Colombia - Insurgency
Colombia is in the midst of a decades-long conflict, pitting the government against two leftist insurgencies and a right-wing paramilitary organization. Colombia's 38-year civil war claims more than three-thousand lives a year. The country's largest guerrilla group, the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, and the rightist United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia are involved in the drug trade to raise money for their fight. A smaller leftist rebel group, the National Liberation Army, relies on kidnapping and extortion for its funding. The United States has labeled all three groups as terrorist organizations.
An alliance of convenience between guerillas and traffickers is nothing new. Since the 1970s, drug traffickers based in Colombia have made temporary alliances of convenience with leftist guerillas, or with right wing groups. In each case, this has been done to secure protection for the drug interests. At other times, the drug traffickers have financed their own private armies to provide security services. Some insurgent and paramilitary groups have, in fact, become little more than bands of well-armed thugs selling their services to drug traffickers.
The presence of the insurgents in Colombia's eastern lowlands and southern rainforest--the country's primary coca cultivation and cocaine processing regions--hinders the Colombian Government's ability to conduct counterdrug operations. The frequent ground fire sustained by Colombian National Police eradication aircraft operating in insurgent occupied areas shows the extent to which some insurgent units will go to protect the economic interests of their "local constituents" (i.e., coca farmers and drug traffickers). Likewise, insurgent attacks continue to pose a threat to CNP personnel, supported by the DEA conducting operations, against clandestine labs.
Several guerilla groups emerged during the 1960s, the first being the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Other groups include the now demobilised M-19, the EPL and the Indian-based group Quintin Lame. The FARC, along with the Ejército Nacional de Liberación (ELN), are the major active groups today and each is thought to have between 10,000 - 15,000 guerillas. Their struggle has largely lost its ideological flavour and in the 1980s and 1990s the two groups became heavily involved in the lucrative narcotics and kidnapping industries. They continue to be powerful, controlling large areas of the Colombian countryside and posing a serious threat to the Colombian security forces, especially in the oil rich south-east and the lucrative coal basins in the north-east. Kidnapping has become a serious security risk and the “industry” is estimated to be worth US$500 million per year. In recent years, the situation has been complicated by the emergence of right-wing paramilitary groups who have taken up arms against the guerillas.
In August 1998 Andres Pastrana was elected with a commitment to tackling the problems of escalating violence and economic stagnation.
Pastrana set up talks with the various guerilla groups and embarked on an ambitious peace plan. As an act of good faith to stimulate the process, the government withdrew its troops from a 16,000 square mile demilitarised zone (DMZ) that was controlled by the FARC. President Pastrana was criticised for this, with many commentators claiming the area was used by the FARC for narco trafficking. In the four years of his Presidency there was much effort but regrettably little progress in the peace process.
On 20 February 2002 the FARC highjacked a Colombian commercial airliner and then kidnapped one of the passengers, a Senator. In response to this and the increasingly violent actions of the FARC, President Pastrana announced the end of the peace negotiation process and took back the demilitarised zone from the FARC. Since the end of the peace process the FARC have kidnapped a presidential candidate and several state legislators from Cali (amongst others) and murdered a member of the Senate. They continue to mount terrorist attacks and intimidate local officials, including Mayors, threatening them with assassination unless they resign their positions.
The peace process with the ELN similarly progressed little, held up by ELN demands for their own demilitarised zone. This was strongly opposed by paramilitary groups and the Colombian armed forces. The third major insurgent group, the AUC or the paramilitaries, have also grown in strength and remain a major problem for the Colombian government. Paramilitary leader, Carlos Castaño, has, however, indicated that the paramilitaries may be amenable to peace negotiations.
As part of its program to end the problems in Colombia, the Pastrana government developed Plan Colombia. Negotiations with insurgent groups were part of a comprehensive scheme designed and implemented by Pastrana's government to counter the country's many problems at all levels. Plan Colombia focused on five strategic issues: (1) the peace process, (2) the Colombian economy, (3) the anti-narcotics strategy, (4) reform of the justice system and protection of human rights and (5) democratisation and social development.
Plan Colombia envisaged projects worth an estimated US$7.5 billion, of which US$4 billion was to come from the Colombian Government. The Colombian Government also looked to the international community - primarily developed countries and international organisations - to provide the remainder of these funds arguing that the drug-related problems of Colombia were global problems.
The US Government was the principal supporter of Plan Colombia through its contribution of US$1.3 billion. The bulk of this was assistance for drug eradication efforts, while nearly US$300 million supported crop substitution, displaced persons, human rights, the judiciary, law and order and the peace process. Rebel groups were critical of the US support, arguing that the solution lies in the peace process and social development, rather than increased military activity. Other donor countries, particularly in Europe, provided significant financial support to the peace process (avoiding the term "Plan Colombia" and its US-military connotations), to the extent that by the end of Pastrana's term Plan Colombia was very close to being fully-funded.
Colombia’s neighbours remain concerned that increased military activity and coca eradication programs will cause the problems (relocation of displaced persons and drug production) of Colombia to spread across their borders. As a result, the US announced in March 2001 the Andean Regional Initiative, a US$731 million program in support of Colombia's neighbours.
