(Senate - June 25, 1996)

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(Ordered to lie on the table.)

Mr. KYL submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill, S. 1745, supra; as follows:
On page XX, between lines XX and XX, insert the following:

Subtitle XX--National Missile Defense

This subtitle may be cited as the `Defend America Act of 1996'.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Although the United States possesses the technological means to develop and deploy defensive systems that would be highly effective in countering limited ballistic missile threats to its territory, the United States has not deployed such systems and currently has no policy to do so.

(2) The threat that is posed to the national security of the United States by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is significant and growing, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

(3) The trend in ballistic missile proliferation is toward longer range and increasingly sophisticated missiles.

(4) Several countries that are hostile to the United States (including North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Iraq) have demonstrated an interest in acquiring ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States.

(5) The Intelligence Community of the United States has confirmed that North Korea is developing an intercontinental ballistic missile that will be capable of reaching Alaska or beyond once deployed.

(6) There are ways for determined countries to acquire missiles capable of threatening the United States with little warning by means other than indigenous development.

(7) Because of the dire consequences to the United States of not being prepared to defend itself against a rogue missile attack and the long-lead time associated with preparing an effective defense, it is prudent to commence a national missile defense deployment effort before new ballistic missile threats to the United States are unambiguously confirmed.

(8) The timely deployment by the United States of an effective national missile defense system will reduce the incentives for countries to develop or otherwise acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles, thereby inhibiting as well as countering the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

(9) Deployment by the United States of a national missile defense system will reduce concerns about the threat of an accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile attack on the United States.

(10) The offense-only approach to strategic deterrence presently followed by the United States and Russia is fundamentally adversarial and is not a suitable basis for stability in a world in which the United States and the states of the former Soviet Union are seeking to normalize relations and eliminate Cold War attitudes and arrangements.

(11) Pursuing a transition to a form of strategic deterrence based increasingly on defensive capabilities and strategies is in the interest of all countries seeking to preserve and enhance strategic stability.

(12) The deployment of a national missile defense system capable of defending the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks would (A) strengthen deterrence at the levels of forces agreed to by the United States and Russia under the START I Treaty, and (B) further strengthen deterrence if reductions below START I levels are implemented in the future.

(13) Article XIII of the ABM Treaty envisions `possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this treaty'.

(14) Articles XIII and XIV of the treaty establish means for the parties to amend the treaty, and the parties have in the past used those means to amend the treaty.

(15) Article XV of the treaty establishes the means for a party to withdraw from the treaty, upon six months notice `if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests'.

(16) Previous discussions between the United States and Russia, based on Russian President Yeltsin's proposal for a Global Protection System, envisioned an agreement to amend the ABM Treaty to allow (among other measures) deployment of as many as four ground-based interceptor sites in addition to the one site permitted under the ABM Treaty and unrestricted exploitation of sensors based within the atmosphere and in space.

(a) It is the policy of the United States to deploy by the end of 2003 a National Missile Defense system that--

(1) is capable of providing a highly-effective defense of the territory of the United States against limited, unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks; and

(2) will be augmented over time to provide a layered defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic missile threats as they emerge.
(b) It is the policy of the United States to seek a cooperative transition to a regime that does not feature an offense-only form of deterrence as the basis for strategic stability.

(a) Requirement for Development of System: To implement the policy established in section 263(a), the Secretary of Defense shall develop for deployment an affordable and operationally effective National Missile Defense (NMD ) system which shall achieve an initial operational capability (IOC) by the end of 2003.
(b) Elements of the NMD System: The system to be developed for deployment shall include the following elements:

(1) An interceptor system that optimizes defensive coverage of the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attacks and includes one or a combination of the following:

(A) Ground-based interceptors.

(B) Sea-based interceptors.

(C) Space-based kinetic energy interceptors.

(D) Space-based directed energy systems.

(2) Fixed ground-based radars.

(3) Space-based sensors, including the Space and Missile Tracking System.

(4) Battle management, command, control, and communications (BM/C3).

The Secretary of Defense shall--

(1) upon the enactment of this Act, promptly initiate required preparatory and planning actions that are necessary so as to be capable of meeting the initial operational capability (IOC) date specified in section 264(a);

(2) plan to conduct by the end of 1998 an integrated systems test which uses elements (including BM/C3 elements) that are representative of, and traceable to, the national missile defense system architecture specified in section 264(b);

(3) prescribe and use streamlined acquisition policies and procedures to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of developing the system specified in section 264(a); and

(4) develop an affordable national missile defense follow-on program that--

(A) leverages off of the national missile defense system specified in section 264(a), and

(B) augments that system, as the threat changes, to provide for a layered defense.

Not later than March 15, 1997, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the Secretary's plan for development and deployment of a national missile defense system pursuant to this subtitle. The report shall include the following matters:

(1) The Secretary's plan for carrying out this subtitle, including--

(A) a detailed description of the system architecture selected for development under section 264(b); and

(B) a discussion of the justification for the selection of that particular architecture.

(2) The Secretary's estimate of the amount of appropriations required for research, development, test, evaluation, and for procurement, for each of fiscal years 1997 through 2003 in order to achieve the initial operational capability date specified in section 264(a).

(3) A cost and operational effectiveness analysis of follow-on options to improve the effectiveness of such system.

(4) A determination of the point at which any activity that is required to be carried out under this subtitle would conflict with the terms of the ABM Treaty, together with a description of any such activity, the legal basis for the Secretary's determination, and an estimate of the time at which such point would be reached in order to meet the initial operational capability date specified in section 264(a).

(a) ABM Treaty Negotiations: In light of the findings in section 262 and the policy established in section 263, Congress urges the President to pursue high-level discussions with the Russian Federation to achieve an agreement to amend the ABM Treaty to allow deployment of the national missile defense system being developed for deployment under section 264.
(b) Requirement for Senate Advice and Consent: If an agreement described in subsection (a) is achieved in discussions described in that subsection, the President shall present that agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent. No funds appropriated or otherwise available for any fiscal year may be obligated or expended to implement such an amendment to the ABM Treaty unless the amendment is made in the same manner as the manner by which a treaty is made.
(c) Action Upon Failure To Achieve Negotiated Changes Within One Year: If an agreement described in subsection (a) is not achieved in discussions described in that subsection within one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President and Congress, in consultation with each other, shall consider exercising the option of withdrawing the United States from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of that treaty.

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For purposes of this subtitle, the term `ABM Treaty' means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, and signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, and includes the Protocols to that Treaty, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974.


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