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The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned

APPENDIX E – ENDNOTES

Foreword

1 President George W. Bush, Jackson Square, New Orleans, September 15, 2005.

2 President George W. Bush, Jackson Square, New Orleans, September 15, 2005.

3 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents (Washington, D.C., February 28, 2003); see also, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), Preface.

Chapter One: Katrina in Perspective

1 The White House, “Proclamation by the President: National Day of Prayer and Remembrance for the Victims of Hurricane Katrina,” news release, September 8, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/print/20050908-12.html.

2 As measured by damage to property.  Measuring destructiveness in terms of damage to property rather than loss of life is a useful way to compare disasters.  Loss of life reflects both the magnitude of the disaster, as well as the quality of the response, while property destruction correlates more directly to the magnitude of the disaster alone.

3 In 1871, Chicago was the fifth largest city in the United States, with a population of almost 300,000.  The fire killed 300 people, made one-third of the city homeless, and destroyed a third of the city’s property.  For Chicago Fire deaths and population displacement, see Lawrence J. Vale and Thomas J. Campanella, eds., The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster [“Resilient City”] (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 28; U.S. Census Bureau, “Table 10. Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places: 1870,” June 15, 1998, http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0027/tab10.txt. For all other Chicago Fire statistics, see Chicago Historical Society, “The Great Chicago Fire,” http://www.chicagohs.org/fire/intro/gcf-index.html; The Chicago Fire and the Fire Insurance Companies (New York: J.H. and C.M. Goodsell, 1871); and Insurance Year Book (1874).  (Note that statistics for disasters can vary significantly depending on the source consulted, both due to variances in how terms are defined and the lack of consistent historical records.)

For statistics on the San Francisco Earthquake/Fire and Hurricane Andrew, see Figure 1.1 and accompanying notes.

4 Rebecca Watson, Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management, U.S. Department of the Interior, written statement for a hearing on Global Oil Demand/Gasoline Prices, on September 6, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 109th Congress, 1st session.

5 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, “Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #6,” August 28, 2005.

6 Evidence suggests that Hurricane Katrina reached Category 3 intensity as it made second landfall, but that only winds to the east of the eye sustained Category 3 speeds.  New Orleans probably experienced Category 2 wind speeds at most.  See Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, August 23-30, 2005 [“Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report”], prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 8.  Under the Saffir-Simpson scale, Category 3 hurricanes are characterized by winds of 111—130 miles per hour.  For an explanation of the Saffir-Simpson scale, see U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale,” [“NHC Saffir-Simpson Scale”] http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml.  During the same period (1851—2005), eighteen Category 4 and three Category 5 hurricanes hit the United States.  For hurricane statistics through 2004, see Eric S. Blake et al., The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United States Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2004 (And Other Frequently Requested Hurricane Facts) [“United States Tropical Cyclones”], NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS TPC-4 (Miami, Florida, August 2005), 12, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/Deadliest_Costliest.shtml.  For 2005 hurricane data, see U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season Tropical Cyclone Reports,” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/2005atlan.shtml; U.S. Department of Commerce, National Climatic Data Center and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Satellite Information Service, “Climate of 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season,” http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/hurricanes05.html.

7 Hurricane Camille is a useful point of comparison—until the 2005 hurricane season, it was the second most intense hurricane of record ever to strike the United States.  U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane History—Hurricane Camille, 1969,” [“Hurricane History—Hurricane Camille”], http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml#camille.  Under the Saffir-Simpson scale, Category 5 hurricanes are characterized by winds greater than 155 miles per hour.  See NHC Saffir-Simpson Scale.

8 Axel Graumann et al., Hurricane Katrina: A Climatological Perspective: Preliminary Report [“Climatological Perspective”], Technical Report 2005-01, prepared for the National Climatic Data Center, (Asheville, NC, January 2006), 21, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/tech-report-200501z.pdf.  For Hurricane Camille’s strength on landfall, see Hurricane History—Hurricane Camille.

9 Climatological Perspective, 21.  Hurricane force winds are defined as those 64 knots (74 miles per hour) or above lasting for one minute at ten meters above ground with unobstructed exposure.  For Hurricane Katrina, the radius was 103.5 miles in the northeast and southeast quadrants, and 69 miles in the northwest and southwest quadrants.  Northern moving systems like Katrina typically have stronger winds to the east, as the storm’s clockwise rotation results in greater centrifugal force, and therefore force, in that direction.  Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report, 3.

10 Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report, 9.  The report states: “Even though Hurricane Camille (1969) was more intense than Katrina at landfall while following a similar track, Camille was far more compact and produced comparably high storm surge values along a much narrower swath.”  See U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Preliminary Report on Hurricane Camille: August 14-22, 1969,” ftp://ftp.nhc.noaa.gov/pub/storm_archives/atlantic/prelimat/atl1969/camille/prelim06.gif.  See U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, “Preliminary Storm Report: Hurricane Katrina,” September 6, 2005, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/tlh/tropical/PSHTAE_Katrina.txt.

11 Estimates on the total affected area vary according to the criteria selected.  The estimate of 93,000 square miles was derived by adding the areas of the 138 parishes and counties first declared Major Disaster areas and made eligible for Individual Assistance or Public Assistance, Categories C – G (31 in Louisiana, 74 in Mississippi, 22 in Alabama, and 11 in Florida).  The exact sum is 92,930 square miles.  See also U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “United States Government Response to the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,” news release, September 1, 2005, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4777.

12 Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report, 8-9.

13 Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report, 8-9.

14 Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, “DOTD’s ‘Louisiana Team’ to Collect Data on Levee Failures,” news release, October 10, 2005, http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/press/pressrelease.asp?nRelease=545.  See also Dr. Ivor van Heerden, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Performance of the Flood Control System, on November 2, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 1st session.

15 See Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report, 9.

16 U.S. Census Bureau, “Annual Estimates of the Population for Incorporated Places over 100,000, Ranked by July 1, 2004 Population: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2004,” Cities & Towns: Places over 1,000: 2000 to 2004, http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/SUB-EST2004.html.  The estimate of the population of New Orleans on July 1, 2004 was 462,269.

17 The Galveston Hurricane was a tremendous human tragedy.  At least 8,000 people lost their lives in this storm.  See United States Tropical Cyclones, 12, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/Deadliest_Costliest.shtml (estimating 8,000—12,000 deaths); U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane History—Galveston Hurricane, 1900,” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml#galveston (estimating 6,000—12,000 deaths); Erik Larson, Isaac’s Storm: A Man, a Time, and the Deadliest Hurricane in History (New York: Random House, 1999), 264-265 (estimating 6,000—10,000 deaths); and Galveston Historical Foundation, “Galveston History,” http://www.galvestonhistory.org/history.htm (estimating over 6,000 deaths and stating that Galveston was the fourth largest city in Texas at the time).

18 Haley Barbour, Governor of Mississippi, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recovering from Hurricane Katrina, on September 7, 2005, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 109th Congress, 1st session; Haley Barbour as quoted on the Public Broadcasting Service, “Storm-Ravaged Mississippi,” NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, September 7, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/weather/july-dec05/miss_9-7.html.

19 See Dr. Robert C. Sheets, former Director of the National Hurricane Center, testimony before a hearing onRebuilding FEMA: Preparing for the Next Disaster, on May 18, 1993, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 103rd Congress, 1st session.

20 Unless otherwise specified, all damage estimates in this chapter are in third-quarter 2005 dollars.

21 Figure 1.1 includes both the most deadly and the most destructive natural disaster from each decade in the period 1900 to 2005.  Often, these are the same disaster.  The four major Atlantic hurricanes of 2004, while neither the most deadly nor most destructive of the decade, are also included to provide context on recent hurricane activity.  They are grouped because they struck overlapping areas, in rapid succession, and together constituted the most damaging U.S. hurricane season on record until Hurricane Katrina struck in August 2005.  The disasters included in the chart are discrete, violent natural disasters in the United States.  They do not include terrorist events, technological failures (e.g., dams breaking or ferries sinking), or protracted, non-destructive natural events such as deadly heat waves or epidemics, which are difficult to compare to discrete, violent events.  Where multiple death estimates are available, the highest credible estimate is shown, capturing deaths caused both directly and indirectly by the event.  Where multiple damage estimates are available, the lowest credible estimate is shown, excluding local post-disaster inflation effects and effects on the national economy.

