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PROHIBITION ON FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WITH COUNTRIES SUPPORTING
TERRORISM ACT OF 1997
TUESDAY, JUNE 10, 1997
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05
a.m., in room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill McCollum
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Bill McCollum, Steve
Chabot, Bob Barr, Asa Hutchinson, Howard Coble, and Charles E. Schumer.
Also present: Paul J. McNulty, chief counsel;
Nicole R. Nason, counsel; Kara R. Norris, staff assistant; and David
Yassky, minority counsel.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MCCOLLUM
Mr. MCCOLLUM. The meeting will come to
order.
Today, we begin consideration of H.R. 748, the
Prohibition on Financial Transactions with Countries Supporting Terrorism
Act of 1997, which I have cosponsored with Mr. Schumer, the ranking member
of this subcommittee.
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The bill will expand the scope of a key provision
in last year's antiterrorism bill, section 321, by eliminating overly
permissive regulations promulgated by the administration last year and
specifically listing exceptions to the prohibition.
In my view, the forces of militant extremism in
the Middle East and Africa are among the greatest international dangers
currently facing America and its vital interests. The deadly threat posed
by international terrorists must not be underestimated. We have all seen
pictures of the bloody slaughter caused by these violent criminals. Yet if
hatred and coldheartedness were all that these killers needed, the world
would be in even more danger than it already is.
Terrorists do need more than desire. They need
support. They need infrastructure. That is why the presence of
terrorist-supporting countries is so harmful to the world community. A
handful of pariah states—Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria,
and Sudan—have been designated by the State Department, pursuant to
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as terrorist-sponsoring
countries or terrorism-list governments.
No one should discount the significance of this
designation. Without the support of these countries, terrorists would
literally not have a home, much less active assistance of government
officials.
There should be no higher priority for the United
States than the battle against terrorism. In my opinion, there should be no
higher priority than the elimination of foreign government support for
terrorists. This is why section 321 of last year's antiterrorism bill is a
vital tool in the battle.
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This section was specifically and successfully
offered as an amendment to the antiterrorism bill by Mr. Schumer and
myself. The clear and unambiguous language of the provision states, in
part, whoever knowingly or having reasonable cause to know that a country
is designated as a country supporting international terrorism and engages
in a financial transaction with the government of that country shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 10 years or both.
The term ''financial transactions'' is defined
very broadly to include transactions involving monetary instruments and
financial institutions.
This language was drafted with a dual purpose in
mind. First, by prohibiting financial support from terrorist countries to
U.S. persons, it attempts to prevent the long arm of terrorism from
reaching the shores of the United States through domestic entities. The
need for this prohibition came to light last year when the Rev. Louis
Farrakhan traveled to Libya and received a personal pledge of significant
financial support from Col. Muammar Qadhafi, an infamous supporter of
terrorism.
The second and broader purpose of the provision
was to prohibit all financial transactions by U.S. persons with these
countries regardless of where these transactions took place. This would
have the effect of cutting off terrorist-sponsoring governments from the
economic benefit of doing business with U.S. companies.
Since five of the seven terrorist-list governments
are already subject to economic sanctions as a result of executive order,
the immediate impact of the ban related particularly to Sudan and
Syria.
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In the course of drafting this amendment last
year, we were advised by the administration that the broad wording in the
prohibition would have unintended consequences particularly in the area of
diplomacy. We agreed to authorize the Department of the Treasury, in
consultation with the State Department, to issue regulations which provided
some exceptions to the ban.
We intended these regulations to exclude various
innocuous transactions that occur in the course of diplomatic activities
and other related official matters. Instead, in August of last year, the
Treasury Department published regulations in relation to section 321 which
essentially reversed the effect of the new prohibition.
These regulations permit all financial
transactions with Sudan and Syria other than those which pose a risk of
furthering domestic terrorism. The regulations prohibit U.S. persons from
receiving unlicensed donations, from engaging in financial transactions
with respect to which the U.S. person knows or has reasonable cause to
believe that the financial transaction poses a risk of furthering terrorist
acts in the United States.
Thus, these regulations completely ignore the
second purpose of the prohibition. They ensure a business-as-usual policy
and represent a step backward in the effort to isolate Syria and Sudan. The
regulations could also permit transactions with other terrorist-list
nations if the current executive order should ever be lifted.
Which brings us to H.R. 748. This bill closes the
loophole created by the administration's regulations and prohibits all
transactions other than those that are specifically connected to diplomatic
activities. The bill strips the executive branch of the authority to issue
regulations exempting transactions from the prohibition.
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It establishes, instead, a legislative exception
only for transactions incident to routine diplomatic regulations among
countries. By this, we mean only those transactions which arise when
officials of this country or representatives of a terrorist-supporting
country travel or engage in activities for diplomatic purposes.
For example, a cab ride from Kennedy Airport to
the United Nations building would not be included. Similarly, an American
diplomat traveling to Syria on official business would not be included.
Many will argue that H.R. 748 is too restrictive.
In addition to witnesses from the administration, we will hear today from
those who believe that H.R. 748 would unnecessarily restrict certain
activities that have been going on and may go on in the future which would
not necessarily be disadvantageous to American security.
Among the concerns that will be expressed are
those relating to the relief of human suffering in terrorist nations and
the impact of the legislation on currently existing business
investments.
I look forward to hearing these discussions. I
know that there are instances where we have to be very specific and,
perhaps, carve out some additional exceptions to those that are in the
bill. But there is a very strong desire on my part and I think on the part
of the members of this subcommittee to make sure that, in the process, we
are not watering down this legislation as the regulation that was
promulgated last year did.
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The intent is very strong. It is desired to
send a message. It is desired to cut off future transactions and
investments by private American business interests in Syria and in Sudan
and in other countries that are on the terrorist list with rare
exceptions.
It has never been the desire of this Member to try
to craft the detailed type of exceptions that I am sure we are going to now
have to put into statute. It was always my hope that this could be done by
leaving this entirely to the regulatory bodies of the administration.
But it does not appear, having experienced what we
just did this past year, that that is going to be a satisfactory solution.
As my colleague Mr. Schumer has said, a car bomb could be driven through
the loophole that was placed there by those regulations.
So here we are today. I look forward to, as I say,
hearing from the witnesses, both from administration and from private
industry, because we have got to draft something that is workable. We have
got to make sure that what we put out is the right thing to do. But it has
got to be tough, and it has got to carry the general message.
[The bill, H.R. 748, follows:]
INSERT OFFSET RING FOLIOS 1 TO 2 HERE
Mr. MCCOLLUM. I understand thatMr. Schumer
will be here this morning, though he is not able to be with us at this very
moment. In the meantime, I yield to my friend Mr. Coble, if he has any
comments.
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Mr. COBLE. I have no opening statement, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you very much, Mr.
Coble.
With that in mind, I will introduce our first
panel today. Our first panel this morning consists of Government witnesses
from the Departments of State and Treasury with special knowledge of
counterterrorism laws and activities.
From the State Department, we have William Ramsay,
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy, Sanctions and Commodities of the
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. Mr. Ramsay is joined by the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Ambassador Philip Wilcox; and by the
Acting Legal Advisor, Michael Matheson.
We also have with us this morning Mr. Richard
Newcomb from the Department of Treasury. Mr. Newcomb is the Director of the
Office of Foreign Assets Control.
We welcome all of you this morning.
I am not sure exactly what procedure we are going
to use, but I assume, Mr. Ramsay, you would like to go first in this
process. Instead of moving from left to right or right to left, we will go
right to you; and, please, any statements you have will be made a part of
the record without objection. Hearing none, it is so ordered. You may
summarize or give us whatever thoughts you wish.
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STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. RAMSAY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ENERGY, SANCTIONS AND COMMODITIES, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS
AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR PHILIP WILCOX,
COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, AND MICHAEL MATHESON, ACTING LEGAL
ADVISOR
Mr. RAMSAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Coble. It is, in fact, a pleasure for me to be here to testify this
morning, because my last posting was in the Congo. I would certainly rather
be here.
H.R. 748 would flatly prohibit virtually all
financial transactions between U.S. persons and the governments of
terrorism-list countries.
We fully agree with your views on the importance
of taking unequivocal measures to compel state sponsors of terrorism to end
such involvement. Fighting international terrorism is one of this
administration's top priorities. Economic sanctions are an important tool
in this effort.
The United States is the world's leader in using
these pressures. In fact, the United States has the most stringent set of
laws of any country in imposing trade and other sanctions against state
sponsors of terrorism—an extensive package of sanctions which bites
when the Secretary of State formally designates a country as a
terrorist-list state.
We forbid the export of dual-use items which could
be used to support military or terrorism ends. We suspend military sales,
foreign aid and Eximbank credits. We deny them GSP. We oppose loans to them
in international financial institutions. We deny U.S. persons tax credits
for taxes paid to such countries.
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These sanctions are all relevant to a state's
support for terrorism. They are designed to deter further support by
depriving terrorist-list states of the means for that support and by
increasing their isolation from the international community.
