Homeland Security


Country Reports on Terrorism 2005

Supplement: Report to Congress Required under Section 7120(b) of the 9/11 Commission Implementation Act of 2004

Table of Contents

Preface

Chapter 1. Terrorist Safe Havens

Chapter 2. Support for Pakistan

Chapter 3. Collaboration with Saudi Arabia

Chapter 4. Struggle of Ideas in the Islamic World

Chapter 5. Outreach through the Broadcast Media

Chapter 6. Visas for Participants in United States Programs

Chapter 7. Basic Education in Muslim Countries

Chapter 8. Economic Reform

PREFACE

This report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(b), which sets forth certain reporting requirements relating to the Department of State’s annual country reports on terrorism. Section 2656f(b) requires the Department of State to the extent feasible to provide Congress an update of the information contained in the report required to be transmitted to Congress under Section 7120(b) of the 9/11 Commission Implementation Act of 2004 (also known as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004). This document forms a part of the annual country reports on terrorism but, for ease of review, is provided under separate cover.

Section 7120(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 includes certain reporting requirements relating to terrorist "sanctuaries." Because the term "sanctuaries" is a term commonly associated with places of worship, we have, for greater clarity and for consistency with the terminology used elsewhere in the annual country reports on terrorism, referred instead here to terrorist "safe havens." We interpret terrorist "safe haven" to have the same meaning as terrorist "sanctuary" for purposes of Section 7120(b).

Chapter 1
Terrorist Safe Havens

A terrorist safe haven is an area of relative security exploited by terrorists to indoctrinate, recruit, coalesce, train, and regroup, as well as prepare and support their operations. Country specific examples are useful, but physical safe havens usually straddle national borders in transnational regions where transnational terrorists often seek refuge. They often take advantage of ungoverned sovereign borders, operating in the Sahel, the Sulu and Celebes (Sulawesi) Seas littoral, and the Afghanistan/Pakistan frontier. Indeed, the most intractable safe havens worldwide tend to exist astride international borders or in regions where ineffective governance allows their presence.

Global communications and financial infrastructure, especially those created by electronic infrastructure such as the Internet, global media, and unregulated economic activity, can allow terrorists to fulfill many of the same functions without the need for a physical sanctuary. These "virtual" havens are highly mobile, difficult to track, and difficult to control.

Physical safe havens provide security for many senior terrorist leaders, allowing them to plan and to inspire acts of terrorism around the world. The presence of terrorist safe havens in a nation or region is not necessarily related to state sponsorship of terrorism. In most instances cited in this chapter, areas or communities serve as terrorist safe havens despite the government’s best efforts to prevent them.

Denying safe haven to terrorists requires a regional approach based on coordinated action by partner governments working with the United States as well as with each other, and by regional and multilateral institutions. Corruption, poverty, a lack of civic institutions and social services, and the perception that law enforcement and legal systems are biased or brutal are conditions that terrorists exploit to create allies or to generate a permissive operating environment. Efforts to build partner capacity and encourage partner states to cooperate more effectively with each other at the regional level are key to denying terrorists safe haven. U.S. Ambassadors, as the President’s personal representatives abroad, have a unique responsibility to bring all elements of national power to bear against the terrorist enemy. They lead interagency Country Teams that develop strategies to help host nations understand the threat, and to strengthen their political will and capacity to counter it.

Regional Strategic Initiative. Building on these efforts, we have worked to develop the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI), a program designed to develop flexible regional networks of interconnected Country Teams. The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is working with Ambassadors and interagency representatives in key terrorist theaters of operation to assess the threat and devise collaborative strategies, actionable initiatives, and policy recommendations.

The RSI is a key tool in promoting cooperation between our partners in the War on Terror – between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, for example, as they deal with terrorist transit across the Celebes (Sulawesi) Sea; or between Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, Niger, Chad, and Mali to counter a GSPC enemy recruiting and hiding in the desert which sits astride their national borders.

Our terrorist enemies are highly adaptable: defeating them requires both centralized coordination and field authority. Resources and responses must be applied in a rapid, flexible, and focused manner. The RSI helps achieve this.

As of April 2006, three RSI strategy sessions have been held, with more scheduled for coming months. These sessions are chaired by Ambassadors, with Washington interagency representatives in attendance. The sessions focus on developing a common, shared diagnosis of the strategic situation in a region. Using this common perspective, networked Country Teams then identify opportunities for collaboration and self-synchronize efforts across multiple diverse programs in concert with NCTC’s operational planning effort to achieve the President’s national strategic goals.

Existing and Potential Terrorist Safe Havens

"Virtual" Safe Haven. Terrorists exploit electronic infrastructure such as the Internet, global media, and satellite communications for recruitment, training, planning, resource transfer, and intelligence collection between and among terrorists and terrorist groups. Like many others, terrorists view the Internet as the most powerful and inexpensive form of communication yet developed. Harnessing the Internet's potential for speed, security, and global linkage gives terrorists the ability to conduct many of the activities that once required physical haven, yet without the associated security risks. With the ability to communicate, recruit, train, and prepare for attacks, any computer may function essentially as a "virtual" safe haven. Closing these havens demands concerted action at the global and regional levels.

The Internet also has empowered the enemy with the ability to produce and sustain its own public media outlets and to present its own distorted view of the world to further its agenda. Terrorists are placing encrypted messages in electronic files to hide photos, maps, and messages on innocent third-party websites, chat rooms, and bulletin boards.

There are several thousand radical or extremist websites worldwide, many of which disseminate a mixture of fact and propaganda designed to challenge information gleaned from other sources. Traditions of tolerance, political asylum, and multiculturalism are key elements of open societies. The enemy has been savvy in exploiting this and in having a consistent message easily heard in the cacophony of the global media and the Internet. Countering the messages that terrorists propagate cannot be done quickly or easily; it must become part of a long-term strategy.

Physical Safe Haven. The remainder of this chapter provides a survey of the status of selected potential and physical safe havens worldwide.

AFRICA

The Trans-Sahara. The sparsely inhabited Trans-Sahara region provides safe haven for terrorist groups operating in North and Northwest Africa.

  • Mali. The Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) maintains a regular but small-scale presence in Mali's northern desert, where it is engaged in recruiting, training, and smuggling activities. GSPC members have been able to move without hindrance in northern Mali; the government has maintained a limited military presence in the north since the negotiated end of a rebellion by elements of the Tuareg population in 1996. The size of the country and the limited resources of the Government of Mali hamper the effectiveness of military patrols and border control measures. There have been no confrontations between the military and the GSPC in 2005 and the government has not taken any steps to modify its military force posture in the region or directly confront GSPC elements in the north. The Malian Government did cooperate fully with neighboring countries in June to try to isolate and capture GSPC cells in its territory, including those responsible for an attack in el-Mreiti, Mauritania.
  • Mauritania. The GSPC and, to a lesser degree, theMauritanian Group for Preaching and Jihad (GMPJ) have conducted supply, smuggling, fundraising, and recruiting operations in Mauritania and the region. On June 4 the GSPC attacked a Mauritanian military outpost at el-Mreiti, killing at least 15 members of the Mauritanian security services.

Somalia. Parts of Somalia, which has no functioning central government, have become havens for terrorist and other illicit activities, threatening the security of the region.

  • A small number of al-Qaida (AQ) terrorists, responsible for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, continue to operate in Somalia and are assisted by elements within the complicated Somali clan structure.
  • Members of the Somalia-based al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) have committed terrorist acts in the past, primarily in Ethiopia. AIAI rose to prominence in the early 1990s with the goal of creating a pan-Somali Islamic state in the Horn of Africa. Presently, AIAI is highly factionalized and diffuse, and its membership -- or even formal existence -- is difficult to define.
  • Other groups have appeared in Somalia that are suspected to have committed terrorist acts against Western interests in the region, or to be capable of doing so. Little is known about movements such as al-Takfir wal-Hijra ("al-Takfir"), but the extremist ideology and the violent character of takfiri groups elsewhere suggests that the movement merits close monitoring. (Takfiri ideology is an inflexible interpretation of Islam that labels those who do not share the same interpretation as "infidels.") Some individuals and groups with past AIAI association and/or current takfiri leanings are sympathetic to and maintain ties with al-Qaida.

EAST ASIA

The Sulu/Celebes (Sulawesi) Sea. East Asia includes a maritime safe haven area composed of the Celebes Sea and Sulu Archipelago, which sit astride the maritime boundary between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The physical geography of the thousands of islands in the region makes them very difficult for authorities to monitor. Thus, they are well suited to terrorist operations and activities, such as movement of personnel, equipment, and funds. This area represents a safe haven for the AQ-linked Jemaah Islamiya (JI) group.

  • The Southern Philippines and Sabah, Malaysia. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), responsible for multiple bombings and kidnappings throughout the southern Philippines in recent years, remains active despite the loss of key leaders and Philippine military operations against the group. In addition, some JI members have obtained safe haven in Mindanao in areas under the control of elements of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf Group. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) is addressing the JI presence through military operations and ongoing peace talks with the MILF. The Government of Malaysia is mediating the GRP-MILF peace talks. The U.S. Institute for Peace is supporting the process by facilitating dialogue on contentious issues such as control of territory. The GRP-MILF talks have made progress, and could lead to a formal peace agreement that would be crucial in addressing the issue of safe haven in the long term. Two specific mechanisms have grown out of the peace process to increase cooperation between the Philippine Government and the MILF. The Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) allows Philippine Government and MILF representatives to broker cease-fire violations. The Ad Hoc Joint Action Group provides a framework for Philippine Government and MILF representatives to cooperate against terrorists and criminals in MILF areas, and has operated with some success over the last year.
  • Indonesia. JI has had links to al-Qaida and was responsible for the August 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta and the bombing outside the Australian Embassy in September 2004 . While Indonesia has significantly improved its efforts to control the maritime boundary area with the Philippines, the area remains difficult to control, surveillance is partial at best, and traditional smuggling and piracy groups provide an effective cover for terrorist activities in the area.

EUROPE

Although most of Europe is not a physical safe haven in a literal sense, domestic terrorist groups, as well as AQ and its associated terrorist cells, remain the principal groups of concern in Europe. North African Salafist groups are especially active, such as the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, the Armed Islamic Group, and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. Moreover, extremist groups recruit and proselytize heavily in some major European cities. The presence and activity of such terrorist cells was dramatically highlighted by the London bombings in July. In addition, terrorist groups opposed to the Middle East peace process such as HAMAS and Hizballah have active propaganda, fundraising, and other support activities in Europe.