The chart does not reflect the enormous loss of life due to the pandemic influenza—sometimes known as the “Spanish Flu”—outbreak of 1918—1919, which claimed the lives of approximately 500,000 Americans and over 20 million people worldwide.  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Vaccine Program Office, “Pandemics and Pandemic Scares in the 20th Century,” last revised February 12, 2004, http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/pandemics/flu3.htm.  See generally Alfred W. Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Table 1.2, below, contains the data used in Figure 1.1

Table 1.2  Worst Natural Disasters in the United States, 1900-2005
Damage in Third Quarter 2005 dollars

Note that statistics for disasters can vary significantly depending on the source consulted, both due to variances in how terms are defined and the lack of consistent historical records.

For statistics on those hurricanes not listed separately below, see United States Tropical Cyclones; U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center,“Hurricane History,” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml; U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, “Memorial Web Page for the 1928 Okeechobee Hurricane,” http://www.srh.noaa.gov/mfl/newpage/Okeechobee.html; Russell L. Pfost, “Reassessing the Impact of Two Historical Florida Hurricanes” (American Meteorological Society, Boston 2003), 1367; and U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “NHC/TPC Archive of Past Hurricane Seasons,” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastall.shtml.

For the Galveston Hurricane, see note 17.

For the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and Fire, see Resilient City, 28 (estimating 5,000 deaths); Harry Chase Brearley, Fifty Years of a Civilizing Force: An Historical and Critical Study of the Work of the National Board of Fire Underwriters (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1916), 98-100 (estimating $6 billion in property damage); U.S. Geological Survey, “Casualties and damage after the 1906 Earthquake,” http://quake.wr.usgs.gov/info/1906/casualties.html (estimating more than 3,000 deaths and $7 billion in property damage).  See generally Rutherford H. Platt, “The Bay Area: One Disaster After Another,” in Rutherford H. Platt, ed., Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1999), 245-247; Virtual Museum of the City of San Francisco, “The Great 1906 Earthquake And Fire,” http://www.sfmuseum.org/1906/06.html.

For the 1927 Mississippi floods, see Paul S. Trotter et al., “Floods on the Lower Mississippi: An Historical Economic Overview,” technical attachment prepared for the National Weather Service, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/topics/attach/html/ssd98-9.htm (estimating 246 deaths and $2 billion in property damage); Miriam Gradie Anderson and Rutherford H. Platt, “St. Charles County, Missouri: Federal Dollars and the 1993 Flood,” in Platt, Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1999), 215-216 (estimating 245-500 deaths).

For Hurricane Camille, see Ernest Zebrowski and Judith A. Howard, Category 5:  The Story of Camille [“The Story of Camille”] (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 266 (reporting 335 deaths); Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Chantal Simonpietri, and Jennifer Oxelson, Thirty Years After Hurricane Camille: Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost (Boulder, Colorado, July 1999) (estimating more than 200 deaths); Hurricane History—Hurricane Camille (reporting 256 deaths and $6 billion in damage).

For Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, the East Coast Blizzard, and the major 2004 hurricanes, see U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Satellite and Information Service and National Climatic Data Center, “1980-2003 Billion Dollar U.S. Disasters,” in A Climatology of 1980-2003 Extreme Weather and Climate Events, Technical Report 2003-01 [“Billion Dollar U.S. Disasters”] (Asheville, NC, December 2003), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/billionz.html; Ed Rappaport, “Preliminary Report: Hurricane Andrew, 16 - 28 August, 1992, prepared for the National Hurricane Center” [“Preliminary Report: Hurricane Andrew”](Miami, Florida, December 1993), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1992andrew.html; U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center,“Hurricane History,” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml.

For Hurricane Katrina deaths, see Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, “Reports of Missing and Deceased” [“Louisiana Missing and Deceased”], February 17, 2006, http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/page.asp?ID=192&Detail=5248; Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report.  For property damage, see U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Damages and Insurance Settlements from the Third-quarter Hurricanes,” http://www.bea.gov/bea/faq/national/2005q3hurricanes.pdf (estimates reflect data as of December 21, 2005); U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Estimated Damage and Insurance Settlements Effects from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma on Monthly Personal Income,” [“Estimated Damage and Insurance Settlements Effects from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma”] http://www.bea.gov/bea/faq/national/oct2005hurricane.pdf (accessed on January 20, 2006).

For GDP deflation, see U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Gross Domestic Product and Corporate Profits: Third Quarter 2005 ‘final’ estimates,” news release, December 21, 2005, http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsrelarchive/2005/gdp305f.htm; and Louis D. Johnston and Samuel H. Williamson, “The Annual Real and Nominal GDP for the United States, 1790—Present,” Economic History Services, October 2005, http://www.eh.net/hmit/gdp.

22 The three next most costly natural disasters are Hurricane Andrew, which hit south Florida in 1992 ($33 billion), the Midwest Floods of 1993 ($27 billion), and the Northridge Earthquake, which hit southern California in 1994 ($25 billion).  By comparison, the direct damages caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks totaled $18 billion.  See Robert Looney, “Economic Costs to the United States Stemming From the 9/11 Attacks,” Strategic Insights 1, no. 6 (Monterey, CA, August 2002), http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/aug02/homeland.asp.  Damages are in 2005 dollars.  For Hurricane Andrew, see note 21, above.  For the Midwest Floods, see Billion Dollar U.S. Disasters.  For the Northridge Earthquake, see U.S. Geological Survey, USGS Response to an Urban Earthquake – Northridge ’94 (n.d., ca. 1996), http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1996/ofr-96-0263/introduc.htm#impacts.

23 Numbers do not equal sum due to rounding.  Estimate derived from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Damages and Insurance Settlements from the Third-quarter Hurricanes,” http://www.bea.gov/bea/faq/national/2005q3hurricanes.pdf (estimates reflect data as of December 21, 2005); Estimated Damage and Insurance Settlements Effects from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.

24 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, prepared written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response, on February 15, 2006, submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session.  Depending on the definition of “damaged and destroyed homes,” this number could be considerably higher or lower than the figure cited.

25 Damage to homes includes major but not minor damage.  Stanley K. Smith and Christopher McCarty, Demographic Effects of Natural Disasters: A Case Study of Hurricane Andrew [“Demographic Effects of Natural Disasters”], Demography, Vol. 33, No. 2 (May, 1996), 266 (repeating results of American Red Cross survey).  Note that the authors of the case study provide a higher estimate of 144,100 houses destroyed or suffering major damage.

26 American Red Cross, “Hurricane Season 2004,” http://www.redcross.org/sponsors/drf/h2004-stewardreport.html.

27 Damage to homes includes major but not minor damage.  For statistics on Hurricane Camille, see The Story of Camille, 226 (reporting 335 deaths); Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Chantal Simonpietri, and Jennifer Oxelson, Thirty Years After Hurricane Camille: Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost (Boulder, Colorado, July 1999) (estimating more than 200 deaths and 22,008 homes destroyed or damaged); Hurricane History—Hurricane Camille (reporting 256 deaths and $6 billion in damage).  For statistics on Hurricane Andrew, see Preliminary Report: Hurricane Andrew (reporting 61 deaths and $25 billion in damage); Demographic Effects of Natural Disasters (reporting 15 deaths and $22 billion in damage).  For statistics on Hurricane Ivan, see Billion Dollar U.S. Disasters, Technical Report 2003-01 (Asheville, NC, December 2003), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/billionz.html (reporting 57 deaths); American Red Cross, “Hurricane Season 2004,” http://www.redcross.org/sponsors/drf/h2004-stewardreport.html (reporting 63 deaths).  For statistics on Hurricane Katrina, see note 21.