Beyond that, additional sanctions on each of the
terrorist-list states—up to and including full
embargoes—reflect our individualized responses to the behavior of
these states, to their economic and military pressure points, and to our
relationships with each of them.
Each country has a different set of potential
vulnerabilities and circumstances. Thus, our sanctions are tailored for
maximum impact.
But in order to have that impact, we need
flexibility—flexibility to ratchet up the pressure, at the best time
and in new ways, or to ease it, if there is improvement—to offer
inducements as well as threaten punishments. We need flexibility to target
vulnerabilities, which vary from country to country. And we need
flexibility, including the timing of implementation, to enlist, wherever
possible, the participation of our friends and allies in a sanctions
regime.
Flexibility in designing specific measures is
vital to the success of sanctions. We have significant concerns with H.R.
748 because it is not inherently adaptable. Because it severely limits our
ability to focus sanctions measures so they are aimed at each regime's
vulnerabilities, we believe that H.R. 748 will have significant unintended
consequences that might divert and detract from our intended focus on
combatting terrorism.
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I would like to cite a few examples of the
problems we believe the bill will cause if it is enacted as written.
U.S. nationals could not receive payments for
claims from terrorist-list governments such as Iran, Iraq and Libya, even
if the payments were compensation for terrorist acts.
The United States could no longer be able to meet
its obligations under the Algiers Accords as well as under the 1996 Iran
Air Bank claims settlement.
U.S. media and American journalists, who work to
publicize companies in these countries, could no longer pay government
fees, such as transmission charges, necessary to work within the
terrorism-list countries.
The repatriation of MIA remains from North Korea
might have to cease, along with our involvement in the current freeze and
dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
U.S. participation in U.N. inspections in Iraq
might have to stop, effectively ending the U.N.'s mission of detecting and
destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
U.S. participation and activities to resolve
POW–MIA activities related to the Persian Gulf War could end.
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The orderly, legal and safe migration of Cubans to
the United States, one of the key elements of our Cuba policy, might be
hampered if monitoring of returnees is not deemed to be a routine
diplomatic function.
Donations of food, medicines and medical supplies,
payments for telecommunications services and facilities and direct mail to
Cuba might also have to cease.
The U.S. role in serving as an effective
intermediary between Israeli and Syria and their pursuit of a peaceful
resolution of their differences would be jeopardized.
H.R. 748 could bar the U.S. Government from
funding or directing humanitarian assistance programs in countries like
Sudan, Iraq, and North Korea. Since 1988, the U.S. Government has been the
leading contributor of humanitarian assistance to Sudanese civilians
suffering from civil war and natural disasters. Most of this assistance is
provided through U.N. agencies and operations.
As Secretary Albright has said, there is no cookie
cutter approach to foreign policy. There is no uniform template by which we
shape or mold our relations in precisely the same pattern for each
country.
Our interest in combatting terrorism is a constant
and basic objective shaping our policy. But while our goals and principles
remain constant, our tactics must be flexible to be effective. The
differing interests we have in each country and the differing circumstances
of each country must necessarily shape the political and practical measures
we use to combat terrorism.
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There are many ways to impose sanctions on a
country without causing the foreign policy consequences I have described.
To use sanctions in an effective way, we must resort to them only when
there is compelling need and after we have carefully assessed the benefits
and costs. Specifically, we weigh the impact we hope the sanction will have
on the behavior or policies of the targeted country against the
identifiable costs to U.S. interests, including our trade and investment,
international obligations and overall economic competitiveness.
The administration's policy is to enlist other
nations to support us in imposing sanctions against the targeted nation
whenever possible. A multilateral approach can serve two objectives: to
maximize the effectiveness of the sanctions by making them as universal as
possible, and to distribute the costs of sanctions among other nations to
achieve more equitable burden-sharing.
Country policies are subject to review in light of
the changing conditions and vulnerabilities of the target country; and, in
fact, our policy towards Sudan, for example, is the subject of a current
review. And when changes are necessary in an economic sanctions regime, we
already have the legal tools we need to do the job.
Mr. Chairman, as we examine ways to make our
sanctions policy more effective in deterring state support for terrorism,
we pledge to consult closely with you and other members of the committee in
pursuit of a common position that is best for the United States.
That concludes my remark, Mr. Chairman; and I
would be happy to answer or take any questions you may have.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Ramsay
follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. RAMSAY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
ENERGY, SANCTIONS AND COMMODITIES, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
The Chairman, thank you very much for the
opportunity to testify today on H.R. 748.
H.R. 748 would flatly prohibit virtually all
financial transactions between U.S. persons and the governments of
terrorism-list countries.
We fully agree with your views on the importance
of taking unequivocal measures to compel state sponsors of terrorism to end
such involvement. Fighting international terrorism is one of this
Administration's top priorities. Economic sanctions are an important tool
in this effort.
The United States is the world's leader in using
these pressures. In fact, the U.S. has the most stringent set of laws of
any country in imposing trade and other sanctions against state sponsors of
terrorism—an extensive package of sanctions which bites when the
Secretary of State formally designates a country as a terrorist-list state.
We forbid the export of dual-use items which could be used to support
military or terrorism ends. We suspend military sales, foreign aid, and
Ex-Im credits. We deny them GSP. We oppose loans to them in international
financial institutions. We deny U.S. persons tax credits for taxes paid to
such countries. These sanctions are all relevant to a state's support for
terrorism. They are designed to deter further support by depriving
terrorist list states of the means for that support, and by increasing
their isolation from the international community.
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Beyond that, additional sanctions on each of the
terrorist-list states—up to and including full
embargoes—reflect our individualized responses to the behavior of
these of these states (which varies); to their economic and military
pressure points; and to our relationships with each of them.
Each country has a different set of potential
vulnerabilities and circumstances. Thus, our sanctions are tailored for
maximum impact.
But in order to have that impact, we need
flexibility—flexibility to ratchet up the pressure, at the best time,
and in new ways, or to ease it, if there is improvement—to offer
inducements, as well as threaten punishments. We need flexibility to target
vulnerabilities, which vary from country to country. And we need
flexibility, including the timing of implementation, to enlist, wherever
possible, the participation of our friends and allies in a sanctions
regime.
Flexibility in designing specific measures is
vital to the success of sanctions. We have significant concerns with H.R.
748 because it is not inherently adaptable.
Because it severely limits our ability to focus
sanctions measures so they are aimed at each regime's vulnerabilities, we
believe that H.R. 748 will have significant unintended consequences that
might divert and detract from our intended focus on combating
terrorism.
The following recitation is a partial list of the
problems we believe the bill will cause if enacted as written.
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U.S. nationals could not receive payment for claims from terrorist-list
governments, such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya, even if the payments were
compensation for terrorist acts;
The intellectual property rights of Americans might be jeopardized, if
U.S. nationals are not permitted to engage in transactions necessary to
register and maintain these rights in the targeted countries;
U.S. media and American journalists, who work to publicize conditions in
these countries, could no longer pay government fees, such as transmission
charges, necessary to work within terrorism list countries;
We might not be able to provide aid or assistance in support of democracy
in these countries;
The repatriation of MIA remains from North Korea might have to cease,
along with our involvement in the current freeze and dismantlement of North
Korea's nuclear weapons program;
U.S. participation in UNSCOM inspections in Iraq might have to stop,
effectively ending UNSCOM's mission of detecting and destroying Iraq's
Weapons of Mass Destruction programs;
U.S. participation in UNIKOM, which monitors the Iraq-Kuwait border, could
end;
U.S. participation in activities to resolve POW/MIA issues related to the
Gulf War could end;
U.S. participation in the implementation of UNSC Resolution 986 (Iraqi oil
for food) might have to cease;
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Our Interests Section in Havana could be forced to close, since it is not
clear that it would fall within the scope of ''routine diplomatic
relations'' as provided for in H.R. 748.
The orderly, legal, and safe migration of Cubans to the United States, one
of the key elements of our Cuba policy, may be hampered if monitoring of
returnees is not deemed to be a ''routine diplomatic function.''
It is unclear whether the ''Support for the Cuban People'' provisions,
including humanitarian assistance, as authorized by the 1992 Cuban
Democracy Act would continue to apply. The 1992 legislation is a key
element in U.S. efforts to build a civil society and lay the groundwork for
a peaceful democratic transition in Cuba;
Donations of food, medicines and medical supplies, payments for
telecommunications services and facilities, and direct mail to Cuba might
have to cease;
The ability of the U.S. to host international sporting events such as the
Olympics could be jeopardized if teams from terrorist-list countries could
not participate;
Ordinary transactions by U.S. citizens living in terrorist-list countries,
including religious missionaries and employees of humanitarian
organizations, could become criminal acts—for example paying a
telephone or electricity bill to a state-owned utility;
The U.S. could no longer be able to serve as an effective intermediary
between Israel and Syria in their pursuit of a peaceful resolution of their
differences;
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H.R. 748 could bar the USG from funding or directing humanitarian
assistance programs in countries like Sudan, Iraq, and North Korea. Since
1988, the USG has been the leading contributor of humanitarian assistance
to Sudanese civilians suffering from civil war and natural disasters. Most
of this assistance is provided through UN agencies and operations;
The law could bar U.S. commercial airlines from making payments to
terrorism-list governments for use of commercial air corridors, thus
requiring route alterations or relocation of airline operations, and
creating potential risks to air safety;
U.S. citizen travel to terrorism-list countries, if it involved payment of
visa fees or other taxes, user fees or charges incidental to normal travel
transactions, could become illegal; and
Students from terrorism list countries might not receive government
stipends for study in US institutions (potentially leaving them unable
either to return to their countries or continue their studies).
