Military


La Violencia (1948-66)

The period known as "La Violencia" (The Violence), in which an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 partisans and others died, lasted for over a decade. Various authorities provide a variety of dates for this conflict, with civil strife starting in 1946 and 1947, and continuing until 1958, 1960, or 1966. La Violencia began as a street riot in Bogota (known as Bogotazo) that erupted in the wake of the assassination in 1948 of Liberal Party leader and presidential candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitan. Rural violence, which had begun as early as 1946, raged out of control in much of the nation after Bogotazo.

Generally speaking, the Violencia era is broken downinto four periods. Increasing political instabilitycharacterized Phase I (1946-April 9, 1948) as the Liberalparty under Alberto Lleras Camargo split its left and right-wing constituencies, losing power to a minority Conservative government. Phase II (Bogotazo-June 13, 1953) saw the bloodiest period of insurrection, with guerrilla warfare spreading inColombia from the Llanos into Tolima. Both Liberal andConservative campesinos organized into guerrillaself-defense groups. Phase III (June 13, 1953-May 10, 1957) coincides with the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship. The regime successfullyinitiated amnesty programs to quell the violence that hadengulfed the country. Phase IV (August 1958-1966) - encompasses the first two National Front governments of Liberal Lleras Camargo and Conservative Guillermo LeónValencia. It witnessed an extensive collaborative effortbetween the United States and Colombia in developing thelatter's internal security apparatus.

From 1948 to 1950 military officers replaced Liberal cabinet officers who had left the coalition government as a result of La Violencia. They cooperated with the radical Conservative president in closing the Liberal-dominated Congress and supported the uncontested election of 1950 that led to the Conservative dictatorship of President Laureano Gomez. The violence, government-ordered repression, and divisions within the Conservative Party brought the army leadership, especially its popular commander, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, into conflict with Gomez. The inability of the civilian leaders to curb either the rural violence or their own bitter political disputes opened the way for Rojas Pinilla, now a general, to take control as military dictator in 1953. The political crisis erupted in June 1953 when Gomez was ousted by Pinilla, who assumed the presidency with the backing of moderate elements within the Conservative Party. A century of military obedience to civilian authority ended.

American military assistance followed the needs of the Colombian military government. The U.S. provided significant support to the Colombian armed forces during the mid-1950s, even though some people criticized President Eisenhower's administration for supporting an undemocratic military regime in Colombia.

By offering amnesty to any guerrilla who would disarm, the new president initially held out a real incentive to end the violence. He also pledged to conduct a nonpartisan administration, which provided an added inducement to return to a peaceful society. Coupled with war weariness these steps resulted in reduced violence until 1956. Then the economy, which had been quite vigorous because of high coffee prices, took a downturn as the coffee market collapsed.

Rojas Pinilla made progress in reducing rural warfare; but by 1957 his regime had become so arbitrary and corrupt that he was put out of office by the oligarchy and the military establishment. When the president tampered with the electoral process in 1957, a military junta deposed him. The former in particular feared Rojas' efforts to organize a mass anti-oligarchical party. By then it was also apparent that the general, aside from being partisan, was building a political organization in the manner of Juan Peron of Argentina. Thus violence rose again and the public was increasingly disaffected by authoritarian rule.

The junta, in turn, was succeeded by the National Front governing arrangement, which resulted in power sharing between the Liberals and Conservatives until 1974. When Colombia returned to civilian rule in the late 1950s, the US underwent a massive reappraisal of its foreign policy toward Latin America, fueled by the stunning Cuban revolution that abruptly introduced a communist bastion in the Western Hemisphere. Both U.S. and Colombian officials saw that the threat to hemispheric security was not from communist conventional forces, but from communist revolutions spurned by internal unrest.

The results of the Colombian military's civic action program showed that if the military is employed in projects which can be adequately supported by the forces involved, there are may benefits for all concerned. Military civic action can assist in national development in a number of possible ways: literacy training, national communications development, health care, and a strengthening of the support for the national government.



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