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2002
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE'S (INS) INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION,
BORDER SECURITY, AND CLAIMS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JUNE 19, 2002
Serial No. 85
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., WISCONSIN, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
LAMAR SMITH, Texas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
RIC KELLER, Florida
DARRELL E. ISSA, California
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
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JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
JERROLD NADLER, New York
ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
MAXINE WATERS, California
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
PHILIP G. KIKO, Chief of Staff-General Counsel
PERRY H. APELBAUM, Minority Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania, Chairman
DARRELL E. ISSA, California
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania
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ELTON GALLEGLY, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah, Vice Chair
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
ZOE LOFGREN, California
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
GEORGE FISHMAN, Chief Counsel
LORA RIES, Counsel
ART ARTHUR, Full Committee Counsel
CINDY BLACKSTON, Professional Staff
LEON BUCK, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
JUNE 19, 2002
OPENING STATEMENT
The Honorable George W. Gekas, a Representative in Congress From the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
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The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the State of California
The Honorable Darrell E. Issa, a Representative in Congress From the State of California
WITNESSES
Mr. Joseph R. Greene, Assistant Commissioner for Investigations, Immigration and Naturalization Service
Oral Testimony
Prepared Statement
Mr. Richard M. Stana, Director of Justice Issues, United States General Accounting Office
Oral Testimony
Prepared Statement
Mr. Steven Camarota, Director of Research, Center for Immigration Studies
Oral Testimony
Prepared Statement
Ms. Marissa Demeo, Regional Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
Oral Testimony
Prepared Statement
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LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the State of Texas
IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE'S (INS)
INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2002
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Immigration,
Border Security, and Claims,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in Room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. George W. Gekas [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. GEKAS. The hour of 2 having arrived, the Committee will come to order. What we have done with the fall of the gavel is to continue a custom that we have started in 1994, whereby every Committee meeting or hearing in which I have had control of the gavel we actually started on time. However, the rules of the House prohibit us from proceeding until a quorum, a hearing quorum, shall have appeared, that being two Members. So reluctantly I have to gavel down the opening part of this Committee meeting until a quorum shall have appeared. The Committee stands in recess.
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[Recess.]
Mr. GEKAS. The Chair notes that the Member of the Committee, Mr. Forbes, has arrived to join the Chairman in forming a proper quorum for the purposes of a hearing, and so we will proceed.
This hearing has been called because of a variety of reasons and because of one particular one which is very vexing and very troublesome in all of its permutations. Just yesterday, the President sent to the Congress a bill to establish a new Cabinet position on homeland security. Inherent in the new construct will be consideration of transferring the duties and in fact the entire Office of Immigration and Naturalization Service to that new structure in homeland security. So that the whole play of issues that are solely in the Immigration and Naturalization Service and its committees that have jurisdiction both in the Senate and in the House now will be on a broader front that is part of homeland security if the bill should succeed in final passage, which brings us to the recurring questions that abound across the land.
The 19 hijackers, as we all know by now, all were aliens, 16 of them were nonimmigrant residents in the United States at one time or another, three of them had overstayed their visas and were subject to expulsion, but we have gone past September the 11th now, gnashing our teeth about the fact that all of that occurred because of a relaxation of or nonexistent set of procedures and statutes that could have prevented that wholesale entry into our country by those who were willing to wreak havoc among our citizenry.
So, we have then the scenario of millions, just millions of illegal aliens in our midst. We have among them some 314,000 who are not only illegal in our country but are under direct court order, final order of expulsion or deportation from our Nation, who are not on their way back to their homes but rather still among us and still counted among the illegal aliens in our midst.
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What is troublesome on top of everything else about which we are worried are the recent statements emanating from the Immigration and Naturalization Service; to wit, it may be that this is a problem that is of illegal aliens but which we can do nothing or that we should just accept as a fact of life in our country and just proceed to live with it without doing anything about it. I cannot subscribe to such a policy or such an idea, and I believe that it is the duty of our Committee to look into the implications of that kind of broad policy statement or description of the conditions of our Nation with respect to illegal aliens.
For instance, I have a direct quote here where the Commissioner has stated that, ''We need to set up a regime where we don't have to spend much of our time and effort in enforcement activities dealing with people who are not terrorists, who are not threats to our national security, who are economic refugees.'' This is a paralyzing statement to me. It implies that with one broad sweep of description that all the illegal aliens couldn't possibly be terrorists, couldn't possibly be people who constitute a threat to our national security. I can't accept that and will not accept that. There are thousands among those millions, perhaps millions among those millions who have exactly that kind of mindset to do harm to our country, to be or become terrorists.
So we have to look into all of this, and in view of the fact that the INS has stated in various ways that interior management of illegal aliens is a priority, and which priority was recognized by the Congress to the effect of additional funding being poured in to help in the management of the number of illegal aliens, then we are more than nonplussed about the conditions that exist. These questions that will be forthcoming from the Committee take into account that we have responded to the requests of the INS for additional funding and resources to deal with the number of illegal aliens, and yet we now have what amounts, to me at least, amounts to throwing up our hands and just accepting the status quo of illegal aliens in our midst.
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I repeat, I will not abide by that personally. I will do everything I can to convince Members of this Committee and colleagues across the membership of the House of Representatives and the other body to convince everyone that this is a problem which we must, must mitigate and to do it as rapidly as we can.
The record will indicate that the lady from California, Ms. Lofgren, is here, as is the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith, who now have joined Congressman Forbes and Congressman Gekas in the constitution of a quorum for this hearing.
Does anyone else wish to indulge in an opening statement? The lady from California is recognized.
Ms. LOFGREN. Yes. I would like to offer a slightly different perspective than the Chairman on this issue. Clearly, all of us, all Americans of all political parties, want to make sure that our country is safe and we need to make sure that those who would do harm to our country, whether they are aliens or whether they are U.S. citizens, as we have found in some instances, are prevented from doing harm to our country.
As I understand it, the INS is cognizant that we have many, many persons who are within the United States who do not have proper documentation, and if we are going to do a good job at protecting the United States from terrorists we need to do a good job of sorting those who would do harm from those who would not do harm. And I will give you an example right from my own neighborhood in San Jose, California.
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I know a family. The father was deceased. He was an American citizen. Mama is a permanent resident of the United States. The second oldest daughter, who is our friend, is a U.S. Born American citizen and a college student and a wonderful, wonderful young lady. And her younger brother, who is 15, is a United States citizen, also born in San Jose. But little brother, who is 7, is undocumented. We are trying to help on the documentation for this but right now he is an ''illegal alien.'' And I don't think that 7-year-old child is a terrorist threat. If we are going to spend resources going after that 7-year-old those are resources that we cannot apply to the terrorists.
There is another little known truth, but it is something I think we need to be honest about, which is that the American economy has relied for many, many years on the presence of undocumented workers in certain industries. If you enjoy the salad this afternoon, you enjoyed the fruit of the labor of undocumented workers in California in the Imperial Valley who pick our crops in the hot sun without benefit of documents, and those undocumented farm workers are I would believe not the terrorist threat that concerns us all.
Similarly, if you go on vacation in California and you go to a hotel and expect to have clean sheets on your bed, you are relying on undocumented workers who are the hotel industry's worker bees. Those undocumented workers, primarily from the country of Mexico, are not the terrorist threat that we need to guard against.
So I think we need to be vigorous in giving tools to the INS. We need to make sure that they have access to the records and the information that has been obtained by the CIA and also by the FBI so that we can get the bad guys. But if we turn especially now, at this very perilous time for our country, if we turn this into an effort to evict the farm workers instead of finding the terrorists, we will be putting America at risk.
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So I hope that we can hone and fine-tune our efforts. Reasonable people can disagree about whether those farm workers should be here or should not be here, but to turn this need to go after terrorists into an effort to oust the people who pick our vegetables I think would be a real disservice to America, and I know that none of us want to do that.
And I thank gentleman for recognizing me.
Mr. GEKAS. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California for an opening statement.
Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing the testimony today. I, too, want to echo a combination of the previous two Members that there are 8 1/2 million, according to the U.S. Census, unlawful, undocumented, use whatever word you want, residents of this country. These are people who by the Commissioner's own statement 40 percent are overstays.
I have been dismayed that the proposal to take care of over-staying is to lower from 6 months to 30 days the time that you are allowed to be here, thus obviously taking care of overstays because if someone is only given 30 days they will undoubtedly leave while if someone is given 6 months that probably makes them stay longer and thus go into overstay.
But having said that, I am hopeful also today that Mr. Greene has brought with him as requested for over 2 months by the department and requested to the Commissioner personally the cost of interior checkpoints that exist within my congressional district, checkpoints that do not seek to find criminal aliens but in fact look through 200,000-plus persons a day and glean some 10 to 20 undocumented workers, most of whom are not criminal and then, as we will go through in question and answer, brag considerably about the amount of drugs that they seize, something which is clearly not a core function.
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So as we go through this process, in an effort to get to a more effective INS, we will also have an opportunity to find out where those changes in emphasis since we clearly, and I would like to associate myself with the gentlelady from San Jose that in fact we are not getting rid of 8 1/2 million workers in this country any time soon, that although I would like to very much and the President would like to see them documented, accounted for, and those who are not wishing us well taken out of this country. In the meantime I hope all of you will be testifying about creative or conventional ways in which we can make America safer by culling through those 8 1/2 million to eliminate those who would do us harm or those who simply are criminals, both of which concern me.