As Secretary Albright has said, there is no
''cookie cutter'' approach to foreign policy—there is no uniform
template by which we shape or mold our relations in precisely the same
pattern for each country.
Our interest in combating terrorism is a constant
and basic objective shaping our policy. But while our goals and principles
remain constant, our tactics must be flexible to be effective. The
differing interests we have in each country and the differing circumstances
of each country must necessarily shape the practical measures we use to
combat terrorism.
Page 18 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
There are many ways to impose sanctions on a
country without causing the foreign-policy consequences I described. To use
sanctions in an effective way, we must resort to them only when there is a
compelling need and after we have carefully assessed the benefits and
costs. Specifically, we weigh the impact we hope the sanction will have on
the behavior or policies of the targeted country, against the identifiable
costs to U.S. interests—including our trade and investment,
international obligations, and overall economic competitiveness.
The Administration's policy is to enlist other
nations to support us in imposing sanctions against a targeted nation
whenever possible. A multilateral approach can serve two objectives: to
maximize the effectiveness of the sanctions by making them as universal as
possible, and to distribute the costs of sanctions among other nations to
achieve more equitable burden-sharing.
Country policies are subject to review in light of
the changing conditions and vulnerabilities of the target country—and
in fact, our policy toward Sudan, for example, is the subject of a current
review. And when changes are necessary in an economic sanctions regime, we
already have the legal tools we need to do the job.
Mr. Chairman, as we examine ways to make our
sanctions policy more effective in deterring state support for terrorism,
we pledge to consult closely with you and other members of the Committee,
in pursuit of a common position that is best for the United States.
That concludes my remarks and I would be happy to
answer or take any questions you may have.
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STATEMENT OF R. RICHARD NEWCOMB, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS
CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Newcomb, as the
representative of the Treasury Department, you should be the next witness;
please proceed.
Mr. NEWCOMB. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I wish to
thank you for inviting me to testify at your hearing today.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control of the
Treasury Department administers economic sanctions and embargo programs
against specific foreign countries or groups to further U.S. foreign policy
and national security objectives. In administering programs, we generally
rely on presidential authority contained in the Trading with the Enemy Act
or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and specific legislation
to prohibit or regulate commercial or financial transactions with specific
foreign countries or groups.
As our function is to implement and enforce
sanctions and embargo programs, my comments this morning are addressed to
sanctions administration and the vital role that licensing plays in the
successful implementation of our programs.
Our sanctions programs on the seven countries
designated by the State Department as supporting international terrorism
are quite diverse and carry different foreign policy guidance. Without the
ability, through general and specific licenses, to tailor sanctions
programs to the realities that we see on a day-to-day basis and to wholly
unforeseeable situations that arise daily, sanctions' usefulness would be
lost as an instrument for the defense of U.S. foreign policy, national
security and economic interests.
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H.R. 748 would amend the current law, section 321
of the Antiterrorism Act, to repeal all executive flexibility in
administering the prohibition on financial transactions against terrorist
supporting governments, permitting only transactions incident to routine
diplomatic relations among countries. This codification would drastically
alter preexisting sanctions programs against five of the seven
terrorist-supporting governments and seriously infringe the President's
ability to conduct foreign policy and use sanctions to respond quickly and
flexibly to changing situations in embargoed countries.
In each of our sanctions programs on terrorist
countries, the scope of the prohibitions and of OFAC licensing policy and
practice responds to specific national security, foreign policy or economic
conditions. In the case of Iran, for example, we have administered a full
blocking of government assets with comprehensive trade sanctions beginning
in 1979 through 1981, import prohibitions from 1987 until 1995, and
comprehensive sanctions on trade in goods and services without the blocking
of assets from May 1995 to the present.
In Cuba from 1963 to the present and North Korea
from 1950 to the present, we have administered comprehensive blocking and
trade sanctions applicable both to the governments and all nationals of
these countries.
With respect to Libya from 1986 to the present and
Iraq from 1990 to the present, comprehensive blocking of government assets
and trade sanctions are in place.
However, unlike Cuba and North Korean nationals,
Libya and Iraqi nationals' assets are not blocked. Pursuant to United
Nations sanctions, transfers to persons in Iraq are prohibited. There are
prohibitions against travel transactions to Libya, Iraq, and Cuba, but
travel transactions are permitted by general license under the North Korean
sanctions and are exempt by statute with respect to the current program on
Iran.
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These variations are not haphazard but reflect the
specific policy context in which each program has been developed.
In each of those programs, general and specific
licensing policies have been adopted to minimize unintended human suffering
while accomplishing program goals and to reflect general interests of the
United States.
Examples of the former include licenses permitting
expenditures relating to travel for family reunification purposes to visit
sick and dying relatives in Cuba; permitting participation in amateur and
nonpolitical international athletic competitions and people-to-people
exchanges; allowing limited fund to be transferred to close relatives so
they can emigrate from Cuba; authorizing humanitarian relief for the people
of North Korea and Iran suffering from natural disasters; permitting
families to stay with their immediate families in Libya; dispersing U.S.
vaccines to combat epidemics; bringing home the remains of Americans who
died overseas and administering decedents estates in target countries;
allowing payments for boat repairs if a U.S. vessel, for example, may be
blown into a target country's waters during a storm. This list could be
expanded.
Among the authorizations serving U.S. interests
are licenses permitting travel payments related to journalism; the
compensation of successful U.S. claimants in the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal in The Hague from Iranian government funds; reciprocal United
States and target country intellectual property protection; payments when
it is necessary to overfly target country airspace or for emergency
landings; the acquisition and sale of publications and informational
materials; and a wide range of humanitarian donations, remittances, family
payments, and other type of travel-related payments.
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In removing licensing authority over financial
transactions by United States persons with regard to the governments of
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, H.R. 748 would not
only adversely affect the President's constitutional responsibility to
conduct the foreign affairs of the United States, it would also eliminate
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control's ability to make decisions
about very human and often unforeseen events and potentially could cause
great suffering for unintended and untargeted third parties.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be glad to answer
questions you have on this.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, very much, Mr.
Newcomb.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Newcomb
follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF R. RICHARD NEWCOMB, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOREIGN
ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me to testify at your hearing today.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
administers economic sanctions and embargo programs against specific
foreign countries or groups to further U.S. foreign policy and national
security objectives. In administering these programs, OFAC generally relies
upon Presidential authority contained in the Trading With the Enemy Act
(TWEA) or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), or upon
specific legislation, to prohibit or regulate commercial or financial
transactions with specific foreign countries or groups.
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Examples of current TWEA programs include
comprehensive asset freezes and trade embargoes against North Korea and
Cuba. Examples of current IEEPA programs include similarly broad sanctions
against Libya, Iraq, the Cali Cartel, and certain foreign terrorist groups,
as well as comprehensive trade sanctions against Iran.
From time to time, sanctions have been imposed by
Congress directly through legislation. Between 1986 and 1991, for example,
OFAC administered the trade and investment prohibitions against South
Africa mandated by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. Similarly, OFAC
has been delegated administration of Section 321 of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the Act), which was signed into law by
the President on April 24, 1996.
SECTION 321
Section 321 of the Act prohibits all financial
transactions by United States persons with the governments of
terrorism-supporting nations designated under section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act, except as provided in regulations issued by the
Secretary of Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The Act
prohibited all financial transactions by U.S. persons with: North Korea,
Cuba, Iran, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Sudan.
All but Syria and Sudan were the subject of
existing comprehensive financial and trade embargoes at the time of
enactment. In accordance with foreign policy guidance provided to Treasury
by State, existing sanctions programs against North Korea, Cuba, Iran,
Libya, and Iraq were continued without change. This permitted the specific
policies developed over time with respect to each of these countries to
remain in effect, including the exceptions to each embargo dictated by
unique humanitarian, diplomatic, news gathering, intellectual property, and
other concerns.
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New regulations, known as the Terrorism List
Governments Sanctions Regulations, were issued August 23, 1996 to impose
the prohibitions on financial transactions with respect to Syria and Sudan.
While most transactions are currently authorized, the new regulations,
drafted in consultation with the Department of State, do prohibit financial
transactions which involve transfers from those governments in the form of
donations and transfers with respect to which U.S. persons know or have
reasonable cause to believe that there is a risk of furthering terrorist
acts in the United States.