Mediterranean. Smuggling, illegal immigration, and narcotics trafficking networks traverse the Mediterranean Sea between Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, providing opportunities for potential terrorist movement and support.

  • Cyprus. Cyprus forms a transit and support hub for various organizations operating in the Eastern Mediterranean and Levant. The Kongra-Gel/PKK has an active presence in Cyprus on both sides of the buffer zone, which it reportedly uses as both a fundraising and transit point. The Kurdish community in the south of Cyprus is estimated at approximately 1,500.

The Caucasus. Over the past decade, insurgent activities in Chechnya, Daghestan, North Ossetia, and surrounding areas have created opportunities for establishing a terrorist safe haven in the north Caucasus.

  • Georgia. The Pankisi Gorge area of Georgia was previously noted as a safe haven; however, Georgian authorities were largely successful in eliminating it. Georgian internal troops continued to carry out operations to rid the Pankisi Gorge of terrorists. The identification and safe removal of hidden weapon caches in the Pankisi area enabled Georgian security forces to secure and protect it from terrorist acts or transit. Although border guard and customs reform continued, Georgia was still used to a limited degree as a transit state for weapons and money. Georgia made efforts to close its borders to those who wished to smuggle money, weapons, and supplies, but was hindered in particular by corruption at border checkpoints, as well as by lack of territorial integrity in the separatist areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

SOUTH & CENTRAL ASIA

Afghan-Pakistan Border. Historically, the mountainous and sparsely populated Afghan-Pakistani border has been an autonomous area, with little control by Islamabad or Kabul.

  • Pakistan. The Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan have been a safe haven for AQ fighters since the fall of the Taliban in December 2001. The FATA also includes Islamist groups and local tribesmen who continue to resist the government’s efforts to improve governance and administrative control at the expense of longstanding local autonomy. Through substantial efforts since 2004, the Government of Pakistan has deployed more than 80,000 security forces into the FATA and made some improvements in health care, education, and social services. These operations have disrupted the terrorists but also affected tribal institutions in the area, requiring efforts to build new political and economic institutions. Bringing government services to this region, and turning an AQ safe haven into a regularly-administered province of Pakistan, remains an important objective in the global war on terror.
  • Afghanistan. The Afghan Government, in concert with U.S. forces and the international community, continues efforts to build security on the Afghan side of the border. The border areas remain a contested region, however, with ongoing insurgent and terrorist attacks and AQ-linked propaganda activity.

MIDDLE EAST

Iraq. Iraq is not currently a terrorist safe haven, but terrorists, including Sunni groups like al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), Ansar al-Islam (AI), and Ansar al-Sunna (AS), Shia extremists, and other groups view Iraq as a potential safe haven and are attempting to make it a reality. Efforts by the Iraqi Government, the United States, Coalition partners, and the international community are helping to thwart the ambitions of these groups, but the battle is far from over. Not all of Iraq’s neighbors have supported the international community in this effort. In particular:

  • Syria. Designated by the United States as a state sponsor of terror, Syria was used as a facilitation hub for terrorist groups operating in Iraq, traditional tribal groups, smugglers, and border-crossers exploiting a porous border with Iraq and lax immigration controls. Foreign terrorists constituted a small percentage of insurgent forces, but their impact was dramatic. Although Coalition and Iraqi commanders consistently reported that most of the enemy killed or captured were Iraqi citizens, foreign terrorist cells continued to move and kept a low profile while training, equipping, and supporting other terrorist groups. In addition, HAMAS, Hizballah, and several other Palestinian terrorist organizations operate offices in Damascus, and the Syrian Government has taken little effective action to curb this activity.
  • Iran. Also designated by the United States as a state sponsor of terror, Iran provided political and ideological support for several terrorist and militant groups active in Iraq. Attractive to terrorists in part because of the limited presence of the United States and other Western governments, Iran is also a safe haven in that known terrorists, extremists, and sympathizers are able to transit its territory and cross the long and porous border into Iraq. Iran also equips terrorists with technology and provides training in extremist ideology and militant techniques.
  • Northern Iraq/Southeastern Turkey. The Kongra-Gel/PKK maintains an active presence in the predominantly ethnic Kurdish areas of southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq. The Kongra-Gel/PKK operates several base camps along the border in northern Iraq from which it provides logistical support to forces that launch attacks into Turkey, primarily against Turkish security forces, local Turkish officials, and villagers who oppose the organization.

Lebanon. The Lebanese Government recognizes several terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, which holds several seats in Parliament, as "legitimate resistance groups" and permits them to maintain offices in Beirut and elsewhere around the country. The Lebanese Government recently agreed to work to disarm Palestinian militias outside the refugee camps within six months and, for the first time, is discussing possible limits to Hizballah’s arms. Although Syria withdrew its military forces in April 2005, it maintains an intelligence presence in Lebanon and continues to offer support and facilitate arms smuggling to Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups. Because the Government of Lebanon does not exercise effective control over areas in the south and inside the Palestinian refugee camps, terrorists can operate relatively freely in those areas.

Yemen. Several terrorist organizations continued to maintain a presence in Yemen throughout 2005. The Government of Yemen recognizes HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) as legal organizations. HAMAS conducted extensive fundraising through mosques and other charitable organizations and maintains offices in Yemen. In December, HAMAS leader Khaled Mishal visited Sanaa and met publicly with President Saleh. Al-Qaida’s operational structure in Yemen has been weakened and dispersed, but concerns remain about the organization's attempts to reconstitute operational cells there. Yemen continues to increase its maritime security capabilities, but land border security along the extensive frontier with Saudi Arabia remains a problem, despite increased Yemeni-Saudi cooperation on bilateral security issues.

THE AMERICAS

Colombia Border Region. This region includes the borders between Colombia, on one side, and Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Brazil on the other. Rough terrain, dense forest cover, and lack of government authority and presence in this area create a safe haven for insurgent and terrorist groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Panama have adopted an unstated policy mix of containment and non-confrontation with Colombian narcoterrorist groups while Peru pursues the domestic terrorist group Sendero Luminoso (SL). FARC used remote areas to house prisoners and hostages and to stage and train for terrorist attacks in cities.

The Triborder Area. Suspected supporters of Islamic terrorist groups, including Hizballah and HAMAS, take advantage of loosely regulated territory and proximity to Muslim communities in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, and Foz do Iguacu, Brazil, to engage in illegal activity and illicit fundraising.

Venezuela. Venezuelan President Chavez has an ideological affinity with two Colombian terrorist organizations, the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), which in turn limits Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia in combating terrorism. The FARC and ELN regard Venezuelan territory near the border as a safe haven and often use the area for cross-border incursions. In addition, splinter groups of the FARC and another designated terrorist organization, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), operate in various parts of Venezuela and are involved in drug trafficking.

Strategies, Tactics, and Tools for Disrupting or Eliminating the Safe Havens

Whether straddling weak border regions or expanding their reach electronically beyond borders, terrorists operate without regard to borders. This fact dictates that our regional and transnational partnerships must be strengthened and has prompted the U.S. and its allies increasingly to think and plan and operate in regions.

Denying terrorists safe haven undermines terrorists’ capacity to operate effectively, and thus is a key element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy and is the cornerstone of UN Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted in September 2001. UNSCR 1373 specifically targets terrorists’ ability to move across international borders and find safe haven, to solicit and move funds, and to acquire weapons; it also calls on states that do not have laws criminalizing terrorist activity and support to enact such laws.

Countering Terrorist Funding. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has acted to block funding of terrorists and their supporters and to promote international cooperation against them. On September 23, 2001, the President signed Executive Order (EO) 13224, giving the U.S. Government a powerful tool to impede terrorist funding. This executive order provides a means to disrupt the financial support network for terrorists and terrorist organizations by authorizing the U.S. Government to designate and block assets of foreign individuals and entities that commit, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism. In addition, because of the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial base of foreign terrorists, the order authorizes the U.S. Government to block the assets of individuals and entities that provide support, offer assistance to, or otherwise associate with designated terrorists and terrorist organizations. The order also covers their subsidiaries, front organizations, agents, and associates.

The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, continues to designate Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. These designations play a critical role in the U.S. fight against terrorism, and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business. Among other consequences of such a designation, it is unlawful for U.S. citizens or any persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to provide funds or material support to a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. U.S. financial institutions are also required to freeze the funds of designated FTOs. As of December 31, 2005, the United States had designated since 2001 a total of 424 individuals and entities as terrorists, their financiers, or facilitators; the global community has frozen more than $150 million in terrorist-related assets.

Executive Order and Foreign Terrorist Organization designations support U.S. efforts to curb the financing of terrorism and encourage other nations to do the same. They internationally stigmatize and isolate designated terrorist entities and individuals. They also deter donations or contributions to, and economic transactions with, named entities and individuals. In addition, they heighten public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations and signal to other governments U.S. concerns about named entities and individuals.

Disrupting the Movement of Terrorists. As part of the effort to deny terrorists safe havens, the Departments of State, Justice and Homeland Security created the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC), which includes U.S. Government intelligence agencies. The HSTC unifies operational efforts against alien smuggling, trafficking in persons, and criminal support to terrorist travel. It is the subject of a separate report to the Congress, under Section 7202 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and forms part of a broader, coordinated effort by the Federal government to combat terrorist travel.

A comparable process of Federal coordination exists under the National Strategy for Maritime Security, which highlights cooperative international efforts to ensure the security of regional seas. Under the Strategy, the U.S. will continue to promote development of cooperative mechanisms to coordinate regional action against maritime threats that span national boundaries and jurisdictions.

Bringing Terrorists to Justice. Under the Rewards for Justice Program, the Secretary of State may offer rewards of up to $25 million for information that prevents or favorably resolves acts of international terrorism against U.S. citizens or property worldwide. Rewards of up to $25 million have been authorized for information leading to the capture of Usama bin Ladin and other key al-Qaida leaders. Rewards also may be paid for information leading to the arrest or conviction of terrorists attempting, committing, conspiring to commit, or aiding and abetting acts of international terrorism.

Since the program's inception in 1984, the United States has paid more than $62 million to more than 40 people who provided credible information that put terrorists behind bars or prevented acts of international terrorism worldwide. In August 2005, a $5 million Rewards for Justice payment, authorized by Secretary Rice, was made to a source that provided assistance in the arrest and conviction of several leaders of a major terrorist group. It resulted in the significant disruption of the group's activities and capabilities. Two additional rewards, totaling more than a half million dollars, were also approved in 2005.

