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27–661CC
1997
DRUG INTERDICTION AND OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO THE NATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL POLICY
PLEASE NOTE: The following transcript is a portion of the official
hearing record of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
Additional material pertinent to this transcript may be found on the web
site of the Committee at [http://www.house.gov/transportation]. Complete
hearing records are available for review at the Committee offices and also
may be purchased at the U.S. Government Printing Office.
(104–69)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
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TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SEPTEMBER 12, 1996
[JOINT HEARING WITH SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
CONTROL]
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
BUD SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr., Pennsylvania
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia
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HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
SUSAN MOLINARI, New York
WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New Hampshire
THOMAS W. EWING, Illinois
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
Y. TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
BILL BAKER, California
JAY KIM, California
STEPHEN HORN, California
BOB FRANKS, New Jersey
PETER I. BLUTE, Massachusetts
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
JACK QUINN, New York
TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
SPENCER T. BACHUS, Alabama
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
ZACH WAMP, Tennessee
TOM LATHAM, Iowa
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
ANDREA SEASTRAND, California
RANDY TATE, Washington
SUE KELLY, New York
RAY LaHOOD, Illinois
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BILL MARTINI, New Jersey
DAN FRISA, New York
TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI, Illinois
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
JAMES A. TRAFICANT, Jr., Ohio
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
PETE GEREN, Texas
GLENN POSHARD, Illinois
BUD CRAMER, Alabama
BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, Michigan
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia
JERROLD NADLER, New York
PAT DANNER, Missouri
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JAMES E. CLYBURN, South Carolina
CORRINE BROWN, Florida
JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
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BOB FILNER, California
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BILL K. BREWSTER, Oklahoma
KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
FRANK MASCARA, Pennsylvania
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD, California
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina, Chairman
TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida
DON YOUNG, Alaska
SUSAN MOLINARI, New York
BILL BAKER, California
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
BUD SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
(Ex Officio)
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
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GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa, Chairman
ALPHONSE M. D'AMATO, New York
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Co-Chairman
BOB GRAHAM, Florida
CONTENTS
TESTIMONY
Bozin, Captain William G., Assistant Deputy
Director, Office of Supply Reduction, Office of National Drug Control
Policy
Ford, Jess T., Associate Director, International
Relations and Trade, National Security and International Affairs Division,
U.S. General Accounting Office
Gelbard, Ambassador Robert S., Assistant Secretary
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of
State
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Pierluisi, Pedro R., Attorney General,
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Pothier, Harvey G., Director, Air Interdiction
Division, Office of Invegtigations, U.S. Customs Service
Reuter, Dr. Peter, School of Public Affairs and
Department of Criminology, University of Maryland, College Park
Saunders, Rear Admiral Norman T., Chief,
Operations, U.S. Coast Guard
Sheridan, Brian E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, U.S. Department of
Defense
Walters, John P., President, New Citizenship
Project and Former Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, Office of National
Drug Control Policy
Warren, Mary Lee, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Bozin, Captain William G
Ford, Jess T
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Gelbard, Ambassador Robert S
Pierluisi, Pedro R
Pothier, Harvey G
Reuter, Dr. Peter
Saunders, Rear Admiral Norman T
Sheridan, Brian E
Walters, John P
Warren, Mary Lee
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Bozin, Captain William G., Assistant Deputy Director, Office of Supply
Reduction, Office of National Drug Control Policy:
Chart, Cocaine Seizures versus Production
Responses to questions from Rep. Coble
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Chart, Cocaine Availability and Usage Rates: 1982–1996
Chart, Office of National Drug Control Policy FY 1997 National Drug
Budget
Ford, Jess T., Associate Director, International Relations and Trade,
National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General
Accounting Office:
Responses to post hearing questions
Report, Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico, June 1996
Report, Drug Control: U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Carribbean Decline,
April 1996
Gelbard, Ambassador Robert S., Assistant Secretary
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, responses to post hearing questions
Pierluisi, Pedro R., Attorney General,
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, responses to post hearing questions
Pothier, Harvey G., Director, Air Interdiction
Division, Office of Invegtigations, U.S. Customs Service, responses to post
hearing questions
Saunders, Rear Admiral Norman T., Chief,
Operations, U.S. Coast Guard, responses to post hearing questions
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Sheridan, Brian E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, U.S. Department of
Defense, responses to post hearing questions
Walters, John P., President, New Citizenship
Project and Former Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, Office of National
Drug Control Policy, responses to post hearing questions
Warren, Mary Lee, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
U.S. Department of Justice:
Responses to post hearing questions from Sen. Grassley, November 12,
1996
Responses to questions from Rep. Gilchrest, March 26, 1997
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
D'Amato, Sen. Alfonse M., statement
Constantine, Thomas A., Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration,
statement:
Responses to questions from Sen. Grassley, November 6, 1996
Responses to questions from Rep. Coble, November 7, 1996
DRUG INTERDICTION AND OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
POLICY
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1996
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
and the Senate Caucus On International Narcotics Control,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07
a.m. in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Coble
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. COBLE. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation and the Senate Caucus on International
Narcotics Control will come to order.
We're meeting today to hear testimony on drug
interdiction and other matters relating to the President's national drug
control policy.
I want to initially welcome Senator Grassley, and
I presume there will be other members of the Senate caucus at this
hearing.
The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the
Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Senator Grassley, for any
opening statement he may have.
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Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank
you very much for your leadership in this effort. The jurisdiction of your
subcommittee, the important responsibilities you have, and taking time out
for this very serious national problem we're dealing with—I thank you
very much.
Today's hearing is on our national strategy and
our international efforts to deal with the problem of drug production,
trafficking, and use, and this hearing comes at a disturbing time. Just
this week the Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse issued another report
that confirms what we already know: that teenage drug abuse is on the rise,
and I'm sorry to say dramatically so.
I understand that the national PRIDE survey due
out later this month will bear witness to this same trend.
What is even more distressing about these numbers
is that they come after years of decline; in other words, years of a
succeeding war against drugs. Not only was teenage drug use declining, but
teen attitudes about drug use were also turning increasingly against drugs
right through 1992. This is no longer the case. More teens are now using
more drugs and seeing use as less dangerous than just a few years ago.
All our major surveys confirm this shocking
reality. The CASA study, however, is disturbing in yet another way. We know
from surveys of attitudes of teenagers that they see fewer dangers in using
drugs than their peers did just a few years ago. What the CASA study
suggests, however, is that a significant percentage of the parents of these
kids see drug use among their own kids as inevitable. These same parents do
not want their kids to try or use drugs; they believe, however, that
nothing can make a difference. They just want to throw their hands up.
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Since many of these parents are baby boomers who
experimented with drugs, they are uncertain about what to do. They are
uncertain how to talk to their children. It is unfortunate that they are
getting little help from this Administration in learning any better.
Today's hearing is an excellent example of this.
Although we have a fine list of knowledgeable witnesses from the
Administration, the individuals here are not policy-makers. With the
exception of Ambassador Gelbard and Mr. Constantine, all the present
witnesses are stand-ins for the responsible policy-making officials.
This is a major joint hearing on our national
strategy and international narcotics control policy. It comes at a time of
major increases in domestic use. It comes after years of declining efforts
in our international drug control efforts. I think that the American public
deserves to hear from policy-makers for drug policy. After all, the
Administration has repeatedly asserted that it takes the issue seriously
and takes it seriously at the highest levels of Government. Unfortunately,
these highest levels are not represented here today.
Although we gave the Administration ample notice
of this hearing, the Administration's chief drug spokesman chose to give a
speech on Asian organized crime in Hawaii. He also is speaking on marijuana
initiatives in California. As important as those meetings are, we gave the
Administration ample time to reschedule. The representation here today is
disappointing, especially at this time.
I am of the opinion that we develop policies and
strategies for a purpose. We intend these means to effect outcomes. We
expect the programs that we develop, the priorities that we set, and the
actions that we take to achieve some purpose.
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In the present case our national drug strategy is
not just meant to be a funding device. It is not supposed to be a warehouse
for housing various Government department pet projects. It's not meant to
be a grab bag of disconnected activities. This is true for our
international efforts. They are meant to be a part of a larger effort. They
are not meant to be disconnected programs.
Further, when our policies and strategies are not
achieving their stated purpose, then we need to ask some tough questions
about what is going on.
What do we find, however, when we look at this
Nation's drug war today? I submit that what we find is very far from what
we intend. I submit that the main objective of our policies and strategies
is to protect our young people from the harm that drugs do—the harm
to them directly from use and the harm that results from drug-related
violence.
At one time we were making progress in this area;
today, unfortunately, by every reporting system we have, the signs are
clear: our efforts are not working.