After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, Washington announced plans to increase its level of assistance to Colombia. The US plans to train and equip anti-kidnapping and bomb squads, assist civilian and military counter-terrorism investigators and help Colombia guard its oil pipelines from rebel bomb attacks. This however will also be subject to funding approval from the United States Congress.
On 20 February 2002 Colombian President Andres Pastrana decided to end his longstanding efforts to conduct peace negotiations with the FARC. Pastrana's decision put a new focus on counter-terrorism in Colombia. The peace process came to an abrupt end after three years during which the government struggled to make progress toward peace with the country's largest leftist rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. President Andres Pastrana ended the peace process following a hijacking and kidnapping by suspected rebels. Pastrana ordered the army to march back into the demilitarized zone. Shortly after the announcement, the rebels began abandoning towns in the zone. Since February 20, the Colombian military has reoccupied the main urban areas in the former zone, while the FARC has continued its terrorist violence.
In a sign of public dissatisfaction with Pastrana's conciliatory approach to terrorists, independent Alvaro Uribe was elected as Colombia's new president on 26 May 2002 with 53% of the vote, avoiding the need for a run off election. This was the first time a candidate had gained an absolute majority in the first round presidential elections. President Uribe campaigned with hardline proposals for dealing with Colombia's terrorist groups, arguing that no negotiation would be permitted until they agreed to a cease fire. During his inauguration, address President Uribe stated that he would also welcome international support for negotiation with Colombia's terrorist groups based on his new approach. President Uribe has also stated that he wishes to increase greatly the country's military and police in order to combat terrorist groups and has requested additional assistance from the U.S to help achieve this objective.
Most Colombians backed President Uribe's get-tough approach to the civil conflict. That is why they voted him into office in May 2002. After winning the presidency, Mr. Uribe said he would be willing to negotiate with all armed groups in Colombia that agree to a ceasefire and refrain from acts of terrorism. Mr. Uribe made clear that the paramilitary groups were included in this. Alavro Uribe was critical of the Pastrana peace initiative from the beginning and called for a tougher approach with the guerrillas. He has proposed a large increase in military spending and an expansion of police forces nationwide. Mr. Uribe would also establish a citizens' network throughout the country to support the military by providing information about armed insurgent groups.
Even wealthy and middle-class citizens voiced support for a special war tax that they are starting to pay in September 2002. The tax amounts to about one-point-two percent of liquid assets and is expected to raise more than 800 thousand dollars in additional revenue for the armed forces. But human rights activists are expressing concern that increased military action will adversely affect civilians living in zones of conflict. They are especially concerned about limits on civil liberties in two zones created under the state of emergency President Uribe declared last month and fully authorized in September 2002. In the two zones military commanders have authority over all law enforcement personnel and may limit citizen movements. Foreigners need special permission to even enter the zones.
Negotiatons with paramilitary leaders Carlos Casaño and Salvatore Mancuso eventually led to a vaguely worded accord on July 15, 2003 with AUC. This accord in theory would result in the beginning of demobilization of paramilitary units from the end of 2003 to the beginning of 2005. However approximately 7,000 of the 20,000 strong AUC membership refused to sign the accord. Nevertheless at the start of October 2004 the AUC announced unilaterally a partial disarmament, with 3,000 of its fighters located along the border with Venezuela disarming by the end of the year.
In August 2003, under increasing pressure by the armed forces, the FARC and the ELN announced an alliance. This partnership had already been a reality in certain parts of the country where ELN and FARC units fought side by side, and has been broadened to include the whole country. The alliance has not made any significant difference yet, but in the long term the two groups pose a much greater threat jointly than they do separately, as the military power of the FARC and the political strength of the ELN complement each other.
By 2004 stepped-up government actions against the guerrillas with the help of significant U.S. military aid had kept the guerrillas mostly withdrawn into the countryside, while government efforts to improve the economy and reduce cocaine production were showing results. Although it is generally believed that the left-wing guerrillas have little chance of taking power in Colombia, they and the right-wing paramilitary forces control as much as half of the country.
Under the leadership of Alvaro Uribe, Colombia saw a relative decrease in violence between the several battling factions fighting for influence and control of the countryside. By 2006, the rates for kidnapping and murder had reached their lowest level in over twenty years. Efforts to demobilize Colombia’s paramilitary groups had proceeded and thousands of soldiers from the AUC and ELN had turned in their weapons to government officials in exchange for amnesty.
Violence however has remained a major factor in the lives of Colombia’s citizens. On 27 December, 2005, 29 government soldiers were killed by a force of approximately 300 FARC members while guarding a group of workmen manually eradicating coca in Macarena National Park. This form of violence, especially in the countryside of Colombia where the government has little or no control, demonstrated the great difficulties that still needed to be overcome in order to stabilize the tumultuous nation.
As of 28 May, 2006, Alvaro Uribe was reelected by an overwhelming majority, receiving 3 times the votes (68%) of the second most popular candidate. This election was a validation for Uribe’s policies and demonstrated the slowly progressing improvements the Colombian government has acheieved.