And I yield back.
Mr. GEKAS. We thank the gentleman. Does anyone else seek recognition for the purpose of an opening statement? If not, we will proceed with the testimony of the witnesses as they are being introduced.
The first witness will be Joseph Greene, Assistant Commissioner for Investigations, Immigration and Naturalization Service. He began his career with the INS as an inspector at JFK Airport in New York in 1973, and he has held numerous positions with the INS, including District Director in Denver and Supervisor, Special Agent, et cetera. Mr. Greene graduated from Loyola College in Maryland, has a Master's Degree in philosophy from Fordham.
He is joined at the witness table by Richard M. Stana, the General Accounting Office, Director of Justice Issues at the GAO, who has been with that organization for 25 years. Most recently he directed GAO's work relating to law enforcement, drug control, immigration, corrections, court administration, and elections system. He is a United States veteran, Army veteran, has an MBA from Kent State University, and has completed JFK School of Government's Program on Leadership and Performance.
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And with them is Steven A. Camarota, Director of Research, Center for Immigration Studies. He has published widely on the political and economic effects of immigration on the United States. His articles on the impact of immigration have appeared in both academic publications and the popular press, including the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, Social Science Quarterly, and Campaigns and Elections. He has a Bachelor's Degree from Juniata College, political science from the University of Pennsylvania, Master's Degree, and a Ph.D. In public policy analysis from the University of Virginia.
And the final witness would be Marissa J. Demeo, the Regional Counsel of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, D.C. office, who helps develop policy positions for this organization and performs legislative advocacy on the national level for civil rights. She has served as vice chair and acting chair to the Secretary of Commerce's Decennial Census Advisory Committee from December 1999 to April of 2002. Before coming to her current status Ms. Demeo was a trial attorney for 3 years in the Civil Rights Department in the U.S. Department of Justice. She holds an undergraduate degree from Princeton University, a law degree from New York University School of Law and membership in that institution's Law Review.
The written statements of each of the witnesses as per custom will be made a part of the record, without objection, and we will ask each to try to limit the oral presentation review of that statement to 5 minutes. We will begin in the order of induction with Mr. Greene.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH R. GREENE, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR INVESTIGATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
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Mr. GREENE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to be here today to talk about the INS Interior Enforcement Strategy. That strategy, as you know, has evolved over the past 10 years and has been dramatically affected by the events of September the 11th.
Beginning in 1984, our special agents generally made arrests and removals of illegal migrants under several distinct activities and categories, fraud, work site, criminal aliens, status violators. But as we moved into the 1990's we began to question the impact of these operations on the overall problem of illegal immigration.
You will recall with me many public reports of major INS law enforcement operations resulting in hundreds of arrests only to learn that either the arrested aliens had returned to their jobs within a few weeks or had been replaced by other illegal aliens. It became increasingly difficult for us to justify to you and to ourselves that we were having any overall impact on illegal migration.
As a result of this, in 1998 I was invited while serving as the District Director of Denver to lead a team that would design a new enforcement strategy. The goal was to frame a strategy that would have a measurable effect on illegal migration, that would support and coordinate the board, enforce the strategy and would operate within the budget and resource constraints that were in place at the time.
The result was the 1999 Interior Enforcement Strategy, which focused on assessing and attacking the greatest harms resulting from illegal immigration in this country. It did this by targeting the infrastructure which supported illegal migration, whether it be a smuggling organization, a fraud conspiracy, an employer involved in widespread immigration violations or a local law enforcement problem created by the arrival of illegal immigrants into a community.
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Let me provide you with highlights of some of the 50 major investigations that have been conducted since January 1999 pursuant to this strategy. In September 2000, the United States Attorney announced the indictment of attorney Robert Porges, who conspired with mainland Chinese smuggling organizations for nearly a decade to file over 6,000 fraudulent asylum applications in New York City. This operation conducted by our agents involved use of RICO authority. Due to the scope and significance of the criminal enterprise it was alleged to have realized $13.5 million during the life of the conspiracy.
The next month, in October 2000, INS conducted an operation for running the largest multi-national anti-smuggling investigation ever conducted in the Western Hemisphere. It resulted in the interdiction of 3,500 illegal migrants destined to the United States and the arrest of 38 smugglers, including Jose Leon Castillo, whose organization alone was responsible for the smuggling of thousands of migrants into the United States during the prior 5 years.
In July 2001, the grand jury indicted Kong yan Fong on smuggling charges involving a conspiracy that had resulted in the death of several smuggled migrants. Fong had been identified by international law enforcement agencies as a significant international migrant smuggler. He was convicted last September and faces life imprisonment.
In December 2001, the grand jury returned a 36 count indictment against Tyson's Foods, Incorporated for conspiracy to import and transport illegal aliens to Tyson's plants throughout the United States. These indictments culminated a 2 1/2 year investigation. And these and other investigations pursuant to the strategy has focused on disrupting and dismantling the corrupt and criminal organizations that make illegal migration to this country possible.
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But since the terrorist attacks we have reevaluated our interior strategy in the light of the new threats and have refocused our strategic direction in interior enforcement. Our strategy is to protect American lives and infrastructure using every available authority at our command under the immigration laws of this country.
Thus, within hours of the attack we began the effort that grew into Operation Tarmac, designed to secure the sensitive areas of airports from individuals who may pose a potential threat. We have audited over 1900 companies conducting business in the restricted areas of airports and, with the help and support of many Federal and local law enforcement agencies, have arrested and deported over 600 aliens who have access to those secure areas. We have also expanded this approach to other critical infrastructures as well.
Certainly the key challenge to interior enforcement is to address all the responsibilities we have within the resources provided. As of June 4, I have 1,944 on duty agents, including supervisors. There are more sworn officers in the Dallas Police Department than I have special agents in the world. Moreover, of that number 112 of them are assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force, 155 are assigned to anti-smuggling units in Border Patrol sectors, 107 are assigned to OCDETF, and 197 are assigned to quick response teams.
On any given day the best I can field is approximately 1,365 special agents to work jails, investigate fraud and smuggling, conduct enforcement operations at work sites, support local task force, respond to local law enforcement officials, arrest immigration violators and support the FBI in their important counterterrorism work. This reality forces our field managers to make difficult decisions every day about how best to deploy our agents in the interest of homeland security.
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We are well aware of the new missions and responsibilities that are coming in the face of these new challenges, and frankly we welcome the challenge. I am looking forward to working with Congress to ensure the right mix of mission and capability to fulfill our homeland security role. I stand ready for your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Greene follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH R. GREENE
MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify before you regarding the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) Interior Enforcement Strategy, and our efforts to increase the domestic security of the United States.
As preliminary matter, and as you know, Mr. Chairman, the President recently announced his proposal for a new Department of Homeland Security. The INS strongly supports the creation of this new cabinet-level department, as proposed by the President and the Commissioner considers this an important and very positive development for the security of our nation and for the mission and employees of the INS. In this new structure, the INS will become a key part of one of the largest agencies in the Federal Government and will be partners in what is the most important mission of our government: protecting the American people and ensuring the safety of our institutions and our precious freedoms.
Enforcing our nation's immigration laws in the interior of the United States has always been an exceptionally demanding and challenging mission. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 have placed even greater demands and challenges upon our agents.
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The INS Interior Enforcement Strategy is symbiotic to our Border Control Strategy established in 1994. The strategies envision a seamless web of enforcement from the interior of the United States to the nation's borders and out to the farthest reaches of source and transit countries that will impact the flow of illegal immigrants to the United States. The underlying principles and goals of these strategies were designed to respond to the changing migration environment in the United States in all its complexity. The Interior Enforcement Strategy includes the following strategic priorities:
Identify, apprehend, and remove alien criminals;
Deter and diminish smuggling and trafficking of aliens;
Respond to community needs as they relate to illegal immigration;
Minimize immigration benefit fraud and other document abuse; and
Block employers' access to unauthorized workers.
Meeting these priorities requires the capacity to remove all removable, deportable, and excludable aliens so that the execution of a final order of removal is a certainty. Only with this effective enforcement can the INS ensure that these key strategic policy objectives are met. The INS has less than 2,000 Special Agents throughout the world.
Within the context of the Interior Enforcement Strategy, INS Special Agents are tasked with a wide range of critical responsibilities including working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and intelligence community to support counter-terrorism efforts within the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). In fact, the INS committed a significant number of agents to the 9-11 investigation and provided a significant amount of investigative information for the 9-11 investigation. In addition to our counter-terrorist efforts, the INS' responsibilities include identifying convicted criminal aliens and processing them for deportation; investigating immigration crimes; and auditing and identifying employers and employees who have violated immigration laws.
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Another of our critical missions is to support state and local law enforcement through the INS' Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) located in Burlington, Vermont. The primary mission of the LESC is to help local law enforcement agencies determine if a person they have contact with, or have in custody, is in fact an illegal, criminal, or fugitive alien. The LESC provides a 24/7 link between Federal, state, and local officers and the databases maintained by the INS.
In FY 2001, the LESC received 221,507 state and local law enforcement inquiries, 10,155 investigative inquiries, and 10, 338 inquiries regarding foreign nationals seeking to purchase firearms, and it lodged 1,465 detainers authorizing the detention of an unlawful alien.