In the last several years, after decades of
decline, teenage drug abuse is on the rise. As chart one over here
indicates, past-month use among teenagers has risen more than 50 percent
over 1992 levels; past-month use of marijuana among kids age 12 to 17 is
now almost at the 1986 rate, as chart two will illustrate here in just a
minute.
I invite everyone to look at the trend shown here
and to tell me that we're doing okay in the war on drugs.
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In the meantime, as chart three shows, emergency
room admissions are going up, and I might add recent arrest data show a
similar trend in increases of drug use among youthful arrestees.
At the same time, funding for international and
interdiction programs have been declining. DOD funding for interdiction has
declined almost 50 percent. From a peak in 1992 of 854 million, it has gone
down to 432 million.
Now, I know that some of the witnesses speaking
for the Administration today will say that it's all Congress' fault. That,
however, is unfair to the truth, and a moment's glance at the record will
show otherwise.
The President's current request for DOD funding
before Congress today, for example, is 50 percent below the 1992 number.
Similarly, the Coast Guard budget requests for the last several years have
consistently spent 40 to 50 percent less on drug interdiction than in 1992.
This is despite the fact that overall spending has increased, so less money
has meant less effort.
Now, these lower numbers requested for drugs are
not accidental. The Administration's stated policy was to cut funding for
these programs. The purpose was to shift effort away from interdiction. The
former drug czar is on record to this point. This change was called a
controlled shift. The idea, according to the Administration, was to do more
in source countries and to do more on treatment.
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As a former drug czar noted, however, there
was no control shift, and treatment has done nothing to stop teenage drug
use.
Instead, we saw declining efforts in both the
transit zone and source countries. As chart four here illustrates, the
results were a decline in seizures. This decline in U.S. effort was echoed
internationally.
Chart five now will show international efforts to
seize cocaine also fell as U.S. emphasis shifted. In the meantime, as the
State Department's ''International Narcotics Control Strategy Report''
notes, international drug cultivation increased in virtually every major
drug-producing country in the world over the last 3 years.
In addition, methamphetamine production and
smuggling through Mexico has increased sharply. This new drug is now
causing serious problems in the Southwest and the Midwest.
So, as our international and interdiction efforts
decreased, international drug production increased. Smuggling has
increased. Trafficker bank accounts have gotten fatter. And more kids are
using drugs and seeing fewer dangers in doing so.
Now, I'm sure that we will hear today that these
declines in international efforts were because Congress did not give the
Administration the money. Well, let me make sure that we know what we're
talking about. It was a Democrat-controlled Congress under a Democratic
President that slashed our international drug programs. But, to be fair to
my Democratic colleagues, the Administration simply did not support its own
budget on the Hill. Congress, Democrat or Republican, does not simply
rubber stamp Presidential requests; yet, when administrations fight for
what they want and what matters to them, they usually do quite well.
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When a Republican President was prepared to fight
for his international budget, we saw increases. This was in a
Democratic-controlled Congress. It was a hard fight, but the President was
willing to make it.
Absent this effort, administration budgets suffer.
That is what we have seen with the international drug budget. This is true
even though overall spending on drugs has increased.
Last fiscal year Senator Coverdell and I helped to
increase spending for international programs. This year again we fought to
get the full funding for international budgets. The Administration did
little to help. The bill passed, however, despite this. It passed despite
the fact that the overwhelming majority of Democrats voted against the
President's own request.
As some of my Democratic colleagues have noted,
the Administration simply took a leave of absence on the drug issue. From
the beginning, the President distanced himself from the issue. The drug
issue was demoted as a priority. Our international programs reflected this
downgrading and, in context, the whole drug issue took a back seat.
Now, with this background it is little wonder,
then, why we have seen teenage drug use on the rise. Is it a surprise that
kids see fewer dangers in using drugs? Is it a surprise that many parents
are ready to run up a white flag?
If our strategies are meant to make a difference,
then where are we today?
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I submit that our recent efforts have been a
failure. Even General McCaffrey, who could not come here today, allowed
this to be the case last week, yet the present strategy offers little new.
Indeed, it has no substantive performance standards with which to measure
success. It has no goals that we can hold it to. This is despite
legislation that mandates such goals.
It is a well-intentioned effort, but, in fact, it
is thin, and this is not acceptable. We can't stand the status quo on this
drug effort.
So I hope that we would hear more today from the
Administration about its efforts, how it's going to change this present
environment. I hope we hear more about what is going to be done to reverse,
then, our present dismal performance.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Senator Grassley.
You touched just about every base. I'll give a
brief opening statement.
Last month the National Household Survey of Drug
Abuse confirmed what many of us have declared for years; that is, we're not
doing the right things to reduce the number of drug users in America.
The 1995 national survey, conducted by the
Department of Health and Human Services, found that since 1992 more
Americans are using drugs for the first time, starting at younger ages.
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The President's response to this finding, in my
opinion, has been disappointing. The President engaged the White House
political machine in a public relations campaign to deny responsibility for
the problem.
I want to make it plain that I am not an election
year recruit to the war on drugs. In fact, my opening statement today
pretty well tracks what I said a little over a year ago at a public
hearing. I have consistently criticized the President's decision to abandon
a balanced approach between drug interdiction, prevention, and drug
treatment. Instead, the President has favored a strategy that emphasizes
treatment of hard-core drug addicts.
I've emphasized that I'm not opposed to drug
treatment. I have said that previously. I reiterate it today. But I am
opposed to the President's decision to reduce drug interdiction and to
leave our country's borders more vulnerable to drug smugglers.
My colleagues and I, who sat on the former
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, on the Judiciary Committee, and on
this committee have sent the unequivocal message to the President that his
national drug control strategy is fatally flawed.
The President argues that the Congress has failed
to fund his drug budget at the levels he requested, but the fact is, the
House passed 1997 appropriations bills provide an increase of over 8
percent over fiscal year 1996 levels. Overall spending on drug control has
risen, on average, between 4 and 5 percent annually since the Bush
Administration. But funding for source country programs and interdiction
have been cut drastically.
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It is obvious to me that the President's drug
control spending priorities have not been effective in stopping drug
use.
Five major administration-sponsored surveys have
confirmed that we simply are not on the right track.
As we have said many times over the past several
years, the President's strategy and overall message are not adequate to
combat this critical problem facing our Nation.
We are desperately in need of a strategy that will
attack drug smugglers before their deadly cargoes reach our borders, and,
just as important, we must have leadership from the White House.
Pardon me for borrowing this phrase, but we need
to send the unambiguous message to our children to just say no to
drugs.
I don't know how significant that is, but it can't
hurt. I think a casual approach to drugs from the top has to send a message
that is not the proper one.
I am now pleased to recognize the ranking member
of the committee, the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Clement.
Mr. CLEMENT. Thank you, Chairman Coble.
Senator Grassley, it's a great honor to have you
over here on the House side with us today. I've sure kept up with your
record over the years and I know your concern about fighting drugs and
stopping drugs and saving our youth in this country.
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Drugs and their impact on our communities are
clearly one of the most complex problems facing the United States. My
constituents rate reducing crime and drugs as one of our top priorities
because it truly is destroying America. People that use controlled
substances commit these heinous crimes, and many of them would never, never
have committed those terrible crimes if they hadn't been on a controlled
substance.
Earlier this year I had the opportunity to see our
front-line command centers in this effort in Key West, Panama, and Puerto
Rico. We received many briefings that indicated that our source country
interdiction efforts were forcing bales of coca leaves to be stranded and
unable to get to the processing laboratories; that the cost of hiring a
pilot to transport drugs has skyrocketed. We learned that more resources
need to be allocated to west coast interdiction efforts, and we learned
that Puerto Rico has become the focal point for smuggling drugs through the
Caribbean to the continental United States.
The interdiction strategy is like a
constantly-changing chess match, with both sides trying to react to and
anticipate the other's moves. Only this isn't a game. At stake is the
future of our children and our communities.
I do not believe that this is a partisan issue,
either. Everyone, democrats and republicans, alike, wants to eliminate this
threat. The only question is: what is the best way to reduce both the
demand and supply of drugs?
The enemy is smart and has millions of dollars in
resources to find weaknesses in our effort to secure our borders, and we
have tightened our adjacent maritime and air borders. They have moved
south.
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As interdiction in Mexico has increased, they have
moved to Puerto Rico and eastern, the Caribbean. Police chiefs have said
that mandatory sentencing has resulted in adult drug sellers using children
to peddle their illegal merchandise.
We must be prepared to fight these smugglers for
years to come.
I believe that, with the effort and support of our
allies in Central and South America and the allocation of sufficient
resources here in the United States, we can succeed. I honestly believe
that is what our constituents want.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses
on their views on our national drug control policy and what we in Congress
can do better to support these efforts.