U.S. Efforts to Work with Other Countries in Bilateral and Multilateral Fora to Cooperate in Identifying and Addressing Terrorist Safe Havens

Group of Eight (G8) Cooperation. The G8 was instrumental in developing cutting-edge counterterrorism standards and practices. These included enhanced travel document security standards efforts, as well as strengthened controls over exports and stockpile security to mitigate the threat to airports from illicit acquisition of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (man portable air defense systems, or MANPADS). G8 counterterrorism initiatives often have an impact well beyond the borders of G8 member states, since the group actively seeks to promulgate the standards and practices it develops to international standard-setting organizations. G8 travel document security standards, for example, were adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization for all its members. A port and maritime security assessment guide created by the G8 was adopted by the International Maritime Organization in December 2004.

At the June 2004 Sea Island Summit, President Bush and the other G8 leaders launched the Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative (SAFTI), designed to increase passenger confidence in the security of international transportation, speed the processing of travelers by border authorities, promote international commerce, and reduce the threat of MANPADS to civil aviation. As part of the SAFTI, G8 leaders adopted a 28-point action plan committing members to implement security-enhancing projects in a variety of transportation security fields, including:

  • Strengthening international standards for passport issuance;
  • Developing new measures to defend against the threat of MANPADS;
  • Establishing a Point-of-Contact network to deal with aviation threat emergencies; and
  • Expanding training and assistance on transportation security to third-party states.

Virtually all outstanding project tasks were completed by the end of 2005.

Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. Throughout the year, the United States also continued to work closely with multilateral partners in numerous counterterrorist financing tracks, including the Counterterrorism Committee of the United Nations, the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and the Counterterrorism Assistance Group (CTAG), as well as in international financial institutions. In addition, the United States agreed with the European Union in June on a Declaration on Combating Terrorism that ratified a wide-ranging set of counterterrorism initiatives, including a commitment to establish a regular dialogue on terrorism finance between the European Union and the United States. Since its launch in September 2004, the dialogue has served as the framework for ongoing exchanges to promote information sharing and cooperation on FATF and on technical assistance issues. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund have also pledged to provide countries with training to increase their capacity to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

The United Nations. The UN continues to provide focus and energy to the international community in its collective fight against terrorism. The Security Counciladopted two resolutions related to terrorism in 2005. Resolution 1617, adopted in July, strengthened the current sanctions regime against the Taliban and al-Qaida, and endorsed the Financial Action Task Force standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Resolution 1624, adopted at a Security Council summit, addressed incitement to terrorism.

The Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) was established by Security Council Resolution 1373 after September 11, 2001, with the goal of raising the performance level of the governments of all 191 member states in the fight against terrorism. The Counterterrorism Committee’s Executive Directorate (CTED), established by Resolution 1535 in 2004, became fully operational in December, 2005. CTED’s mandate is to enhance the Committee’s ability to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373 and to continue its capacity-building work by facilitating technical assistance to member states and promoting closer cooperation and coordination with international, regional, and sub-regional organizations. It is also undertaking visits to certain nations to assess their implementation of obligations under Resolution 1373.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 and successor resolutions require states to impose financial and other sanctions on groups and individuals of those associated with Usama bin Laden, the Taliban, or al-Qaida. In 2005, UNSCR 1617 was passed, clarifying what constitutes association with al-Qaida. UNSCR 1617 also "strongly urges all member states to implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the FATF 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering and the FATF Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing." UNSCR 1624, a resolution calling on states to take certain measures relating to the incitement of terrorist acts, was adopted unanimously in September 2005 at a Security Council summit as part of the UN’s response to terrorism. We are currently discussing the implementation of this resolution internationally.

The UN General Assembly took several important steps in 2005 on the counterterrorism front. The Outcome Document issued at the high-level plenary meeting held at the United Nations on September 14-16 contains a clear and unqualified condemnation of terrorism "in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever, and for whatever purposes," and sets objectives for UN actions to counter terrorism. It also calls for the adoption and implementation of a comprehensive strategy to promote comprehensive, coordinated, and consistent responses at the national, regional, and international level. The General Assembly also negotiated and adopted four antiterrorism resolutions, 60/43, 60/73, 60/78, and 60/158, and continued work on the negotiation of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. The General Assembly concluded the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in April. By December 16, 94 states had signed this important new instrument.

European Union (EU). The United States and EU states developed more comprehensive, efficient border security processes to ensure close cooperation among law enforcement agencies and to improve information-sharing capabilities. Progress has been slower as the United States and European Union worked through regular counterterrorism and terrorist financing engagements to develop mechanisms to implement the 2004 U.S.-EU Summit Declaration on Combating Terrorism. A contributing factor has been member states' reluctance to grant more than token responsibilities to the EU counterterrorism coordinator's office or other Community institution. Following months of analyzing member states’ national counterterrorism systems, member state leaders agreed in December, 2005, to revise the EU counterterrorism action plan, which is designed to disrupt terrorist networks and address conditions terrorists exploit to recruit new members, but does not have effective coordinating mechanisms at the EU level.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). European nations are active participants in a variety of multilateral organizations that contributed to counterterrorist efforts, including the G8, NATO, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The United States and its partners worked through all of these organizations to establish and implement best practices, build the counterterrorism capabilities of "weak but willing" states, and institutionalize the war against terrorism globally. OSCE members committed themselves to becoming parties to the 12 UN terrorism conventions and protocols, to work together to modernize travel documents and shipping container security, and to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist organizations.

The OSCE held two workshops in 2005 on ICAO's minimum security standards for handling and issuance of passports, sponsored visits by ICAO and other experts to provide technical advice to requesting countries on new travel document security features, and increased OSCE countries' cooperation with Interpol in reporting lost or stolen passports. Also in 2005, the State Department funded an OSCE conference designed to share best practices and discuss combating terrorist financing policy. The 180 participants addressed a broad range of terrorist financing topics, including UN Security Council requirements and FATF standards, building effective domestic regimes, developing Financial Intelligence Units, best practices in prosecuting terrorist financing cases, and safeguarding charities from abuse. The conference already has resulted in the development of improved legislation in OSCE member states.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) played a key role in combating terrorism at the regional level in Europe. First and foremost, NATO continues Operation Active Endeavor (OAE), a naval operation that aims to combat terrorism by monitoring maritime traffic in the Mediterranean. NATO is contributing to the fight against terrorism through military operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans and the Mediterranean and is also engaged in a far-reaching transformation of its forces and capabilities to better deter and defend against terrorism, and is working closely with partner countries and organizations to ensure broad cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) is a multi-faceted, multi-year strategy aimed at defeating terrorist organizations by strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security forces, promoting democratic governance, discrediting terrorist ideology, and reinforcing bilateral military ties with the United States. The overall goals are to enhance the indigenous capacities of governments in the pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, and Niger, as well as Nigeria and Senegal) to confront the challenge posed by terrorist organizations in the region, and to facilitate cooperation between those countries and our Maghreb partners (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) in the global war on terror.

The need for TSCTI stemmed from concern over the potential for expansion of operations by Islamic terrorist organizations in the Sahel. TSCTI was developed as a follow-on to the very successful Pan-Sahel Initiative, which focused solely on the states of the Sahel. Ongoing concern that Islamist terrorists continue to seek to create safe havens and support networks in the remote expanses of the Sahel, as well as the public affiliation of some terrorist groups with al-Qaida, led to its formal approval by the U.S. Government early in 2005.

TSCTI was originally envisioned as a five-year program based on counterterrorism, democratic governance assistance, a public diplomacy component, and military assistance. TSCTI’s main elements include:

  • Counterterrorism (CT) programs to create a new regional focus for trans-Saharan cooperation, including use of established regional organizations like the African Union and its new Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers. These programs include training to improve border and aviation security and overall CT readiness;
  • Continued specialized Counterterrorism Assistance Training and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) activities in the trans-Sahara region and possible regional expansion of those programs;
  • Public diplomacy programs that expand outreach efforts in the Sahel and Maghreb regions, Nigeria, and Senegal and seek to develop regional programming embracing this vast and diverse region. Emphasis is on preserving the traditional tolerance and moderation displayed in most African Muslim communities and countering the development of extremism, particularly in youth and rural populations;
  • Democratic governance programs that strive, in particular, to provide adequate levels of USG support for democratic and economic development in the Sahel, strengthening those states to withstand internal threats; and
  • Military programs intended to expand military-to-military cooperation, to ensure adequate resources are available to train, advise, and assist regional forces, and to establish institutions promoting better regional cooperation, communication, and intelligence sharing.

African Union (AU). The Addis Ababa-based AU Commission provided guidance in 2005 to its 53 member states' ratification and implementation of continental and international counterterrorism commitments; it also coordinated assistance to cover member states’ counterterrorism gaps. The Department of State and the National Defense University's Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) collaborated with the AU to run counterterrorism workshops. Although AU Commission political will to act as an effective counterterrorism partner is strong, capacity remains relatively weak. The AU seeks to create a counterterrorism unit at its headquarters to promote member state counterterrorism efforts more effectively. The AU welcomes technical and financial assistance from international partners/donors to bolster both AU headquarters and the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) activities approved by member states.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The United States has worked closely with the ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), comprising Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam to enhance counterterrorism cooperation. In November 2005, President Bush and his ASEAN counterparts announced agreement to launch an "Enhanced Partnership" for more intensive cooperation on a range of important issues including combating terrorism. The ASEAN community has vigorously supported expansion of regional counterterrorism capacities as envisioned in the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism. The US-ASEAN Counterterrorism Work Plan is the blueprint for U.S. engagement on this effort. ASEAN members have reached out to neighboring countries to expand cooperation in areas of information exchange and law enforcement cooperation, as well as increasing counterterrorism finance and law enforcement capacity-building efforts through training and education.

The United States has been an active participant in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) CT activities, especially in the area of maritime security cooperation. Early in 2005, the United States and Singapore co-chaired an ARF confidence-building measure to prevent and counter terrorist attacks and other unlawful acts in the Strait of Malacca. This measure built on earlier efforts to strengthen agreement among participants on the key elements of maritime security. Subsequent events hosted by India and Japan focused on expanding capacity building for maritime security. In July 2005, the 25 ARF foreign ministers adopted a "Statement on Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and Security in Enhancing Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and other Transnational Crimes," in which the ministers committed to improve cooperation in these areas.

