginot, French minister of war who started the project. A huge workforce constructed the fortifications that were considered impregnable by the French military. More than 26 million cubic feet of cement was used to build a series of giant pillboxes, gun turrets, and dragons teeth. Elevators led to underground passages that included living quarters, hospitals, cafeterias, and storehouses. It sounds like our missile silo bunkers.
More than $1 billion was spent by the French military. That is in 1930s dollars. Factored today that would be $12 billion they spent to build the Maginot Line, and from a nation much smaller than the United States. It was truly an awesome endeavor intended to thwart a great threat to France; that is, an invasion by Germany.
Of course, there was just one problem. The German military high command were no fools. They developed an adequate counter. They simply went around the Maginot Line. By going through Belgium, the Maginot Line proved almost useless in defending the
French homeland, and it did nothing to counter the blitzkrieg tactics used by the Germans to counter static defenses.
I might also add here that Gen. Charles de Gaulle, who I believe was not a general at that time but a colonel, opposed the Maginot Line, but the French Government, I am sure, probably in sort of a working relationship with concrete people and builders and those who wanted to make a lot of money building this huge fortification, decided to go down that road. Charles de Gaulle warned of the blitzkrieg coming and that the Maginot Line would do nothing to protect them against it.
I think the analogy of the Maginot Line to ballistic missile defense is startling. Are we going to spend tens of billions of dollars on a defense against a single threat? Will our enemies simply go around the ballistic missile defense, our Maginot Line? Of course, they will. The counter is simple. Truck bombs, weapons of mass destruction slipped into our country by plane, boat, or truck would all go around the ballistic missile defense.
Perhaps some of my colleagues want a simple answer to real and potential threats from around the world. We want a simple silver bullet defense against a dangerous world. We may spend billions of dollars for this new Maginot Line, but the result will be the same as it was for the French 60 years ago. Life is just more complicated than what a national missile defense could counter.
In fact, the Maginot Line analogy applies, I think, to the psychology of missile defense. As Louis Snyder wrote, `The French public, too, had an almost mystical faith in the Maginot Line and believed its defense to be absolute and total.'
Mr. President, I hope we don't fall in the same trap, but ever since star wars started under the Reagan administration, we have had this sort of concept that we could build some kind of a dome over the United States that would be impregnable, that would totally and fully protect all of our citizens. That is mythical. There is no such dome. A truck bomb, a terrorist attack by boat, a suitcase, anthrax poisoning, that missile shield would never protect us from anything such as that.
So I hope and trust that the authorizing committee will take a look at all these other threats, I think much more real, much more determinable, and I believe much more effectively countered other systems than a national ballistic missile defense system.
So that, again, was the purpose of my amendment. It was to try to bring balance. I appreciate the fact that this bill is focused on one area. But I still believe that this is the way we ought to go if we are going to make any rational decisions around here on how we spend our taxpayers' dollars on defense.
I think we need this kind of study, and I appreciate what Senator Levin has said. I appreciate his leadership. In my conversation with Senator Warner from Virginia, the chairman, he was open to this, and I hope and trust that the Armed Services Committee will proceed down that line and provide us with the kind of balanced information we need on the Appropriations Committee before we go down this road of spending billions of dollars on a ballistic missile defense.
[Page: S2804]
AMENDMENT NO. 75 WITHDRAWN
Mr. President, with that, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
The amendment (No. 75) was withdrawn.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I start out by extending my appreciation and praise to the Senator from Mississippi, Senator Cochran, who has done an incredible job on this legislation. He has, for years, advocated a capability of this Nation to defend itself against missile attack. Without his dedication and hard work we would not be here today. The Senator from Mississippi has performed a signal service, not only for the people of Mississippi but the people of this Nation, including all 50 States rather than just 48. I thank him for the marvelous job he has done.
I also think it is worthy of note that the persuasiveness of his arguments have caused the administration to significantly shift their position on this very important issue. So, again, my congratulations to the Senator from Mississippi and my sincere appreciation.