I also know that General McCaffrey, who I had
opportunity to meet with for approximately two hours recently, is really on
the front lines and really trying to make a difference and I know he wanted
to be here, and I know he offered a number of other dates such as September
the 13th and 16th and 18th where he could have testified before this
hearing.
As a lot of you know, he's out on the west coast.
He spoke yesterday in Hawaii. Today he will stop in California to report on
the heroin threat and to speak out, as he did earlier this week in Arizona,
against a domestic threat—a State referendum to legalize the use of
marijuana for medical purposes.
But through it all—and the amount and the
demand of illegal drugs in the United States, if I had to bring it back to
any particular area, I'd have to say the destruction of the family has had
a lot to do with the number of people that are taking illegal drugs
today—the breakdown, the destruction of the family.
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I hope, knowing that this is a very complex issue
and we've got to fight it on a lot of different fronts, but let us put it
in its proper perspective and let us fight not only the demand for drugs
but also the flow of drugs into the United States.
I don't know of a country on the face of the earth
that is facing such a dilemma as we are today and thinking about a country
as prosperous as the United States, the most prosperous country on the face
of the earth, and yet we have our people destroying themselves, but not
only destroying themselves, but destroying others.
I'm committed to the proposition in the 104th
Congress and to the next Congress to doing everything I can to try to make
a difference.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Clement.
We have been joined by the gentleman from
Delaware. Senator Biden, good to have you with us.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very
much.
I'll be brief. I should start off by pointing out,
when I ever attend a joint hearing over here I always feel much more
important. You are so much higher. I mean, it's a—you sit up here and
you feel like you really have some power.
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[Laughter.]
Mr. BIDEN. Over in the Senate side
we—
Mr. COBLE. Senator, that may be
deceptive.
Mr. BIDEN. I know in the Senate side we
don't have much.
Mr. Chairman, you and Mr. Clement and others and
Senator Grassley and I have been working on this drug issue for a long
time, and there is a debate—and I'm glad there is a debate
now—once again. For a while the debate sort of slid off the front
pages of the papers in America and it, quite frankly, slid out of the
political context of what was going on in the House and the Senate,
basically for the past 3 1/2 years.
There is some old stuff, the good news and the bad
news. I see John Walters—we've worked together on this issue since
the first drug czar—and others we're going to hear from today who
know this. This is preaching to the choir.
The good news is that violent crime is down. Even
youth crime has begun to fall. Overall drug use is level. But, despite all
that positive news, drug abuse among children has risen, and it's alarming
concern.
We base that on surveys, primarily, but roughly
it's gone from 5.5 percent of the children or a little over 5 percent of
the children in that cadre of children that we consider to be teenagers and
youth trying drugs to some over 11 percent.
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A lot of people say, ''Well, you still have 89
percent of the kids who don't try, don't use.'' Well, I want to tell you,
even if we kept at a constant level the percentage of children who tried
for the first time and used marijuana or any other drug, we've got a real
problem on the horizon. We've got 39 million kids under the age of 10 in
the United States of America, and if everything stays constant, not one
single percentage increase in use among young people in America, the
problem goes up exponentially.
We're going to produce more hard-core users at the
end of that tube. We're going to produce more violent crime. We're going to
produce more problems. We're going to produce more deaths. We're going to
produce more requirement for more police, for more treatment.
And so I think for us to finally begin to focus on
this is important—very, very important.
And I know there is criticism on both sides that
this is a political year, a political issue. But I know the men and women
up here are not going to let this die, assuming—now I know all of you
are going to be around next year. I may not be around next year. I'm up for
election. But, assuming I'm around, I'm not going to let it die, either.
And so maybe we can regenerate some positive interest and focus on
this.
There's something we can do in the meantime. Let
me add one thing, and I will finish with this, Mr. Chairman.
I'm not sure the blame game is of any real
consequence other than to get this back on top. As John and others and my
colleague in the Senate know, I wrote a report. Before, back in the good
old days, Mr. Chairman, when you all had a republican President, I used to
write an alternative drug strategy. I got in the habit of, every year,
writing a report on drug strategy. And so last year, in 1995, I wrote a
report, and this is not particularly clairvoyant. It seemed awfully
obvious.
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It started off on the first page saying, ''The
Nation has already seen its first signs of a trend that chills every
parent: a rise in drug use among children. This is the proper focus of our
national drug and crime debate in the months ahead. We should get about the
business of—'' so on.
And so all of a sudden we all went out there and
discovered this issue. You know, a year later it got discovered, like,
''What in the heck happened? Man, this all happened overnight.''
Well, it was happening, and we let our guard down.
We let our guard down in the first 2 years of this Administration. They
didn't do the job, in my opinion, in terms of focusing on this issue.
With all due respect, the Congress, democrat and
republican, alike, the last 4 years, up until the last 4 months, hasn't
focused on this. We got preoccupied with budget deficits, which is
necessarily a thing to be preoccupied with. We got preoccupied with how we
were going to stop spending. It was literally off the scope, off the radar
screen.
So, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I think the
question for us is: there are four or five things that will not change the
landscape fundamentally but will change our approach and our attitudes to
allow us to really have a springboard in the next Congress to deal with
this focused problem of drug use among youth in America.
There are five things I will not bore you with
now, Mr. Chairman, that I have proposed. I take no pride of authorship in
them. It's not like they're my original ideas. A couple are, but most are
common-sense notions we all agree on that we could do now, democrats and
republicans joining together right now and get them done before we leave
and the President will sign them.
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One is we've got a real problem, a thing called
''club drugs.'' You all have been speaking about them. We've been reading
about them: Special K, Ropynol—Special K is an animal tranquilizer,
Ropynol is a drug produced in other countries and is illegal here, but it
literally induces amnesia. Unscrupulous men drop them in women's drinks,
induce amnesia, increases rape, increases molestation—no ability to
testify afterwards.
This is the kind of thing that's on the horizon, a
little like Pat Moynihan telling us in the 1980s that, ''Hey, there's a
thing called 'crack.' It's in the Bahamas. We'd better get ready for it.''
We all kind of went, ''Blah-blah, yeah,'' and bang, but because of the
leadership of Bill Bennett and others, when steroids started to blow up,
when quaaludes started to come back we focused on them. We made them
schedule one drugs and we stopped an epidemic.
We can stop this beginning of a thing that's not
an epidemic yet if we act now and make it a schedule one drug.
Number two, I think Senator Hatch and I and many
of you over here have been working on methamphetamine. As that old saying
goes, ''You think crack's bad, wait until meth reaches the same
proportions. You ain't seen nothing yet.''
Literally you can predict it. Three years ago, I
wrote a report because some of the experts down there came to me and told
me about it saying, ''Hey, in Hawaii there is a thing called 'ice.' It's
heading east.''
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Literally you can trace its progression.
Chuck Grassley and I tried to get more DEA agents,
and we did—if you remember, Chuck—into the upper midwest
because they were moving out of California and moving up into Idaho and
Montana in the production of this. Now Idaho is a major producer State of
methamphetamines. It's moving east. We could deal with it
now—now—if we're willing.
Thirdly, by dealing with precursor
chemicals—the third thing is, we should write the check, folks. There
is money in the crime trust fund now to release for programs related to
youth and drug abuse. Let's just write the check before we leave. Let them
get about the business of starting to spend it.
The fourth thing is pharmacotherapy. I realize
this is—I'm kind of a lone voice here, but I'll make you a bet you
all come around on this one. There are potential medical helps for
addiction and prevention that are sitting on the shelf that the chemical
companies cannot spend the hundred million dollars it takes to produce
because the return on their investment is not likely to be of value to
them. They are not going to do it. We should be dealing with it, and I
propose some alternatives I think everyone would agree with.
The last thing is, we want to get tough. There is
something we should get tough on right now, not fool around—liberals,
conservatives, moderates have no disagreement on it that I'm aware of, and
it will not change, will not end the problem, but there is an
increasing—in this competitive market among the peddlers they are now
literally targeting recovering addicts. They are going to the drug
equivalent of the AA meetings and standing outside and they are targeting
recovering addicts.
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As we all know, the addicted population consumes
about 60 percent of all the drugs out there. We should nail those SOBs. We
should increase the penalties. We should send a message.
It will not end the problem, but I think there are
several things we can do, and the most important thing to do in any and all
of these things would do beyond the substance of them, Mr. Chairman, in my
view, is it will say, ''Hey, we're back in the game. We are back in the
game. We understand the problem. We're taking concrete action to do
something about it.''
I thank you for your time and I yield the
floor.
Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Senator.
It is good to have the gentlemen from California
and Michigan with us, as well.