28 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, written statement submitted for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response, on February 15, 2006, to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session.

29 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a hearing on “Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response,” on February 15, 2006, submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session.

30 A football field is 120 yards long by 53 yards wide.  End-zones are included in this calculation.  National Football League, “Beginner’s Guide to Football,” http://www.nfl.com/fans/rules/basics.  Based upon this, the height of debris is calculated by finding the volume of the debris stacked on the football field.  This is done by dividing 118,000,000 by the product of 120 and 53:  118,000,000 / 6360 = 18,553 yards.  There are 1760 yards in a mile, so the number of miles high is then calculated by dividing 18,553 by 1760:  18,553 / 1760 = 10.5.  So the debris, if stacked onto the space of a football field, would reach ten and a half miles high.

31 The methodology and time period examined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in developing these statistics for “most affected areas” differ from those used to develop the estimate of areas “impacted” by Hurricane Katrina included in note 11.  First, the Bureau of Labor Statistics defines “most affected areas” as the thirty-four parishes in Louisiana and forty-seven counties in Mississippi that FEMA designated for both individual and public disaster assistance.  This Report defines areas “impacted” by Hurricane Katrina as those parishes and counties designated for individual assistance and/or public assistance, categories C-G (reimbursement for rebuilding and/or replacing disaster-damaged public facilities such as roads, bridges, and public buildings).  Second, the Bureau of Labor Statistics includes all counties designated for assistance as of September 30, 2005, thereby including the areas affected by Hurricane Rita in addition to those affected by Katrina.  By contrast, this Report’s methodology on this point only includes those counties and parishes designated for assistance as of August 29, 2005, thereby counting only those counties that were affected by Katrina.  U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Labor Market Statistics for Areas Affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: September and October 2005,” http://www.bls.gov/katrina/data_after.htm; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Labor Market Statistics Prior to Disaster for Areas Affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,” http://www.bls.gov/katrina/data.htm#2.

32 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “State Personal Income: Third Quarter 2005,” news release, December 20, 2005, 4, http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsrelarchive/2005/spi1205.pdf.

33 Nationwide all grade conventional retail prices increased from $2.28 per gallon on August 1 and $2.62 on August 29, to peak at $3.08 on September 5.  U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Retail Gasoline Historical Prices, Worksheet for U.S. All Grades Conventional Retail Gas Prices (Cent Per Gallon),” All Grades spreadsheet, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/wrgp/mogas_history.html.  While gas prices had risen steadily throughout 2005 due to increasing global demand for crude oil, the temporary shutdown of major oil refineries and pipelines in the Gulf region as a direct result of Hurricane Katrina spurred a sharp and sudden drop in domestic supply that further exacerbated this price incline.  See U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “A Primer on Gasoline Prices,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis_publications/primer_on_gasoline_prices/html/petbro.html (accessed February 6, 2006).

34 U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, “Hurricane Katrina/Hurricane Rita Evacuation and Production Shut-in Statistics Report,” news release, January 11, 2006, http://www.mms.gov/ooc/press/2006/press0111.htm.

35 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, “Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #10,” August 30, 2005.

36 Stacy R. Stewart, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Ivan, 2-24 September 2004, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, May 2005), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/2004ivan.shtml.

37 Kenneth Moran, Director of the Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, testimony before a hearing on Ensuring Operability During Catastrophic Events, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, October 26, 2005, 109th Congress, 1st session.

38 Kenneth Moran, Director of the Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina and Communications Interoperability, on September 29, 2005, submitted to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 109th Congress, 1st session.

39 Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, written statement provided for a hearing on Public Safety Communications from 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, submitted to Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives September 29, 2005.

40 Louisiana Hurricane Recovery Resources, “Energy, Oil, and Gas,” http://www.laseagrant.org/hurricane/oil.htm (accessed January 11, 2006); U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, “Gulf Coast Hurricanes Situation Report #31,” October 31, 2005.

41 The ten major to medium spills caused by Katrina accounted for 7,359,990 gallons.  Given that 134 spills of less than 10,000 gallons have not been assessed in detail, the actual oil spill figure for Hurricane Katrina is likely higher than 7.4 million gallons.  Louisiana Hurricane Recovery Resource, “Energy, Oil, and Gas,” http://www.laseagrant.org/hurricane/oil.htm (accessed January 11, 2006).  The Exxon Valdez spilled about 10.8 million gallons into the waters off of Alaska.  See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, “Excerpt from the Official Report on the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/History/excerpt.htm (accessed January 11, 2006).

42 Gulf Coast Hurricane Emergency Environmental Protection Act of 2005, H. Res. 4139, 109th Congress, 1st session (October 25, 2005).

43 As of the time of writing, Louisiana has recovered 1,103 bodies, 23 of which were not storm related, for 1,080 storm related deaths.  See Louisiana Missing and Deceased.  There were 231 deaths in Mississippi, fifteen in Florida, two in Alabama, and two in Georgia.  See Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report, 10.  Since there are still at least 2,096 people from the Gulf Coast area missing, it is likely that the death toll numbers will increase.

44 For the number of dead in other states, see Katrina Tropical Cyclone Report, 10.  For the definition of the New Orleans metropolitan area, see The White House, Office of Management and Budget, “Updates of Statistical Area Definitions and Guidance on Their Uses,” OMB Bulletin 06 – 01, December 5, 2005, 42, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/bulletins/fy2006/b06-01.pdf.

45 These numbers were extrapolated from data on 754 released bodies of known age, of which 183 were between the ages of sixty-one and seventy-five and 355 were over the age of seventy-five.  Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, “Vital Statistics of All Bodies at St. Gabriel Morgue,” January 18, 2006, www.dhh.state.la.us/offices/ publications/pubs-192/5796.pdf.

46 Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, “Deceased Katrina Victims Released to Families 11-4-2005,” news release, November 4, 2005, http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/news.asp?ID=145&Detail=728&Arch=2005.

47 As of February 17, 2006, 191 victims were unclaimed.  Louisiana Missing and Deceased.

48 Louisiana Missing and Deceased.  In the immediate wake of the hurricane, the Department of Justice requested that the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) establish a hotline to accept reports of missing children and adults related to both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  As of February 13, 2006, 97 percent of the 5,071 missing children cases reported to the NCMEC for Hurricane Katrina had been resolved, with the majority of the unresolved cases in Louisiana.  The NCMEC received 12,514 reports of missing adults, all of which were referred to the National Center for Missing Adults (NCMA).  National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, “Katrina/Rita Missing Persons Hotline: Update on calls/cases,” report through February 13, 2006, http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/KatrinaHotlineUpdate.pdf.

49 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response, on February 15, 2006, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th Congress, 2nd session.  In the first half of the 1930s, almost one million people left the plains, and after 1935, 2.5 million left.  Not all of this migration, however, was due to the Dust Bowl, as drought and changing economic conditions played a factor as well.  Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 49.

50 By January 13, only 82 individuals still resided in transient shelters in Louisiana, representing those few who were ineligible for housing programs or had refused other housing options.  Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, testimony before a hearing on Housing Needs after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, on January 13, 2006, House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, 109th Congress, 2nd session.

51 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Secretary Leavitt To Gulf Region: Announces Streamlines Access to Benefits for Hurricane Katrina Victims,” news release, September 13, 2005.  See also Arizona Department of Health Services, “Hurricane Evacuees Find Lost Records-And More-Through Arizona’s Office of Vital Records,” news release, September 23, 2005, http://www.azdhs.gov/news/2005all/katrina_vrecords.htm; District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, “Mayor Williams Introduces Legislation to Aid Katrina Victims,” September 20, 2005, http://dc.gov/mayor/news/release.asp?id=763&mon=200509.