Mr. President, the question of whether to deploy defenses against ballistic missiles has been a contentious and unresolved issue for over 40 years. As a result, Americans today are vulnerable to destruction by a missile attack on our soil. The bill before us today, the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, resolves this national policy debate by calling for the deployment of an effective missile defense system when technologically possible to protect our citizens from the threat of a ballistic missile attack on the U.S.
Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen announced in January that the Clinton Administration, after years of discounting the existence of a missile threat to the U.S., will now support and provide the necessary funding for development and deployment of a ballistic missile defense system. On the surface, this appears to be one of the President's more propitious policy reversals. Yet, the Clinton Administration threatened to veto this bill, which establishes in law the missile defense policy the Administration now claims to support.
While I am pleased that the Administration has lifted its veto threat, I question the interpretation of the passage of yesterday's amendment that reportedly provided the basis for this latest reversal of position. The United States should proceed with deployment of a missile defense system irrespective of whether Russia agrees to reduce its nuclear force levels in accordance with the START II agreement. How many times do we have to point out that the requirement for missile defenses is predicated upon a much broader threat that the Administration apparently still doesn't fully comprehend.
Mr. President, since its inauguration, the Clinton Administration has demonstrated an approach to national defense that can only be described as disengaged and minimalist. Administration officials have sought not to maximize our military strength within reasonable fiscal constraints, but to find ways to minimize defense spending at the expense of military capability and readiness, and in so doing, they have endangered our future security.
Our late colleague and a man I greatly admired, Senator John Tower, stressed time and again that the size and composition of our Armed Forces, and thus the amount of our budgetary resources that are devoted to defense, must be determined by the level and nature of the threat. The Clinton Administration's long-standing opposition to missile defenses, as well as its continued refusal to provide adequate levels of defense spending, are the complete antithesis of Senator Tower's sound advice. Consequently, our nation is vulnerable right now to the threat of an accidental or unauthorized missile launch from Russia or China, and will be vulnerable to additional threats in the near future from North Korea and other rogue nations implacably hostile to America and governed by unpredictable leaders.
Mr. President, one of the principal reasons for our country's vulnerability to ballistic missile attack is not lack of money or technology. It is the 1972 ABM Treaty.
In the 1960s, at the height of the Cold War, then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
developed the theory of Mutual Assured Destruction as a means of deterring nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This concept relied on the assumption that, so long as both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were confident of their ability to retaliate against each other with assurance of enormous destruction, nuclear war would be averted and there would be no incentive to build more offensive nuclear weapons.
The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was an essential component of this `balance of terror' concept. It prohibits the deployment of effective defensive systems which were perceived as undermining the concept of mutually assured destruction. In effect, the ABM Treaty was designed to keep the citizenry of both the U.S. and the former Soviet Union equally vulnerable to destruction in a nuclear exchange.
The ten years following ratification of the ABM Treaty, however, witnessed the greatest expansion of Soviet offensive strategic nuclear forces in history, destroying the basic premise of the MAD doctrine, and the ABM Treaty as well. Yet, the Treaty's proponents cling to it with an almost theological reverence.
It was President Reagan who finally called into question the wisdom of continuing to deprive ourselves of missile defenses in the face of overwhelming evidence that the Soviet Union was pursuing the capability of launching a debilitating strike against the U.S. His March 1983 speech set the stage for the first serious discussion of defensive systems in over a decade. If his vision of a global system was technologically and financially unrealistic, his dream of protecting the American public from the threat of foreign missiles was prescient, and the Strategic Defense Initiative--the butt of many a joke by arms control theorists--was instrumental in bringing down the Soviet Union without firing a shot.
Since work began in earnest in the Reagan Administration to develop missile defenses for our nation, the threat has changed. The end of the Cold War and the emergent threat of ballistic missile proliferation have fundamentally altered the approach this country must take to the issue of missile defenses. In fact, the imperative to deploy effective systems is greater now because of the unpredictability of the potential threats.
Throughout the Bush Administration, as our overall defense strategy and budget were being adjusted to reflect the changes in the world, so too was our plan for ballistic missile defenses revised to address the changed threat.
Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration has retained allegiance to the outmoded ABM Treaty and, over the years, has significantly cut the funding and restricted the objectives of the ballistic missile defense program.