From a sanctions enforcement perspective, we
believe the Act and implementing regulations are important because they
provide OFAC with comprehensive jurisdiction over all financial
transactions between U.S. persons and the Governments of Syria and Sudan.
We now have authority to act to stop or impede any particular suspicious
transfer to or from these governments by informing U.S. persons handling
the transfer that a reasonable cause exists to believe that the transaction
may pose a risk of furthering terrorist activity in the United States. We
believe the Act's authority provides a significant new tool to prevent
funding of terrorist activities in the U.S.
H.R. 748
H.R. 748 would amend the current law, section 321
of the Antiterrorism Act, to repeal all Executive flexibility in
administering the prohibition on financial transactions against terrorism
supporting governments, permitting only transactions incident to routine
diplomatic relations among countries. This codification would drastically
alter pre-existing sanctions programs against five of the seven
terrorism-supporting governments, and seriously infringe the President's
ability to conduct foreign policy and use sanctions to respond quickly and
flexibly to changing situations in embargoed countries.
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OFAC's function is to implement and enforce
sanctions programs. For that reason, my comments are addressed to sanctions
administration, and the vital role that licensing plays in the successful
implementation of our programs. Our sanctions programs on the seven
countries designated by the State Department as supporting international
terrorism are quite diverse, and carry different foreign policy guidance.
Without the ability—through general and specific licenses—to
tailor sanctions programs to the real world and to wholly unforeseeable
situations that arise daily, sanctions' usefulness would be lost as an
instrument for the defense of U.S. foreign policy, national security, and
economic interests.
In each of our economic sanctions programs on
terrorist countries, the scope of the prohibitions and of OFAC licensing
policy and practice responds to specific national security, foreign policy
or economic conditions. In the case of Iran, we have administered a full
blocking of government assets with comprehensive trade sanctions
(1979–81), import prohibitions (1987–95), and comprehensive
sanctions on trade in goods and services without the blocking of assets
(May 1995-date). In sanctions on Cuba (1963-date) and North Korea
(1950-date), we have administered comprehensive blocking and trade
sanctions applicable both to the governments and all nationals of these
countries. With respect to Libya (1986-date) and Iraq (1990-date),
comprehensive blocking of government assets and trade sanctions are in
place. However, unlike Cuban and North Korean nationals, Libyan and Iraqi
nationals' assets are not blocked. Pursuant to United Nations sanctions,
transfers to persons in Iraq are prohibited. There are prohibitions against
travel transactions to Libya, Iraq, and Cuba, but travel transactions are
permitted by general license under the North Korean sanctions, and are
exempt by statute for Iran. These variations are not haphazard, but reflect
the specific policy contexts in which each program has developed.
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In each of these programs, general and specific
licensing policies have been adopted to minimize unintended human suffering
while accomplishing program goals and to reflect general interests of the
United States.
Examples of the former include licenses permitting
expenditures related to travel to visit sick and dying relatives in Cuba;
permitting participation in amateur and nonpolitical international athletic
competitions and people to people exchanges; allowing limited funds to be
transferred to close relatives so that they can emigrate from Cuba;
authorizing humanitarian relief for the people of North Korea and Iran
suffering from natural disasters; permitting husbands, wives, sons and
daughters to stay with their immediate families in Tripoli; dispensing U.S.
vaccines to combat the outbreak of epidemics; bringing home the remains of
Americans who have died overseas and administering decedents estates in
target countries; allowing payments for boat repairs when a U.S. vessel has
been blown into target country waters during a storm. The list goes on and
on.
Among the authorizations serving U.S. interests
are licenses permitting travel payments related to journalism; the
compensation of successful U.S. claimants in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
in The Hague from Iranian Government funds; reciprocal U.S. and target
country intellectual property protection; payments when it is necessary to
overfly target country airspace or for emergency landings; the acquisition
and sale of publications, information and information materials; and a wide
range of humanitarian donations, remittances, family payments, and
travel-related transactions.
In removing licensing authority over financial
transactions by U.S. persons with the governments of Cuba, Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria, H.R. 748 would not only adversely
affect the President in his Constitutional responsibility to conduct the
foreign affairs of the United States, it would also eliminate OFAC's
ability to make rational decisions about very human and often unforeseen
events and cause great suffering for unintended and untargeted third
parties.
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Thank you.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Ambassador Wilcox, Mr.
Matheson are you here to make statements or in just a supportive capacity?
We would welcome any statements you may have.
Mr. WILCOX. Mr. Chairman, I have not
submitted a statement. I would be pleased to answer your questions and to
comment on any aspect of this.
I would be prepared to comment on our view toward
Syria and Sudan with respect to their support for international terrorism,
the differences between those two countries and any other aspect of
this.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Well, why don't I yield
myself 5 minutes? We will go from there.
I will ask you that question right off the bat,
then, Ambassador Wilcox. I understand that we have a terrorist list of
countries. There are seven of them. Iran, Iraq, Libya and so on are
included in this list. But Syria and Sudan don't have embargoes against
them right now. Why are we treating them differently? I understand they are
terrorist countries like everybody else.
Mr. WILCOX. Mr. Chairman, let me say, first
of all, that we very much welcome your support and commitment to doing
everything the United States government can to minimize the threat of
international terrorism and to bring pressure to bear against state
sponsors of terrorism to stop this reprehensible activity.
Page 28 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
We do seek a workable means of doing this. We
have, over the years, I think, achieved a wide variety of measures against
these seven states. All of these states are different; and, as Mr. Ramsay
said, we believe that our sanctions policy toward each of these states
should be tailored to the particular kind of terrorism they support, the
degree of their culpability, and other foreign policy factors.
The threshold level of sanctions that apply to all
of the seven state sponsors represent a very substantial package of
sanctions. And they should. Those sanctions have been applied vigorously
over the years because they represent the kind of pressure we want to bring
to bear against states which in any way support international terrorism and
meet our definition of state sponsors.
Beyond that, we believe that the President needs
flexibility to choose the particular measures and the right combination of
measures. The one-size-fits-all policy does not work and, indeed, could
have adverse consequences for the United States.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Why Syria and Sudan? Why are
they different? What makes them different?
Mr. WILCOX. Let me address Sudan. The press
reports have given a mistaken impression that somehow we have been lenient
toward Sudan. That is not true. We have taken the lead among nations, for
example, in the United Nations, in promoting new multilateral sanctions
against Sudan. We have had some success. But that task is not complete yet,
so we are continuing to press it.
Page 29 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The thrust of that effort is to impose aviation
sanctions against Sudan. We hope we will succeed. Sudan is a different
case, in some respects, from countries like Iran and Libya and Iraq, which
are more flagrant offenders and more actively involved in state sponsorship
of terrorism than Sudan.
Since former Secretary Christopher designated
Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993, we had a very intensive
dialogue with Sudan. That is a distinctive feature, too. We do have
diplomatic relations with Sudan, whereas we do not with five of the state
sponsors. And in that dialog, we have made very clear our requirements.
To some extent, the Sudanese have responded
positively. For example, the world's leading terrorist financier, Usama bin
Laden, at our request was expelled from Sudan in May, 1996. That was a
significant step. He has not been permitted to return. He is now hiding in
Afghanistan, and we think that has reduced his capability to finance
terrorist activities around the world.
Sudan has also told us that it has removed members
of the Abu Nidal organization from Sudanese territory. We are very
skeptical of that claim. Instead, we have evidence that that has not taken
place. Sudan, at our request, has closed a terrorist training camp which
was used by resident terrorist groups for terrorist training; and our
embassy has visited that camp and inspected it.
Now those are positive steps. But, on balance,
Sudan's response has not been satisfactory. Sudan still needs to do more to
change its behavior. The steps that it taken are perhaps only tactical;
but, nevertheless, Sudan has been responsive to some extent, because we
have had a dialogue with them.
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We think that if further sanctions are to be
brought to bear they should be focused and tailored to the need. We do not
think that the situation in Sudan is immutable, but we are skeptical that
at any time soon their performance is going to change.
I see the red light is on. I
could——
Mr. MCCOLLUM. No, you can continue to talk.
That is really for me. That is my own flag. Please continue.
I want to hear the answer to this question because
it is the very crux of the problem with regard to what we need to decide
here today, and our committee members need to hear it. Unfortunately, there
are only two or three of us here because it is the first day back, but we
are still going to ask you quite a few questions, and I will be liberal
with Mr. Coble, Mr. Hutchinson or anybody else that comes in. So please
proceed.
Mr. WILCOX. Thank you.
We certainly do want to continue our discussions
with you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the committee on what measures
could be appropriate for Sudan which would be most likely to achieve our
shared policy objective, and to do it in a way that would not create
adverse consequences for other U.S. foreign policies. So we hope that we
can do that, sir.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Before we go into Syria, let
me ask you to clarify why you think Sudan is different now.
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Even though you have told us you think Sudan has
taken some positive steps, isn't it true that Sudan still does things in
harboring terrorist activities or looking the other way or allowing their
properties to be utilized for the basing of terrorist training and so?