The LESC provides every law enforcement officer in participating states direct access to the INS. When a police officer arrests an alien, INS personnel at the LESC are able to provide that officer with vital information and guidance, and if necessary, place the police officer in contact with an INS officer in the field. On a daily basis, these interactions result in the INS taking into custody individuals who are present in the United States unlawfully and who may have committed a crime. The partnerships fostered by the LESC increase public safety by identifying criminal aliens who may otherwise pose a threat to the local community or our nation.
Another way in which the INS has responded to the needs of the law enforcement community is through 45 Quick Response Teams (QRTs) across the United States. The QRTs are comprised of 200 INS Special Agents and Detention and Removal Officers. The primary duty of the QRTs is to work directly with state and local law enforcement officers to take into custody and remove illegal aliens who have been encountered by state and local law enforcement officers for violations of state or local laws.
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For decades, the INS has actively participated in Federal, state, and local task forces that target criminal activities and enterprises with criminal alien involvement. One such task force is the Violent Gang Task Force (VGTF). INS agents assigned to VGTF units in major cities throughout the United States assist local and Federal agencies in investigations and operations involving alien-based gangs and organized crime groups. The INS also has 127 Special Agents assigned to the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) in nearly 60 cities across the United States. OCDETF is a multi-agency Federal task force operating under the direction of the Department of Justice, which has as its primary mission the identification, investigation, prosecution, and dismantling of sophisticated organizations involved in narcotics trafficking.
INS agents from each District also participate in a nationwide worker exploitation task force that conducts investigations targeting abusive employers who subject workers to inhumane or substandard working conditions, or who violate a wide range of other criminal statutes. The task force is comprised of Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies across the country.
Worksite enforcement activity is another facet of our interior enforcement strategy. The Immigration and Nationality Act was revised in 1986 to establish employment controls that restrict the availability of work for illegal aliens. The goal, of course, was to deter illegal immigration by removing the employment opportunity magnet. Under this strategy, the INS specifically targets employers who are abusive to their workers and violate other Federal and state laws, regardless of industry or geography.
Page 21 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCINS Special Agents conduct investigations of immigration benefit and document fraud. Benefit fraud investigations target organizations, facilitators, and unscrupulous attorneys and immigration consultant, who seek to take advantage of vulnerable immigrants to undermine our legal immigration system. Benefit fraud may involve attorneys who prepare fraudulent asylum applications, immigration consultants who arrange fraudulent marriages, and very complex business-related visa fraud schemes. Recent activities have included an initiative focusing on facilitators of student visa fraud.
Document fraud investigations target individuals who produce or sell counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration and identity documents. These investigations may involve high quality photo-substituted passports used to attempt entry into the United States, counterfeit ''green cards'' and Social Security cards sold to illegal aliens seeking to gain employment here, or genuine, but fraudulently obtained, U.S. birth certificates, driver's licenses, or other identification used by aliens to establish a new, ''legal'' identity in the United States.
INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT IN THE POST 9/11 ENVIRONMENT
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 prompted a refocus of the INS' strategic approach to its law enforcement responsibilities. The INS is committed, as the highest priority of its interior strategy, to ensure domestic security using all the immigration law enforcement authorities at its disposal. There are several notable examples of this approach.
Worksite Enforcement—National Security Focus
Page 22 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCAs a result of a new emphasis on worksite enforcement targeting national interest industries, there has been more than a 20 percent increase in employer case completions. Specifically, the INS launched Operation Tarmac to enhance security at our nation's airports.
INS Headquarters directed its field offices to initiate worksite enforcement investigations into the hiring practices of companies employing individuals who work at airports and who have direct access to commercial aircraft and other secure areas to ensure that these individuals are authorized to work and that employers are complying with the employment eligibility verification requirements. Particular attention is devoted to companies that provide security at major airports throughout the United States. These operations have includes prosecution of individuals who violated criminal immigration statutes, removal of unauthorized aliens from airport worksites, and fraudulent document training of security officials responsible for granting access badges to secure areas.
The primary objective of Operation Tarmac is to ensure that travelers have confidence in their safety and security while traveling. This effort has been undertaken in cooperation with a variety of Federal agencies, as well as airport authority management officials. Participating Federal agencies include the FBI, the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorney, the Transportation Security Administration, and the Offices of the Inspector General for the Departments of Labor and Transportation.
Operation Tarmac has been an enormous undertaking. For example, the INS has audited over 190,000 Employment Eligibility Verification Forms (Forms I–9) at more than 1,900 airport businesses; and, to date, over 500 unauthorized aliens have been arrested, and over 260 have been charged with criminal violations of law. We have also initiated Operation Glowworm, using the same goals and methodologies to enhance the security of our nation's nuclear power facilities.
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Operation Southern Focus
Our efforts to enhance domestic security also led to the initiation of Operation Southern Focus. In January 2002, the INS initiated a multi-jurisdictional enforcement initiative aimed at targeting alien smuggling organizations specializing in the movement of U.S.-bound aliens from countries that are of interest to the national security of the United States. Information available to the INS indicates terrorist organizations often use human smuggling organizations to move around the globe. Many targets of Operation Southern Focus were believed responsible for smuggling hundreds of aliens. Since the inception of this operation, five significant alien smugglers have been arrested and charged with alien smuggling violations, and significant alien smuggling pipelines have been severely crippled.
Alien Absconder Initiative
The INS recently initiated the Alien Absconder Initiative (AAI). The AAI is designed to identify and apprehend unauthorized aliens who have unexecuted final orders of removal. The objective of Phase I of the AAI is to locate, apprehend, interview, and deport approximately 5,900 aliens with unexecuted final orders from countries with active al Qaeda networks and to gather valuable information to assist in the prevention of future terrorist or criminal attacks. INS Headquarters provided more than 5,000 leads to INS field offices that have thus far resulted in the apprehension of nearly 700 fugitives, including 32 positive hits from the National Crime and Information Center (NCIC).
Phase II of the AAI targets over 300,000 immigration fugitives with unexecuted final orders of removal. The AAI is the INS' first national program to address alien absconders.
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Joint Terrorism Task Forces
Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) continue to be the backbone of the INS' efforts to combat international terrorism in the interior of the United States. The INS has 112 JTTF agents stationed in various locations. JTTF agents serve as a critical component in the effort to root out terrorists and their supporters. INS Special Agents working with the JTTFs have played a significant role in recent terrorist investigations nationwide. Working closely with the FBI and other agencies within the multi-agency task forces, INS Special Agents serve the national security of the United States by proactively investigating, targeting, and arresting known terrorists, terrorist organization leaders, members, and associates.
INS agents assigned to the JTTFs have conducted approximately 6,300 joint INS/FBI interviews since September 11, 2001 and have played a critical role in increasing our domestic security efforts.
CONCLUSION
In closing, I would like to state that the men and women of the INS stand ready to tackle the many critical missions with which they are faced. The INS' mission of deterring illegal migration and combating immigration-related crime has never been more critical to our nation's efforts to ensure the safety of the American public. Thank you for this opportunity to appear, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. GEKAS. The time of the gentleman has expired. We turn to Mr. Stana.
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STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA, DIRECTOR OF JUSTICE ISSUES, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. STANA. Mr. Chairman and Member of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss challenges pertaining to INS's Interior Enforcement Strategy. INS issued this strategy in 1999 and refocused it somewhat following the events of 9/11. The strategy was designed to identify and remove criminal aliens from the United States, dismantle and diminish alien smuggling operations, resolve community complaints about illegal immigrants, detect benefit and document fraud and deny employers access to unauthorized workers.
My prepared statement discusses in detail the results of our most recent work on these programs. In my oral statement I would like to briefly make three main points.
First, INS faces numerous daunting enforcement issues. For example, the potential pool of removable criminal aliens and fugitives numbers in the hundreds of thousands. Criminal aliens are incarcerated in hundreds of Federal, State and local facilities while others are fugitives at large across the country. The number of individuals smuggled into the United States has increased dramatically and alien smuggling has become more sophisticated, complex, organized and flexible.
Annually thousands of aliens illegally seek immigration benefits such as work authorization and change of status, and some of these aliens use these benefits to enable them to conduct criminal activities. Hundreds of thousands of aliens unauthorized to work in the United States have used fraudulent documents to circumvent the process designed to prevent employers from hiring them. In some instances employers are complicit in this activity. Given the nature, scope and magnitude of these issues, INS needs to ensure that it is making the best use of its limited enforcement resources.
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Second, our work has disclosed fundamental management challenges that are common to INS's interior enforcement programs. The issues I just listed are daunting, yet the interior enforcement programs receive about one-fifth of funding devoted to border enforcement. Therefore, INS needs to make best use of its limited resources.
The following examples illustrate the need for improvement.
Example one: In several areas we noted that INS does not believe it had sufficient staff to reach its program goals, but it also lacked data on how best to use existing or additional staff. In the criminal alien removal program and at the forensic document laboratory INS lacked good management information to determine how many staff it needed and how to allocate additional staff to best achieve program goals.
Example two: INS has had long-standing difficulty developing and fielding information systems to support its program operations. Too often, program and management data were kept in a loose collection of automated systems that were difficult to access and analyze. Further, data gaps and inaccuracies put INS officials in a poor position to make fact-based decisions about applicant eligibility and program management.