Remember, back in 1994, when the President evoked considerable laughter from his audience at a campaign rally when he said:
[Page: S2805]
Here's what they [the Republicans] promise . . . we're going to increase defense and we're
going to bring back Star Wars. And then we're going to balance the budget.
The Clinton Administration's attitude for the past six years has been to ridicule efforts to develop and deploy a system to effectively defend our nation against a ballistic missile strike. The result has been a significant and dangerous delay in ending the `terror' of a nuclear strike.
Now, the President has belatedly agreed, at least rhetorically, to the agenda he formerly ridiculed. While I applaud the President's words, I remain more than mildly skeptical about his true commitment to protecting our nation from the clear threat of missile attack.
The President's budget proposal, which was submitted to the Congress on February 1, proves skeptics correct.
While the President was pledging more funding for development of a national missile defense system on one hand, his other hand was taking $250 million out of the program to pay for the Wye River Agreement. At the same time, the Administration decided to push back the deployment date for missile defenses from 2003 to 2005, with no justifiable reason for doing so.
If the President is truly getting serious about missile defense, why would he show us the money, and then snatch it back and slip the deployment date two additional years beyond its already much-delayed timetable?
Another indication of the Administration's disingenuous embrace of missile defenses are the qualifications attached to its support in two areas: questions about the nature of the threat, and continued deference to the restrictions of the ABM Treaty.
No fewer than 30 times over the last several years, President Clinton has gone before the public and boasted that, thanks to his policies, the American people, for the first time since the dawn of the Cold War, can go to sleep at night without the threat of missiles targeted against their country. Clearly, the Administration has been existing in a virtual state of denial about the expanding and diverse threat of ballistic missiles.
I urge the President to take another look at the report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, known as the Rumsfeld Commission. It is a completely nonpartisan and very sobering look at the threats we face. The Commission concluded that the threat is here now, and that traditional methods of determining the nature and scale of the threat need to be examined.
The Rumsfeld Commission's meticulous examination of the growing threat to the U.S. of ballistic missiles, with its emphasis on the difficulties inherent in determining when serious threats will appear and the tendency of such threats to materialize sooner than anticipated, should have shaken the White House out of its fatuous complacency. Apparently, that is not the case.
A recent article in Inside the Pentagon pointed out that, even after the Rumsfeld
Commission report was released in July 1998, the Administration predicted the absence of a rogue nation threat, excepting North Korea, before 2010. And in a February 3 letter to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the President's National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, wrote that, prior to a decision to deploy a national missile defense system, `the President and his senior advisers will need to confirm whether the rogue state ballistic missile threat to the United States has developed as quickly as we now expect. . . .'
Apparently North Korea's launch last August of an intercontinental ballistic missile over Japan, Iran's ongoing efforts with Russian assistance to develop such a missile, and Iraq's continuing efforts in that regard do not constitute a threat.
Equally disturbing is the Administration's view of the ABM Treaty. In his February 3 letter, Mr. Berger reiterated that `the ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability'--a reminder that we are dealing with an Administration that is imbued with an unquestioned adherence to an outdated treaty. While I am mindful of arguments that deployment of national missile defenses may be perceived by some nations as a potentially hostile act, theories of nuclear deterrence that were of questionable value during the Cold War clearly do not apply today or in the foreseeable future and should not be permitted to stand in the way of going forward.
If the Administration supports deployment of an effective national missile defense system, it cannot remain wedded to the ABM Treaty. Make no mistake, the ABM Treaty was intended to and does preclude our ability to deploy nation-wide missile defenses. Construction of a missile defense facility at the one treaty-permissible site cannot be expanded for national coverage without violating the terms of the treaty. While the original 1972 treaty permitted each country two sites, it stipulated that they had to be deployed so as to preclude even regional coverage.
Deploying a national missile defense system, therefore, requires either unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty or an expeditiously negotiated revision of it. As the treaty clearly prohibits us from providing for the common defense--our most fundamental constitutional responsibility--I urge the Administration to proceed without delay to achieve the needed changes to the treaty, or move for its abrogation.