APEC. The 21 member economies of APEC (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam) are committed to creating a safe environment for the movement of goods and services throughout the region. The APEC Counterterrorism Task Force (CTTF) was established to coordinate implementation of the Leaders’ 2002 Los Cabos Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth, the Leaders’ 2003 Bangkok Commitments on Security; and subsequent counterterrorism and non-proliferation initiatives. In 2005, the CTTF and other APEC fora gained commitment from members to address counterterrorism, non-proliferation, and secure trade; dismantle transnational terrorist groups; and eliminate proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

APEC is committed to bolstering regional maritime and port security and strengthening international non-proliferation regimes. In 2005, the APEC Framework for Secure Trade was adopted, and further capacity building was provided to seven APEC economies to help them implement the International Ship and Port Facility Security code. APEC strengthened export control systems through capacity building initiatives such as the 2005 Export Control Conference for APEC Economies. APEC also agreed to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct and Import/Export Guidelines for Radioactive Sources by the end of 2006. APEC also resolved to undertake Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) Vulnerability Assessments based on ICAO or similar international guidelines at international airports. APEC improved travel document security standards and launched a pilot project to share lost and stolen passport data between Australia and the United States. APEC members adopted individual Counterterrorism Action Plans in 2005 to combat terrorist financing in APEC economies. APEC members convened the third Secure Trade in the APEC Region Conference in 2005 to protect sea and air transport from acts of terrorism.

OAS Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE). At the February 2005 CICTE Fifth Regular Session, CICTE expanded its mission beyond disrupting terrorism financing and enhancing border security to address threats to aviation, seaport, and cyber security. To accomplish this enhanced mission, CICTE has various ongoing counterterrorism capacity-building programs in airport security, customs and border security (land, air, and sea), financial controls, policy engagement exercises, and counterterrorism needs assessments.

CICTE spent more than $5 million in regional counterterrorism capacity-building assistance. In 2005, CICTE provided training to nearly 500 port and airport security officials to help 29member states meet the requirements of the International Maritime Organization’s International Ship and Port Facility Security code and ICAO new air security standards. CICTE advised 15member state governments on how to meet the requirements of UNSCR 1373; the 13 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism; and the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism (IACAT). The U.S. Senate ratified the IACAT in 2005.

Three Plus One Group on Triborder Area Security (3+1). The governments of the Triborder Area (TBA) in South America -- Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay -- have long been concerned with arms and drugs smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and movement of contraband goods through this region. The United States joined them in 2002 to form the "3+1 Group on Triborder Area Security," which is designed to fight cross-border crime and thwart money laundering and potential terrorist fundraising activities. In October 2005, Paraguay hosted financial intelligence unit representatives and other experts from Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and the United States to discuss the transnational movement of funds. Delegations also discussed and planned to implement a U.S. program to help uncover discrepancies in customs data that suggested illicit activity. The Three also agreed to strengthen border controls, establish customs databases, share legislative standards, and designate points of contact on bulk cash movements.

Brazil hosted a meeting of the broad 3+1 group in December, 2005, where delegates reaffirmed their commitment to fulfill obligations outlined in UNSCR 1373, including the denial of safe haven to terrorists or terrorist financiers, and to exchange information among governments. Additionally, the four countries reiterated the need to strengthen law enforcement ties by organizing a meeting for TBA public prosecutors in early 2006.

Long-Term Goals and Actions Designed to Reduce Conditions that Allow Terrorist Safe Havens to Form

The Middle East Partnership Initiative. As President Bush noted, when an "entire region sees the promise of freedom in its midst, the terrorist ideology will become more and more irrelevant, until that day when it is viewed with contempt or ignored altogether." Conversely, systems characterized by an absence of political choice, transparent governance, economic opportunities, and personal freedoms can become incubators for extremism, hate, and violence.

The State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is a presidential initiative launched in 2002 so democracy can spread, education can thrive, economies can grow, and women can be empowered in the Middle East. It has funded more than 350 programs in 14 countries and the Palestinian territories, ranging from support for election monitoring to improvements in the quality of education to efforts seeking a greater role for women in society.

The initiative is a partnership that works closely with academic institutions, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations in the Arab world with the goal of building a vibrant civil society so reform can flourish. Since its launch in 2002, MEPI has received $293 million to fund initiatives leading to freedom and opportunity. Congress has appropriated an additional $99 million for the current fiscal year for this successful transformational diplomacy initiative.

Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA). The ATA provides partner countries the training, equipment, and technology they need to combat terrorism. ATA programs address specific partner nation needs, such as increasing capabilities to find and arrest terrorists, and building lasting cooperation and interactivity between law enforcement agencies and personnel.

ATA sponsored 217 courses and technical consultations and trained approximately 4,300 students from 78 countries in 2005. In its two-decades of existence, ATA has trained more than 52,300 students from 146 countries. ATA provides programs tailored to the needs of each partner nation and to local conditions. Such training include crisis management and response, cyber terrorism, dignitary protection, bomb detection, airport security, border control, kidnap intervention, and hostage negotiation and rescue, response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, countering terrorist finance, and interdiction of terrorist organizations. All courses emphasize the rule of law and respect for human rights.

Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP). The Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) enhances host governments’ border security by helping other nations create computerized watch lists to screen arriving and departing visitors. Since 2001, the State Department has provided TIP assistance to 20 countries. This assistance was instrumental in interdicting insurgents in Iraq, stopping hundreds of individuals traveling on stolen passports in Pakistan, and arresting wanted criminals, narcotics smugglers, and human traffickers worldwide. These programs complement other U.S. Government efforts to enhance aviation, border, cyber, maritime, and transportation security; protect U.S. citizens, businesses and government facilities and personnel abroad; and secure critical infrastructure.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Launched in May 2003, the PSI promotes international cooperation to interdict Weapons of Mass Destruction-related shipments en route. To date more than 60 countries are engaged in PSI activities dozens of countries participate in operational exercises to strengthen states’ capacity to work together on interdictions. Announced by the U.S. Government in January 2002, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) is intended to ensure that maritime containers posing a terrorism risk are identified and examined at foreign ports before they are shipped to the United States. CSI originally focused on the top 20 foreign ports that ship approximately two-thirds of the total number of containers to the United States. As CSI has evolved, it has expanded to additional ports based on volume, location, and strategic concerns. Other programs in which the U.S. Government actively participates include the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Global Partnership Against the Spread of WMD, the Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise, the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program, and the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA).

Counterterrorist Finance Training. In response to new international standards against the growing threat of illicit cash couriers and bulk cash smuggling, the State Department worked with its interagency partners in 2005 to develop a training course on interdicting bulk cash smuggling. This course provided operational training to foreign customs officers, investigators, and other officials on the detection, interdiction, analysis, investigation, and seizure of illicit cross-border cash used to facilitate terrorism and criminal activities. The training, conducted in three Middle Eastern countries, emphasized the need to investigate the source, destination, and organization behind cash smuggling, and stressed FATF requirements on reporting outbound/inbound currency and working with Financial Intelligence Units. As a result of vulnerabilities uncovered during this training, one country moved aggressively to implement new laws and regulations. In response to high demand, the State Department is planning to increase the number of courses offered and to provide this training to countries in other geographical regions.

Increasing Economic Development. Economic Development is central to the President's National Security Strategy. Expanding the circle of prosperity throughout the world is critical to our national security. Poverty, weak institutions and corruption can turn nations of great potential into recruiting grounds for terrorists. Well-conceived and targeted aid is a potential leveraging instrument that can help countries implement sound policies, and reduce any attraction that anti-Western terrorist groups may have in failing states.

The Millennium Challenge Account, established by Congress in 2004 and based on President Bush’s concept, represents a new model to achieve transformational development by providing assistance to countries that rule justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom. The prospect of an MCA Compact is a powerful incentive for the poorest countries to reform. Good governance and sound policies, not foreign aid, are the keys to economic development. U.S. private sector trade and investment in the developing world topped $450.2 billion in 2004 and dwarfed our foreign aid package of $19.7 billion. Capital in developing countries unutilized to weak policies and poor property rights, is estimated to be as high as $9 trillion.

Debt relief for the poorest countries is another element of our development strategy. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) introduced in 2006 promote debt sustainability, reduce the likelihood of debt distress, and enable the poorest countries to devote additional resources to reducing poverty and promoting economic growth. We support both of these programs. In addition our aggressive multilateral and bilateral efforts to open markets and liberalize financial services, transportation, telecommunications and government procurement support development.

The Agency for International Development (USAID), carries out foreign assistance programs that support key U.S. foreign policy interests and have a positive public diplomacy impact in the developing world. USAID’s humanitarian aid programs and its activities in promoting economic growth, agriculture, trade, health, democracy, and conflict prevention help reduce the risk of poor countries becoming breeding grounds for terrorism. In Afghanistan, USAID is helping to build a safe, stable society that meets the needs of its people and eliminates the environment in which terrorist groups have flourished. USAID has been on the front lines of support to tsunami-affected countries, garnering goodwill toward the United States among people in the hardest-hit areas. Our rapid humanitarian assistance and generous reconstruction pledge in response to the devastating South Asian earthquake helped Pakistan in its hour of need, tangibly changing hearts and minds about the U.S. role in this predominately Muslim country.

Chapter 2
Support for Pakistan

The 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States "make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan" and "support Pakistan’s government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education, so long as Pakistan’s leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own."

Composition and Levels of Assistance, Including Security and Other Assistance

The U.S. Government’s commitment to a long-term relationship with Pakistan is highlighted by President Bush’s pledge to Pakistani President Musharraf to seek from Congress $3 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Pakistan during the five-year period from FY 2005 through FY 2009. In addition to ESF and FMF, the USG is also providing other forms of assistance to Pakistan, including funding for Child Survival and Health (CSH), Development Assistance (DA), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Anti-Terrorism Assistance (NADR-ATA), Export Control and Border Security (NADR-EXBS), Terrorism Interdiction Programs (NADR-TIP), Food for Peace (P.L. 480 Title I & II), and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA). The chart below offers a comparison of levels:

Assistance to Pakistan
($ in millions)


Account FY 2005
(incl. Suppl.)
FY 2006 Est. FY 2006
Suppl. Req.
for Earthquake
FY 2007
Request
CSH 21.000 32.172 5.300 21.700
DA 29.000 40.590 10.500 29.000
ESF 297.600 296.595 40.500 350.000
FMF 298.800 297.000 - 300.000
IMET 1.885 2.024 - 2.075
INCLE 32.150 37.620 - 25.500
NADR-ATA 6.051 6.100 - 8.590
NADR-EXBS 1.000 0.700 - 0.600
NADR-CTF - - - 0.100
NADR-TIP 0.900 1.000 - 1.000
P.L. 480 Title I & II - 22.127 - TBD
ERMA - 5.000 - -
IDFA - - 70.000 -
TOTAL 688.386 740.928 126.300 738.565

Approximately $740.928 million in U.S. assistance is being provided to Pakistan from monies appropriated for FY 2006. In addition, the Administration has made a supplemental FY 2006 appropriation request to Congress for $126.3 million for Pakistan to meet relief needs from the devastating October 8, 2005 earthquake. The Administration is requesting $738.565 million in assistance for Pakistan for FY 2007.