Mr. WILCOX. Absolutely. Sudan's record, as
I said, is, on balance, still very negative. Sudan has not redeemed itself
and is still a state sponsor of terrorism because it continues to harbor
terrorist groups on Sudanese soil.
We do not have information that those groups in
Sudan are using Sudan as a base for planning and plotting terrorist attacks
in other countries today, although we do have some evidence that that was
true in the past.
For example, we believe that the Sudanese
government knew about the plot to attack President Mubarak in Addis Ababa
before that attack took place; and the Sudanese government has defied our
wishes and those of the U.N. Security Council in refusing to deliver up
those suspected terrorists to justice for that attempted assassination. So
Sudan certainly has not redeemed itself and is deserving of continued
treatment as a state sponsor.
The severity of Sudan's offenses, though, as I
said, are somewhat different from those of countries like Iran. Sudan does
not carry out direct terrorist attacks overseas; Sudan does not assassinate
its political enemies abroad. Sudan has not been involved, in a tactical or
operational sense, in efforts to use terror to undermine the Middle East
peace process, although Sudan has refused to acknowledge the existence of
the State of Israel and to support the peace process.
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. What makes Syria different? I
am not going to dominate the whole time—you almost should have been a
witness today in your own right by reason of your specialty in regard to
terrorism. So from the terrorist perspective, please tell us about Syria
and what makes it different from other terrorist-list nations.
Mr. WILCOX. Although it is not my
bailiwick, I want to note that the United States has other very serious
problems with Sudanese behavior: its gross violation of its human rights of
its citizens, its perpetuation of a cruel civil war that has brought
terrible harm and suffering and its subversive activities which contribute
to instability in neighboring countries. Those are other reasons why we
have serious problems with Sudan and reasons toward which any new policy
measure should be directed.
Turning to Syria, since 1986, and indeed for
decades, Syria has harbored Palestinian extremist terrorist organizations
in Damascus. It has supported the Hezbollah in Syrian-controlled areas of
Lebanon. For these reasons, the United States has designated Syria as a
state sponsor of terrorism.
Another major Syrian offense took place back in
the late 1980's when the Syrian Government was involved in a plot to blow
up an airliner bound for Israel at London's Heathrow Airport.
Since 1986, when that happened, there has been no
further direct involvement of Syria in acts of terrorism that we know of.
Syria, however, has continued to harbor these terrorist groups in Damascus
and has retained a relationship with Hezbollah. For that reason, we have
kept Syria on our list; and we intend to do so until those policies
change.
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For the last 3 years, Syria has parted company
with the other state sponsors by acknowledging and committing itself to a
peace process with Israel. That is a major departure for any state sponsor
of terrorism. None of the others in the Middle East have done so.
Syria has been involved, on a periodic basis, in
very intensive negotiations with the State of Israel under a process which
the United States has sponsored and served as the principal mediator. The
success of that process, Syrian-Israeli peace, is a strategic objective for
the United States and for our friends in the region, including the
Government of Israel and our Arab friends there.
That is a very important foreign policy objective.
We would not wish to impose new sanctions on Syria how if those sanctions
could risk the future of Syrian engagement in the peace process.
There is no active negotiation at the moment
between Syria and Israel, but we believe that it will be resumed at some
stage.
Syria has also, from time to time, intervened in a
positive way in southern Lebanon to restrain the Hezbollah from terrorist
attacks across the Israeli border into civilian settlements in northern
Israel.
Back in the early 1990's Syria was also helpful in
facilitating the release of American hostages who were held hostage by
Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon. None of that is enough to mitigate Syria's
continued permission for these groups to maintain activities in Damascus
and in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley, so we will keep Syria on the
list for that reason.
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Mr. Chairman, there are other factors which I
cannot discuss in this open hearing which bear upon the safety and security
of Americans. I would be pleased to brief any members of the committee on
this in private session. But that is another factor in our approach to
Syria and in our calculus on whether or not new sanctions against Syria
would be a positive way of changing its behavior towards support for
terrorism.
In short, we do not believe that sanctions would
have that effect. Indeed, we think they would have a counterproductive
effect. So the administration does not support the extension of sanctions
against Syria.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Well, let me get a clear
understanding from all of you in relation to Syria, then I will go to Mr.
Coble for questions.
My understanding today is that the
administration's position on the legislation before us is that you would
like to see it modified in terms of some exceptions or with more
specificity than it has today with regard to the terrorist-list
countries—maybe even tailored with regard to Sudan. It is also my
understanding that it is your position that there should be no financial
transaction restrictions whatsoever with regard to Syria. Is that correct?
That you want a complete exception for Syria?
Mr. Ramsay.
Mr. RAMSAY. I would say at this time, Mr.
Chairman, that the administration is keeping under review all of the
terrorist-list states and can adjust the sanction of each of the
terrorist-list states as a function of how our policies and relations with
them evolve. Our review of H.R. 748 is that it causes a lot of collateral
problems that are probably unintended which could conceivably be fixed by
H.R. 748 but needn't be fixed by legislation at all.
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. Well, Mr. Ramsay, let me
interrupt you tell you that it would be highly desirable to give you the
flexibility. But when we gave it to you last time—and we really gave
it through Mr. Newcomb and the Treasury Department that was an
unsatisfactory result.
I read in my opening statement the liberality you
took in your interpretation of the legislation and that was not acceptable
to Congress. It was our desire to tighten that noose.
There is a difference, I suppose, in our opinion
about foreign policy, but this legislation deals with more than just
foreign policy—it deals with terrorism, with activities of the
highest order of concern to this Congress.
So, consequently, just let me say up front that,
unless I am sadly mistaken about the temperament of my colleagues on this
committee, we intend to proceed with, at the very least, some specifically
defined language with regard to financial transactions.
Now we may well grant some exceptions to these
transactions in order to allow for conditions and circumstances that have
to be here. I realize we are not capable and really shouldn't be in the
business of micromanagement; but, to some extent or another, we are going
to get a bit more involved than normal just because we are not happy with
the product you've given us.
Is my understanding correct that the
administration, would want to have a total exemption for Syria and some
specifically staggered exemptions and various targeted exemptions or
exceptions, if you will, for some of these other terrorist-list countries
rather than the blanket language which is in the bill today?
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Mr. RAMSAY. Well, Mr. Chairman, we
understand that it is your intention—the committee's intention to
proceed with H.R. 748; and we have thought about the possibility of
exemptions for one country or the other under some kind of adjusted H.R.
748. But our view is I think our interests—the U.S. interests are
best served by our common view of terrorism and our common view of the
desire to stem terrorism and do what needs to be done to challenge
terrorism, which we think can best be done with the authorities we already
have under the various statutes that have been passed to constrain
transactions as appropriate and to challenge those countries individually
as a function of our relations with each of them individually, rather than
try to do it in a particular amendment that would affect all seven in a
homogeneous way.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. We are going in
circles—again, I want to clarify this. On the one hand, you are
saying we would like to have an open hand and give us total flexibility. On
the other hand, I think you are saying to me that you are prepared to offer
some suggestions about how we might proceed in regard to tailoring this
legislation in a more direct way. But does that more tailored way include a
total exemption for Syria? Is it your assertion that, as I gather from
Ambassador Wilcox, this administration does not want Syria to have any
sanctions at all?
Mr. RAMSAY. Sir, I can't
say——
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Or any in this bill?
Mr. RAMSAY. I can't say that this panel is
briefed to be able to answer that question directly. That is a very
specific question. I think we would need to engage other people back in the
Department.
Page 37 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
But my view is that the Department's position
would be for each of the terrorist-list countries we would like to have a
separate dialogue on what is appropriate for each of those countries as a
function of our relations and their roles in terrorism and other
activities.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Coble, you are recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good to have you all with us this morning,
gentlemen.
Mr. Ramsay, I sit as a member of the Subcommittee
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the full Judiciary Committee, and I
find your comment interesting in that you say the intellectual property
rights of Americans might be jeopardized if U.S. nationals are not
permitted to engage in transactions necessary to register and maintain
these rights in the targeted countries. Elaborate in a little more detail
about that concern.
Mr. RAMSAY. Basically, sir, as I understand
the constraint, the kinds of transactions—the kinds of registration
fees that would need to be paid in whatever country the interested American
party would like to register his trademark cannot be paid. It could
conceivably be paid if that company requested a license to do so and, under
Treasury licensing authority, that license were granted. But in a blanket
ban on financial transactions, that company would not be able to register
his trademark.
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Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I am
thinking—just thinking aloud now. I am sure we don't want to do
anything to frustrate the intellectual property of our people. If Mr.
Ramsay and his staff could present language that might address this
concern—Mr. Ramsay—would you be amenable to that, Mr.
Chairman?
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Coble, if you would
yield, I am very amenable to suggestions by both the Treasury and the State
Department with regard to some specific language. As I have said earlier, I
don't think we ought to be having to micromanage, but we obviously can't
have as flexible a bill as they would turn it into what we had before. So,
yes, I would be very amenable.