Example three: Working level guidance was sometimes lacking or nonexistent. We found that INS had not established guidance for opening and prioritizing benefit fraud and work site enforcement investigations. Without such guidance, INS cannot be assured that the highest priority cases are investigated and resources are used optimally.
Page 27 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCExample four: Program coordination within INS and with other agencies was sometimes problematic. We found that the anti-smuggling program lacked coordination, resulting in multiple anti-smuggling units, overlapping in their jurisdictions, making inconsistent decisions about which cases to open, and functioning autonomously without a single chain of command. We also found that coordinating with the Labor Department on work site enforcement issues was sometimes problematic because Labor would not delve into authorization issues if it might cause workers not to report potential workplace wage and safety violations.
We have made many recommendations to improve program operations, some of which have already been implemented by INS. In our strategic plan, we expressed our intent to follow up on these issues and recommendations.
My last point is having an effective Interior Enforcement Strategy is an essential complement to having an effective border strategy. Controlling illegal immigration requires INS not only to raise the risk of apprehension at the border but also target resources to those who successfully penetrate border controls by denying work authorization and immigration benefits to those who are not eligible to receive them and to remove those illegally in the United States.
INS needs to address significant challenges and appropriately staffing program areas providing reliable information for program management, establish a clear and consistent guidance for working level staff to do their jobs consistent with the goals of the program, promoting collaboration and coordination with INS and with other agencies and developing outcome-based measures that would indicate progress toward the strategy's objectives. Addressing these issues is important if INS is to achieve full program potential.
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This concludes my oral statement. I would be happy to address any questions the Subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stana follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA
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Mr. GEKAS. We thank the gentleman and turn to Mr. Camarota.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN CAMAROTA, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES
Mr. CAMAROTA. Mr. Chairman and Member of the Committee, thank you for offering me the opportunity to testify at this hearing on interior enforcement. My name is Steven Camarota, and I am Director of Research at the Center for Immigration Studies here in Washington.
Along with visa processing overseas, the Nation's borders and ports of entry, enforcing laws within the interior of the United States is a key component of administrating the Nation's immigration laws. Unfortunately, for quite some time enforcement has been largely neglected. This has helped to create a very large illegal alien population, now estimated at over 8 million.
There are a number of reasons why interior performance must be improved. First, in a nation built on the rule of law, allowing any set of laws, including those pertaining to immigration, to be widely flouted undermine the very foundation of our Republic.
Second, we know from a variety of sources that illegal aliens are overwhelmingly unskilled, with perhaps three-fourths lacking a high school education. In a 1997 report, the National Research Council concluded that by increasing the supply of such workers immigration was responsible for close to half of the decline in relative wages for high school dropouts since 1980, making workers who already are the poorest in the Untied States even poorer.
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By lowering wages and labor costs illegal immigration creates a third problem. There is strong evidence that increasing reliance on unskilled illegal alien labor in such industries as agriculture and construction is slowing productivity gains and causing the United States to fall behind its international competitors.
A fourth problem with illegal immigration is it imposes significant costs on taxpayers. For example, the National Research Council has estimated that an immigrant with less than a high school education, which includes the vast majority of illegal aliens, imposes a net fiscal drain of $89,000 on public coffers during the course of his or her lifetime.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, illegal immigration is a problem because it increases the risks from foreign born terrorists. In a study recently completed by the Center for Immigration Studies we found that at least 22 of 48 al Qaeda foreign born terrorists operating within the United States since 1993 had committed significant violations of immigration laws prior to taking part in terrorism. Thus, strict enforcement of immigration laws could be a key component of our antiterrorism efforts given the large number of foreign terrorists who violate our immigration laws.
Now what can be done to make interior enforcement more effective? Let me touch on a few things very quickly. First, the tracking system currently envisioned for foreign students should be expanded to include the more than 1 million temporary workers, trainees and in-company transfers. INS investigators then could be sent out to follow up to the sponsoring employer or other institution as soon as they receive notice that a person is not coming to work or attending class as they agreed to when they got their visa.
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Second, another area of enforcement that is needed is to put the names of all visa overstays in the Nation's criminal data base. Now, of course we have to create an effective entry-exit system to do that. The INS has estimated that some 40 percent of all illegal aliens in the country are people who enter on temporary visas and then overstay. With millions of visa overstays in the country, there is no question that tens of thousands of them are arrested or pulled over in routine traffic stops each year. In fact, two of the 9/11 hijackers were pulled over in traffic stops in the months preceding the attacks, including the plot's ring leader Mohamed Atta.
Now the centerpiece of any Interior Enforcement Strategy has to be enforcing the prohibition on hiring illegal aliens. While work site enforcement, as it has commonly been called, may not seem to be vital to national security, in fact it is. We found that eight of the 48 al Qaeda terrorists in our study worked in the U.S. illegally prior to taking part in terrorism.
Also, gaining control of the border is probably not going to be possible unless we slow the number of illegal job seekers trying to cross it. You all know the national security, economic and fiscal arguments against illegal immigration are overwhelming. Many people still argue that there is little that can be done about this situation, but the evidence is actually to the contrary. The INS itself estimates that 200,000 illegal aliens each year leave the country on their on or are deported. Another 200,000 or so actually get green cards as part of the normal legal immigration process. In sum, the illegal alien population decreases in theory by about 400,000 a year. Of course something like 800,000 new illegal aliens arrive annually, but if we significantly reduce the number of new illegal aliens entering and increase the number who go on their own by vigorously enforcing the laws within the United States, the problem will largely take care of itself over time.
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Now, no system can be foolproof, but with regard to terrorism it doesn't have to be if only some of those involved in a terrorist plot can be uncovered and stopped the entire conspiracy can often be unraveled, as was the case with the millennium plot. If properly implemented, interior enforcement can help to improve the lives of the working poor in this country, save taxpayers money, increase business productivity and help reduce the terrorist threat.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Camarota follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN A. CAMAROTA
Interior enforcement is a critically important part of effective immigration control. Along with visa processing overseas, the borders, and ports of entry, enforcing laws within the United States is a key component of administering the nation's immigration laws. Unfortunately, for a long time, efforts to enforce immigration laws within the United States have been very limited. This has helped to create a very large illegal population, now estimated by the Census Bureau at more than 8 million.(see footnote 1) Lax enforcement of immigration laws has also increased America's vulnerability to foreign-based terrorists. Reinvigorating interior enforcement could play a vital role in reducing both conventional illegal immigration and the terrorist threat. In my testimony I will explain why interior enforcement is so important to the nation and suggest some possible ways to make it work better.
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There are a number of reasons why interior enforcement must be improved. First, in a nation built on the rule of law, allowing any set of laws, including those pertaining to immigration, to be widely flouted undermines the very foundation of our republic. More specifically, there are significant costs to the U.S. economy and American taxpayers from allowing millions of people to live in the United States illegally. Finally, there is the risk from foreign-born terrorists. In a study recently completed by the Center for Immigration Studies, we found that 22 of 48 al Qaeda-linked terrorists who have been involved in terrorism in the United States between 1993 and 2001 had committed significant violations of immigration laws prior to taking part in terrorism.(see footnote 2) Thus, strictly enforcing immigration laws could become a key component of our anti-terrorism efforts.
WHY ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM
Illegal Immigration Is a National Security Risk. As already indicated, a number of terrorists violated immigration laws before they committed their crimes. In many cases these terrorists lived, worked, opened bank accounts, and received driver's licenses with little or no difficulty. They operated for extended periods within the United States while they were in violation of immigration laws. For example, of the 48 terrorists in the study cited above, at least 13 had overstayed a temporary visa at some point.
In addition to overstaying visas, we found in our study that terrorists have violated immigration laws in a number of other ways. Some terrorists have engaged in fraudulent marriages to American citizens, such as Fadil Abdelgani, who took part in the plot to bomb New York City landmarks in 1993, and Khalid Abu al Dahab, who raised money and helped recruit new members for al Qaeda from within the United States. Terrorists also violated immigration laws by providing false information on their applications for permanent residence, such as Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, who inspired several terrorist plots. Still other terrorists have violated the law by working illegally in the United States; at least eight terrorists held jobs for extended periods while living in the country illegally before taking part in terrorism, including those involved in the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the plot to bomb New York landmarks, and the Millennium plot. Because such a large percentage of foreign-born terrorists violated immigration law, enforcing the law would be extremely helpful in disrupting and preventing terrorist attacks.
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Tolerating Illegal Immigration Facilitates Terrorism. One might reasonably point out that the vast majority of illegal aliens are not terrorists. However, allowing a large illegal population to reside in the United States facilitates terrorism for two reasons. First, it has created a large underground industry that furnishes illegals with fraudulent identities and documents that terrorists can (and have) tapped into. Several of the 9/11 terrorists were assisted in getting their Virginia driver's licenses from someone who specialized in helping run-of-the-mill illegal aliens obtain them.
Second, the existence of a huge illegal population creates a general contempt or disregard for immigration law. Although the general public may still want the law enforced, the scale of illegal immigration creates a tacit acceptance by law enforcement, policymakers, and even the INS itself. With millions of illegal immigrants already in the country, and with immigration laws widely flouted, it is perhaps easy to understand why the immigration inspector at Miami's airport allowed Mohammed Atta back into the country in January 2001 even though he had overstayed his visa on his last visit and had abandoned his application to change status to vocational student by leaving the country.