The mix of U.S. assistance for Pakistan reflects the diverse ways that the U.S. Government is cooperating with Pakistan in pursuit of critical U.S. policy goals. These include prosecuting the war on terror; countering nuclear proliferation; building a stable and democratic Afghanistan; ensuring peace and stability in South Asia through the continuation of the India-Pakistan reconciliation process; supporting Pakistan’s efforts to become a modern, prosperous, democratic state; and assisting it in recovering from the October 8, 2005 earthquake.

U.S. FMF funding for Pakistan is designed to enhance Pakistan’s capabilities in the war on terror; help it to better control its borders; meet its legitimate defense needs; and make Pakistan more secure, so that it can more readily take the steps necessary to build a durable peace with all its neighbors – thus fostering security and stability throughout the South Asia region. FMF is being used by Pakistan to purchase helicopters, aircraft, weapons systems, munitions, and other equipment, which, inter alia, has enabled Pakistan’s armed forces to operate effectively against foreign terrorists and militants in the rugged conditions in the tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The Pakistani military is continuing major military operations along that border, which to date have resulted in the capture or death of several hundred foreign terrorists and militants, at the expense of the lives of over 200 Pakistani servicemen. The Administration’s FY 2007 FMF request is $300 million, the same amount as requested for FY 2006.

IMET assistance for Pakistan complements FMF by providing training to Pakistani officers with the goal of promoting military-to-military cooperation, increased professionalism, and enhanced military interoperability between Pakistan and the United States. IMET also assists Pakistan in developing expertise and systems to more effectively manage its defense establishment; builds technical skills for better operation and maintenance of U.S.-origin equipment; and promotes military subordination to democratic civilian rule and respect for human rights. For FY 2007, the Administration’s IMET request is $2.075 million, a slight increase over the $2.024 million requested for FY 2006.

Measures to Ensure that Assistance Has the Greatest Long-Term Positive Impact on the Welfare of Pakistani People and Their Ability to Cooperate Against Terror

ESF, DA, and CSH assistance is being used to improve the lives of ordinary Pakistanis; lay the groundwork for the country’s sustained economic growth; and strengthen social, political, and economic institutions. This assistance alleviates the conditions that breed extremism while demonstrating that the U.S. interest in Pakistan extends beyond the war on terror to concern for the Pakistani people as a whole. ESF funds reduced Pakistan's bilateral debt to the United States by $1 billion in FY 2003 and a further $460 million in FY 2004. This debt reduction, together with prior comprehensive donor debt rescheduling, enabled Pakistan to reduce its total sovereign debt from 89% of GDP in 2000 to 64% of GDP in 2004, laying the groundwork for economic forms designed to stabilize its macroeconomic environment, boost economic growth, and reduce poverty.

During FY2006, more than $200 million in ESF funds are being provided to the Government of Pakistan to enable the country to carry out further economic and social reforms, expand its poverty alleviation programs, and reform and expand access to public education and health care. Pakistan’s use of this money is guided by the Shared Objectives agreed to with the U.S. Government.

A total of approximately $67 million in FY 2006 ESF and DA funds is being used to implement education reform programs in Pakistan, supporting the government of Pakistan’s education sector reform initiative. Pakistan’s literacy rate greatly hampers its ability to develop and expand its economic base. Literacy averages 49% nationwide, and in Pakistan’s remote tribal areas can be as low as 0.5% for women. The dearth of good public schools results in thousands of youth attending private madrassahs, or schools which teach only religious subjects, some of which also inculcate a radical, jihadist ideology. U.S. Government-funded education programs in Pakistan are aimed at improving the quality of education in Pakistani primary and secondary schools, especially in Baluchistan and Sindh provinces; improving early childhood education; training teachers; increasing parental and community involvement in schools; ensuring that teachers have adequate classroom materials; and providing scholarships for disadvantaged students to obtain a higher education. Literacy education programs target out-of-school youth and illiterate adult populations and focus on women and girls.

Democratization is a key focus of U.S. Government assistance toward Pakistan. Democracy is a fundamental tool to combat terrorism over the long term. During FY 2006, the U.S. Government will spend over $14 million on ESF and DA-funded democratization programs. The programs include several mutually-reinforcing components: legislative training to increase the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of Pakistan’s provincial and national parliaments; identifying and training young political reformers; increasing women’s political participation; increasing the capacity of indigenous NGO’s to serve as policy watchdogs and promote human rights; and independent media training to make journalists more professional.

Pakistan trails its South Asian neighbors in almost all key health areas: maternal and infant mortality; safe, affordable family planning; and control of infectious diseases. FY 2006 CSH funds are being used to increase availability of maternal and child health services, especially in rural areas; to improve health care at the provincial and district level through better resource management; to help maintain Pakistan’s low HIV prevalence rate by increasing awareness; to control other infectious diseases; and to improve water and sanitation.

In addition, $5 million in ERMA funds and $22.127 million in P.L.-480 Title II monies are being used to meet humanitarian relief needs from Pakistan’s devastating October 8, 2005 earthquake. This does not include the supplemental FY 2006 request for a combined $126.3 million in ESF, DA, CSH, and International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA) for Pakistan earthquake humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. IDFA provide emergency relief including shelter, food, water and sanitation, humanitarian air service, logistical coordination, and transport of supplies to affected populations. Throughout 2006, ESF, DA, and CSH will support reconstruction efforts to rebuild, furnish, and supply health and education sector infrastructure and human resource capacities; re-establish the livelihoods of earthquake victims; relocate displaced victims; and provide vocational training, agriculture and livestock development, asset formation, enterprise development, micro-credit, and market restoration to skilled and unskilled individuals.

The Administration is requesting $350 million in ESF for Pakistan for FY 2007, an increase of $50 million from its FY 2006 request. This increase is designed to meet earthquake reconstruction needs, and is focused on rebuilding educational, economic, social and health care infrastructure, including human capital, in the earthquake zone. The Administration is requesting for FY 2007 $29 million in DA and $21.7 million in CSH funds, a decline from the estimated $40.590 allocated for DA and $32.172 allocated for CSH in FY2006.

INCLE funds for Pakistan continue to strengthen border security and enable law enforcement access to remote areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border – thus enhancing the country’s capability to interdict traffickers in narcotics, arms, people, and contraband, as well as terrorists. INCLE funds are used to reform, strengthen, and improve cooperation among Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies, all of which play an important role in the war on terror. INCLE funds also support a counter-narcotics Air Wing based in Quetta, Baluchistan, operated by Pakistan’s Interior Ministry, which includes fixed-wing surveillance aircraft and Huey II helicopters. INCLE funds are used to procure vehicles and communications, surveillance, and related equipment for border control and counter-narcotics activities. Border security roads that facilitate law enforcement access to inaccessible parts of Pakistan’s tribal areas (FATA) are also funded by INCLE, as are an Automated Fingerprint Identification System and National Criminal Database, and training and equipment to expand law enforcement investigative skills and forensic capacities. In order to tackle poppy cultivation, INCLE funds also support crop control, alternative livelihood, and demand reduction programs.

The Administration’s FY 2007 INCLE request of $25.5 million represents a decrease from the estimated $37.62 million allocated for FY 2006, reflecting the maturity of our INCLE programs in Pakistan.

NADR-EXBS (Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs/Export Control and Related Border Security) assistance strengthens Pakistan’s export control system and thus prevents WMD and related technology transfers. NADR-EXBS funds are used for nonproliferation export control training to address legal/regulatory reform, export licensing systems, and customs enforcement; for general inspection and WMD detection training for border control personnel; and for procuring specialized radiation/chemical-detection equipment. The Administration's $600,000 FY 2007 request in NADR-EXBS assistance represents a slight decrease from the $700,000 allocated for FY 2006.

NADR-ATA counterterrorism funding for Pakistan enhances the capabilities of elite national police units responsible for counterterrorism investigations and tactical operations. NADR-ATA trained the Special Investigation Group (SIG) and crisis response teams that were integral in making arrests after the December 2003 assassination attempts on President Musharraf and the May 2004 car bombs near the Karachi consulate. The Administration’s FY 2007 request of $8.590 million for NADR-ATA represents an increase over the $6.1 million allocated in FY 2006.

NADR-TIP funding for Pakistan is being used to support the PISCES (Personal Identification Secure Comparison Evaluation System) automated border control system, sustain ongoing program operations, and expand coverage to additional Pakistani ports-of-entry. The Administration is requesting $1 million in NADR-TIP funds for Pakistan for FY 2007, the same as requested for FY 2006.

The Administration is requesting $100,000 in Counter-Terrorism Finance (NADR-CTF) funds for FY 2007 to support the assignment to U.S. Embassy Islamabad of a resident legal advisor to assist the Pakistani Government in establishing the counter-terrorist finance infrastructure needed to prevent money flows to terrorist groups.

Measures to Alleviate Difficulties, Misunderstandings, and Complications in U.S.-Pakistani Relations

The U.S. and Pakistan engage in extensive consultations to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance has the greatest long-term benefit for Pakistanis and enhances the country's ability to cooperate in the global war on terror. An example is the annual consultations that result in mutually-agreed Shared Objectives for the Government of Pakistan’s use of ESF funds. The United States also participates in the annual Pakistan Development Forum, which brings together the Government of Pakistan and bilateral and multilateral donors to discuss Pakistan’s development priorities and assistance needs. The U.S. holds regular consultations with major donors, including the EU, Japan, and World Bank, to ensure that assistance to Pakistan is effectively coordinated and that its impact is maximized.