52 HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt said that most of those displaced by Katrina did not have access to their medical records.  Sarah A. Lister, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL33096 (Washington, DC, September 21, 2005).

53 Bruce Katz, Matt Fellowes, and Mia Mabanta, Katrina Index: Tracking Variables of Post-Katrina Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, February 2006,), 24, 38, 40, 44.

54 U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, “Addendum: Revisions/Updates to the Dec. 15 Katrina Economic Impact Report,” December 2005.  In total, Katrina, combined with Hurricanes Rita and Wilma, forced about 600,000 into unemployment.  This is measured by the number of jobless claims benefits with the hurricanes listed as the primary reason.

55 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Labor Market Statistics Prior to Disaster for Areas Affected by Hurricane Katrina,” September and October 2005, http://www.bls.gov/katrina/data_archived.htm.

Chapter Two: National Preparedness — A Primer

1 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Domestic Incident Management, states “[t]he Federal Government recognizes the roles and responsibilities of State and local authorities in domestic incident management.  Initial responsibility for managing domestic incidents generally falls on State and local authorities.  The Federal Government will assist State and local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed, or when Federal interests are involved.  The Secretary will coordinate with State and local governments to ensure adequate planning, equipment, training, and exercise activities.  The Secretary will also provide assistance to State and local governments to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities, including those of greatest importance to the security of the United States, and will ensure that State, local, and Federal plans are compatible.”  The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 [“HSPD-5”] (Washington, DC, February 2003), § 6.

2 “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, are few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”  The Federalist No. 45.

3 U.S. Constitution art. 1, sec. 10; U.S. Constitution art. 4, sec. 2; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); The Federalist No. 45.  “It must never be forgotten that the Federal government is one of enumerated powers and that it does not possess a general police power,” Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Novak, Treatise on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. (Minnesota: West Group Publishing, 1999), 346.

4 U.S. Constitution, amend. 10.

5 U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8; art. 2, sec. 2.

6 U.S. Constitution, art. 4, sec. 4.

7 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2005).  The other two sections of the Insurrection Act permit Presidential action independent of State requests.  The President may send in Federal military forces or federalize a State’s National Guard troops without a request from the Governor in those situations where the President finds it necessary to enforce Federal laws, judicial decisions, or protect Federal rights.  10 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333 (2005).

8 See generally, Thomas E. Drabek and Gerard J. Hoetmer [“Drabek & Hoetmer”], Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government (Washington, DC:  International City Management Association, 1991), 3-29.

9 National Academy of Public Administration, Coping With Catastrophe: Building an Emergency Management System to Meet People’s Needs in Natural and Manmade Disasters [“NAPA Report”] (Washington, DC: National Academy of Public Administration, 1993), 10.

10 NAPA Report, 10.

11 See Drabek & Hoetmer, 6-7; NAPA Report, 10-11.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency—a former independent agency that became part of the new Department of Homeland Security in March 2003—is tasked with responding to, planning for, recovering from and mitigating against disasters.  FEMA can trace its beginnings to the Congressional Act of 1803, generally considered the first piece of disaster legislation. In the century that followed, ad hoc legislation was passed more than 100 times in response to hurricanes, earthquakes, floods and other natural disasters.

By the 1930s, when the Federal approach to problems became popular, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was given authority to make disaster loans for repair and reconstruction of certain public facilities following an earthquake, and later, other types of disasters.  In 1934, the Bureau of Public Roads was given authority to provide funding for highways and bridges damaged by natural disasters.  The Flood Control Act, which gave the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers greater authority to implement flood control projects, was also passed.  This piecemeal approach to disaster assistance was problematic and it prompted legislation that required greater cooperation between Federal agencies and authorized the President to coordinate these activities.

The 1960s and early 1970s brought massive disasters requiring major Federal response and recovery operations by the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, established within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  Hurricane Carla struck in 1962, Hurricane Betsy in 1965, Hurricane Camille in 1969 and Hurricane Agnes in 1972.  The Alaskan Earthquake hit in 1964 and the San Fernando Earthquake rocked Southern California in 1971.  These events served to focus attention on the issue of natural disasters and brought about increased legislation.  In 1968, the National Flood Insurance Act offered new flood protection to homeowners, and in 1974 the Disaster Relief Act firmly established the process of Presidential disaster declarations.

However, emergency and disaster activities were still fragmented.  When hazards associated with nuclear power plants and the transportation of hazardous substances were added to natural disasters, more than 100 Federal agencies were involved in some aspect of disasters, hazards and emergencies.  Many parallel programs and policies existed at the State and local level, compounding the complexity of Federal disaster relief efforts.  The National Governor's Association sought to decrease the many agencies with whom State and local governments were forced to work.  They asked President Jimmy Carter to centralize Federal emergency functions.

President Carter's 1979 executive order merged many of the separate disaster-related responsibilities into a new Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  Among other agencies, FEMA absorbed: the Federal Insurance Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, the National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services Administration and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration activities from HUD.  Civil defense responsibilities were also transferred to the new agency from the Defense Department's Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.  See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA History,” http://www.fema.gov/about/history.

12 The Red Cross had originally been chartered in 1900, but its re-chartering in 1905 significantly expanded its role in responding to disasters.  See Brien R. Williams, “The Federal Charter of the American Red Cross,” American Red Cross Museum, April 2005, http://www.redcross.org/museum/history/charter.asp; and American Red Cross, “A Brief History of the American Red Cross 2001,” http://www.redcross.org/museum/briefarc.html.  In response to the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt announced that all Federal aid was to be channeled through the American Red Cross.  Federal troops were sent to the city in order to provide security and the Federal government established tent camps where those affected by the disaster were provided with shelter and food.  NAPA Report, 10. 

13 NAPA Report, 11.

14 NAPA Report, 11; Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, Public Law 920, 81st Congress, 2nd session (January 12, 1951)

15 The order stated, “Federal disaster relief provided under the [Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950] shall be deemed to be supplementary to relief afforded by state, local, or private agencies and not in substitution therefor. . .”  Executive Order no. 10427, 18 Fed. Reg. 407 (1953).

16 NAPA Report, 11 (citing Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report on “New Approaches to Federal Disaster Preparedness and Assistance,” May 14, 1973).

17 The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, § 5170, 102 Stat. 4689 (1988) (amended 2000) [“Stafford Act”].

18 Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5170 and § 5191 (2005) require the Governor’s request as a condition for Presidential declaration of a major disaster.  Robert Theodore Stafford served in Congress as a Representative and a Senator from Vermont.  Prior to his Congressional career, Stafford served in the United States Navy during both World War II and during the Korean conflict.  He was the Governor of Vermont from 1959-1961.  While in the Senate, he led the passage of the Stafford Act, which was the amended version of the 1974 Disaster Relief Act (Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 401, 88 Stat. 143).  For additional information, “Stafford, Robert Theodore,” Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000776.

19 This figure represents an average since the Disaster Relief Act was enacted in 1974.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Annual Major Disaster Declaration Totals,” http://www.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_annual.fema.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “2004 Federal Disaster Declarations,” http://www.fema.gov/news/disasters.fema?year=2004.

20 “Discipline” refers to the various emergency response fields (e.g., police, medical, firefighters).

21 The White House, Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC, July 2002), 42.

22 6 U.S.C. § 312 (2005) (requiring the Secretary to execute these responsibilities through the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response).

23 The White House, “President Bush signs Homeland Security Act,” news release, November 25, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021125-6.html.

24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Department of Homeland Security Facts for March 1, 2003,” February 28, 2003, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=817. See also The White House, “Ridge Sworn In as Secretary of Homeland Security,” news release, January 24, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/20030124-5.html.  Before becoming Secretary of Homeland Security, Thomas Joseph Ridge was the first Homeland Security Advisor to the President of the United States and Director of the White House Office of Homeland Security, the precursor to the current Homeland Security Council.  Prior to his service to the President, Secretary Ridge was the governor of Pennsylvania.  The White House, “Biography of Secretary Tom Ridge,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/ridgebio.html.