Mr. COBLE. Why don't you think about
considering doing that, Mr. Ramsay? Submit some language that you think
might, without trashing the bill, assuage the problems that you have with
the legislation.
Mr. RAMSAY. Yes, sir. We would be happy to
do that.
Mr. COBLE. All right, sir.
Mr. RAMSAY. Your concern raises sort of a
general issue about how one designs sanctions in the first place. Is the
design of sanctions best structured with a sweeping imposition and then a
multitude of exceptions or is it better designed by identifying the
vulnerability——
Mr. COBLE. Yes.
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Mr. RAMSAY [continuing]. And targeting the
sanction on the vulnerability?
Mr. COBLE. That may well be subject to
interpretation, I guess, depending to whom you are talking.
Mr. RAMSAY. Yes, sir.
Mr. COBLE. Mr. Newcomb, let me put a
three-prong question to you. How are U.S. sanctions against terrorist-list
governments enforced? What rules do the Federal law enforcement agencies
perform? And how you do you respond to the complaint that OFAC does not
vigorously target terrorist, quote, front companies, close quote?
Did you get all three of them down, Mr.
Newcomb?
Mr. NEWCOMB. If we can take them one by
one.
Mr. COBLE. OK. Fine.
Mr. NEWCOMB. How do we enforce them? We
have—for each of these programs and when promulgated by the President
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act or going back to Cuba
and North Korea for the Trading with the Enemy Act, we develop a
comprehensive set of regulations which goes into prohibitions and general
authorization, what we call general licenses.
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So we develop a comprehensive program that goes
into specifically what is intended to be targeted and the unique facts,
circumstances and situations that exist for each of these countries,
specifically dealing with the foreign policy criterion goals that are
developed in consultation—very actively in consultation with the
State Department.
We work closely with the Federal law enforcement
community. We work with U.S. Customs Service and the FBI and others in
terms of developing information and moving forward in our enforcement
program. We have an active civil penalty program. In the course of any
given year, we collect over 200 penalties and bring revenues of over a
million dollars in for violations of our programs. Now, this is across the
board, but I think most of these are terrorist supporting countries.
With regard to not vigorously enforcing, your
question was——
Mr. COBLE. Targeting——
Mr. NEWCOMB [continuing]. Targeting.
Mr. COBLE [continuing]. Terrorist front
companies. And you might explain to us what front companies are.
Mr. NEWCOMB. Sure. When we identify a
government, we usually define that as a government, its agencies,
instrumentalities or controlled entities or individuals or entities acting
for or on their behalf or owned or controlled by. So we have developed a
program where we can designate individuals, companies and front
organizations that act for or on behalf or are under control by these
governments.
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So, for example, in the case of Libya, which is
heavily invested in Europe in oil-refining production, downstream
distribution activities, we have identified those companies and
organizations that they own and control. Same thing with financial
institutions.
We did this for Iraq, where we quite extensively
went and named names of individuals and entities that were a part of Saddam
Hussein's military procurement network outside of Iraq so that individuals,
U.S. persons in Europe, the Middle East and Central and South America,
wherever, would know by name the particular individual and entity that they
would otherwise not know who not to do business with.
We maintain this list of specially designated
nationals, specially designated terrorists, specially designated narcotics
traffickers. We have over 3,000 names which are incorporated in what we
call our Specially Designated National List.
U.S. financial institutions have developed over
the years what is called name recognition software where, in an automated
basis, they are able to work into their computers the ability to stop
transactions with these entities or organizations. We are all now working
with major companies to screen all of their sales so that they don't
inadvertently do business with any of these named entities.
So we have a very comprehensive program in place
to deal with those front companies, and we do have a very active program.
The list continues to be developed, to be refined and to be more meaningful
as to precisely who you are doing business with.
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If it is Iraq, for example, they can't set up
a bunch of companies or have a bunch of people going out, doing their
buying or selling or procurement. If we know about it, we will name them.
They are offlimits to U.S. persons.
And the third part of your question was?
Mr. COBLE. I think you responded about
vigorously targeting the front companies.
Mr. NEWCOMB. Yes, sir, I believe we did
that.
Mr. COBLE. Yes, sir.
Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, the red light
notwithstanding, may I have one more question.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Certainly.
Mr. COBLE. Does the FBI and/or the Customs
have the authority and do they follow a practice of initiating
investigations on their own, Mr. Newcomb, or do they depend upon referrals
from your office?
Mr. NEWCOMB. We work it both ways. I would
say, for the most part, they develop investigations, they develop leads on
violations on their own; and over the years we have developed a very good,
productive enforcement kind of relationship.
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We also receive leads which we can handle in one
of two ways. We have civil enforcement authority and criminal enforcement
authority. If there is a criminal violation, we refer it out to Customs or
the FBI, depending on the nature of what it is. If it is a Customs-type
violation, we give it to Customs. If it is more of a terrorist
type—domestic terrorist type activity, it would be with the FBI.
We have civil penalty authority which, when either
of the two defer to us or if it doesn't rise to the sufficient level that
it is referred out after consultations, we will deal with it in-house; and
we have a very active ongoing program in that regard.
Mr. COBLE. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hutchinson, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I appreciate this hearing, because it gives me an
insight as to how a law is passed by Congress and then implemented by a
regulatory agency—in this case, the Treasury Department and the State
Department.
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As you know, I was not a member of this body
when the antiterrorism bill was debated and enacted; but, from my reading
of the statute, it is pretty clear that Congress meant for section 321 to
be applied broadly, prohibiting financial transactions with terrorist
states.
I understand that the phrase ''except as provided
in regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with
the Secretary of State'' was included during final negotiations to exempt
routine diplomatic and consular relations. Unfortunately, the
administrations capitalized on its narrow authority to rewrite the intent
of the statute. At least that is my view of it.
Rather than requiring that an individual have
knowledge of a country's terrorist status, this new interpretation focuses
the burden of proof on whether the individual who conducts a financial
transaction with a terrorist country believes the interaction poses a risk
of furthering terrorist activity in the United States.
Now I just would like to have Mr. Newcomb or Mr.
Ramsay respond to my concern, as a new Member of Congress, that the intent
of this body was not carried out in the regulations that were adopted. If
you could briefly respond, and I have got some other questions—Mr.
Ramsay.
Mr. RAMSAY. Mr. Hutchinson, it has become
clear in the last weeks that we got significantly away from what the
Members of Congress intended when we passed the legislation. We didn't
think we were doing that at the time we wrote the regs.
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We had available to us the legislative
history, we had statements on the floor, we had discussions and the
correspondence with our relevant contacts on the Capitol Hill, and we
thought we were reaching the correct conclusion about what the intention of
the Congress was.
There are authorities available to us for banning
transfers out of revenues or currencies that might be used for terrorist
purposes. There are other statutes that allow us to intervene on terrorist
activities; and we have authorities in the IEEPA, in the Trading With the
Enemy Act and elsewhere that allow us to ban transactions as appropriate
under the circumstances that obtained at the time with the country.
At the time we were looking at these regulations
we had no foreign policy impulse to change our sanction status with either
Sudan or Syria. We had a dialogue on with Sudan that we hoped was going to
lead some places. It didn't lead to as many places as we had hoped, as you
heard from Ambassador Wilcox.
We had a multilateral effort going in the United
Nations that we expected to lead to action in civil aviation. We are still
working on that. But there was no reason at that point in time to ratchet
up the sanctions on Sudan other than to catch exactly what we had thought
was the intention of the——
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Let me phrase it a
different way. As a result of the enactment of section 321, did the State
Department's policy change?
Mr. RAMSAY. The State Department's policy
was directed at implementing section 321. As we understood it, it was
intended that was to go at what was called the Farrakhan
amendment—that is to say, the transfer inbound of monies that might
be used to further terrorist purposes. So we banned transactions that could
lead to that kind of activity.
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Mr. HUTCHINSON. But how many persons have
been denied the ability to engage in financial transactions with the
governments of Syria and Sudan since the Treasury regulations were issued
in August 1996?
Mr. RAMSAY. Well, we wouldn't necessarily
know if a donation had been refused by somebody. We would only know if a
donation were desired by somebody and they wanted to seek a license to have
it brought in, in which case they would have to apply for a license from
the Treasury.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Newcomb, do you want to
comment?
Mr. NEWCOMB. Let me say, in developing and
implementing these programs following the receipt of guidance from the
State Department, we have an active compliance program where we got
ourselves—we are in touch with all the financial institutions with
regard to the requirements of Syria and Sudan. We developed a brochure. We
did training. We had a very active dialogue. So, in effect, what has
happened is the chilling effect.
These transactions are something financial
institutions do not desire to handle because they don't want to be in a
situation where they want to be caught having this, as in the case of, as I
mentioned before, our other sanctioned countries. By working with the
financial institutions, these transfers are not taking place.
The other point I want to make is that the way
these regulations were promulgated is we took jurisdiction across the board
for transfers to the target countries and from the target countries back.
What we did then was we generally licensed everything except donations
coming in and where there was——
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Mr. HUTCHINSON. What do you mean, donations
coming in? Explain that.