The release from detention of 1993 World Trade Center Bomber Ahmad Ajaj, or Brooklyn subway bomber Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, both of whom had no legal right to be in the country, does not seem so outrageous when one considers that immigration law is routinely violated and millions of people are allowed to live in the country illegally. Tolerating mass illegal immigration is by no means the only factor increasing the chance that terrorists will successfully enter and remain in the country, but by not enforcing immigration law we certainly made life easier for the large number of terrorists who had broken immigration laws in the past.
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Illegal Immigration Imposes Significant Costs on the Economy. We know from a variety of sources that illegal aliens are overwhelming unskilled, with perhaps more than three-fourths lacking even a high school education. Each year roughly one-quarter of a million illegal aliens who lack a high school education settle in the United States. Allowing in so many unskilled workers creates very significant economic problems. The economic goal of a modern society such as ours is to create a large middle class through high-wage, capital-intensive jobs exhibiting growing labor productivity and aiming toward a flatter distribution of income. Mass unskilled immigration, a very large share of which is illegal, subverts these goals. In its 1997 report, the National Research Council concluded that by increasing the supply of unskilled workers, immigration was responsible for close to half the decline in relative wages for high school dropouts from 1980 to 1994, translating into lost wages for those dropouts amounting to about 5 percent of their incomes.(see footnote 3)
From the point of view of employers, this seems like a desirable state of affairs, since lower labor costs mean higher profits, and for consumers it should mean lower prices as well. Of course, for the 10 percent of our workers who lack a high school education and who are already the lowest-paid workers, this reduction is quite harmful. But, putting aside the impact on the working poor, the long-term consequences of illegal immigration for the economy are also harmful.
There is strong evidence that in industries as diverse as construction, garment manufacturing, and agriculture an increasing reliance on unskilled illegal-alien labor is slowing productivity gains and causing the United States to fall behind its international competitors. Unskilled immigration acts as a subsidy by artificially holding down labor costs by increasing the supply of labor. Businesses tend to want subsidies and often grow dependent on them. But like any subsidy, illegal immigration prevents innovation and causes the industry in question to lose its competitive edge in the long term. Reducing illegal immigration and allowing wages to rise naturally would not only be good for the working poor, it would make for a more productive economy. Employers, in response to upward pressure on wages, would adopt more productive methods, such as dried-on-the-vine raisin production or greater use of pre-fabricated material in construction. We can reduce illegal immigration secure in the knowledge that it will not spark inflation because unskilled workers account for such a tiny fraction of total economic output. High school dropouts account for less than 4 percent of total output in the United States, so even if wages rose substantially for these workers, the effect on prices would be very small.
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Illegal Immigration Is Also a Problem for Public Coffers. In addition to reducing wages for the working poor and hindering productivity gains, there is another problem with illegal immigration—it imposes significant fiscal costs. As a practical matter, the middle and upper class in the United States pay most of the taxes. The poor, immigrant or native, generally consume significantly more in public services than they pay in taxes. Because illegal aliens are overwhelming unskilled, this results in their having much lower incomes and tax payments. Moreover, while illegal aliens are not supposed to use most welfare programs, in fact they often make use of them anyway. Even if the immigrant himself is not eligible because of legal status, immigrant families can still receive benefits on behalf of their U.S.-born children, whose welfare eligibility is the same as any other native-born American.
In research done by the Center for Immigration Studies, we estimated that of households headed by illegal aliens from Mexico (the largest component of the illegal population), 25 percent used at least one major welfare program. This is lower than the 34 percent estimated for households headed by legal Mexican immigrants. But it is much higher than the 15 percent estimated for natives. Significant use of public services coupled with much lower tax payments means that illegal immigrants almost certainly create a net fiscal drain.
In 1997 the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) estimated that immigrant households consume between $11 billion and $20 billion more in public services than they pay in taxes each year. This net fiscal drain (taxes paid minus services used) is almost entirely the result of unskilled immigrants. The Academy estimated that an immigrant with less than a high school education imposes a net fiscal drain of $89,000 on public coffers during his lifetime. This burden on taxpayers would, of course, become even worse if these immigrants were legalized, because they would remain largely poor, given their limited education levels, but they would become directly eligible for welfare programs. From the point of view of taxpayers, reducing illegal immigration by enforcing the law would almost certainly be desirable.
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WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MAKE INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVE
Tracking System for Temporary Visa Holders. There is a longstanding problem that the federal government often has no idea whether foreign visitors have left when their temporary visas expire. In addition, it often has no idea where foreign citizens live while their visas are still valid. A number of terrorists have been tourists and business travelers, and it would be very difficult to track such individuals within the United States. Even in the current environment, it is unrealistic to expect all foreign visitors to submit their passports every time they check into a hotel and to expect hotels to report that information. Currently, foreign travelers are required to write down their destination upon entering the United States, but no effort is made to verify the information; in fact, two of the 9/11 jihadists listed ''Marriott Hotel, New York'' as their destination. Perhaps there is some practical means for tracking tourists and business travelers; developing such a system would certainly be a significant challenge, but it is something the INS should at least be studying.
While tracking tourists and business travelers may not be possible at present, it would be possible to track foreign citizens residing here for extended periods of time who are affiliated with an American institution responsible for their whereabouts. Such a system makes sense because many of these long-term visitors (here from one to six years, or more) reside here for a long time in a legal status, whereas short-term visitors are less likely to have the time to hatch sophisticated plots before their visas expire. Although short-term tourists and business travelers, who are not attached to any American institution, make up the majority of non-immigrants, the number of long-term visa holders requiring oversight is still quite large. In 1999, there were more than 923,000 foreign students and exchange visitors admitted (including their spouses and young children), up 45 percent just from 1995. And the number of long-term foreign workers, plus family members, was approximately 1 million in 1999, up 123 percent from 1995. Tracking these individuals through their American institution is both desirable and possible. If they leave their schools, jobs, or otherwise violate the visa we would know it immediately, and then we could send out an investigator while the trail was still warm.
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Tracking Foreign Students. One of the largest single categories of long-term temporary visitors is foreign students (F1 and M1 visas). A number of terrorists originally entered on student visas, including Eyad Ismoil, a conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour, and both were in the country illegally when they committed their crimes. Ismoil dropped out after three semesters and remained in the United States illegally, while Hanjour never even attended class. Both Khalid Abu al Dahab and Wadih el Hage originally came to the United States on student visas, later married Americans, and became naturalized citizens.
The 1996 immigration law mandated that the INS develop a computerized tracking system for foreign students to replace the current manual, paper-based system. Unfortunately, the system has not moved beyond the pilot stage, and has only been tested in a couple of dozen southeastern schools, largely because of opposition from universities and colleges. Institutions have opposed it, fearing the extra administrative burden and also because they do not like the idea of treating foreign students differently from their American counterparts. But given the very real threats we face, tracking students makes perfect sense. Ideally such a system would provide the INS with real-time information verifying a student's enrollment and immediately notify the INS if the student drops out or otherwise is not honoring the terms of his visa. The border security bill recently signed by the president will go a long way toward creating such a system. Of course, it remains to be seen whether such a system will be given the resources and political support it needs to be fully implemented.
Tracking System Should Be Expanded to Non-Students. There is no reason to limit the tracking system only to foreign students. There are an additional million temporary workers, trainees, and intra-company transferees who can and should be included in such a system. Expanding the new tracking system to cover both foreign students and foreign workers is needed to ensure that the system is as comprehensive as possible. INS enforcement then could follow up with the sponsoring employer or other institution as soon as it receives notice that the person is no longer honoring the terms of the visa.
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An Entry/Exit System Is Needed for Effective Interior Enforcement. An estimated 40 percent of illegal aliens entered the United States originally on a temporary visas and then did not honor the time limit. Given the large number of terrorists who have overstayed, enforcing visa time limits could disrupt or perhaps uncover terrorist plots in the future. The first step to enforcing time limits is the establishment of an entry/exit system that would automatically record the entry and exit of all persons to and from the United States. Those who overstayed should be barred from ever entering the country again. The system would also allow the INS to identify overstayers who are still in the country. Such a system is provided for in the border security bill the president signed last month, and it is up to elected officials to ensure that it is properly implemented.
Names of Visa Overstayers Should Be Placed in a Criminal Database. In January of 2002, the INS announced that it was going to add to the FBI's criminal database the names of more than 300,000 illegal aliens who have been ordered deported, but whose departure the INS cannot verify. This is certainly a good start, but once a well-functioning entry/exit system is in place, there is no reason why the names, photos, and fingerprints of all visa overstayers could not also be added to the criminal database (assuming we begin gathering such information on all visa applicants). In that way, if they are ever arrested for a crime or even pulled over in a traffic stop, they could be held by local police and then turned over to the INS. This could become a key component of interior enforcement. With 3 to 4 million visa overstayers living in the United States, there is no question that tens of thousands of them have some encounter with the authorities each year. Traffic stops and arrests are a significant opportunity to apprehend those in the country illegally, and we should take full advantage of them.