25 HSPD-5, § 4.

26 HSPD-5, § 18.

27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System [“National Incident Management System”] (Washington, DC, 2004), ix.

28 National Incident Management System, 2.

29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “NIMS and the Incident Command System,” http://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_ics_position_paper.txt.  The 9/11 Commission found that the September 11, 2001, attacks demonstrated the need for nationwide adoption of the ICS.  See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: WW Norton and Company), 397.  After President Bush issued HSPD-5 on February 28, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security worked with State and local governments, the emergency management community, the private sector and other key stakeholders to develop the National Incident Management System.

30 National Incident Management System, 7.

31 National Incident Management System, 138.

32 National Incident Management System, 11.

33 National Incident Management System, 7.

34 National Incident Management System, 14-16.

35 The President directed the development of a National Response Plan to align Federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management.  See HSPD-5.  The development of the NRP included extensive vetting and coordination with Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private-sector entities, and the first-responder and emergency management communities.  For a list of the signatories of the NRP, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan [“National Response Plan”] (Washington, DC, December 2004), iii-viii.

36 National Response Plan, 15.

37 States and locals, using mutual aid agreements, are frequently able to respond without Federal assistance.  In addition, many requests by Governors for Federal assistance are made that do not result in a disaster declaration but are nevertheless significant.

38 See generally, National Response Plan.

39 The Catastrophic Incident Annex is an integral part of the National Response Plan.  It lays out the “context and overarching strategy” for response to catastrophic incidents.  It also presages the publication of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement—“a more detailed and operationally specific” plan for catastrophic incident response.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Catastrophic Incident Annex,” in National Response Plan, pg.“CAT-1.”  As of February 2006, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement exists in draft form only, and has not been officially released.  A catastrophic incident is defined as “Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. . . .” National Response Plan, 63.  Although the National Response Plan by virtue of the Catastrophic Incident Annex did anticipate the need for a more robust Federal response to a catastrophic incident, that is all it did.  Without the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, that acknowledgement was not made operational and thus had no practical effect.

40 National Response Plan, 3.

41 National Response Plan, 3.

42 National Response Plan, 1.

43 HSPD-5, § 4.

44 National Response Plan, 4.

45 Governor Blanco’s letter to the President requesting Federal assistance in the form of an emergency declaration seems to have satisfied the second criterion, while the substantial involvement of multiple Federal departments and agencies seems to have satisfied the third.  On August 27, 2005, Governor Kathleen  Blanco sent a letter to President Bush requesting an emergency declaration for the State of Louisiana.  The letter stated, “I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments, and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save lives, protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster.”  Kathleen  Blanco, Governor of Louisiana, “Letter to President Bush requesting that he declare an emergency for the State of Louisiana due to Hurricane Katrina” (Baton Rouge, August 27, 2005).  That same day President Bush declared a state of emergency in Louisiana, stating, “I have determined that the emergency conditions in certain areas of the State of Louisiana, resulting from Hurricane Katrina beginning on August 26, 2005, and continuing is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant an emergency declaration…”  For complete text of declaration, see 70 Fed. Reg. 53238 (Sept. 7, 2005).

46 National Response Plan, 4.

47 National Response Plan, 7.

48 Prior to Katrina’s landfall on the Gulf Coast, all of the lead agencies responsible for various support activities had already deployed liaisons to FEMA headquarters or field locations, and the Federal and State coordinating officers had co-located in Baton Rouge to begin establishing a unified command.  Upon declaring an INS, the Secretary designated a PFO.  NRP actions that had not yet been taken at this time included standup of the Interagency Incident Management Group and establishment of a fully functional Joint Field Office.   U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #4,” August 27, 2005, 11-15, indicates all ESFs have been activated.  Former Federal Coordinating Officer of Louisiana, William Lokey, states, “On Saturday morning, August 27, 2005, I was assigned to respond with the ERT-N to Louisiana as FCO for Katrina Operations.  I arrived in Baton Rouge late in the afternoon. After checking in with FEMA staff who had been working in New Orleans on a previously declared disaster and who had evacuated to Baton Rouge, I went to the Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center.  There, I met with FEMA staff from Region VI that had responded as the Advance Emergency Response Team (ERT-A), other members of the ERT-N who were arriving, and Colonel Jeff Smith (State Coordinating Officer), my primary counterpart for State of Louisiana operations.  My first priority was to work with Jeff Smith to identify the State’s priorities, then to organize my staff to start planning and working with our State counterparts to identify tasks and objectives to meet those priorities.  The State was heavily involved in the ongoing evacuation efforts but did begin working with us on such issues as search and rescue, commodity distribution, and medical needs.  We worked late into the night and began again early on Sunday morning . . . Other ERT members from the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) had arrived and began discussions with their counterparts.  These included but were not limited to people from ESF-1 Transportation, ESF-8 Health and Medical, and the Defense Coordinating Officer.  We worked on identifying distribution sites; sending food and water to the Superdome; coordinating with health officials in New Orleans and the State; and planning with State and Federal agencies on potential search and rescue efforts.”  William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana, testimony before a hearing on Hurricane Katrina Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

49 FEMA has used the NRP during all major disasters since the NRP was adopted.  National Response Plan, Appendix 5.  http://www.fema.gov/news/disasters.fema?year=2005.

50 Operationally, the Federal government was utilizing the NRP before landfall and prior to the declaration of an INS.

51 The Joint Field Office (JFO) structure and Principal Federal Official (PFO) position can be implemented without an INS declaration by the Secretary of Homeland Security.  National Response Plan, 28-33.  The NRP states, “During actual or potential Incidents of National Significance, the overall coordination of Federal incident management activities is executed through the Secretary of Homeland Security” (emphasis added).  National Response Plan, 15.  This suggests that the Secretary can create the structures found in the NRP, such as JFO and PFO, even if there is only the potential for an INS, and an INS has not yet been declared.

52 National Response Plan, 28-33.

53 HSPD-5, § 5.

54 National Response Plan, 71.

55 42 U.S.C. § 5143 (2005); National Response Plan, 65.  The delineation of roles and responsibilities between the statutorily empowered FCO and the policy constructed PFO are unclear.  Section 5143 of the Stafford Act expressly requires the President, immediately upon his declaration of a major disaster or emergency, to appoint a FCO to conduct response and recovery operations in the affected area.  The President has also formally delegated his response and recovery powers granted him in the Stafford Act to the Secretary of Homeland Security.  The Stafford Act of 1974 gave this authority (to direct other departments) to the President; Executive Order 12148 delegated this authority in 1979 to the FEMA Director; and Executive Order 13286 subsequently transferred the authority in 2003 to the Secretary of Homeland Security.  See Executive Order no. 12148, 44 Fed. Reg. 43239 (1979); Executive Order no. 13286, 68 Fed. Reg. 10619 (2003).  This delegation of authority is consistent with the Secretary’s designation as PFO for incident management in HSPD-5.  However, the Secretary has delegated his Stafford Act authority to the FEMA Director and according to the NRP can name a third and separate individual PFO for an Incident of National Significance.

56 National Response Plan, 16.  See also note 65.

57 National Response Plan, 15, 25.

58 National Response Plan, 15.

59 See “Emergency Support Function Annexes” in National Response Plan, pgs. “ESF-i” et seq.

60 Reorganization Plan no. 3 of 1978, 43 Fed.. Reg. 41943 (June 19, 1978).  The organization of FEMA was further defined in Executive Order no. 12,127, 44 Fed. Reg. 19367 (March 31,1979) and Executive Order no. 12148, 44 Fed. Reg. 43239 (July 20, 1979).