Questionable in its utility even at the time it was negotiated, the ABM Treaty was signed with a totalitarian regime that no longer exists and which violated the treaty at every opportunity. Its day is past. If Russia will not agree to negotiate changes to the treaty that will permit deployment of national missile defenses, then we must exercise our authority to withdraw from the treaty to protect our national interests.
Mr. President, let me take a moment to talk about the larger problem, of which the Administration's refusal to recognize the clear threat posed by proliferating ballistic missile development is but one aspect.
I have long been critical of many aspects of the Clinton Administration's national security policies. This is an Administration that has never been comfortable with the conduct of foreign policy, and so has little grasp of the role of military force in guaranteeing our place in world affairs. Both our policies and the force structure needed to support them seem to be decided in this Administration on the basis of what we can afford after taking care of all other priorities, instead of what is necessary to protect our interests.
We can honestly debate the merits of the numerous contingencies to which the Administration has deployed military force, but no one can deny that the combination of over 10 years of declining defense budgets and longer and more frequent force deployments has stretched the Services perilously close to the breaking point. What is at risk, without exaggeration, are the lives of our military personnel and the security of the United States.
After years of denying the obvious, in the face of compelling testimony before Congress from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Administration has finally begun to concede that we have serious readiness problems in our Armed Forces. Those of us who have been criticized for sounding alarm bells about military readiness now have the empty satisfaction of seeing the Administration admit there is more to maintaining a strong defense than their history of falsely promising to do so.
After six years of short-changing the Armed Forces, the President proposed adding money to the defense budget--another stunning policy reversal--for readiness, modernization, and even national missile defense. Once again, though, his rhetoric far exceeds his actions.
Last fall, the President asked for $1 billion in immediate, emergency funding to redress readiness problems--a mere drop in the bucket compared to what the Service Chiefs said was required. Congress added another $8 billion, but then wasted most of that on pork-barrel spending. The result--a band-aid solution to a serious readiness crisis.
The same minimal approach is reflected in the President's budget submission for Fiscal Year 2000. After promising a budget increase of $12.6 billion, the President only asked for $4.1 billion in his budget request, and most of that will be needed to pay for ongoing contingencies in Bosnia and southwest Asia and desperately needed military pay raises and benefits. The rest of the so-called increase comes from `smoke and mirrors', like anticipated lower inflation and fuel costs, cuts in previously funded programs, and an economically unsound incremental funding plan for military construction projects. And even if everything works as planned, the Administration budget short-changes the military next year and every year thereafter.
There is a pattern here, Mr. President, of promising everything and delivering very little. Whether it's protecting our citizens from a ballistic missile attack, or maintaining modern, prepared armed forces, this President seems incapable of following through on his commitments.
Mr. President, I am uncomfortable with a conclusion that the President does not care about the common defense. I must assume, instead, that he simply fails to understand the imperative of establishing policies and providing needed resources to protect our nation's interests and our citizens.
The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 establishes a national policy that we must protect Americans from a clear and present danger--the threat of ballistic missile attack. The President was correct to withdraw his veto threat and join with the Congress to put in place both the policy and the resources that will make our citizens safe.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
[Page: S2806]
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 257. Although this bill is not as comprehensive or detailed as I would prefer, I have come to the conclusion that S. 257, as amended, sends an important signal of our country's commitment to defending itself from ballistic missile attack from a rogue state.
As my colleagues are aware, I am an advocate for national missile defense, and have authored legislation that has advanced the NMD program. I urge the Administration to include funding in the budget that would allow for NMD deployment, and am pleased that $6.6 billion was added to the future years defense plan for this purpose.
Increasingly, I am convinced that we need NMD sooner rather than later. Last July, the Rumsfeld Commission reported that several rogue states could develop an ICBM capable of threatening our country before we expect it. Recent missile tests by North Korea and Iran have confirmed the essence of the Rumsfeld panel's findings. I was disturbed by these developments, but have long said that we should be prepared before we are surprised.
Our country needs to move forward aggressively with NMD. But because our NMD program does not exist in a vacuum, it needs to be guided by what I call three common sense criteria: compatibility with arms control, affordability, and use of proven, tested technology.
As introduced last year S. 257 did not address these concerns, and its authors were refusing to entertain ame