I thank the first panel. Gentlemen, best laid
plans of mice and men go awry, as you all know, particularly in the waning
days of the Congress, and today is no exception.
At 12 today the full Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee will meet in this room for about an hour for a
markup, so we will recess at 12 and hopefully resume on or about 1, and I
regret this has occurred, but that is the schedule in these late days.
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At the outset, gentlemen, as you may remember,
this is our rule last time. I would appreciative if you all could tailor
your remarks to around 5 minutes. Now, no one will be keel-hauled and
jailed if you violate that, but because of the time constraint, if you
could stay in the neighborhood of 5 minutes, that will be appreciated.
The red illuminating light will be your warning
that the 5-minute time has come.
The first panel I am pleased to introduce to you
all consists of: John Walters, former deputy director for Supply Reduction
of the Office of National Drug Control Policy; Jess Ford, associate
director, International Relations and Trade, National Security and
International Affairs Division of the General Accounting Office; Pedro R.
Pierluisi, the attorney general, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. We weren't
sure, sir, because of the storm, that you would be able to join us, but
it's good to have you. And, finally, Dr. Peter Reuter, who is with the
School of Public Affairs and the Department of Criminology at the
University of Maryland at College Park.
Gentlemen, thank you all for being with us. Mr.
Walters, I will recognize you initially.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN P. WALTERS, PRESIDENT, NEW CITIZENSHIP PROJECT AND
FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SUPPLY REDUCTION OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL POLICY; JESS T. FORD, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND TRADE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO; AND DR. PETER REUTER, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
AND DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK
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Mr. WALTERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm pleased to be here. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify. I'd like to ask that my prepared testimony be
placed in the record, if that's acceptable.
Mr. COBLE. Without objection.
Mr. WALTERS. And I'll offer just a couple
of summary points that may be pertinent to the discussion that has been
conducted so far.
When I served in the Administration in the Drug
Policy Office, I thought that it wasn't a matter of the blame game as much
as it was accountability, and that not only the American people but the
Congress and others had a right to expect us to carry out the intent of the
law, which was to create a strategy and help the President provide
leadership to reduce the drug problem. We weren't the be all and end all,
but we were responsible for the Federal responsibility of both leadership,
programs, and policy.
In that capacity—and it was a different
time—if we had come before Congress with this kind of thing happening
that you saw in these charts here with use, supply, and policy and programs
producing the results or lack of results you see here, I would have fully
expected that Senator Biden and his other colleagues in both the House and
the Senate would have asked us to leave. The results are ridiculous. And,
worse than that, the policy, or the alleged policy and programs contained
in these documents offer no hope of turning it around.
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There are no goals, as Senator Grassley
mentioned in his opening statement. The programs offer—I defy any of
the subsequent people to testify here or any of my colleagues to explain
how this collection of policies and programs offers any hope of turning
those numbers around. I'll talk a little bit in my 5 minutes about those
specifics.
I've worked with most of the people serving in
Government now that will testify before you subsequently. Those I haven't
worked with I know, for the most part, and they are fine people. They have
not gotten the support.
Last week Senator Biden dared me to blame the
Congress as much as he's blamed the Executive Branch, and I'll mention some
things that I think Congress should do before it goes home.
First of all, the strategy is divided into roughly
five parts: international, interdiction, law enforcement, treatment, and
prevention. I want to briefly mention each one of those in my remaining
time.
Keep in mind, 72 million people, according to the
latest survey, have used illegal drugs in their lifetime, and if you think
that's a bunch of kids experimenting who later go on and don't try, over
22.6 million used them last year of that 72 million, almost 30 percent. And
7 million, according to the drug office—over seven million, according
to their last estimates of 1994, are drug addicts. That has probably gone
up.
It's not something you turn around easily and it's
not something that's a fleeting thing in youth that never continues.
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In the international realm, what you have today I
think is increasingly unlimited access to produce and transit drugs to the
United States without any serious risk of harm. Our foreign policy I
believe has not had a priority in this area. The visibility of the
President, Secretary of State, the priority in meetings and
others—and I believe there are hard-working people in the State
Department, some of whom will testify before you, who have been working
hard against the tide. But the fact of the matter is: other nations and
this country knows—I think the citizens of this country
know—this has not been a foreign policy priority.
If you do not make it a foreign policy priority,
none of the major supplier countries will make the effort to stop the
supply. And it's not a matter of how much money we give them; it's not a
matter of how much we cooperate with them; it's not a matter of show arrest
or show raids; it's a matter of telling them, ''Look. This is a poison.
It's a threat to American citizens. We will not continue business as usual
if you don't reduce the flow.''
Secondly, we have not used the sanctions
available. Colombia, which has widely been shown to have its own president
corrupted by drugs, depends on certain trade preferences conditioned on
cooperation in drugs. The President has failed to provide the necessary
trigger that Colombia is not cooperating, despite the fact that he
decertified them for the purposes of the State Department.
Congress should pass a resolution triggering those
cut-offs of trade preferences.
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In interdiction—and I'll just take 2
more minutes—we have cut, as those charts previously showed, the
capacity of the U.S. forces to reduce the supply of drugs between South
America and the United States. That has helped to contribute to the lowest
prices and highest purities recorded in recent years. That fuels use.
Discount prices, high potency fuel use and addiction. They're not the sole
factor here, but they are a crucial factor, and we ought to learn by that
experience and stop the stupid argument about whether or not you focus on
supply or demand. You have to focus on both.
We spent more money on Department of Education
prevention spending than we spent on the Defense Department providing
resources to interdict drugs. I ask you to ask the Defense Department
representatives that will follow: what is the comparative amount we spent
on bringing democracy to Haiti over the last several years in regard to and
in comparison to what we spent on protecting Americans from drugs?
I'm not against bringing democracy to Haiti. I'm
not against AWACS time in Iraq or Bosnia. But compare the amount of AWACS
time devoted to those missions and the amount of time devoted to protecting
this country from drugs.
It's not a matter of more spending; it's a matter
of what are your priorities. And maybe we can't do everything, but my
argument is: the American people have a right to expect and they do expect
that we will protect our children and our streets.
Since I've already gone over, let me just
summarize on the demand side, and I'll be happy to take questions on law
enforcement and treatment.
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The key to making these programs work and the
reason why this strategy doesn't do it is it doesn't come to grips with the
realities. HHS has produced data showing that we have a 75 percent capacity
utilization in treatment centers. We are cycling people through outpatient
treatment that are hard-core addicts that need residential treatment.
The current delivery system for these programs
does not deliver the money to where the addicts are, it does not deliver
quality treatment, and it does not deliver the kind of treatment that
everybody that works in this field says they need. There is no serious
effort in this strategy. In fact, in the beginning of the Clinton
Administration they dismantled the one program, the capacity expansion
program that was designed to deal with it.
It's not the be all and end all, but before you
dump more money in this system you'd better make sure someone's got a
policy and program that's going to produce something.
The same thing with drug-free schools. We have
spent over $2 billion in the last several years on the drug-free schools
program that has been a giant source of debate. The current Administration
request—the request is $86 million below the 1992 level in the last
year of the Bush Administration.
The problem is not spending on the drug-free
schools program. The report released earlier this year said kids say there
is too much drugs in their school. They want the drugs out.
You passed a law in the late 1980s saying, as a
condition of receiving Federal assistance, every school district, including
colleges and universities, had to have a drug policy and had to enforce
it.
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To the best of my knowledge, there has never been
an IG compliance investigation anywhere in this country, although youthful
drug use is going up and you get continued reports that drugs are in
schools.
I'm not against providing money. I don't think
that's the key. But you'd better use a stick as well as a carrot and start
and order the Education Department to conduct compliance reviews with the
policies and actions of school districts around the country, beginning with
the biggest ones. That's the stick here, and $86 or $26 or $36 million in
this program in a block grant to schools that comes down to $2 per student
is a ludicrous way of dealing with the problem that you have now.
Finally, I think that the problem has to have
serious leadership, and the statements of the President have been
reprehensible in the early part of the Administration. They undermined
hours and hours of Partnership for Drug-Free America ads when the President
jokes about and leaves the lasting impression that his most important
statement on drugs is, ''I didn't inhale,'' when he goes on youthful
television and says, ''If I had it to do over again, I would inhale.'' What
is that message? What was he trying to teach our young people?
I believe in responsibility. You want to have them
take responsibility? He ought to step up and take responsibility and say,
''That was wrong. I am a morally serious person on this subject. It was a
mistake. It's not my message,'' and explain why, as the example or parent
of the baby boomer generation that experimented with drugs, why our kids
today should not make the mistake his generation made.