61 Homeland Security Act of 2002 [“Homeland Security Act”], Public Law 296, 107th Congress, 2nd session (November 25, 2002) § 501, codified at 6 U.S.C. § 312 (2005).

62 National Response Plan, pg. “ESF 5-1.”  See also Homeland Security Act, § 507, codified at 6 U.S.C. § 317 (2005).

63 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Regional and Area Offices,” http://www.fema.gov/regions.

64 FEMA Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs) are on-call personnel, not carried on the permanent payroll, activated to augment the full time employee pool when a surge capacity is required to respond to a disaster.  Many have years of experience, while others may have little to no prior disaster or emergency response experience.  These employees are only used to assist in the aftermath of specific disasters and emergencies.  The reservists are trained to fulfill specific disaster response staffing needs, including key program, technical, and administrative functions.

65 The RRCC is a standing facility operated by FEMA that is activated to coordinate regional response efforts, establish Federal priorities, and implement local Federal support until a JFO is established in the field and/or the PFO, FCO, or Federal Resource Coordinator (FRC) can assume their NRP coordination responsibilities.  The RRCC establishes communications with the affected State emergency management agency and the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) coordinates deployment of the Emergency Response Team–Advance Element (ERT-A) to field locations, assesses damage information, develops situation reports, and issues initial mission assignments.  National Response Plan, 27.

66 These regions have two of the largest regional staffs within FEMA: Region VI has 100 employees and over 300 reservists, and Region VI has 115 employees and over 550 reservists.  See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA: Region VI – About Region VI,” http://www.fema.gov/regions/vi/about.shtm (last updated March 3, 2005); U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA: Region IV,” http://www.fema.gov/regions/iv/index.shtm (last updated October 22, 2004).  The NRCC and the RRCC in Region IV began monitoring Hurricane Katrina as early as Tuesday, August 23. On Thursday, August 25, the NRCC activated to Level 2—partial activation—at 7:00 am, and the Region IV RRCC activated to Level 2 at 12:30 pm.  On Saturday, August 27, the NRCC went to Level 1—full activation—at 7:00 am, and Region IV and Region VI RRCCs went to Level 1 activation at 12:00 pm.  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Hurricane Katrina Response Timeline,” September 10, 2005.  FEMA employs more than 2,600 full-time staff, about 1,000 of them in its ten regional offices, and nearly 4,000 disaster reservists.  FEMA disaster reservists, officially known as Disaster Assistance Employees, serve as a surge force for rapidly increasing the pool of Federal response personnel during a major disaster.  The program recruits and trains citizen volunteers to become full Federal employees when a major disaster exceeds the capacity of FEMA’s permanent staff.  The agency has access to this collective pool of human resources, but does not have its own critical response assets, such as buses, trucks, and ambulances.

67 Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2005).

68 Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5191 (2005).

69 Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2005).

70 Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan (Baton Rouge, April 5, 2005), 3.

71 The Constitution requires that “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”  U.S. Constitution, art.1, sec.10.

72 EMAC was developed in the 1990s and officially ratified by Congress as an organization with thirteen member States in 1996.  Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Public Law 104-321, 104th Congress, 2nd session, (October 19, 1996).  As of October 2005, 49 States, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico had enacted EMAC legislation.  National Emergency Management Association, “EMAC Overview,” December 2005, http://www.emacweb.org/?323.  EMAC is administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA).  During an emergency, NEMA’s staff works with EMAC member states to coordinate the EMAC system.

73 Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan (Baton Rouge, April 5, 2005), 3.

74 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Catastrophic Incident Annex [“Catastrophic Incident Annex”], in National Response Plan, pg. “CAT-1.”

75 National Response Plan, 63.

76 Catastrophic Incident Annex, pg. “CAT-1.”

77 National Response Plan, 44.

78 Given its draft status, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement has never been part of incident planning or exercises nor had it been widely disseminated, and as a result is not a part of current operational plans for incident management.  Furthermore, our experience in Hurricane Katrina suggests it must now be reconsidered to make it more robust in ensuring that Federal assistance arrives as soo as possible.

79 The White House, “President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation,” news release, September 15, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050915-8.html.

Chapter Three: Hurricane Katrina — Pre-Landfall

1 The White House, “President Discusses Hurricane Katrina, Congratulates Iraqis on Draft Constitution,” news release, August 28, 2005.

2 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory, Hurricane Research Division, “Frequently Asked Questions,” http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/A3.html.  The National Hurricane Center defines “major hurricanes” as hurricanes that reach maximum sustained 1-minute surface winds of at least 111 mph.

3 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA: 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook,” May 16, 2005.  In 2004, the hurricane season had been particularly devastating.  Twenty seven disasters were declared in fifteen States and two U.S. Territories.  The season was especially difficult for Florida, which took a direct hit from four hurricanes and one tropical storm in six weeks.  Together, Hurricanes Charlie, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne, directly or indirectly resulted in over 150 U.S. deaths and approximately forty-six billion dollars in damage.  Richard J. Pasch, Daniel P. Brown, and Eric S. Blake, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Charlie,  prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, October 18, 2004), (updated January 5, 2005); Jack Beven II, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Frances, prepared for National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 17, 2004); Stacy R. Stewart, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Ivan, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 16, 2004), (updated May 27, 2005); Miles B. Lawrence and Hugh D. Cobb, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Jeanne, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, November 22, 2004), (updated January 7, 2005).

4 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA Issues 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook: Another Above Normal Season Expected,” news release, May 16, 2005.

5 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, “New Weather Forecast Office in Key West Hoists Hurricane Flags for Wilma,” news release, October 24, 2005: “Hurricane Wilma is part of a hurricane season replete with “firsts”: . . . a record of seven named storms had formed by the end of July.”

6 Jack Beven II, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Dennis, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, November 22, 2005) (updated December 16, 2005).

7 Monroe County, Key West Florida, “Emergency News Hurricane Dennis,” July 8, 2005, http://www.monroecounty-fl.gov/Pages/MonroeCoFL_EmerNews/EmergencyArchives/S00633CB7.  Evacuations were ordered in the Florida Keys for “all non-residents” and “all residents west of the Seven Mile Bridge.”  For information on major disaster declarations, see Federal Register. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Alabama; Major Disaster and Related Determinations,” July 10, 2005, http://www.fema.gov/news/dfrn.fema?id=4284; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Mississippi; Major Disaster and Related Determinations,” July 10, 2005, http://www.fema.gov/news/dfrn.fema?id=4285; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Florida; Major Disaster and Related Determinations,” July 10, 2005, http://www.fema.gov/news/dfrn.fema?id=4286.  In preparation for Hurricane Dennis, FEMA activated its Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) in Atlanta at the highest operational level.  FEMA conducted coordination calls between Federal, State and local officials, positioned liaison officers at State Emergency Operations Centers, pre-staged emergency supplies and response teams at various locations, and requested the activation of the First U.S. Army’s crisis action team.  See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Regional Center at Highest Level in Preparation for Hurricane Dennis,” news release, July 9, 2005; Department of Defense, First U.S. Army, “First U.S. Army Stands up Crisis Action Team for Hurricane Dennis,” news release, July 9, 2005.  Other military preparations for Hurricane Dennis included the alert of National Guardsmen in Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana and Georgia.  See U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Taking Precautions as Hurricane Dennis Approaches,” news release, July 8, 2005.

8 State of Louisiana, Office of the Governor, “Governor Blanco Declares State of Emergency Regarding Hurricane Dennis,” news release, July 8, 2005, http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=717.

9 Jack Beven II, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Dennis, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, November 22, 2005), (updated December 16, 2005).

10 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, August 2005 Update to Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook: Bulk of This Season’s Storms Still to Come (Washington, D.C, August 2, 2005).

11 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA Raises the 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook,” August 2, 2005, http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2005/s2484.htm.

