Soviet Fleet Shipbuilding - Second Five-Year Plan (1933-37)
The leading idea of the naval shipbuilding program during the second Five-Year Plan was the need to build in the first and foremost, submarines, bombers and mine and torpedo aircraft. Forecast of development of submarines and aircraft allowed to conclude that in the near future they will become even more important in military operations at sea. However, the actual level of technical development of submarines and aircraft had not yet provided evidence that they completely replace the surface ships as the main striking force of the fleet. Especially, this was true of submarine capabilities, which were dramatically decreased in size in limited theaters of naval operations, in particular in the Baltic Sea, where conditions favored the organization ASW. To ensure submarine operations surface forces, particularly ASW ships and boats, were necessary. At the same time, in limited size naval theaters in which the value of mines particularly increased, required fleets of large trawlers and surface mine-layers (both large and small).
Naval shipbuilding program for the second five-year plan to some extent take into account all these requirements. It provided for the construction of a number of cruisers, destroyers and smaller warships. As trawlers, ships and boats ASW, the construction of their planned in insufficient quantities, and construction of amphibious ships are not planned at all.
Completion of the Second Five-Year Plan of the technical reconstruction of the entire economy, has ensured that the USSR in the state advanced industry, contributed to the implementation of the naval shipbuilding program. The total tonnage of warships of the Navy during the first two five-year plans has increased significantly. Simultaneously develop naval aviation, coastal defense intensified, expanded system based Navy.
During the second five-year period ther was a dramatic increase in the fleet of naval aviation, in particular the number of heavy bombers and fighters. However, the material part of aviation in the last years of the Second Five-Year Plan was not enough. Moreover, the consistent increase in the importance of aviation (notably defined during the war in Spain) and the complexity of the tasks of the Navy demanded more quantitative growth of the Air Force.
Much was made during the Second Five-Year Plan for the construction of coastal defense, particularly in the Pacific theater. However, the major shortcoming of this construction is relatively little attention to the preparation of the land fronts the defense of naval bases.
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