U.S. public diplomacy programs in Pakistan play a critical role in improving mutual understanding; garnering Pakistani support for U.S. policies; supporting Pakistani reforms; and laying the foundation for a stable, productive, long-term U.S.-Pakistan relationship. U.S. public diplomacy efforts include people-to-people exchanges that bring students, journalists, academics, politicians, and other opinion leaders to the U.S. for academic programs and study tours; placement of articles and opinion pieces in the Pakistani media; interaction with journalists to explain U.S. policies; and public appearances by the U.S. ambassador, other officials, and American exchange visitors.

Chapter 3
Collaboration with Saudi Arabia

Steps to Institutionalize and Make More Transparent Government-to-Government Relations

Former Crown Prince Abdullah’s visit to President Bush’s ranch in Crawford in April 2005 helped strengthen the U.S.-Saudi relationship. In November, Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal inaugurated the Strategic Dialogue in Jeddah. The Strategic Dialogue consists of six working groups to improve U.S.-Saudi relations in human development, economy, energy, consular affairs, military cooperation, and counterterrorism. These working groups meet periodically to address issues including reform, human rights, visas, child custody cases, energy, economic issues, and security cooperation. As part of the Strategic Dialogue, ministerial level meetings are to be held every six months, alternating between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

Intelligence and Security Cooperation in the Fight Against Islamic Terrorism

The United States and Saudi Arabia have an ongoing and robust dialogue on a full range of counterterrorism issues, including regular high-level discussions and close working-level collaboration. Saudi cooperation in this area is significant, and U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies have benefited and continue to benefit greatly from Saudi information and intelligence on individuals and organizations. U.S. law enforcement agencies have provided Saudi security and intelligence officers counterterrorism training in both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia provided the U.S. with critical evidence that led to the November 2005 conviction of an al-Qaida associate for conspiring to assassinate President Bush.

In 2005 Saudi Arabia improved its capabilities to take down terrorist cells. A series of raids throughout the year netted many of the Kingdom’s most wanted individuals. Since May 2003, Saudi Arabia has arrested more than 600 terrorist suspects and has conducted more than 60 raids. The information gleaned from these arrests and raids yielded insights into the plans and capabilities of the Saudi al-Qaida network. Saudi Arabia has also jointly designated with the U.S. more entities to the UN 1267 Committee than any other country. Saudi Arabia has instituted new anti-money laundering and counterterrorism finance laws and regulations and established a Financial Investigations Unit.

Saudi Contribution to Stability in the Middle East and Islamic World, Including the Middle East Peace Process by Eliminating Support for Extremist Groups

Saudi Arabia has been an important partner in the war on terror. It was one of the first countries to condemn the September 11 attacks and provided key logistical support to investing much of the surplus revenue in social development and infrastructure projects. King Abdullah supports investments to diversify the economy away from its reliance on the petrochemical industry. Saudi Arabia’s accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2005 further strengthened the Kingdom’s ability to attract foreign investment.

Ways to Promote Greater Tolerance and Respect for Cultural and Religious Diversity in Saudi Arabia and Throughout the Islamic World

The Secretary of State designated Saudi Arabia a "Country of Particular Concern" pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act. This is an important element of our bilateral dialogue with the Saudi government. The U.S. is working to promote religious and cultural diversity in Saudi Arabia and counter the spread of extremist ideology through high-level engagement and exchange programs aimed at reaching key population groups. We also support efforts to promote moderation and tolerance, such as the National Dialogue initiative.

On April 25, 2005, following the visit of former Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz to Crawford, Texas, the United States and Saudi Arabia issued a joint declaration noting that "future relations must rest on a foundation of broad cooperation. We must work to expand dialogue, understanding, and interactions between our citizens." The declaration noted that such cooperation would include programs designed to:

  • Increase the number of young Saudi students traveling and studying in the U.S.;
  • Increase military exchange programs so that more Saudi officers visit the U.S. for military training and education; and
  • Increase the number of Americans traveling to work and study in Saudi Arabia.

In 2005 Saudi Arabia initiated a scholarship program to fund up to 15,000 Saudi students to attend undergraduate and graduate studies in the United States.

Ways to Assist Saudi Arabia in Reversing the Impact of Financial, Moral, Intellectual, or Other Support to Extremist Groups in Saudi Arabia and Other Countries, and to Prevent this Support from Continuing in the Future

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia work closely together to combat terrorism in Saudi Arabia and abroad. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia established a Joint Task Force on Terrorism Finance that has significantly improved our cooperation to combat terrorist financing. The Saudis have announced plans to establish a Commission for Relief and Charitable Works Abroad to oversee the activities of Saudi charities overseas, but this body is not yet functioning.

The United States and Saudi Arabia have jointly designated entities to the UN 1267 Committee, and the Saudis have submitted over 20 names. Saudi Arabia has instituted new anti-money laundering and counterterrorism finance laws and regulations, including the removal of charity boxes from mosques, restrictions on the amount of cash that can be carried into or out of the Kingdom, and establishment of a Financial Investigations Unit in the Security and Drug Control Department of the Ministry of Interior to investigate money-laundering cases.

Chapter 4
Struggle of Ideas in the Islamic World

The competition of ideas is an important component of the global war on terrorism. In this context, the goal of the United States is to promote the principles of freedom and opportunity. We must offer an agenda of hope for future generations in opposition to the "visions of violence and death," which, as the 9/11 Commission Report states, is the best offer of terrorist recruiters. As the President said recently, "by standing for the hope and freedom of others, we make our own freedom more secure." America must offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity to people throughout the world, a vision rooted in our enduring commitment to freedom. We promote the fundamental rights of free speech and assembly, freedom to worship as one chooses, rights for women and minorities, the rule of law, and limits on the power of the state not because we seek to replicate American democracy, but because these are the universal human rights.

Goals for Winning the Struggle of Ideas

We seek to convey the message that the United States is an agent of positive change in the world and committed to working in partnership with others to improve the freedom and economic conditions of people across the globe. In addition to offering a positive vision of hope and opportunity, we must isolate and marginalize violent extremists, and undermine their efforts to exploit religion to rationalize their acts of terror. We must work to amplify a clear message from people of every nationality and faith that no injustice, no wrong – no matter how legitimate – can ever justify the murder of innocents. We must also foster a sense of common interests and common values between Americans and people of different countries, cultures and faiths across our world.

Tools to Accomplish Such Goals

The U.S. Government has a broad range of tools applicable to the struggle of ideas. The Department of State conducts academic and professional exchanges, English teaching, media training, information outreach programs, including speaker programs and Electronic Journals, web chats and video conferences, television cooperatives, and American Corners, among other programs. We seek to form strategic partnerships with private sector organizations to expand our traditional reach. Our diplomats in the field are our first line of engagement with media, NGOs, think tanks, academic institutions, as well as governments and the general public. Extensive information about U.S. policy, politics and society is conveyed to journalists and the general public through the Department of State’s comprehensive websites in English and six world languages, electronic publications, pamphlets, and television products.

Through public diplomacy programs we seek to inform others about U.S. policies and actions and about American society and values which provide the basis for our policies and actions. Through development assistance, we seek to help others achieve a better life, one offering hope and opportunity for the future. Our approach must be humble but effective and based on mutual respect and partnership. We are pursuing tactics that involve a wide range of public diplomacy and advocacy tools. We group these under the label of four "E’s" -- Engage, Exchange, Educate and Empower.

  • Engage

Engage more aggressively, explaining and advocating our policies in ways that are fast, accurate and authoritative. We have done this through some of the following new tools:

    • New rapid response unit. This new unit monitors and translates major world media in real-time, produces a daily report on stories driving news around the world and provides the U.S. position on these issues.
    • Speaking on the record. A streamlined clearance process eliminates the requirement that Ambassadors obtain pre-clearance from Washington before conducting media interviews. Ambassadors and other senior officials are now encouraged to speak out using common sense and policy guidance from Washington.
    • "Echo Chamber" messages. This new product provides U.S. Ambassadors and others clear, common-sense guidance so they are better able to advocate U.S. policy on major news stories and policy issues.
    • Regional PD hubs. Planning is underway to create hubs in key media markets where the spokesmen’s full time job will be to advocate U.S. policies on regional media, especially television. The first hub will be opened in Dubai in the summer of 2006.
    • "Strategic Speakers" program. This program identifies and recruits prominent speakers to travel to key regions and engage media on USG-funded programs, focusing this year on three key themes -- building democracy, terrorism/security, and trade/development.
    • Internet-based initiatives. "Democracy Dialogues" and web chats as a rapid engagement tool.
    • Greatly expanded presence on Arab media. State Department officials conducted 148 appearances on Arab and regional media in January and February, 48 of these in Arabic.
    • Educational and professional exchanges, and humanitarian and development assistance programs.
    • Expanded media training for Arab and Muslim journalists to improve their professionalism.
  • Exchange

We have initiated the following programs:

    • Edward R. Murrow Journalism Program in partnership with the Aspen Institute and six leading U.S. journalism/communications schools.
    • Fortune/State Department International Women’s Mentoring Partnership to mentor businesswomen from the Middle East.
    • Sports Diplomacy Initiative planning major outreach events to reach youth audiences.
    • International Fulbright Science Award for Outstanding Foreign Students in Science to attract the world’s best science students to the United States.
  • Educate

We are expanding one of our most effective and eagerly sought programs, English language teaching. As the same time, we are becoming more effective in encouraging foreign students to study in the United States and Americans to study abroad.

    • National Security Language Initiative (NSLI) – NSLI will work to (1) expand the number of American students and teachers mastering critical need languages; (2) increase the number of advanced-level speakers of all foreign languages; and, (3) increase the number of foreign language teachers for students studying foreign languages, and to begin this instruction at earlier ages.
    • NSLI was announced by President Bush at the University President’s Summit.
    • Additional funding for English Access Microscholarship Program – an innovative program that reaches underserved high school students throughout the Arab and Muslim world.
    • "U.S. Higher Education" and "See You in the USA" Electronic Journals.
  • Empower

Recognizing that the voices of government officials are not always the most powerful or the most credible, we are working to empower our fellow Americans and to reach out to Muslim-American communities. We have initiated the following programs:

    • Business Women Leaders Summit: Work underway on a businesswomen’s group for a major women’s conference in Amman, Jordan later this year. Under Secretary Hughes will also attend major conferences to highlight empowerment of women.
    • Citizen Ambassadors: We are launching a program this summer to encourage and empower citizens to travel on behalf of America.