12 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, August 23-30, 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 2005), 1.  Excerpt from this text:  “The complex genesis of Katrina involved the interaction of a tropical wave, the middle tropospheric remnants of Tropical Depression Ten, and an upper tropospheric trough.  This trough, located over the western Atlantic and the Bahamas, produced strong westerly shear across Tropical Depression Ten, causing it to degenerate on 14 August approximately 825 n. mi. east of Barbados.   The low-level circulation gradually weakened while continuing westward, and it eventually dissipated on 21 August in the vicinity of Cuba.  Meanwhile, a middle tropospheric circulation originating from Tropical Depression Ten lagged behind and passed north of the Leeward Islands on 18-19 August.  A tropical wave moved through the Leeward Islands and merged with the middle tropospheric remnants of Tropical Depression Ten on 19 August, forming a large area of showers and thunderstorms north of Puerto Rico.  This activity continued to move slowly northwestward, passing north of Hispaniola and then consolidating just east of the Turks and Caicos during the afternoon of 22 August.  Dvorak satellite classifications from the Tropical Analysis and Forecast Branch (TAFB) of the Tropical Prediction Center (TPC) began at 1800 utc that day.  The upper tropospheric trough weakened as it moved westward toward Florida, and the shear relaxed enough to allow the system to develop into a tropical depression by 1800 utc 23 August over the southeastern Bahamas about 175 n. mi. southeast of Nassau.  The depression was designated Tropical Depression Twelve rather than “Ten” because a separate tropical wave appeared to be partially responsible for the cyclogenesis, and, more importantly, the low-level circulation of Tropical Depression Ten was clearly not involved.”

13 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory #1 (Miami, Florida, August 23, 2005).  National Hurricane Center Katrina Advisories were released every several hours beginning at 5:00 pm edt on August 23 and ending at 10:00 am cdt on August 30.  Advisories were typically issued at 5:00 am, 11:00 am, 5:00 pm, and 11:00 pm edt each day.  The advisories are numbered sequentially from 1 to 31.  Most of the advisories were updated with supplemental advisories—for example, Hurricane Katrina Advisory 1 was released at 5:00 pm edt and Advisory 1a was released at 8:00 pm edt.  Advisory 2 was released at 11:00 pm edt.  The official publication time zone switched from Eastern Daylight Time to Central Daylight Time with Advisory #17, released at 10:00 am cdt, August 27, 2005.  All Hurricane Katrina Advisories are available from the National Hurricane Center.  See U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Katrina Advisory Archive,” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/KATRINA.shtml?.

14 Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, on October 27, 2005, submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

15 “Based on aircraft reconnaissance flight-level wind data, the cyclone became Katrina, the 11th tropical storm of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season, at 1200 utc 24 August when it was centered over the central Bahamas about 65 n. mi. east-southeast of Nassau.”  Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, August 23-30, 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 20, 2005), 1.

16 FEMA’s Hurricane Liaison Team became operational at 7:00 am edt on August 24, 2005.  The HLT had begun monitoring the storm the previous evening.  FEMA Tropical Storm Katrina Briefing, August 25, 2005.

17 U.S. Department of Defense, OASD HD, Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline (Aug. – Sept. 2005), November 2, 2005, 2.

18 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Tropical Storm Katrina Advisory 4 (Washington, D.C., August 24, 2005).

19 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 9,” August 25, 2005; U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, “Tropical Storm Katrina Discussion Number 8,” August 25, 2005.

20 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, Miami-South Florida Forecast Office, “Hurricane Katrina Storm Report,” September 1, 2005, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/mfl/events/?id=katrina.

21 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center (Miami, Florida, August 2005), 10.

22 Florida Power & Light, Company, “FPL begins assessment process following Hurricane Katrina,” news release, August 26, 2005, http://www.fpl.com/news/2005/contents/05101.shtml.

23 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Remote Sensing Tutorial, “Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma,” http://rst.gsfc.nasa.gov/Sect14/Sect14_10a.html.

24 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, Miami-South Florida Forecast Office, “Hurricane Katrina Storm Report,” September 1, 2005, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/mfl/events/?id=katrina; and Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, “Bronson to Assess Hurricane Katrina Damage to South Florida Agriculture,” news release, August 29, 2005, http://www.doacs.state.fl.us/press/2005/08292005.html.

25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP # 1,” August 25, 2005.  The Emergency Operations Center is the physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support domestic incident management activities normally takes place.  An EOC may be a temporary facility or may be located in a more central or permanently established facility. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C., December 2004), 64.

26 Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #1, August 25, 2005.

27 “Despite all of our efforts and despite the fact that we pre-positioned more commodities and staged more rescue and medical teams than ever before in our agency's history, our initial response was overwhelmed.”  William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Officer, Baton Rouge, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina Response in Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

28 On August 25, FEMA began to identify ERT-A teams for deployment to Florida and Alabama.  FEMA Tropical Storm Katrina Briefing, August 25, 2005.  For definition of ERT-A, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Glossary,” http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is14/glossary.htm#E.

29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Situation Update,” August 26, 2005, http://www.fema.gov/emanagers/2005/nat082605.shtm.  Throughout this Report, note that events were occurring in different time zones.  Times referenced as Central Daylight Time (cdt) reflect the local time events took place in Louisiana.  All Noon FEMA video teleconferences took place at 12:00 pm Eastern Daylight Time (edt), which was 11:00 am in Louisiana and Mississippi.  Throughout the report, times are referenced in accordance with the source material supporting the text.

30 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory #11 (Washington, D.C., August 26, 2005).

31 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina (23-30 August 2005), prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 2005), 2-3.

32 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Intermediate Advisory # 14 (Miami, Florida, August 26, 2005); U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Situation Update,” August 26, 2005.

33 See National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center Hurricane Katrina Advisories 15 through 26, covering a period from August 26, 2005, 11:00 pm edt to August 29, 2005, 6:00 am cdt.  These advisories are available at the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Katrina Advisory Archive,” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/KATRINA.shtml?.

34 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline,” n.d., ca. 2005.

35 Brigadier General David L. Johnson (USAF, Ret.), Director of the National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, written statement for a hearing on NOAA Hurricane Forecasting, on October 7, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Science, 109th Congress, 1st session, 2.

36 The last National Hurricane Center Advisory on August 26 was issued at 11:00 pm edt.  Katrina made landfall at 6:10 am cdt on August 29, fifty-six hours later.  U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory # 15 (Miami, Florida, August 26, 2005).

37 State of Louisiana, Executive Department, Proclamation No. 48 KBB 2005: State of Emergency—Hurricane Katrina (Baton Rouge,  August 26, 2005); State of Alabama, Office of the Governor, State of Emergency Proclamation (Jackson, August 26, 2005).

38 Brent Warr, Mayor of Gulfport, Mississippi, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, submitted to the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

39 Department of Homeland Security SITREP #4, August 27, 2005.  See generally, Robert R. Latham Jr., Executive Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, on December 7, 2005, submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session.

40 Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005, 2.

41 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina Overview of Significant Events,” November 28, 2005, 4.

42 State of Alabama, Office of the Governor, Executive Order No. 939 (Jackson, August 26, 2005).

43 U.S. Department of Defense, “Mississippi Guard Provide Relief to State,” Armed Forces Press Service, September 8, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/20050908_2648.html.

44 “More than 8,000 people perished September 8, 1900 when the category 4 hurricane barreled into Galveston…,”  U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “The Galveston Storm of 1900 - The Deadliest Disaster in History,” http://www.noaa.gov/galveston1900/.  See also Erik Larson, Isaac’s Storm: A Man, a Time, and the Deadliest Hurricane in History (New York: Random House, 1999), 264-265.  Note that statistics for disasters can vary significantly depending on the source consulted, due to both variances in how terms are defined and the difficulty of confirming specific data in the aftermath of a devastating event.