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He is the moral leader in that regard, and
when he acts to undermine the status of parents and other institutions, it
has a profound effect. He's not the only one responsible, but that
responsibility, that moral leadership, as you saw with Mrs. Reagan and
President Reagan and President Bush, has important catalyzing effects that
can't be measured.
I know a lot of social scientists don't like the
moral argument. They want to talk about treatment and they want to talk
about all of the other programmatic solutions. But the meaning and the
intention and the guidance of people is based on their sense of right and
wrong, and you need to empower the sense of right and wrong that using
drugs is wrong and standing against them is right and expect that from your
leaders and expect that from your citizens.
I'm sorry for going over, but thank you.
Mr. COBLE. Mr. Walters, you recall in my
opening statement I indicated that a casual response does not get it done,
and you pretty well have emphasized that. Thank you, Mr. Walters.
Gentlemen, I'm going to be more lenient. I'm going
to—let's say near 10 minutes—Mr. Walters used about
10—because this is an important subject matter and I realize 5
minutes is a pretty narrow window.
And don't worry about your doing it, Mr. Walters,
because you gave good information, good evidence.
And so you all keep in mind, let's all try to
maybe stay in the area of 8 to 10 minutes, and I think that will give you a
little more flexibility.
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I'm pleased to recognize the attorney general from
Puerto Rico.
Mr. PIERLUISI. Good morning, Mr. Chairman
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, as well as the caucus.
Thank you for allowing me the opportunity of
presenting the government of Puerto Rico's perspective on drug control
policy.
As I will testify today, the government of Puerto
Rico is not only fighting crime within its boundaries, but it has also
joined forces with the Federal Government to curtail the effects that drug
trafficking is having on the island, as well as the rest of the Nation.
Shortly after taking office, Governor Rossello
realized that Federal and State efforts needed to be united in order to
eliminate crime and drug trafficking. One of Governor Rossello's first
official acts was to visit the Puerto Rico headquarters of every Federal
law enforcement agency operating in the island. His itinerary extended from
the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the DEA to the Coast Guard and the
Postal Inspection Service, as well as several other Federal agencies.
Since then, Federal and local agencies have joined
their efforts, forming several task forces. The United Forces for Rapid
Action, known in Puerto Rico as FURA for its Spanish acronym, is one of
them. FURA is the largest working group dedicated to the investigation,
detection, and seizure of drugs along the coastline of Puerto Rico. It is
integrated by the Puerto Rico Police Department, the Puerto Rico Special
Investigations Bureau, the National Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, and
the U.S. Coast Guard.
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Also, in a coordinated campaign that commenced on
June 4, 1993, we have mobilized the National Guard of Puerto Rico units to
support the state police in the rescuing of 77 communities where drug
dealers had virtually taken control. After these initial operations, we
supported and continue to support the rescued communities by rehabilitating
and re-empowering them through a coalition of 18 social service agencies
that comprise what we call ''The Quality of Life Congress.''
Some of the major accomplishments of this thorough
campaign directed at improving the living conditions of the residents of
Puerto Rico include: seizures of 35,000 unregistered firearms; more than 12
tons of cocaine confiscated; recovery of more than $16 million in cash that
had been in the possession of drug traffickers; shutting down of 250
''retail outlets'' to which motorists could drive right up to and purchase
illegal drugs—we call them actually ''drug points,'' and it's
basically like a delivery service, and we eliminated 250 of them; 1,400
suspects taken into custody. Those are some of the statistics.
Over 23,000 families in these 77 neighborhoods
have, to date, been rescued. I should emphasize again ''rescued.'' We are
basically restoring quality of life for these people. Past 5:00 in the
afternoons, they could not go outside. Their kids could not play outside.
Basically the drug lords were in control. In each of these 77
neighborhoods, as a result of this unprecedented initiative, we now can
attest to a good and decent quality of life. That is what the fight against
drugs is all about.
Congressman Bill McCollum, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee, as well as
Congressman Schumer, ranking minority member and former chairman of the
same subcommittee, have described the program as a model that should be
emulated in housing projects all across America.
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I should say that Administrator Tom Constantine,
who is present at this hearing, can also attest to the effectiveness of
this program.
It is evident that the growth of criminal
incidents is directly linked to the proliferation of drugs in Puerto Rico.
Our island has become a major point of entry for drugs originating in South
America and destined to the United States mainland for various reasons.
Following are some of the major ones.
In the 1980s Florida was a drug smuggler's haven
until the Federal Government invested heavily in manpower and
high-technology surveillance. Fairly quickly the drug smugglers were
captured or scared away from their Floridian paradise. The lure of money
brought them to other pastures, and they began introducing their deadly
profitable cargoes into the United States' market through a new
trans-shipment area: Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Puerto Rico is located 350 miles from South
America and approximately 800 miles from Florida. The island's 300-mile
coastline provides an ideal scenario for sea, land, and air smuggling of
illegal contraband, such as drugs, weapons, and currency.
There are more than 100 trafficking organizations
currently operating in the eastern Caribbean, as reported by the DEA.
Puerto Rico is a part of this great Nation, and
once the drugs have entered the area, there are no more borders to cross.
In other words, if they get past us, then they will show up on the streets
of Miami, New York, or ''Small-Town USA.''
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We estimate that over 7 tons of cocaine arrive in
Puerto Rico on a monthly basis. At least 85 to 90 percent of these drugs
are later transported into the United States mainland and destined
primarily to the eastern seaboard cities of New York, Boston, Newark,
Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Miami. The remaining 10 to 15 percent stays in
Puerto Rico.
By the way, that's what fuels the high crime
situation in our island, because that 10 to 15 percent that stays in Puerto
Rico is sold at these drug points that I mentioned to you and that we have
been basically eliminating.
The vast availability of cocaine in Puerto Rico is
reflected in its relatively low cost and high purity, comparable only to
those found in New York and other major eastern seaboard cities.
Most of the violent deaths occurring in Puerto
Rico are directly related to the upsurge in the smuggling of controlled
substances and in the incidence of addition to such substances.
In 1992, only 24 percent of the murders taking
place in our island were directly related to drugs. By 1995 there has been
a dramatic change. Now 63 percent of the murders are related to drugs.
Based on these, as well as other well-documented
facts, Governor Rossello sought the designation of Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands as the seventh HIDTA of the Nation, and on November 2, 1994,
we were designated as such.
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Today we reaffirm our commitment to improve the
lives of the residents of Puerto Rico and the rest of the Nation by
presenting a united front against this drug epidemic. Our goal is to reduce
the availability of drugs in the area and in the continental United States.
Our collective efforts against drugs are making a difference.
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Rubin,
stated before this committee, ''Because drug traffickers are shifting from
the southwest to the Caribbean, Customs has put in place Operation Gateway
in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Cocaine seizures in Puerto Rico, in
the first half of the fiscal year 1996, were up 46 percent from the
previous year, and seizures of heroin were also up substantially.''
Yes, we are achieving significant results, but we
still have far to go. Our borders are vulnerable, and although I have
spoken mostly on our supply side strategy, we cannot forget the demand
aspect of this problem. We have to question where did we go wrong socially
and what can we do to turn the demand tide around?
I'd like to conclude my testimony by quoting
Governor Rossello on the conference entitled, ''Meeting the National Threat
of Drug Abuse and Crime'' which was held in San Juan earlier this year.
Then he stated, ''For the sake of an entire generation of young people, and
for the sake of generations to come in the new millennium, may God be with
us all as we strive to meet and to defeat the national threat of drug abuse
and crime.''
This concludes my formal remarks, but I'd like
to—I'd be happy to answer any questions you may have, particularly on
our interdiction efforts and the Coast Guard assets and effectiveness in
our region.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. COBLE. Thank you, sir.
Let me say, if there are members of the third
panel in the audience, if you have other things to do, you may leave,
because, as I say, we're going to have a recess at 12:00 and then we will
reconvene on or about 1:00, so if there are members of the third panel who
need to do other things, there is no way we can get to you before
1:00—that's the third panel.
Mr. Ford?
Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If it would please the chairman, I'd like to have
my full statement submitted for the record and I'll try to summarize
briefly.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I'm
pleased to be here today to talk about a recent review we did on narcotics
efforts in Mexico. We initiated the work at the request of Senator Grassley
and the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control and another House
subcommittee.
Our review focused on four major areas: first, a
discussion of the nature of the drug trafficking threat from Mexico;
second, Mexican efforts to counter drug trafficking activities; third, U.S.
strategy and programs intended to stem the flow of illegal drugs through
Mexico; and, lastly, we discussed recent initiatives by the United States
and Mexico to increase counter-narcotics activities.
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Our report was issued in June of this year, and I
believe it has been made available to the committee.