As we actively prosecute the struggle of ideas, we need to recognize it will require a long-term effort spanning years and generations. For that reason, we are placing increased emphasis on programs directed at younger audiences, including undergraduates and, in select cases, high school students.

The U.S. Government's assistance programs, administered through USAID, MEPI (Middle East Partnership Initiative), MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation), and other USG entities advance U.S. interests by increasing access to education, improving health care, and empowering people to build better lives. Civic engagement is an important component. Assistance programs to strengthen and professionalize independent media and civic society contribute to opening the "marketplace of ideas," as well as support development and reform across the board.

Through the Administration’s request for $75 million in supplemental funds, we will dramatically increase our potential to speak directly to the Iranian people, as well as to support the courageous work of reformers and activists in that country.

Additional Resources Necessary to Help Win the Struggle of Ideas

The FY 2007 Public Diplomacy budget request ($351,001,000) reflects the resource requirements necessary to implement the President’s Management Agenda (PMA) with respect to effective and efficient U.S. public diplomacy. The recommended increase of approximately $21 million (of which $11 million is wage and price inflation) for PA, IIP and Public Diplomacy activities for the regional and functional bureaus equates to a 6.1% increase over the enacted FY 2006 Public Diplomacy budget appropriation ($329,734,000).

In an effort to clarify the $10 million new and expanded program request, Under-Secretary Hughes has identified five "strategic pillars" -- engagement, education, empowerment, exchange, and evaluation.

To buttress the engagement pillar and support the President’s priority of winning the war on terrorism, funding requests for:

  • Countering disinformation and discrediting terrorists. This exemplifies our commitment to use public diplomacy and public affairs tools to engage foreign publics, discredit terrorism, confront hateful propaganda and dispel or counter dangerous myths about our country, our goals and our policies ($2 million).

The strategic pillars of engagement and empowerment complement and support the President’s priority of succeeding in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are reflected in the FY 2007 Public Diplomacy budget requests for the Bureau of Near East and North African Affairs, which includes such requirements as:

  • Expanded television cooperatives and foreign journalist tours. These have proven to be one of the most critical components of the Department’s overseas media outreach.
  • Expand Arabic and Chinese language services. These will offer more complete policy statements and transcripts in local languages and in formats more accessible to intended audiences. Approval of these requests and related requests will allow the Department to reach audiences in two of the fastest growing regions in the world ($2.3 million).

Education and empowerment support the President’s goal of advancing the freedom agenda, particularly in the Middle East. Our FY 2007 budget request includes funding for:

  • Establishment of new and the continued maintenance and operation of American Corners. $3.2 millionis required for implementation of these programs.

Similarly, the pillars of education and engagement support the advancement of the President’s prosperity agenda and are realized in our FY 2007 budget requests for:

  • Dialogue on freedom and prosperity to expand the speakers program by creating a new Youth Speaker Program. This will aim to recruit Americans from various walks of life to engage younger groups. ($1.2 million).

Engagement and evaluation will be crucial principles to the success of our efforts to explain the President’s strategy at home and abroad, and will be accomplished in the FY 2007 budget requests by:

  • Utilizing polling and evaluations of perceptions of America and the American lifestyle. This aims to outline concepts for other countries to consider in seeking improvements in the quality of life for their citizens. ($1.3 million).

As one of her early steps to firmly establish the culture of measurement within public diplomacy, Under Secretary Hughescreated a combined evaluation unit under the direction of Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Public Diplomacy Evaluation Office (PDEO) strategy is to evaluate all major public diplomacy and exchange programs individually as well as to provide an overall strategic framework for public diplomacy assessment.

The PDEO has completed evaluations or is in the process of evaluating a range of programs focused on the Islamic world:

  • Youth Exchange and Study (Cultural Bridges/YES). ECA's groundbreaking program for secondary school students from the Arab and Muslim world is now in its third year. Surveys are conducted on each cohort prior to the start of the program, at its conclusion, and one year after completion.
  • "Hi" Magazine. An assessment of Hi Magazine, the Department's monthly Arabic-language publication, is close to completion. Based on preliminary data, the Under Secretary has suspended publication of the magazine. The Internet version is still in operation and being revised.
  • American Corners. A formal evaluation is under way on the role and impact of American Corners in several Muslim countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia.
  • English Access Microscholarships. A formal evaluation is under way of this innovative program which involves students from a score of countries with significant Muslim populations
  • 9/11 International Visitor Program. PDEO continues to track the impact of ten "Special Initiative" projects carried out after 9/11 by the International Visitor Leadership Program for opinion leaders from the Arab and Muslim world.

Benchmarks for Measuring Success and Linking Resources to Accomplishments

The PDEO has researched other government public diplomacy evaluation and measurement tools and it is considered one of the most advanced in terms of measuring outcomes of public diplomacy. Organizations as diverse as the Peace Corps, Department of Defense, the British Council, The World Bank, and non-profits in Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands, have all consulted with the PDEO on how to measure public diplomacy activities.

The measures used by the PDEO are based upon recognized social and behavioral science methodologies and include measuring changes in audience attitudes (knowledge, skills, perceptions, understanding), behavior, and condition. Examples include:

-- Improved or increased understanding of the United States, its policies and values.
-- Initiated or implemented "positive" change within an individual's organization -- positive referring to changes that support U.S. ideals and values.
-- Institutional partnerships and linkages and ongoing collaboration.
-- Changes in editorial content in major media.

Participation in International Institutions for the Promotion of Democracy and Economic Diversification

The United States is a leading participant in many international organizations, such as the United Nations and NATO, important to the struggle of ideas and the war on terrorism. We also play a leading role in other initiatives, such as the Forum for the Future and the Community of Democracies, which stimulate cooperation with other nations to advance the agenda of freedom. For the first time since its creation in 2000, the Community of Democracies, in response to U.S. recommendations, created regional dialogues which brought together governmental and non-governmental organization representatives from each region, including the Middle East, to discuss the particular challenges and solutions unique to their area. We will continue to seek opportunities to build on the momentum coming out of the April ministerial, particularly in support of the Forum for the Future and Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) process.

U.S. Assistance Sufficient to Convince Allies and People in the Islamic World that the U.S. Is Committed to Winning This Struggle

U.S. assistance programs are intended to improve economic conditions and opportunities in developing countries around the world, thereby serving the U.S. national interest in a more prosperous and secure international community. Our assistance can have the additional impact of demonstrating our commitment to help poorer countries or countries in special need, as we saw after the tsunami of 2004 and the Pakistan earthquake of 2005. There is, however, no set amount we could identify as being sufficient to win the struggle of ideas. That struggle will be a continuing effort of many years.

Chapter 5
Outreach Through Broadcast Media

Initiatives of the Broadcasting Board of Governors with Respect to Outreach to Foreign Muslim Audiences

This section provided by the Broadcast Board of Governors.

The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) has significantly enhanced U.S. international broadcasting to Muslim audiences since 9/11. BBG's planning for 2006 and 2007 continues to reflect this priority.

Through programs that combine the talents of several of the broadcast entities, the BBG is addressing the public diplomacy challenges of the war on terrorism. Emphasizing a more rigorous use of research, new technologies, more frequent program review, and more appealing broadcast formats, BBG broadcasters are adapting commercial broadcast techniques to succeed in competitive international broadcast markets. While each market is researched to determine local audience requirements, the journalistic product remains the same – accurate, objective, and comprehensive.

As BBG resources have shifted from areas of the world where the local media are increasingly free and robust to the Middle East and Southwest Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has become a major broadcaster to Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. RFE/RL continues to expand its efforts in the Muslim countries of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan as well as to the majority Muslim populations of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and the North Caucasus. VOA has similarly reduced its broadcasts to Europe, increasing its focus on Iran, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan, and other nations critical to the war on terrorism. VOA’s daily evening television news broadcast to Iran is having singular success in reaching audiences deprived of objective news coverage. The Administration’s proposed budget for FY 2006 included resources to more than double VOA’s television output to Iran.

ARABIC BROADCASTING

To effectively communicate with the predominantly young audiences in the Middle East, the BBG created a new concept in international broadcasting – Radio Sawa – a 24/7 network of stations specifically designed to reach the large segment of the Arabic-speaking population under the age of 35. Radio Sawa went on the air in March 2002, quickly attracting and sustaining a loyal audience throughout the Middle East, as new transmission sites were added throughout the region. In 2006, Radio Sawa continues to broadcast accurate, authoritative, comprehensive and timely news about the Middle East, the U.S. and the world. In addition to over 300 newscasts per week, Radio Sawa offers discussion and informational programs such as the popular "Sawa Chat" interactive feature and the "Free Zone," a weekly review and discussion of democracy and freedom as they relate specifically to the Middle East. Feature programs encourage discussion of key social and political issues in a manner very different from indigenous Arab media. In the weeks leading up to the Iraqi vote on the new constitution, Radio Sawa broadcast "Windows on the Iraqi Constitution." This daily program featured Iraqi experts explaining the meaning of every article of the new Iraqi constitution.

Radio Sawa broadcasts on FM in Morocco (Rabat, Casablanca, Tangier, Meknes, Marrakesh, Agadir and Fes), Jordan (Amman and Ajlun), the Palestinian territories (Ramallah), Kuwait (Kuwait City), Bahrain (Manama), Qatar (Doha), U.A.E. (Abu Dhabi and Dubai), Iraq (Baghdad, Nasiriya, Basra, Mosul, Sulimaniya and Erbil), and Djibouti. Radio Sawa broadcasts on medium wave to Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Sudan. In early 2006, Radio Sawa began broadcasting across Lebanon from FM transmitters in Beirut, North Lebanon, South Lebanon and Bekaa Valley.

Building on the success of Radio Sawa, the BBG launched Alhurra Television on February 14, 2004, covering 22 countries in the Middle East via the same satellites used by major indigenous Arabic channels. In the two years Alhurra has been broadcasting 24/7, the channel has provided in-depth coverage of historic events, including elections in Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon and the trial of Saddam Hussein. The channel has been a consistent leader in reporting on and analyzing new democratic trends in the Middle East. Through objective and accurate reporting, Alhurra has been an example of a free press to the region and has become a trusted source of news for its more than 21 million weekly viewers. Alhurra gives its audience insights into life in America and the American system of government. During the U.S. electoral campaign in 2004, Alhurra provided daily in-depth coverage of the activities and opinions of the candidates, and live coverage of the Republican and Democratic Conventions. Alhurra’s weekly program, "Inside Washington," gives viewers an in-depth look at the American political process and provides viewers throughout the Middle East with fresh perspectives on the U.S. and U.S. foreign policy.