45 The Saffir-Simpson scale for measuring hurricane strength had not been developed until 1969—four years after Hurricane Betsy made landfall on the Louisiana coast.  The classification of Hurricane Betsy as a Category 3 storm was made retroactively based on wind speed readings.  For general information on Hurricane Betsy, see U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Historical Records of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Response to Recent Hurricanes,” http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/Hurricane_files/Hurricane.htm.  For deaths, see Eric S. Blake et al., The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United States Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2004 (And Other Frequently Requested Hurricane Facts), NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS TPC-4 (Miami, Florida, August 2005), 7, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/Deadliest_Costliest.shtml; compare to U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “How Safe is New Orleans from Flooding?” September 11, 2003, http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/functions/cw/hot_topics/11sep_msy.htm (reporting 81 deaths).  For extent of flooding by parish see, Joseph A. Towers, former Attorney for the Army Corps of Engineers, testimony before the Task Force on Updating the National Environmental Policy Act, Congressional Resources Committee, 109th Congress, 1st session, 2005, http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/nepataskforce/archives/josephtowers.htm.

46 “Damaged homes” include those with major damage, but not those with minor damage.  For deaths, see Ernest Zebrowski and Judith A. Howard, Category 5:  The Story of Camille (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005); For homes damaged or destroyed, see Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Chantal Simonpietri, and Jennifer Oxelson, Thirty Years After Hurricane Camille:  Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost (Boulder, Colorado, July 1999).  For other information, see U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane History – Hurricane Camille, 1969,” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml#camille.

47 See Greg Brouwer “The Creeping Storm,” Civil Engineering Magazine, June, 2003, http://www.pubs.asce.org/ceonline/ceonline03/0603feat.html.  See also U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Morganza to the Gulf of Mexico Hurricane Protection Project,” http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/prj/mtog/.  It is important to note that the levees protecting New Orleans were designed in advance of the Saffir-Simpson model.  Although it is often reported that New Orleans levees were constructed to protect against a Category 3 storm, the levee system was actually designed to withstand a Standard Project Hurricane (SPH)—a theoretical hybrid of many different storms.  The central pressure for an SPH is in the Category 4 range, the highest wind speed is that of a high strength Category 2, and the surge is similar to that of a Category 3.  Al Naomi (Senior Project Manager, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), “Talkback,” Riverside (a publication of the U.S. Army Corps of  Engineers), January, 2005, 8, http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pao/Riverside/Jan_05_Riv.pdf.

48 In 1999, the Senate of the State of Louisiana issued a resolution “to authorize and to urge the governor of … Louisiana to support the development of the ‘Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan for Coastal Louisiana’ by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to provide continuous hurricane protection from Morgan City to the Mississippi border.”  Senate of the State of Louisiana, House Concurrent Resolution No. 142 (Baton Rouge, June 18, 1999).  The Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan for Coastal Louisiana by the New Orleans District U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was released in June 2000.  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan for Coastal Louisiana (New Orleans, June 2000).

49 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan for Coastal Louisiana (New Orleans, June 2000).

50 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, Southern Region headquarters, “Tropical Cyclone Hazards: Inland Flooding,” July 27, 2004, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/srh/tropicalwx/awareness/flooding.htm: “It is common to think the stronger the storm the greater the potential for flooding.  However, this is not always the case.  A weak, slow moving tropical storm can cause more damage due to flooding than a more powerful fast moving hurricane.” See also, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Comprehensive Hurricane Protection Plan for Coastal Louisiana ( New Orleans, June 2000).

51 Statement  of Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr (Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere.), before 31st AMS Broadcasters Conference 200-300 Broadcast Meteorologists/Private Sector and Industry, June 26, 2002, http://www.noaa.gov/lautenbacher/ams-broadcasters.htm

52 The origins of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project can be traced back to 1998 when, in the wake of Hurricane Georges, the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness recognized the need for more comprehensive hurricane planning.  After an initial period of development, the State of Louisiana submitted planning proposals to FEMA for approval.  FEMA granted the State funding in 2001, but was forced to withdraw those funds a year later, due to budgetary constraints.  Despite this setback, the need for catastrophic hurricane planning in Louisiana continued to be recognized at both the Federal and State level.  On March 17, 2004, FEMA awarded funding to the State of Louisiana for what would become the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project.  See Sean E. Fontenot, Former Chief, Planning Division, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, written statement submitted for a hearing on Preparing for Catastrophe: The Hurricane Pam Exercise, on January 24, 2006, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session, 10.

53 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Hurricane PAM Exercise Concludes,” July 23, 2004.  The Hurricane PAM exercise included participants from thirteen southeast Louisiana Parishes: Ascension, Assumption, Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, and Terrebonne.  See also Senator Susan Collins (R-Maine), statement at a hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: The Hurricane Pam Exercise, on January 24, 2006, to the Senate Committee Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session.

54 Wayne Fairley, Chief, Response Operation Branch, Response and Recovery Division, FEMA Region IV, written statement submitted for a hearing on Preparing for Catastrophe: The Hurricane Pam Exercise, on January 24, 2006, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session, 9.

55 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005.

56 Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory # 15A (Washington, D.C., August 27, 2005); Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory # 19 (Washington, D.C., August 27, 2005).  As noted previously, times are referenced in accordance with the time zone—Eastern Daylight Time or Central Daylight Time—listed on the source material supporting the text.

57 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory # 19 (Miami, Florida, August 27, 2005).

58 NHC’s Bill Reeve warned that the storm was headed toward “the worst possible locations for storm surge” and would produce a surge typical of a Category 4 or Category 5 hurricane.  See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005.

59 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina: August 23-30, 2005, prepared for the National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Miami, Florida, December 2005).  See also U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Intermediate Advisory # 18A, (Miami, Florida, August 27, 2005).

60 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005),  4. State Representative Cedric Richmond called Governor Blanco on Saturday afternoon after visiting a ballpark where hundreds were in attendance.  Representative Richmond “learned that some people had not paid attention to the weekend news and did not realize the severity of the hurricane aiming at New Orleans.  He worries that many may have thought that the hurricane was still targeting the Florida panhandle….

61 Louisiana Office of the Governor, Response to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 (Baton Rouge, December 2005), 4.

62 Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, “Timeline for Hurricane Katrina,” n.d., ca. 2005, 2.

63 In Phase I or the Precautionary Phase, “The Plan prescribes that during the Precautionary phase, the location of staging areas for people who need transportation will be announced and that public transportation will concentrate on moving people from the staging areas to safety in host parishes with priority given to people with special needs.  Furthermore, during the Precautionary stage the Plan directs that nursing homes and other custodial care organizations in the risk areas should be contacted to ensure that they are prepared to evacuate their residents.”  Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan,” in State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan Supplement 1A (Baton Rouge, January 2000); Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Events,” n.d., ca. 2005, 2.  On Saturday August 27, 2005, representatives of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association (LNHA), sitting at the Louisiana State EOC, started calling and emailing all the at-risk nursing homes in Louisiana, checking on their preparedness for the storm and determining if they were planning to evacuate or shelter-in-place.  They were able to reach most of the nursing homes. They learned that the State EOP was also calling nursing homes, as were the local parish sheriffs.  By Sunday morning, some nursing homes that intended to shelter-in-place had decided to evacuate.  They had previously been told that buses were available but, by the time they decided to evacuate, drivers were not available.  At that point the LNHA made formal requests for bus drivers, but none materialized prior to landfall.  In all, prior to the storm, twenty-one nursing homes evacuated and sixty-eight sheltered-in-place.  See generally, Joseph A. Donchess, Executive Director of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association, written statement for a hearing on Challenges in a Catastrophe:  Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, on January 31, 2006, submitted to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, 2nd session.

64 Mississippi State officials estimated that approximately 400,000 people used U.S. 49 and Interstates 55 and 59 to evacuate during the 2004 hurricane season.

65 The TCC received traffic reports from Louisiana State Police troops, LA DOTD traffic counters, and other sources.  Louisiana State Police, “LSP Timeline of Event