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While adding visa overstays to the criminal database would help reduce illegal immigration, one may still wonder if it would ever be useful against terrorists. In fact, two of the 9/11 hijackers were pulled over in traffic stops in months preceding the attacks. In the spring of 2001, the plot's ringleader, Mohammed Atta, received a traffic ticket in Broward County, Florida, for driving without a license. He had, by this time, overstayed his visa on his previous visit to the United States between June of 2000 and January of 2001, though the INS at Miami International Airport allowed him back into the country. Had a system of carefully tracking overstays and placing their names in the criminal database been in place, then we might have been able to apprehend Atta and perhaps avert the 9/11 attacks. Although he had not overstayed his visa, Ziad Samir Jarrah, who was on board United Airlines Flight 93 that crashed in Pennsylvania on 9/11, was issued a speeding ticket on September 9 in Maryland for driving 95 miles an hour in a 60-mile-per-hour zone. Thus, even the most sophisticated terrorists in American history seem to have run afoul of the law prior to carrying out their plans.
For the INS to quickly take custody of visa overstayers detained by police, it would need more detention space and more agents assigned to interior enforcement. By adding the names of visa overstays to the criminal database, the INS would in effect enlist the help of thousands of local law enforcement officers.
Enforcing the Ban on Hiring Illegal Aliens. The centerpiece of any interior enforcement strategy has to be enforcing the prohibition on hiring illegal aliens. While worksite enforcement, as it is commonly called, may not seem to be important to national security at first glance, it is, in fact, vital to reducing the terrorist threat. In 1986, Congress prohibited the employment of illegal aliens, although enforcement was at first spotty and has been virtually nonexistent for most of the past decade. Although it is obviously directed at turning off the magnet of jobs attracting conventional illegal aliens, such worksite enforcement is also important for anti-terrorism efforts. Gaining control of the border between crossing points is probably only possible if we dramatically reduce the number of illegal job seekers who routinely cross into the United States. If prospective illegal aliens knew there was no job waiting for them in the United States, fewer would try to cross illegally, making it easier to secure the border.
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As already indicated, the estimated 8 million illegals now living in the country have also created a vast market and infrastructure for fraudulent documents. The existence of widespread fraud can only make it easier for terrorists to operate in the United States. In addition, it would be much harder for terrorists who overstay their visas to blend into normal life if finding a job is made more difficult. A number of terrorists have worked illegally prior to being arrested for terrorism. At least eight of the terrorists in our study worked in the United States illegally before being arrested. Of course, terrorists could still come with large sums of cash and try to live undetected, but doing so would be much harder if getting a job is much more difficult.
Worksite Enforcement Must Be Made Effective. There are two steps that are needed to make worksite enforcement effective. First, a national computerized system that allows employers to verify instantly that a person is legally entitled to work in the United States needs to be implemented. Employers would submit the name, date of birth, Social Security number (SSN), or alien registration number to the INS for each new hire. This information is already collected on paper as part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, but is not used by the INS. After an instant check of its database, the employers would then receive back from the INS an authorization number indicating that the person is allowed to work in the United States. The authorization number would provide the employer an ironclad defense against the charge that they knowingly hired an illegal alien. Tests of such systems have generally been well received by employers.
Document fraud, of course, is widespread, but a computerized system would be a key tool in uncovering it. For example, a valid SSN that is linked to a different name and submitted to the INS, or a SSN and name that show up among numerous employers across the country, would both be indications that a worker is trying to skirt the law. The INS could develop procedures to identify potential problems of this kind. When a potential problem is identified, the INS would then go out to the employer and examine all the paperwork for the employee, perhaps conducting an interview with the worker and determine the source of the problem.
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Dramatically Increase the Number of INS Investigators. Investigators from the INS are charged with such tasks as worksite enforcement, anti-smuggling efforts, and combating document fraud. There are only approximately 2,000 agents assigned to interior enforcement for the entire country. This number must be increased dramatically. At present there are only the full-time equivalent of 300 INS inspectors devoted to worksite enforcement year-round, whose job it is to enforce the ban on hiring the five or six million illegal immigrants now working in the country. If the number of investigators was increased to the levels necessary, they could begin to visit employers identified by the verification system as having a potential problem, and additionally could randomly visit worksites to see that employers were filing the paperwork for each worker as required by law. Those employers found to be knowingly hiring illegals would be made to pay stiff fines.
It is not just in the area of worksite enforcement that more investigators could be put to work. The system of tracking students and perhaps other visitors requires that there be enough agents to locate those identified by the tracking system as having violated their visas. If we create a tracking system, for example, but there are no agents to investigate those who stop working or attending class, then a tracking system is almost meaningless. Failure to develop such a system means that millions of illegal immigrants will continue to work and live in the United States facing little or no penalty. Not only does this make a mockery of the rule of law, harm the working poor, and impose significant costs on taxpayers, it also exposes the country to significant security risks.
Enforce Employment Verification and Alien Registration. Most of the recommendations outlined above have dealt with temporary visa holders or efforts to reduce illegal immigration. More effective monitoring is also needed of permanent residents. A number of militant Islamic terrorists have been legal immigrants, including Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali (ringleader of a plot to bomb New York landmarks) and Mahmud Abouhalima, a leader of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. Until the early 1980s all non-citizens living in the United States were required to register annually their whereabouts with the INS. This practice should probably not be revived in that form. Potential terrorists cannot be expected to dutifully send in their addresses. However, the employment verification system outlined above could be a very effective tool in locating non-citizen legal immigrants. This is especially important when a person is placed on the watch list after he has entered the country. At present, there is often no way for the INS to know where that individual lives; however, the employment verification process would provide the INS with the last known employer for green card holders who work. Thus, if it became necessary to arrest or at least undertake surveillance of a non-citizen, his last known employer would be a place to start. The verification system would in effect be alien registration, at least for those resident aliens who work.
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The INS Must Integrate Databases. One reform that would be relatively easy to undertake would be for the INS to integrate its various databases. At present, separate databases are maintained for non-immigrants, immigrants, citizenship applications, and deportations. The INS needs to establish a single integrated file on each foreign citizen that uses a biometric identifier like a digitized fingerprint. This file would contain information from each step in the visa process, including each land border crossing, each entry and exit at airports, each change in status at school or work, each arrest, as well as any application for permanent residence. This file should be accessible to law enforcement and would remain open until the person becomes a citizen.
Prevent Illegal Aliens from Obtaining Driver's Licenses and Bank Accounts. One change that seems obvious is to make it more difficult for illegal aliens to get driver's licenses and open bank accounts. Bank accounts are important because they make it easier for people who work illegally in the United States to cash paychecks and transfer money abroad. Thus, by allowing illegals to open bank accounts we make it easier to be an illegal alien, which in turn can only increase illegal immigration. A foreign passport or consular registration card should not be enough to open an account in the United States. A person should be allowed to open an account only with a U.S.-issued driver's license or state I.D. card. The key is to prevent illegals from getting driver's licenses. A number of the 9/11 terrorists were able to get licenses and open bank accounts with little difficulty. Virginia, which issued eight drivers licenses to 9/11 terrorists, only required that a third party attest to the fact that the license applicant is a state resident. This is a clear invitation for illegal aliens and terrorists to obtain drivers licenses.
Page 44 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCAll states must require birth certificates and other supporting documents for licenses. Unfortunately, a number of states do not carefully verify identity or eligibility for a license, and in fact some states now explicitly allow illegal aliens to get licenses. Not only do licenses make it easier to open bank accounts, licenses are also helpful when accessing government documents, looking for a job, renting motor vehicles, and of course boarding commercial airliners. If we are serious about reducing illegal immigration and protecting the country from terrorists, then doing a great deal more to prevent illegals from opening bank accounts and obtaining drivers licenses will have to be part of our efforts.
Amnesties for Illegal Aliens Have Helped, and Not Hindered, Terrorists. The existence of a large illegal population clearly creates a host of problems for the United States. Instead of enforcing the law, some have suggested giving green card to the illegals, thereby ''eliminating'' the illegal population. Of course, this would not solve the problem of future illegal immigration; after the last amnesty in 1986, the 2.7 million who were given green cards were entirely replaced by new illegal aliens within less than 10 years. While the events of 9/11 have significantly reduced political support for what had been growing momentum to grant amnesty to Mexican and perhaps other illegals, the idea will likely re-emerge at some point in the future. Some have even argued after 9/11 that granting amnesty would be helpful to national security because it would allow law enforcement to know who is in the country. For this reason some amnesty advocates have even taken to calling it a ''registration'' of illegal aliens. However, in the past, amnesties have helped terrorists, and not impeded them in any way.
Mahmud Abouhalima received amnesty under the 1986 Immigration and Reform and Control Act, by falsely claiming to be an agricultural worker even though he was a cab driver. Given the limited resources of the INS, it was not possible to investigate or even verify the stories of the millions of people who applied for amnesty. As a result, the vast majority who applied for the amnesty were approved. Issuing Mahmud Abouhalima a green card facilitated his terrorism because he could then work at any job he wished and was able to travel to and from the United States freely. In fact, according the October 4, 1993, issue of Time magazine, it was only after he received his green card in 1990 that he made several trips to Pakistan, where he received combat training. Thus, the 1986 amnesty is what made his training by al Qaeda possible. Had Abouhalima not been given permanent residency, he would not have been able to travel abroad and become a trained terrorist.