Alhurra has also organized town hall meetings to provide a forum for discussion on sensitive issues. Six members of the Kuwaiti Parliament participated in such a meeting, broadcast live from Kuwait, to discuss the possibility of reforming the laws affecting women’s political participation in Kuwait as well as the role of women throughout the Middle East. In a town hall meeting live from Damascus, guests discussed the laws governing the media in Syria and called for the end of interference in the press by the Syrian authorities. Less than 24-hours after Alhurra television broadcast the historic townhall meeting live from Damascus, the Alhurra team that produced the meeting left the country in protest after the Syrian Government attempted to censor the content of Alhurra’s future town hall meetings scheduled for the rest of the week. A special two-hour Town Hall Meeting live from Sharm el-Sheikh soon after the terrorist attacks there, presented a frank and open discussion of the war on terror.

Alhurra and Radio Sawa provided extensive coverage of the Egyptian presidential and parliamentary elections, including exclusive reports on the candidates, the debates and violence on election day. Both networks also provided extensive live coverage of the aftermath of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon including live Town Hall Meetings in Beirut on Alhurra.

Radio Sawa and Alhurra Television continue to grow in popularity and credibility and now reach a total unduplicated audience of 35 million persons 15 and older according to international research firms such as ACNielsen and Ipsos. The surveys show that, despite high levels of anti-American sentiment throughout the region, both Alhurra and Radio Sawa are regarded as credible sources of news and information by their audiences. According to an ACNielsen survey conducted in August, 2005, 77% of Alhurra’s viewers and 73% of Radio Sawa’s listeners consider the news reliable. Compared to ACNielsen surveys a year ago, news credibility for Alhurra took major jumps in three key markets: in Egypt 70% to 92%, in Jordan from 46% to 68%, and in Lebanon from 53% to 79%. The survey also reported that news on Alhurra and Radio Sawa was a powerful programming factor for their audiences. Some 77% of the Alhurra audience said they were interested in watching Alhurra for the news. Radio Sawa listeners in the broadcaster’s key markets ranked the station as one of their top two choices for radio news and information.

IRAQ

Alhurra Iraq, a special television stream containing more concentrated news and information to and about Iraq, began broadcasting in April, 2004. Alhurra has gained a foothold in one of the most competitive TV marketplaces in the world. By the summer of 2006, we expect to launch a customized stream of programming in Europe to serve its large Arabic-speaking population. Alhurra’s goal is to help its viewers make educated and informed decisions about political, social, and economic events affecting their lives. To this end, during the historic elections in Iraq, Alhurra produced and broadcast the first televised electoral debate in Iraq’s history, featuring six candidates representing the major political parties. This historic debate brought about a candid discussion among the candidates and provided a forum for the viewers to be able to compare and contrast each of the parties’ candidates.

On election day in Iraq, Alhurra produced more than 11 hours of continuous live coverage of the voting. Other programs included "Half of Iraq," a show exploring women’s issues in the campaign. The channel also broadcast public service announcements encouraging all Iraqis to vote and showcasing the platforms of the various political parties.

Throughout its two-year history, Alhurra has provided a forum for discussion of important topics by a wide variety of experts including the all-important voices of moderation. Alhurra’s talk shows, roundtables and documentaries have routinely tackled vital topics that are taboo on many other stations in the region, including the struggle for human rights, the position of women in Arab society, religious freedom, freedom of the press and freedom of expression.

RFE/RL’s Radio Free Iraq continues to provide the Iraqi people with information about events in and around their homeland. A survey in March, 2005 showed listening rates at a weekly level of 19%. RFI appeals to a wide political spectrum of listeners in Iraq, covering the most significant political developments in the country during 2005 through its extensive network of stringers based at its Baghdad bureau, and its editors in Prague.

When the interim government was approved by the parliament on April 28, Radio Free Iraq presented the important components of the story to its listeners in Iraq within an hour of the vote. Starting in June, Radio Free Iraq gave extensive coverage of the preparations for the trial of Saddam Hussein, both in the daily news and weekly programs such as "Human Rights in Iraq." RFI provides daily coverage of the trial when it is in session.

Throughout the summer, RFI closely followed the negotiations on the new Iraqi constitution through a daily special program entitled "Iraq's Constitution." In its five hours of daily original programming, RFI aired press conferences, interviews with politicians and representatives of different factions, and discussions with political experts drawn from inside the country to analyze legal trends, points of controversy, and what agreement would mean for the citizens of Iraq. On October 15, the day of the constitutional referendum, Radio Free Iraq doubled its original broadcast hours to 10 in order to cover the vote, analyze the events for its listeners and provide international reaction. Radio Free Iraq also provided thorough coverage of the historic December 15 parliamentary elections in Iraq, assigning correspondents to a dozen major cities in Iraq, including two Sunni strongholds, to report on the voting. In Baghdad alone, seven RFI correspondents reported live from the polling stations.

VOA KURDISH SERVICE

VOA Kurdish Service, another broadcast service to the Middle East, has garnered a weekly audience of 31% of ethnic Kurds in Iraq. Data from another recent survey also shows VOA Kurdish with a 90% rate of credibility among Kurds in Iraq. VOA also maintains two websites on the Internet in the two major Kurdish dialects, Sorani and Kurmanji. Reaching the Kurds of Iraq in their own language is vital to U.S. efforts to help build a peaceful, democratic Iraq. Through its broadcast journalists in Washington and stringers in Iraq and elsewhere, the Kurdish Service has closely followed the transfer of Iraqi sovereignty to the interim Iraqi Government, the arraignment of Saddam Hussein, and the January and December 2005 elections. VOA provided interviews with voters and candidates and senior Iraqi and U.S. officials and newsmakers, panel discussions with experts and call-in shows on various aspects of the elections and Iraq’s ethnic and religious politics.

In September, 2005, VOA Kurdish hosted a Newsmaker press conference with Iraqi president Jalal Talabani at VOA headquarters, which received widespread coverage on Kurdish Internet websites, radio and television stations, and print media. The Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, who says he is a longtime listener to VOA’s Kurdish, Persian, and English broadcasts, recently remarked: "VOA’s continuous promotion of values of democracy, freedom, and human rights has influenced our positive view of the United States as a champion of liberation from dictatorship and totalitarianism." According to a recent survey conducted by InterMedia, VOA netted a 24% audience share among the Kurds of Iraq. The survey reported: "In fact, no radio station ranks higher in terms of reliability," and added: "VOA occupies a unique position among Iraqi Kurds as it is the only major international broadcaster offering programs in the Kurdish language."

IRAN

In 2006, broadcasting to Iran remains a key BBG priority. Based on its experience with Radio Farda, the BBG is expanding VOA television service in the Persian language. The combined resources of RFE/RL and VOA supply 24 hours of programming each day to Iran. Farda’s newscasts focus on Iran-related news, including interviews with Iranian dissidents and pro-democracy advocates. Radio Farda reaches significant audiences in Iran, in spite of Iran’s consistent jamming. Listening remained stable at 13.6% -- the highest weekly reach rate of any international broadcaster, and more than double that of BBC’s Persian service. Among its key target group, youth aged 18-29, Farda’s weekly reach was 30%.

State Department Deputy Spokesman Adam Ereli came to RFE/RL's Washington studios on April 30, 2005, to participate in a call-in show devoted to press freedom in Iran. The one-hour program was broadcast on May 3, to coincide with World Press Freedom Day. Mr. Ereli spent more than two hours in the studio with moderator Behruz Nikzat, answering phone calls and e-mails from listeners in Iran that began to flood in as soon as it was announced that Ereli was in the studio.

Throughout May, 2005, Radio Farda reported on university student protests in Tehran, which began when members of the "Office for Fostering Unity," Iran's biggest student organization, staged a sit-in on the campus of Amir Kabir University. On May 3, Radio Farda secured exclusive interviews with four of six activists banned from public speaking by the Iranian Government – all outspoken critics of the Islamic Republic's constitution and advocates of a national referendum.

Radio Farda provided the Iranian people with balanced, thorough coverage of their Presidential election. On the day of the election, Farda altered its programming schedule to provide reports every half hour throughout the day on turnout, polling and the election process. Radio Farda's Tehran correspondent toured polling stations, reporting live during newscasts. Outside Tehran, Radio Farda correspondents in four provinces filed reports on the presidential race, while broadcasters in Prague phoned voters in Iran's 20 other provinces throughout the day to gauge the popular mood and to monitor proceedings at the voting booths.

In addition to Radio Farda, VOA Persian broadcasts four hours of daily radio programs to Iran. In 2005, the service revamped its programming into a new format that provides even more in-depth coverage of news and current events, along with a daily call-in segment featuring experts and callers from within and outside of Iran.

VOA has also stepped up its television offerings to Iran. Now, in addition to its roundtable and feature programs, VOA produces a live, daily, evening news program for Iranian television viewers. In May 2005, this program was increased from a half hour to an hour each day. This direct satellite program, News and Views, features news on Iran, the U.S., and the world, with views from regional experts, conversations with experts inside Iran, a weekly View from Washington on U.S. policy, and a daily segment showcasing the thoughts and comments of Iranians as they email to Washington. In 2005, 21.4% of respondents reported viewing VOA Persian TV during the previous week.

In June 2005, VOA Persian presented an unprecedented three-hour block of live television coverage of the Iranian elections, which included live correspondent reports from Washington, New York, Los Angeles, and key capitals around the world. Commentary from guest experts and analysts examined the impact of the election on the Iranian people.

VOA’s 30-minute weekly youth-oriented TV magazine show, Next Chapter, changed its format in 2005 to include more original news pieces on major international developments and cultural issues of special interest to young Iranians. New to VOA Persian’s TV line-up in 2005 is the live, monthly, 90-minute Negahi Faratar (Looking Ahead) program, which focuses on U.S.-Iran relations, human rights, and the pro-democracy movement in Iran. The program allows U.S. officials and policy experts to engage in a direct dialogue with the Iranian people. In 2006, VOA plans to expand its popular talk show, Roundtable With You, from a weekly 90-minutes to a daily 60-minute broadcast, and launch Late Edition, a 60-minute daily news and cultural magazine TV show that will provide news and information aimed at Iran’s youth. VOA is also developing NewsTalk, a daily reporter’s roundtable featuring top journalists and experts who will discuss Iranian and regional news. VOA Persian’s web site continues to be one of VOA’s five most