The report builds on prior GAO reports and
testimonies on U.S. and Mexican efforts to control drug activities, and
many of the things that I'm going to talk about we found on our previous
efforts.
Mr. Chairman, let me paint a picture for you on
the nature and magnitude of the problems we face from Mexico.
Mexico is the primary transit country for cocaine
entering the United States from South America. It is also the major
source—a major source country for heroin, marijuana, and, most
recently, methamphetamines. U.S. Government estimates indicate that up to
70 percent of the cocaine enters the United States through Mexico.
In addition, Mexico supplies up to 80 percent of
foreign-grown marijuana consumed in the United States, and from 20 to 30
percent of the heroin.
Two-thirds of the cocaine entering Mexico arrives
via maritime vessels, making detection and apprehension a very difficult
process.
During the past 3 years, Mexican trafficking
organizations operating on both sides of the border have replaced
U.S.-based outlaw motorcycle gangs as the predominant manufacturer and
trafficker of methamphetamines, primarily in the western part of the United
States.
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The DEA estimates that up to 80 percent of the
methamphetamine available in the United States is either produced in Mexico
and transported to the United States or manufactured in the United States
by Mexican traffickers.
Moreover, its proximity to the United States,
endemic corruption, and little or no financial regulation have combined to
make Mexico a major money laundering center, a haven for the initial
placement of drug profits into the world's financial system.
Given this picture, it's not surprising that the
State Department has declared no country in the world possesses a
more-immediate narcotics threat to the United States than Mexico.
Now let me briefly talk about what happened since
the Mexican government assumed responsibility for the drug control efforts
in late 1992.
On the positive side, Mexico has eradicated
substantial acres of marijuana and opium poppy; however, the number of
drug-related arrests in Mexico has declined by two-thirds since 1992 from
approximately 28,000 in 1992 to 10,000 in 1995.
On average, 45 tons of cocaine was seized annually
in Mexico between 1990 and 1992, but during the 1993 and 1995 period that
dropped down to only 30 tons.
According to U.S. officials, Mexican
counter-narcotics efforts are hampered by pervasive corruption in key
institutions, economic and political problems, and limited
counter-narcotics and law enforcement tools and capabilities.
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Now let me move to the resource issue.
In late 1993, United States revised its
international cocaine strategy from one that focused on intercepting drugs
as they move through the so-called ''transit area,'' including Mexico, to
stopping cocaine at its source. U.S. funding for counter-narcotics efforts
in the transit zone declined from about $1 billion in fiscal year 1992 to
approximately $570 million in 1995.
Moreover, since 1992 direct U.S. counter-narcotics
assistance to Mexico has been negligible because of Mexico's 1993 policy of
not accepting most U.S. counter-narcotics assistance.
Our ability to monitor previously-provided U.S.
assistance—primarily helicopters—has been hampered by these
reductions.
Since our August, 1995, testimony before this
subcommittee, there have been some positive signs. The U.S. Embassy now has
elevated drug control importance in its overall country plan. It has also
developed a drug control operating plan and has developed measurable
objectives so that you can assess whether or not the program is
effective.
The Mexican government has recently signaled a
willingness to develop a mutual counter-narcotics assistance program and
has taken some important law enforcement, and money laundering legislation
is now working through their system.
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We believe these actions are positive
signs.
The U.S. and Mexico have created a framework for
increased cooperation and are expected to develop a joint counter-narcotics
later this year.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude with this
one thought: Mexico is critical to the success of any U.S. strategy; thus,
U.S. and Mexican officials must follow through on these new initiatives
that I have just talked about if we are expected to try to deter any
illegal drugs entering the United States.
I'd be prepared to answer any questions you might
have at this time.
Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Ford.
Dr. Reuter.
Dr. REUTER. Thank you very much.
I ask that my written testimony be submitted for
the record. I'll summarize it here.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify here.
I was, before obtaining a position at the
University of Maryland, at the Rand Corporation, where I directed a study
on the effectiveness of drug interdiction, and particularly of military
involvement in drug interdiction, in 1988. In my testimony I will stick
strictly to issues related to drug interdiction.
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In particular, what I would like to talk about is
ways of analyzing how much should be spent on interdiction and whether the
interdiction budget ought to be expanded at this time. I propose the
classic academic answer, which is that we don't know nearly enough to make
that decision in a sensible way, but maybe the discussion will be
helpful.
Secondly, I'll talk about how interdiction and the
recent increase in adolescent drug use are related or not related.
The framework for thinking about allocating the
budget among different programs, including interdiction, is based on the
notion that interdiction can affect the price of drugs and, by that, affect
consumption, but can't really reduce drug imports directly. That is, given
the maturity of the production, transportation, and domestic distribution
system, it's impossible to have an interdiction system that's so effective
that only a fixed amount of cocaine can enter this country.
Instead, we can make doing the business
sufficiently more expensive, that the price of cocaine goes up, consumption
goes down, and less enters the country as a consequence.
The way interdiction accomplishes this is simple
in principle. Interdiction raises the cost of smugglers by increasing the
risk that drugs get seized and the amount that they have to pay people who
work for them, in return for taking risks of going to prison. They also
lose assets, including transportation assets.
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So the more intense interdiction is, then the
higher the cost that smugglers face. The higher cost smugglers face, the
higher import prices. And from higher import prices we get higher retail
prices. Then, by magic, we get reduced consumption.
All that is a matter of theory; there is, not much
evidence. In particular, one of the critical missing elements, which I will
talk about in the context of the EBR study, is that we have no idea what is
the relationship of an increase in smugglers' costs and the increase in the
retail price of cocaine.
So, in fact, raising smugglers' costs by a fixed
amount let's say by $5,000—might raise the retail price of cocaine by
$5,000. That might raise the retail price by 20 percent if that $5,000 is
20 percent of total smugglers' costs.
Then the question is: if we put another $500
million into interdiction, how would that compare in terms of raising
retail price as compared to other price-raising strategies that we have,
such as domestic enforcement or source country control?
The only thing that we have at the moment that
addresses this with relatively current evidence is the Evidence-Based
Research—I think that's a wonderful name—Evidence-Based
Research study of the interdiction program, which estimated that an
additional $500 million would raise the smugglers' cost per kilo of cocaine
by about $3,800.
Mr. BIDEN. What is the cost of a kilo right
now?
Dr. REUTER. A kilo at the high wholesale
level—that is probably at a point of entry, in a 100-kilo
bundle—might sell for about $20,000. I'm certainly not up-to-date on
1996 prices, but it would be $15 to $25,000, I think—probably around
20 now.
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Mr. BIDEN. So it would raise it from 20 to
23?
Dr. REUTER. From 20 to 24, roughly. And you
could regard that as a 20 percent increase, which would be a stunning
effect if it translated into 20 percent increase in retail prices, or it
could be regarded as $4,000 or $3,800 as compared to a retail price of
$120,000, in which case it's not very much.
The point is that we have here one systematic
study of one program from which I would have drawn a conclusion different
from ONDCP. I would have said that, even given the uncertainties, this
provided a reasonable basis for shifting some assets into interdiction. But
I have not seen the full study and there may be technical problems with it
that don't show up in the summaries that are available for the general
public.
But we have that one study which shows that $500
million in interdiction would accomplish this increase, and we have nothing
to compare that with. I have no idea if taking $500 million out of domestic
enforcement would comparably sort of reduce prices so that it makes sense
to do this.
In general, there has been absolutely no interest
in a continuing line of analysis that allows decisions about these programs
to be made in a systematic fashion, comparing the effectiveness of these
programs by some standard measure like how much they raise the retail price
of drugs.
This hearing, in large part, is called because of
the concern about the increase in adolescent drug use. There is a question
about how that relates to interdiction.
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I've talked mostly about interdiction as it
relates to cocaine. With respect to marijuana I imagine it's obviously
somewhat more complicated by this existence of a very large domestic
production industry.
But it's very hard to see a price-raising program
like the interdiction program as having very substantial effects on
initiation rates amongst adolescents. Over the period from 1981 to 1992,
there were sharp declines in the price of cocaine and more ambiguous
movements in the price of marijuana. During that period, initiation rates
plummeted.
It is very easy to tell a story—and it isn't
more than a story—that initiation rates are fairly insensitive to
price.
So the question is: is arguing about the
interdiction program relevant to a concern about changing initiation rates
amongst adolescents?
I would say at the moment we have a very meager
understanding of what drives adolescent drug use, but the price appears to
be of secondary importance.
Rise in adolescent drug use in the last 3 years
was predicted only in the most general way by any analysts. We always have
had a hypothesis of generational forgetting, but no reference as to whether
this would happen in 1993 or 2003 or 2013. Even now no one has any kind of
model as opposed to a sound bite that explains why we've seen this increase
and what policy, if any, or environmental factors could explain it.