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The case of Mohammed Salameh, who rented the truck used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, shows why an amnesty will not hinder terrorists. His application for amnesty was denied because he was not as adept at making fraudulent claims as was Abouhalima. The INS did its job in his case and rejected his application on its face. However, because there is no mechanism in place to force people who are denied a green card to leave the country, he continued to live and work in the United States illegally and ultimately take part in terrorism. Thus, in the past terrorists who applied for amnesty either received it, making their operations easier, or, when turned down, simply continued to engage in terrorism unhindered. In sum, the last amnesty only helped terrorists and did nothing to hinder those involved in the first World Trade Center bombing. If we are to have an amnesty, then at the very least we first need to devote a great deal more resources to interior enforcement, including detention space and INS agents assigned to investigate applications and to detain and remove those found ineligible.
CONCLUSION
Although the national security, economic, and fiscal arguments against illegal immigration are overwhelming, many people still might argue that there is little that can be done about this situation. In fact, the problem isn't nearly as intractable as it may seem. The INS estimates that each year roughly 150,000 illegal aliens leave the country on their own, another 200,000 or so get green cards as part of the normal ''legal'' immigration process, 50,000 illegals are deported, and about 20,000 die. In sum, at least 400,000 people leave the illegal-alien population each year.
Of course, something like 800,000 new illegals arrive annually, and thus the total illegal population continues to grow. But the numbers leaving the illegal population are still huge, and we can use this fact to our advantage. If we significantly reduce the number of new illegal aliens entering the country and increase the number who go home, even if only modestly, we can engineer an annual decline in the illegal-alien population, allowing the problem to become progressively smaller over time through attrition.(see footnote 4)
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Strict enforcement of immigration laws—at consulates overseas, at ports of entry, at the border, and especially in the interior of the United States' is one of the most effective means we have of reducing the threat from foreign-born terrorists. Failure to develop a vigorous interior enforcement system will result in the continual increase of the illegal alien population, imposing significant costs on unskilled American workers, taxpayers, and, in the long-run, American business. By enforcing immigration laws we can improve the lives of the working poor, save taxpayers money, and help reduce the terrorist threat.
Mr. GEKAS. We thank the gentleman. And we turn to tower final witness, Ms. Demeo.
STATEMENT OF MARISA DEMEO, REGIONAL COUNSEL, MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND
Ms. DEMEO. On behalf of MALDEF, I appreciate the opportunity to present testimony to you today. In order to evaluate the INS's Interior Enforcement Strategy and its effect on the national security and the civil rights of Latinos, I will raise two issues. The first point I will make is that the Federal Government's changing Interior Enforcement Strategy at work sites does not forward the goal of fighting terrorism but impacts greatly the Latino community.
The second point I will make is that allowing local law enforcement to engage in immigration enforcement when crime is not involved decreases public safety and increases mistrust between Latinos and local law enforcement.
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First, as has been stated there are approximately 8 1/2 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S., and 60 percent are from Latin American countries. Traditionally the INS has focused its Interior Enforcement Strategy in areas that are designed to protect the public safety, which we support by focusing on crime and work sites where crime or abuse is occurring. Since 9/11, however, the interior enforcement policy has changed significantly.
In my written testimony I review recent INS enforcement activities at airports. Hundreds of individuals have been fired from their jobs and hundreds more have had indictments brought against them. The intention to fight terrorism and the result of finding no ties to terrorism in these efforts, however, are constant themes in these enforcement efforts.
Take the case of Salt Lake City Airport. After checking work authorization papers the INS ensured that over 200 individuals were fired from their jobs, and working with the U.S. Attorney's Office, they secured an additional 69 indictments. Most of the indictments were brought against Central and South American immigrants for allegedly using false Social Security cards. While three employees worked in security screening, many worked in other areas, such as janitorial services and food services. The U.S. Attorney admitted that not one of the persons indicted was associated with any kind of terrorism. He also said ''we think we simply had people who wanted to work.''
The firing and indictments of hard working family-oriented Latinos is not helping our war on terrorism, but it is causing grave economic and other hardships on our community. Congress should provide strict oversight of the INS's Interior Enforcement Strategy post-9/11 and redirect those efforts to methods that actually achieve the goal of increasing national security.
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Second, there are already tensions between local law enforcement agencies and many minority communities. The fear and mistrust of local law enforcement in the Latino community is only heightened when local law enforcement engages in immigration enforcement. Also racial profiling of Latinos increases. Current trends post-9/11 to involve local law enforcement in enforcing immigration laws make matters worse.
INS Commissioner Ziglar announced in December that the INS would for the first time input data on over 300,000 individuals who have somehow violated their visas into an FBI data base. About half of those on the list are originally from Mexico and most have violated civil immigration laws but are not dangerous criminals. Local law enforcement officials who stop motorists for a traffic violation could access the data base and detain individuals even if there are no criminal violations.
Earlier this year the INS also began working on agreements with Florida and South Carolina so that more local law enforcement officials could arrest immigrants on civil immigration violations. In South Carolina the State Attorney General is eager to deputize his local officials to enforce immigration laws. He said, ''you can go around the streets of Columbia, South Carolina, and you can see people that there is every reason to suspect that they are not here legally.'' He further explained that, ''you have got our borders being overrun in this country. I am sure we are going to find out that the major problem in South Carolina will be those of Mexican origin.''
To make things worse, Attorney General Ashcroft recently announced that the Justice Department would soon seek the help of local law enforcement to enforce not only criminal but also the civil immigration laws. The AG did this despite strong opposition from the Latino community. Although the AG tried to present the involvement of local law enforcement as limited, he could not hide this dramatic new interpretation of immigration law. Going against long-standing precedent, the AG has now interpreted the law in a way that claims that every local law enforcement agency has the ''inherent authority'' to enforce not only the criminal provisions of the immigration law but also the civil provisions.
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This drastic change in legal interpretation will empower not only local law enforcement officials who are trying to fight terrorism, but it will also empower and embolden those officials who are bad actors. We are particularly concerned about the impact of this decision in areas where there are new and growing Latino immigrant communities. Eighty thousand local law enforcement agencies could begin enforcing civil immigration laws for which they are not trained and which will increase fear among Latinos and increase abuse.
Congress must take steps to remove local law enforcement's involvement in immigration where criminal activity is not involved to reduce the possibilities of civil rights violations of Latinos and a reduction in overall public safety.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Demeo follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARISA J. DEMEO
INTRODUCTION
The Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) appreciates the opportunity to provide testimony regarding ''The Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS') Interior Enforcement Strategy'' and some of the changes INS has made since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. MALDEF is a national nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting and promoting the rights of Latinos in the areas of education, employment, political access, immigrants' rights, criminal justice, and public resource equity. We achieve our mission through community education, litigation and advocacy. Founded in San Antonio, Texas, in 1968, MALDEF now is headquartered in Los Angeles with offices in Sacramento, San Antonio, Houston, Albuquerque, Phoenix, Chicago, Atlanta, and Washington, D.C.
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In order to evaluate the changes to the interior enforcement actions of the INS and their effect on national security and the civil rights of the Latino community, this testimony raise two issues: 1) the federal government's changing interior enforcement strategy at work sites does not forward the goal of fighting terrorism but impacts greatly the Latino community; and 2) allowing local law enforcement to engage in immigration enforcement when crime is not involved decreases public safety and increases mistrust between Latinos and local law enforcement.
CHANGING INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY AT WORK SITES DOES NOT FORWARD THE GOAL OF FIGHTING TERRORISM BUT IMPACTS GREATLY THE LATINO COMMUNITY
Traditionally, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has focused its interior enforcement strategy in areas that are designed to protect the public safety. According to the latest estimates from the census in 2000, approximately 8.7 million undocumented immigrants were living in the U.S. in April of 2000.(see footnote 5) The largest group is from Mexico, which is estimated to be about 3.8 million.(see footnote 6) Another 1.4 million are from other Latin American countries in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean.(see footnote 7) As a result, any interior enforcement strategy will greatly affect not only the Latinos who are here in an undocumented status, but their families with whom they live, including spouses, children, and siblings who are in many cases either U.S. citizens or legal immigrants.
We supported the INS' past policy to focus primarily on crime, smuggling of undocumented immigrants, fraud rings, and work sites where there is also smuggling of undocumented immigrants, human rights abuses and other criminal violations.(see footnote 8) Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, however, the INS interior enforcement policy has changed significantly. In this section, the testimony will review the current trend in the INS' activities in work site raids. In the following section, the testimony will discuss the INS' increasing cooperation with local law enforcement.
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Soon after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., the INS initiated an interior enforcement operation, which has been called either ''Operation Safe Travel'' or ''Operation Tarmac'' on different occasions. This Operation was first reported in the press in Seattle, Washington; however, the Operation is a national strategy. According to media reports, over 350 individuals have been arrested by authorities at 13 airports throughout the country mainly because of presenting false information regarding their immigration status or using false documentation to obtain employment.(see footnote 9) Hundreds more have lost their jobs as a result of the raids.
In Seattle, INS officials met with representatives from employers who employ individuals at the Sea-Tac Airport.(see footnote 10) While INS officials spoke about their activities as fulfilling the need to fight terrorism, the INS did not just search the records of security screeners and baggage handlers.(see footnote 11) INS also searched records of individuals who worked in the food service sector and in maintenance.(see footnote 12) Further, the INS provided no evidence that the status of being undocumented per se means that one is a security risk.