Mr. NEWCOMB. Moneys coming in where they
were not for a specific commercial purchase such as a purchase of goods
where you can match up a transfer of a money payment with an invoice.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. So you are allowing all
commercial transactions to take place?
Mr. NEWCOMB. Yes. Donations prohibited.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Have you prohibited any
commercial transactions between individuals of this country and terrorists
states?
Mr. NEWCOMB. We do with respect to the five
designated—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. You prohibit commercial
transaction with those states?
Mr. NEWCOMB. Yes. Depending—there are
all different types of programs and there are different rules that apply to
each of them. But, for the most part, they are all prohibited except for
very specific kinds of sub——
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Mr. HUTCHINSON. But Syria and Sudan, you
don't prohibit any commercial transactions with those states?
Mr. NEWCOMB. We permit—we take
jurisdiction from financial transactions going to Syria, Sudan, and from
the governments to the United States. They are generally licensed then,
except for donations coming from these countries into the United States or
where there is a reason to believe that it is for a terrorist purpose.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Let me just conclude, Mr.
Chairman.
It is my understanding there is not a significant
amount of legislative history since section 321 was passed by Congress. So
you are limited in what could be obtained from legislative history; and I
think you are pretty well bound then at that point with the language of the
statute, which, again, I believe is very clear as to congressional
intent.
Again, I will just say I am very disappointed as a
new member of this body. I have always wondered how something Congress says
can be so misconstrued in its application. I am troubled by that. I
appreciate the Chairman holding this hearing; and, hopefully, this new
legislation will remedy this problem.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr.
Hutchinson.
Mr. Chabot, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
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Mr. CHABOT. I thank the chairman.
I have a number of questions, and any of the
gentleman are welcome to take a shot at any of the questions I ask.
The first one, do you have any idea how many
persons continue to engage in the financial dealings with Sudan or Syria or
how substantial are the U.S. investments in this country at the present
time and what source of interest is there in the future there?
Anyone that would like to take those?
Mr. RAMSAY. Well, sir, I don't think any of
us is particularly well set up to answer in hard numbers. We can certainly
do that for you. The commercial interests in Sudan are very limited, for
instance. There is virtually no investment inbound to Sudan. There was some
interest expressed by some oil companies about oil deposits in the south of
Sudan. For commercial reasons, they have not pursued that. There is some
trade with Sudan. It is probably not more than $50 or $60 million in total.
And I guess that that is almost all agricultural commodities.
We buy gum arabic and sesame seeds from Sudan, and
Sudan buys wheat and shelled lentils and other foodstuffs and some
equipment for the exploratory programs for the companies in the south, the
oil companies in the south. I don't know how much of that there is now,
because I don't think there is much activity there now.
Syria, on the other hand, there is a great deal of
commerce back and forth and a fair amount of investment across the economy.
I think you will hear from some panels later on about some of the extent of
that investment. There is also a large oil involvement in Syria, oil and
gas, and just general commercial. But I am sorry I don't have the kinds of
details that you might want. I can supply that if that would be useful,
sir.
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Mr. CHABOT. OK.
[The information follows:]
| United States Department of State |
| Washington, DC, October 15, 1997. |
Hon. BILL MCCOLLUM, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Crime,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives.
please find enclosed a
copy of the transcript of the June 10, 1997 hearing at which William C.
Ramsay testified. The transcript has been edited and an insert provided as
requested.
If you have any further questions, please do not
hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,
| Barbara Larkin, |
| Assistant Secretary, |
| Legislative Affairs. |
Enclosure:
As stated.
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SYRIA AND SUDAN
Because Syria and Sudan have been designated by
the Secretary of State as state sponsors of terrorism, the U.S. Government
provides Syria and Sudan with no economic aid, no military aid, no
PL–480 assistance, no Peace Corps program, no Ex-Im assistance, and
no OPIC assistance. We do not sell Syria or Sudan military equipment or
arms. We are required by statute to vote in international fora against
projects providing aid to Syria and Sudan. We have in place a stringent
export licensing regime to prevent the export of items to Syria and Sudan
that would enhance Syria or Sudan's ability to support terrorism or
increase their military potential, particularly with respect to dual use
items for nuclear, chemical or biological warfare.
SYRIA
Commercial trade between the U.S. and Syria is
conducted by the private sector but subject to normal government regulatory
procedures relating to licenses or customs duties. In addition, foreign
exchange is controlled through the official bank of the government of
Syria. Although we do not have data on the number of persons who conduct
trade, there are over 140 American firms that conduct business with Syrian
companies. The volume of trade between the U.S. and Syria in 1996 totaled
approximately $242.5 million. This included U.S. exports of $226 million
(primarily industrial equipment and agricultural goods) and imports of
$16.2 million (primarily oil and textiles). There are several American
firms with existing investments in or pending contracts with Syria's oil
and gas sector. Syria's major trading partners are in Europe, and European
firms would reap the benefits of contracts lost by American firms in the
event of a unilateral economic embargo of Syria by the U.S.
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SUDAN
The USG is not aware of any meaningful investment
by U.S. firms in Sudan. The volume of trade between the U.S. and Sudan in
1996 consisted of $50.4 million in exports and $18.7 million in imports.
Most of this trade was in agricultural commodities.
Mr. CHABOT. Were there any other countries,
or what countries, perhaps, came close to being on the list that aren't on
there? Are there others that are on—either on the horizon or just
didn't quite make it?
Mr. WILCOX. Mr. Chabot, we look at lots of
countries, which, for one reason or another, might be eligible. We don't
have a list of also-rans. I can assure you that we are very concerned about
any hint of state support for terrorism by any country in the world. So we
cast our net widely in our annual survey by the Secretary of State.
Mr. CHABOT. Were there any countries that
come to mind that came close to being on there?
Mr. WILCOX. Sir, there are a number of
countries that looked at, but as I say, we don't have a hierarchy of
also-ran countries.
Mr. CHABOT. I understand that. But when I
asked the question, did anything come to your mind, well, yes, here is one
that probably came close?
Mr. WILCOX. We are very concerned about
Afghanistan, although Afghanistan does not have a government which most of
the nations of the world recognize, nor a government which controls the
majority of Afghan territory. But it is clear that terrorist training still
exists inside Afghanistan. Usama bin Laden, the notorious terrorist
financier, has moved to Afghanistan, so Afghanistan is a country of
continuing concern to us.
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Mr. CHABOT. OK. Thank you.
When we do put these particular countries on the
list and our trade is restricted, what countries have been the most
egregious in taking up the slack and taking advantage of a situation and
trading with terrorist countries?
Mr. WILCOX. As you know, we have a
difference of policy view with our European colleagues on trade and
investment in Iran and in Libya. The United States has a complete embargo
on trade and investment. The European countries do not, and so those
countries continue to actively trade with Iran, and they have interests in
oil investment there as well. The same is true with Libya, where European
countries buy Libyan oil, and some European countries have investments in
oil production in Libya.
Mr. CHABOT. Would it be fair to say that
France would be near the top of the list of those countries that have had a
tendency to take advantage of situations where we are trying to promote
world peace or antiterrorist measures?
Mr. WILCOX. France and the United States
have made common cause against international terrorism, and we have
cooperated in many ways. We have a difference of view with the Government
of France on economic stances against state sponsors of terrorism neither
France nor any other European Government has laws like ours which designate
governments as state sponsors of terrorism.
France has been an active partner in enforcement
of the U.N. Security Council sanctions against Libya, but those sanctions
do not include an oil embargo, and so French companies continue to invest
and operate in the Libyan oil sector.
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Mr. CHABOT. My time is running out, but I
guess you are being very diplomatic, I think. Some of our allies
have—France among them—have taken advantage of the situations
all around the world where we are trying to do the right thing and they are
looking strictly at their own economic benefits. And perhaps we can say
that and you can't, but——
Mr. WILCOX. Well, I agree. And we regret
that. We wish these other countries would join us in similar policies,
rather than continuing to do trade and investment on a more or less normal
basis with these countries.
Mr. CHABOT. I thank the chairman.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Barr you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Who drafted the regulations issued August 23,
1996?
Mr. RAMSAY. The regulations drafted would
have been physically drafted in the Department of the Treasury but with the
foreign policy guidance of the Department of State on how to draft it.
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Mr. BARR. Who actually drafted them?
Did you, Mr. Newcomb?
Mr. NEWCOMB. They were drafted in our
office, yes, but, as Mr. Ramsay said, following guidance from the State
Department on questions presented.
Mr. BARR. I have rarely seen an effort that
it is so blatant to subvert the intent of Congress. I think you ought to be
ashamed of these regulations. You didn't try—and I give you
credit—you didn't try to hide what you were doing. You crafted
regulations here that are clearly designed to completely gut the
congressional intent and the clear language of the statute. I think it is
outrageous, what you all have done here. It is a shame we have to even
waste time on this, but we do.