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Similarly, next to nothing is known about how
different enforcement programs affect initiation rates. Under these
circumstances, choices about programs and policies like how much to spend
on the interdiction budget will continue to be driven by impressions and
beliefs rather than any solid evidence.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. COBLE. Thank you, gentlemen.
Murphy's law is at work today, gentlemen. The old
Murphy's law adage would be, ''If anything can go wrong, it does go
wrong.''
A member of our second panel has to depart
imminently, and he has requested that we hear from him and question
him.
To do that—I'm willing to accommodate him if
it will not inconvenience you all, and I'm going to let you all make that
call. If we do alter the schedule to that end, it would require you all
returning for questioning on or about 1:00.
If you all can't do that, we will—can you
all—what says the first panel to that?
Okay. Well, I think then, for the benefit of the
second panel—Administrator Constantine is still here? Sir, I regret
that I can't do that, but I hate to impose on this panel. I didn't know
about your schedule until today. Would it be possible for you to come back
later in the day? And I hope you understand, sir, I'm uneasy about
inconveniencing the first panel that's already in place, so why don't we,
sir, just accept your written testimony and then we will hear from the
second—your partner in the second panel after we conclude with the
questioning of the first panel, if that's amenable to you. I regret we
can't do it the other way, but I think, given the set of circumstances as
they are, we'll do it that way.
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Thank you, sir.
Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Chairman, as I understand
it, you will accept Mr. Constantine's statement into the record as if
read?
Mr. COBLE. That's correct.
Mr. CLEMENT. And then any questions or
whatever we could ask into the record, itself, and—
Mr. COBLE. That would be in order.
Mr. CLEMENT.—for him to respond to
our request.
Mr. COBLE. That would be in order.
Senator, do you want to be heard on this
matter?
Mr. GRASSLEY. It's your decision, sir.
Mr. COBLE. This is an out-of-the-ordinary
set of circumstances. The blame should be assigned to no one. It's just
something that we can't control.
So if you will submit your statement then, sir, I
appreciate that and wish you well at your graduation down the road.
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Thank you, gentlemen.
Now, Senator Grassley, Mr. Clement and I usually
impose the 5-minute rule upon us, as well, during questioning, so if you're
not uncomfortable with that, I will recognize the Senator from Iowa for 5
minutes of questioning, and then we will move along.
Thank you again, gentlemen, for being with us.
Senator Grassley?
Mr. GRASSLEY. The 5-minute rule is
generally used in the Senate, so I'm very comfortable with it.
Mr. Walters, in the past you have been involved
with the development of a national drug strategy. I know from your
testimony in past hearings that you're very familiar with the present drug
strategy. I think you made that clear in your presentation today. And, of
course, you're an expert on the present state of drug use in America.
We all realize that everyone has his own opinion
as to what should be included and emphasized in our national drug strategy,
and I'm asking you your opinion. What is the level of effort suggested in
the present drug strategy compared with years past? What is the level of
commitment in this strategy as compared to previous strategies? And
characterize it above or below previous years. And then, lastly,
shortcomings that you might see in the present strategy, if any.
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Mr. WALTERS. Yes, Senator. I'll try to take
those in order.
If you measure the strategy in aggregate amount of
money asked for, it's roughly the same as the last strategy in 1992. Those
previous strategies were going up. It's roughly at the same level in
current figures or in deflated figures.
The places the strategy is spending money are
different. I think J.L. has already referred to the reductions in
interdiction, reductions in international programs in some areas, big
increases in law enforcement spending of different types, some decline but
roughly constant treatment spending, and some declines but roughly constant
prevention spending.
But I think that illustrates that the problem is
not how much money you spend; the problem is how you manage the money. And
the problem, as I tried to outline in my opening statement, is I don't
think there is the proper policy management, construction, and
implementation of programs.
I think you have to change the desire of foreign
partners in source countries to do more themselves, and if they don't want
to do more, spending more money is not going to make them do more. It is a
big problem. It is not an easy problem for them. But I think the
fundamental problem today is the will of our foreign partners and their
perception that we are not serious as a Nation.
I think that's the Federal Government, generally,
and I would recommend, as I said in my opening statement, that the Congress
take into its hands the ability to express, even if through resolution
before you go home, our dissatisfaction with the performance of Colombia,
Mexico, and other countries at this point in time.
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If you can do that, it has an effect. I think you
should do more down the line.
In terms of interdiction, I take Mr. Reuter's
point. We've been discussing this for some years now. But one point I'd
like to make in the EBR study that he didn't make is that the study
estimates that $500 million would cause a disruption of 130 metric tons'
equivalent of cocaine. It also points out that United States consumes
somewhere under 300 metric tons.
The exact consequences of these disruptions and
whether they—how much additional supply they can roll into the
pipeline and how hard to do this, that is a legitimate source of
debate.
But the fact of the matter is—and it's not
we should just do interdiction. The issue is, we should reduce the supply
and reduce the demand at the same time—addictive demand, casual
demand, source country supply, domestic supply.
I think the overall management—the failure
of overall management is reflected in the fact that this drug strategy
doesn't have any numerical goals. They're hard to make, they're difficult
to make, but they are also political. They stake the integrity of the
President on reaching certain goals.
My view is, if you try hard and you don't make it,
or you seem to try hard, that's not a detriment; but if you don't try and
you don't make it, then I think the American people have a right to hold
you accountable, no matter where you sit in the Government. It's not a
right, it's a privilege.
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In terms of treatment, I talked about that at some
length about the problems I think exist in the current treatment system and
the failure to kind of come to grips with those. And in terms of
prevention, I think a lot of what we do at the Federal level has to do with
creating a certain kind of attitude.
In a hearing last week, Senator Biden pointed out
that, in meeting with young people in his District, they want an excuse to
say no. They want adults to give them the moral support to say, ''I don't
use drugs.''
In an exchange with him afterwards, I said,
''Adults need that too.'' The American people and citizens and other
leaders need to know that the climate in this country is that you are going
to not tolerate sales and use. We ought to close open air drug markets, as
Puerto Rico has tried to do with astounding success. We ought to insist
that schools not tolerate drug use. We ought to insist that programs that
receive money are accountable. We ought to insist that the highest-level
officials—the President and his drug director—provide goals, as
required by law, and link programs to the achievement of those goals.
It doesn't do it.
This is a strategy for failure. People don't like
the drug war analysis. This is a strategy for a domestic Vietnam. We know
this won't work, and I defy any subsequent witness to tie the programs and
policies in this to reducing the current terrible trends.
Now, if we continue, knowing this won't work,
we're asking the young recruits that Mr. Constantine is going to go swear
in to be ground up in the maw for no good achievement.
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There are hundreds of them and thousands of them
on the line, and we're not supporting them with the right kinds of policies
at the national level.
That's a long answer, but it was a long question.
Sorry.
Mr. COBLE. Senator Biden, your round for 5
minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I'd be happy to
yield if you want to go Senate, House—
Mr. COBLE. Either way. Go ahead.
Mr. BIDEN. All right. Dr. Reuter, you have
been before my committee on the other side almost as much as Mr. Walters
has. There is this ongoing debate that we've always had about the efficacy
of interdiction and the allocation of resources.
One of the things I am always reminded
of—and I'm not sure that you were the first one to tell it to me, or
whoever it was in the committee—to put this in focus, that it takes
only 10 square miles to supply the entirety of the world's heroin
supply.
Dr. REUTER. The U.S. heroin, sir.
Mr. BIDEN. If I'm not mistaken, the
American consumes less than 10 percent of the world's heroin.
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Dr. REUTER. Right.
Mr. BIDEN. I was under the impression it
was 10 square miles for the world's supply.
Dr. REUTER. No.
Mr. BIDEN. No? All right. So you've got 10
square miles, and we've watched it move. We've watched it move from
Afghanistan to Burma. We watched it move into Peru. We watched it move
all—I mean, we've watched this thing move.
So keep in mind what we're dealing with here is a
fairly porous borders, and in some sense necessarily porous.
But I think that Mr. Walters makes a valid point.
If we had the resources to add another half billion dollars to
interdiction, if it would have the effect of taking 130 metric tons out of
the supply in the United States, that would be a good thing, a positive
thing. It wouldn't be bad.
Dr. REUTER. Right.
Mr. BIDEN. The problem I have is: where do
we take it from? Or where do we add to?
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This is a prelude to my question.
As I understood your testimony, although we have
now at least a study that says half a billion would affect 130 million
metric tons—
Dr. REUTER. 130 metric tons. Yes.
Mr. BIDEN.—we don't have any
comparable study to say, if you took a half a billion out of local law
enforcement or you took a half a billion out of treatment or you took a
half a billion out of any other sector, what that might do at the other
end.