Another report of work site enforcement at an airport came from the Lindbergh Field airport in San Diego, California.(see footnote 13) Again, the search was not limited to those who arguably might hold high security positions.(see footnote 14) The search included employers who hire individuals to work at McDonald's, retail shops, newsstands, candy shops and bookstores.(see footnote 15) INS spokesperson Lauren Mack stated, ''This is a part of our commitment to protect the nation's security and safety in the wake of Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.''(see footnote 16) She went on to say, ''We've received information that some airport employees with access to sensitive security areas, especially the tarmac, may have been working in this country without the appropriate authorization to do so.''(see footnote 17) What Mack did not say was that the INS had facts to establish that working without authorization equaled being a security threat.
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In Salt Lake City, Utah, the INS not only checked work authorization papers, it ensured that 202 individuals were fired from their jobs.(see footnote 18) In addition, INS worked with the U.S. Attorney's office in Utah to secure 69 indictments.(see footnote 19) Of the 69 indictments, most were from Central and South America.(see footnote 20) Except for six of the indictments, the rest were brought against individuals who are allegedly in the country in an undocumented status.(see footnote 21) Their indictments were for allegedly using false Social Security cards.(see footnote 22) Based on information and belief, the six individuals indicted for allegedly lying about their past criminal histories were white non-Latinos. The indictments were brought against employees who worked for private companies in areas such as security screening, janitorial and food services.(see footnote 23) Of the 69, 3 were involved in security screening.(see footnote 24)
While the INS operation in Salt Lake City, Utah, was done to fight terrorism, U.S. Attorney Paul Warner admitted that none of the suspects have been tied to terrorism.(see footnote 25) He stated, ''While there is no evidence that anyone indicted as a part of Operation Safe Travel has attempted any kind of terrorist activity at the airport or that the airport is anything less than safe, in today's environment, we are not going to wait around for something to happen.''(see footnote 26) Warner also said about those who were caught in this operation, ''We think we simply had people who wanted to work.''(see footnote 27)
After Salt Lake City, the INS continued its Operation in Portland, Oregon.(see footnote 28) INS detained thirty individuals for allegedly providing false information to work for employers serving the Portland International Airport.(see footnote 29) It found an additional 94 who allegedly were unauthorized to work.(see footnote 30) Two of the individuals indicted in Portland are Jose Fortanel Garcia and Victoriano Royas Modesto, both from Mexico living with their spouses and children in the U.S.(see footnote 31) Their attorney indicated that neither had been charged with a violent crime, using a weapon, or a serious drug crime, and that the two are not dangerous in any way.(see footnote 32) The Assistant U.S. Attorney handling the case, Kathleen Bickers, stated ''This is part of the federal government's increased vigilance to ensure airport security and safety.''(see footnote 33) This was said despite the fact that officials reported that there was no evidence linking those arrested to terrorist activities.(see footnote 34) Ed Sale, an INS spokesperson claimed that those who are undocumented are ''trying to hide (their illegal immigration status), [therefore] they're subject to coercion and bribery. That could be a security threat.''(see footnote 35) Although Sale made this claim, he produced no facts to substantiate it.
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In Phoenix, Arizona the INS cooperated with the Social Security Administration, the FBI, and U.S. Marshals Service to indict 33 workers at Sky Harbor International Airport for document fraud.(see footnote 36) Almost all of the workers are Latinos. Again there was no evidence connecting any of these workers with terrorist activities.
In the Washington, DC area, a total of 104 workers have been arrested who were employed at Dulles, Reagan National and Baltimore Washington International Airports.(see footnote 37) Many of these workers were undocumented immigrants and were charged with supplying false information to obtain jobs. Yet again, none were linked to terrorism in any way.(see footnote 38)
In San Francisco, 25 immigrants were arrested at San Jose and San Francisco International Airports. Eleven of those arrested were undocumented immigrants, and 14 were lawful permanent residents with prior felony convictions. All of them were subject to deportation.(see footnote 39)
In Las Vegas, 27 workers at McCarran International Airport were indicted on charges of providing false information regarding their immigration status or using false social security numbers to obtain employment.(see footnote 40) Maria Del Carmen Reyes and Mirella Bravo-Zambrano, two workers who were arrested, were described by their employer as outstanding examples of quality workers who ''. . . are wives and mothers and didn't deserve to be handcuffed and shackled like they were.''(see footnote 41)
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While the INS has argued that its Operation Safe Travel or Operation Tarmac focusing at airports across the country is a good tool to fight terrorism, it has so far failed to prove the effectiveness of the tool that is hitting the Latino community particularly hard. After the federal government's operations have resulted in hundreds of employees being fired and hundreds more being indicted most often for document violations, the federal government has yet to connect any of those arrested at the airports with terrorism or terrorist activities. Justice Department officials admit that had these workers done the same thing in order to work in a restaurant or at Wal-Mart they might not have been prosecuted.(see footnote 42) Government officials admit time and again that there have been no ties to terrorism yet they keep insisting that this is an effective tool to fight terrorism. While the INS' efforts so far have focused heavily at airports, other sites that the government will allege are national security concerns will also be targeted.(see footnote 43) The firing and indictments of hard-working, family-oriented Latinos and other immigrants are not helping our war on terrorism but are causing grave economic and other hardships on our community. Congress should provide strict oversight of the INS' interior enforcement strategy post-9/11 and re-direct those efforts to methods that actually achieve the goal of increasing national security.
ALLOWING LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TO ENGAGE IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT WHEN CRIME IS NOT INVOLVED DECREASES PUBLIC SAFETY AND INCREASES MISTRUST BETWEEN LATINOS AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
MALDEF traditionally has been opposed to allowing local law enforcement to engage in immigration enforcement where crime is not involved. There are already many tensions between local law enforcement agencies and minority communities in different parts of the country for a variety of reasons. The fear and mistrust of local law enforcement in the Latino community is only heightened when local law enforcement engages in immigration enforcement.
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In order to address this issue through litigation, MALDEF filed a case last year against the Rogers, Arkansas police department. In our case, we allege that Rogers police pulled over our plaintiff, Miguel Lopez, while he was driving his car with his family in July 2001 as he was approaching his home. After detaining Lopez and his wife, the officers asked to see their immigration papers and searched their car without their consent. The offices left without issuing a citation. It was racial profiling similar to that experienced by African Americans with the added offense of asking for immigration papers without any reason other than race or national origin.
Immigrants, generally, prefer not to draw attention to themselves from the government or the private sector even if they are here legally. This explains, in part, why Latino immigrants under-report when they are the victims of crime or when they are the victim of illegal civil practices, such as employment discrimination, unsafe working environments, or housing discrimination even though they experience these practices in significant numbers. Current trends post-9/11 to involve local law enforcement in enforcing immigration laws, particularly civil laws, will only drive Latino immigrant communities further underground and make them less willing to provide information to law enforcement that would be helpful in solving crimes and resolving legal violations that affect not just Latinos but others with whom they work and live. It will also lead to less cooperation from immigrant communities with law enforcement searching for leads to fight terrorism.
On December 5, 2001, at a House hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, INS Commissioner James W. Ziglar announced that the INS would for the first time input data on over 300,000 individuals who have overstayed their visas or somehow violated their visas into a federal criminal database.(see footnote 44) Although Ziglar claims that this was not part of the anti-terrorism strategies, it was done at a time when local law enforcement is looking for ways in which they can help fight terrorism.(see footnote 45) South Carolina Attorney General Charlie Condon, for example, wants the INS to delegate more authority to local law enforcement to enforce immigration laws.(see footnote 46) About half of the individuals on the list of 300,000 are originally from Mexico.(see footnote 47) It has been reported that most of the individuals are people who have violated civil immigration laws but are not dangerous criminals.(see footnote 48)
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The FBI runs the database, known as the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), to which the 300,000 names will be added.(see footnote 49) Over 80,000 law enforcement agencies have access to NCIC.(see footnote 50) INS officials have said that once the names are in the system, local law enforcement officials who stop motorists for a traffic violation or for minor infractions could have access to the database and detain the individual until the INS comes to take over the detention.(see footnote 51) INS Commissioner Ziglar has admitted that, ''It's a huge project and it absolutely will create more work at the field level.''(see footnote 52)
The State of Florida has already begun working on a broader agreement with the INS that would allow Florida law enforcement agencies to arrest immigrants on civil immigration violations.(see footnote 53) Under this plan, 35 police officers, sheriff's deputies and other state law enforcement agents would be trained in immigration policies and procedures and would carry out limited immigration enforcement responsibilities.(see footnote 54)
The Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, Charlie Condon, has also initiated a similar plan to deputize a special unit of state law enforcement officers to investigate immigration violations.(see footnote 55) Claiming that undocumented immigrants are easy to identify on sight, Condon stated during his announcement of his effort that, ''You can go around the streets of Columbia, [South Carolina] and you can see people that there's every reason to suspect they're not here legally.''(see footnote 56) He went on to explain that, ''You've got our borders being overrun in this country. I'm sure we're going to find out that the major problem in South Carolina will be those of Mexican origin.''(see footnote 57) Although the details of these plans have yet to fully emerge, it is clear that there will be ramifications for the Latino and immigrant communities. In South Carolina, those of Mexican origin are the express targets of local law enforcement involvement with federal immigration law enforcemen