And I find it hard to believe you all are
objecting to this legislation. All we are doing is telling you to do what
you should have done in the first place.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Barr.
Ambassador Wilcox, and Mr. Ramsay, in April of
last year, we enacted into law the antiterrorism bill that is the subject
of the section that we are trying to amend here today. One other provision
in that law which is not the subject directly of this hearing had a
requirement that, in consultation with Treasury, State designate a list of
foreign terrorist organizations. To date, that has not happened. Why hasn't
it happened? Where are we with this? And when do we expect to have a
list?
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Mr. WILCOX. Mr. Chairman, we have not
completed that list yet, because after the legislation was adopted, we
discovered that the task of assembling the administrative records that were
called for by the statute was an immense task. We were determined to carry
that out carefully. It has engaged the energy of dozens of lawyers and
officials in many different agencies.
My office has been deeply involved in that
process. We have spent many, many thousands of hours in preparing those
administrative records. They are exhaustive, detailed documents. They must
be done scrupulously, because the consequences of designating these
organizations are very serious.
We have to be fair to our own citizens if we are
going to proscribe contributions to these organizations. We have to be
judicious when we consider that these designations will bar aliens from the
United States and give us extraordinary powers to exclude members and
activists in these organizations.
It has turned out to be a very, very challenging
task, and we are well along in the process. I cannot give you a precise
date when we will be completed. We are very anxious to complete it. The
slowness has not been for lack of effort or investment of time and energy.
It is because of the size of the task and our commitment to doing it
right.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. As you know, the trigger for
us has been the idea of ending the fundraising activity of these
organizations. It is one of the primary purposes of the antiterrorism
bill.
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I might suggest to you: You say you are close,
obviously that is a determination of judgment on your part, and I hope that
you are, but I would suggest that if you can't get all of this ironed out,
perhaps there are some organizations that are so blatant and apparent, you
can at least promulgate them seriatim—we don't have to have every one
of them. You certainly have the right to add to the list.
Am I correct, there is nothing in the law that
prohibits you from adding or deleting later on?
Mr. WILCOX. No, there is not, Mr. Chairman.
I thank you for that proposal. Our preference would be to do them as a
group. But let me discuss your proposal with other agencies who are
involved.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. The main thing I am concerned
about is just getting this going. We have got some very blatant
organizations out there, and the potential for fundraising continues with
every passing day. And this is something for terrorism that none of us
want. So I am just trying to be creative and constructive.
Lastly, I want to clarify something. There has
been some concern raised that the routine diplomatic relations exception
proposed by this bill, H.R. 748, would not capture the United Nations
activities. I think it would, but I would like to know what you think, Mr.
Ramsay.
Mr. RAMSAY. I think that the exceptions
that we are concerned about can be captured. It is a question of language.
It is a question of identifying each of those and setting them aside
as—always permitted. All of those things that I cited could
conceivably be dealt with one in one fashion or another, if the approach is
to put in a sweeping ban and then draw exceptions, as opposed to going for
something more targeted at the kinds of activities in Sudan that might be
more responsive to our measures than the broad brush.
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. Well, I was really interested
specifically in the question of whether or not the terminology and your
judgment of routine diplomatic relations would include the activities of
the United Nations, seeing as several of those things you presented in your
testimony as concerns were activities of the United Nations.
We certainly anticipated activities like the cab
fares I mentioned earlier as being routinely diplomatic. But there are many
more activities that, to me, would be considered routinely diplomatic. It
seems to me this is fairly reasonable language that would allow the
diplomats to the U.N. and other countries to engage in whatever U.N.
activities were normally considered routinely diplomatic—I think
virtually everything they do is. Would you not agree?
Mr. RAMSAY. It is conceivable we can write
language like that, sir, but there are complications, depending on the U.N.
program. If you take, for instance, U.N. 986 with Iraq, basically that
program entitles private sector companies to be involved in buying of oil
and selling of goods, of humanitarian goods and food, into Iraq. So there
is a very different set of things that we have to capture there which are
not normal.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Routine diplomatic relations.
I understand.
And, Mr. Newcomb, I don't know that you were asked
this question, but somebody has suggested to us—I think one of the
witnesses coming on in the next panel—that the Office of Foreign
Assets Control is understaffed and underfunded. Is it? Do we need to
support you in gaining some more support to do your job?
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Mr. NEWCOMB. My colleague just asked me if
I planted that, and the answer is, no, I didn't. We can always use more
staff. But let me say, because of these new requirements that we have,
including the Antiterrorism Act, that process is under way and we are being
staffed up to deal with many of these situations.
As with any organization, you can always use more
staff. But as far as getting this job done with regard to these specific
programs, let me say for the record that we have comprehensive economic
embargoes in place on all of these countries, following the consultations
with the State Department as to what it is we are trying to do. So I am
confident that we are doing what is required.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Well, we could spend all
morning with you all because there are many other things that could be
asked, but—Mr. Matheson.
Mr. MATHESON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to emphasize, if I might, the great
difficulty of trying to deal with all of the possible situations that would
have to be dealt with, with a series of explicit exceptions if you do not
have some residual discretion on the part of Treasury to make further
exceptions where the circumstance requires.
You started with the question of routine
diplomatic activities, and I think, for example, there are a number of
situations with these terrorist countries where we don't have normal
diplomatic relations, where we have interest sections or other
arrangements, and that is the kind of issue that we would have to try to
interpret in some fashion.
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Mr. Ramsay's list of examples of problems that
would have to be dealt with is only partial. I could easily list 20 or 25
examples where I think we would all readily agree that there should be some
kind of exception. A large part of the difficulty is that you can't
necessarily anticipate all of these in advance, which is why Treasury
always has, in these other sanction programs, some residual discretion to
deal with the situation. I know you are unhappy with the way the discretion
has been exercised to date.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Very unhappy. That is why we
gave you that discretion in the first place.
Mr. MATHESON. And obviously, we have to
have further discussion about that. What I am saying is, if your bottom
line is that you have no discretion reserved, then it is going to be
extremely difficult to cover all of the necessary matters that you would
want to have exempted from a financial transactions ban, which is a very
broad ban.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.
Does anybody else have another followup question
for this panel? Mr. Barr? Mr. Hutchinson?
Again, we have got a lot of work to do with you
before we complete this bill. I don't want it to be a product that is
totally unworkable in some way for the State Department or for the Treasury
Department.
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Gentlemen, I think you have got the message
from all of us. We want most of these financial transactions—what we
call commercial transactions—and money flowing between our countries
and these terrorist states, including Syria and Sudan, very constrained
compared to what it is today. That was the original intent of the language,
and unless my colleagues decide otherwise in the markup, it remains the
intent.
Thank you very much.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Our next panel today consists
of several witnesses with special expertise and interest in both Syria and
Sudan.
Our first witness is Ms. Hillary Mann. Ms. Mann is
an associate fellow at the Washington Institution for Near East Policy,
where she focuses on terrorism and U.S. counterterrorism policy. She has
written articles on Middle East terrorism for the Los Angeles Times and
Washington Times and is currently conducting a study of the gaps in the
U.S. sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism. Prior to joining the
Washington Institute in 1996, Ms. Mann served for 1 year in the State
Department and also worked at the National Security Council.
Also with us today is Kate Almquist, a policy
analyst with World Vision Relief and Development, Inc. Ms. Almquist is
currently managing an ongoing advocacy initiative which seeks resolution of
the crisis in Sudan. Prior to her position as a policy analyst, Ms.
Almquist also served World Vision as an international liaison
assistant.
Our next witness is Mr. James Latham. Mr. Latham
is the senior vice president, general counsel, and secretary for ITT
Sheraton Corp., a Boston-based hotel network. Since joining ITT Sheraton in
1975, Mr. Latham has served as general counsel for the Europe, Africa,
Middle East, and India Division as well as vice president and assistant
secretary of Sheraton Management Corp. Prior to his association with ITT
Sheraton, he was a partner in a law firm in Massachusetts.
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Finally, the subcommittee will hear testimony
today from Mansoor Ijaz. Mr. Ijaz is the founder and chairman of Crescent
Investment Management, a New York-based global investment advisor and bank.
He has written several op-ed pieces for the Wall Street Journal and the Los
Angeles Times, and he has appeared on CNN's ''Inside Business'' and
''Business Asia.'' Mr. Ijaz conducts extensive business in the Middle East
related to his investment management company.
We look forward to hearing from all of our
witnesses today; we are going to go in the order in which I introduced
you.
Ms. Mann, and all the witnesses, your written
testimony will be incorporated, without objection, into the record. Hearing
no objection, it is so ordered. You may proceed to summarize your testimony
or give us any portion of it that you wish.
Ms. Mann.
STATEMENT OF HILLARY MANN, ASSOCIATE FELLOW, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR
EAST POLICY
Ms. MANN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity to appear before you
today.
While America's attention has focused recently on
the heartwrenching and horrific testimony about the Oklahoma City bombing,
it is important to take notice of the international trend toward more
deadly terrorist attacks that nearly doubled the number of terrorist
casualties last year.
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