Dr. REUTER. That's right. That's the point.
If the EBR findings stand up to scrutiny—and I've not seen the
detail, the study, itself—it makes, I think, a sort of good prima
facie case that more interdiction would be a useful reallocation from most
other domestic enforcement programs, or, from my point of view, from source
country control programs, though there is scarcely $500 million left in
that account.
And so, as I say, I might have interpreted this
differently, but it's one study of one program and you just don't know what
you're comparing against.
Mr. BIDEN. But don't you agree with Mr.
Walters that there has not been—and I would argue there hasn't been
for a while—enough emphasis from the foreign policy side of our
equation on—
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Dr. REUTER. I think there is this
great American penchant for going to the fundamentals, and it's so often
misleading. I mean, you go to prevention to stop demand at its beginning,
or you go to production so you don't have to deal with the distribution,
and so on.
I think we have good arguments and lots of
evidence to suggest that these are very elusive target. It is hard to
persuade producer countries to act aggressively on our behalf, and even
when they do act aggressively on our behalf, as has been the case
historically with Mexico with respect to heroin previously, we get fairly
modest results from that in terms of our own prices.
I mean, there is a lot of very cheap land and
labor there, and it is nothing we are going to do that's going to make that
really expensive.
Mr. BIDEN. I would argue, when we did have
some cooperation in Colombia because of their own internal situation and
because of initiatives, I'd argue—we had an argument at the
Administration at that time, we lost an opportunity. We did not come in and
fill any void to give any alternatives at that time, and some of us are
arguing the Andean policy should be altered to provide for access for
people to get back to their business.
The irony was, at the very time we were telling
those farmers in Colombia who were being shut down that they're out of
manufacturing, they're off the farm, we were also going after them on the
flower treaty we had with them and the number of treaties that
they—so the last Administration had such a bogus foreign policy
related to that, that I found it astounding.
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Dr. REUTER. I hate to be so relentless
about this, but you cannot raise the price of land and labor in Colombia
enough to make any difference to the price here. If you make flower growing
more profitable, the wages of Colombian labor might go up 25 percent. That
would be wonderful and that would raise the price of leaf growing in
Colombia by 20 percent, let's say. And that would be $0.02 on the price of
a bundle of crack.
It just is very seductive. It's very
irrelevant.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, my time is up and
I have some other questions if we have time, but I'll submit them in
writing if you wish.
Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Senator. We have a
vote on so we have to move along here.
Mr. Walters, I'd like for you, during my 5-minute
segment, to respond to what Dr. Reuter said, but I want to put a question
to you first.
You stated that the Clinton Administration's
claim—in your testimony—that it will address the drug problem
by increasing treatment slots for hard-core addicts is questionable. You
further note that, while treatment spending almost tripled during the
fiscal years 1988 through 1994, the number of persons treated declined by
145,000 people.
Since the number undergoing treatment is falling
or reducing, do you have any determination what became of the millions of
dollars earmarked for that purpose?
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Mr. WALTERS. Yes. Again, those are all
numbers from the Clinton Administration drug office. I'm not calculating
them myself. And they get them, I think, from HHS studies.
There are some cases where the money improved the
quality of certain treatment programs. It went from poor quality to high
quality.
I don't think there is any evidence—and I'd
be happy to have Dr. Reuter, who also studies this stuff, if he has
evidence, to respond here. I don't think there is any evidence that the
overall system got better.
Again, I think we've got a sterile debate—I
said this to Senator Biden last week—over whether treatment works.
HHS has a campaign. This is ''treatment works'' month. I believe treatment
works. I've helped people get into treatment. If I had a family member that
had a drug or alcohol problem, I would put them into treatment.
But the kind of treatment they would get is not
the kind of treatment hard-core addicts are going to get. I'm not going to
take them down to those centers. I'm going to take them some place
else.
The problem is quality control. The problem is
location. And the problem is modality of treatment.
The problem is the system has maintained a block
grant mentality. It has not provided built-in accountability in the system,
so poor-quality treatment and rotating outpatient treatment gets the same
support.
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We have more hard-core addicts. They need
long-term residential treatment and a variety of support services. The
money that has been dumped in by the Federal Government at over $2 billion
a year has gone to increasing, by their own estimates, the percentage of
outpatient, not residential treatments.
The bureaucracy has absorbed the money. The
bureaucracy has apportioned the money in areas where you don't have the
same kind of need.
In 1989, the study we had showed that we were
using treatment capacity at 80 percent. The latest study shows we're using
it at 75 percent. So we've got more excess capacity that's not being used,
while we still have virtually the same, if not more, addicts, depending on
what estimate you use.
Mr. COBLE. Thank you, sir.
We have a vote on now. Senator Grassley, could you
take the Chair while I go vote?
I'll let Senator Grassley have the Chair, and
we're going to have—let's do it that way.
Mr. GRASSLEY [assuming Chair]. Mr.
Clement?
Mr. CLEMENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. Walters, do you think we've truly had a war on
drugs? And if we have had a war on drugs, when was that?
Mr. WALTERS. I think the war metaphor is
good. I support it to those that criticize it because it talks about
mobilizing and focusing the country's attention. I think the peak of public
concern about this was last—although it's now with violent crime, as
far as I've seen in Gallup polls—a peak public concern. The peak
before that was in roughly around 1988 and 1989.
Between 1979 and 1992, overall drug use declined
by 50 percent. The measured use of cocaine peaked in 1985 and dropped
almost 80 percent—78 percent between 1985 and 1992.
We did not radically reduce the number of
hard-core addicts, however—the people who experimented in their teens
and in the 1970s and early 1980s and who became addicts during that period
of time and who continue to cycle through the system, as far as we can
measure it, and are getting older and sicker and showing up more frequently
in emergency rooms.
I think in any other domestic social
pathology—teenage pregnancy, HIV transmission, dropout rates, you
name it, if we had a 50 to 80 percent decline we would consider that a
remarkable success. We've done that with the entry pipeline for drug use.
We have not done as good a job, as I said, with addiction, but the fact is,
there are fewer people in the demographic years 1979 to 1992 that are going
to end up as addicts.
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But we're creating the addicts of the next five to
10 to 15 years today with these increases in teenage drug use.
Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Walters, you state that,
according to the Administrative Office of the Courts, there has been a 10.3
percent reduction in Federal case filings between fiscal year 1992 and
1995. Yet, the testimony of the Department of Justice indicates that
Federal prosecutors filed 3 percent more drug cases in 1995 than they did
in 1992. How do you reconcile this apparently conflicting testimony?
Mr. WALTERS. My testimony contains a
footnote that explains it. There are several different accounting systems,
and we've tried to be fair and present the various accounts here.
I think I tried to use the most accepted to show
that the filings, despite increases in spending that are quite extensive in
law enforcement here, have been, I think, from my ability to gather who
considers which accounting system best, have declined.
But I have not tried to hide any of the
conflicting evidence or other studies.
Mr. CLEMENT. Well, as you know,
it's—I don't think you took into consideration the number of State
cases, either, the increase in that area.
Mr. WALTERS. No. I just talked at the
Federal record. Yes. That's fair.
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Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Walters, you seem to
believe that aircraft and ship patrol hours should be used as a ruler to
measure the success of our drug interdiction efforts. We did a little
calculation that in 1991 the Coast Guard interdicted .96 pounds of
marijuana and cocaine per aircraft and ship patrol hour. This rate
increased to 2.99 pounds per patrol hour in 1994. Isn't this a result of
smarter patrolling and interdictions due to increased intelligence?
Mr. WALTERS. Yes. I agree that it's better
to do this smarter than dumber. I do think, though, that when you're doing
it smarter you need a certain level of resources, and actually the decline
in ship hours—resources—and the central part of my testimony
uses data from the joint task force that the Federal Government runs in
Florida and reports their measure of resource decline causing an efficiency
decline.
But I certainly don't mean by saying ''dollars''
that dumb spending of dollars is a substitute for smart spending of
dollars, and I think I've tried to make that clear across the board.
Mr. CLEMENT. Which one do you think is most
important: seizing the drugs or putting these drug kingpin operators out of
business?
Mr. WALTERS. My preference is neither of
those; it's stopping the flow and reducing availability on the supply
side.
We ask the wrong question. We let agencies come up
here and say, ''I've got so many arrests.''
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I've tried to talk about the various measures and
what they show, but I've tried to also make clear, the key—the
contribution that supply reduction can make to demand reduction is to
decrease availability, make it more expensive, make it harder to find.
When we do that it's not a substitute for demand
reduction but it helps demand reduction work. It's like taking a bridge. If
you want to contr
