Railroads - 1946-80 Postwar Period
The Soviet Union had over 83,000 miles of railway track, of whichover 20,000 miles were electric. This system handled from 66 to 85 percent of the freight traffic and 50 percent of the passenger traffic in the Soviet Union. Railroads were the principal means of transporting military hardware from the USSR. Rail transport also may be used to carry fuel from rear areas to the fmnt.
The Soviet Railroads (Sovetskie zheleznye dorogi - SZD) were managed and operated by the all-union Ministry of Railways. The ministry was divided into twenty-three main administrations, each responsible for an overall segment of the railroads' operating or administrative management. Directly under the ministry were the thirty-two regional railroads, which in fact constituted the SZD. The railroads were named after republics, major cities, river basins, or larger geographic areas. The October Railroad, headquartered in Leningrad, was of course named in honor of the October (Bolshevik) Revolution. Each regional railroad, except the Moldavian, was subdivided into divisions. The divisions were generally named after their headquartered stations.
Rail transport in peacetime fell under the supervision of the Ministry of Railways. This agency was a uniformed service with ranks similar to the military. It also operated all civilian railway services within the USSR. Military rail forces worked with civilians in every-day operations, but in wartime, the railway system would revert to military control.
A Railroad Troops Directorate handled rail construction and maintenance of the MOD-controlled tracks. It operated trains carrying sensitive military cargo such as missiles over the civilian rail system. Also, military railroad troops participated in construction projects in the civilian sector. In time of war, the military rail transport staff of the front chief of the rear plannned and directed rail shipments and movements. Front logistic bases probably would be located near large rail centers. The chief of rail transport at front level is responsible, through yard and regulating elements, for dispatch of supplies from rail stations to army logistic bases.
Railroad troops, whose mission was to build railroads and bridges and organize communications in the event of war, actually spent the majority of their time serving the USSR Ministry of Transport construction. According to a Pravda report: “The ministry ‘entrusts’ the railroad troops with its least prestigious and lowest-paying jobs, and the soldiers can often be seen with crowbars and sledgehammers doing work that civilian specialists won’t touch.” The railroad troops did fully 25 percent of all heavy work such as excavation and ballasting.
The Soviet Railroad Troops were well-trained professionals, and proved themselves a viable force in trying conditions. Soviet perceptions of military rail transportation in wartime conditions provided a backdrop for the railroad troops. Despite some expressed Soviet doubt as to military railway effectiveness, there were several positive Soviet measures toward building a military railway reserve which implied that this mode was still of significance in Soviet military thought. Closely allied with Railroad troops, Military Communications troops, or VOSO, were responsible for the flow of military goods within the USSR.
The Soviet Railroad Troops were well-trained, professional, and proved themselves a viable force in the trying conditions extant on BAM. Rail transport still constituted a vital portion of the Soviet military logistics system. In spite of a continuing reliance on rail transport, long-standing deficiencies continued to exist which would hamper the use of the rail net in any future conflict. Despite some expressed Soviet doubt as to military railway effectiveness, several positive Soviet measures toward building a military railway reserve implied that this mode was still of significance in contemporary Soviet military thought.
Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov announced in the summer of 1981 that the basic form of operation in a future war would be the “theater strategic operation,” which highlighted for Western analysts that a fundamental change in Soviet planning for theater war had taken place. The developments that Ogarkov publicly articulated in 1981 had not sprung full-blown in the 1980s. Rather, Soviet concepts for strategic combined-arms operations in continental TSMAs had been integral to Soviet planning for at least a decade and a half. Thus, by the early 1970s Soviet military educational institutions like the Voroshilov General Staff Academy were instructing Soviet officers in the conduct of all components of theater strategic operations, including rear service support.
One of the major tasks to which Soviet logistic planners addressed themselves in the early l970s was the accelerated development of a logistic infrastructure better able to sustain such sweeping conventional operations. Many of these rear service preparations are associated with that component of strategy Soviet planners term strategic deployment and more specifically the discipline within strategic deployment, “preparing the theater of strategic military action.” Theater preparation encompasses a broad spectrum of engineer, signal, line of communication, and other preparations for conducting large-scale combined-arms operations. The logistic aspects of these preparations consisted of major programs designed to establish logistic reserves of all types of supplies throughout theater areas, with particular emphasis put on pre-positioning in Eastern Europe ammunition and POL stockpiles capable of supporting many weeks of operations.
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While most major Siberian cities are located along the Trans-Siberian Railroad, many smaller settlements are only accessible during the winter months, when the region's many unpaved roads are frozen. By early 1960, U-2 missions had helped establish that actual deployment of missiles in the USSR was proceeding at a very slow pace. U-2 photography also showed that most combat positions for Soviet missiles were located along the Trans-Siberian Railroad; US experts concluded that the early Soviet ICBMs were so heavy and cumbersome that they could be moved only by rail. |
At the urging of CPSU first secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev, in the late 1950s electrification proceeded on some high-density passenger and freight lines. Khrushchev gave priority to railroads in the Ural Mountains area and to those connecting the Urals with southeastern and central European areas and with Siberia and other eastern regions. By the end of 1960, the railroads had a network of 125,800 kilometers of lines, some 13,800 kilometers of which were electrified.
Beginning in the early 1960s, the railroads experienced a period of prosperity. Freight traffic grew rapidly, by 59 percent between 1961 and 1970, while passenger traffic increased by 50 percent. New equipment improved labor productivity. More electric and diesel-electric locomotives entering service, combined with improved tracks and roadbeds, increased net train weights and speeds. In the late 1960s, as the growth of net train weights and speeds leveled off, train density--the number of trains moving on a given track--increased, thus allowing further increases in freight carried. Nevertheless, in the early 1970s train productivity continued to grow, but at declining rates. By 1975 the railroads reached their limits in terms of traffic density and train speeds and weights. Subsequently, the railroads strained to satisfy the demands of the national economy. Between 1977 and 1982, the total tonnage of shipments stagnated, increasing only from 3.723 billion tons originated to 3.725 billion tons originated. Other indicators dropped--such as the average daily distance traveled by locomotives and cars, and speeds--the result of ever increasing track congestion. Additional factors contributing to poor railroad performance in the late 1970s and early 1980s were a deteriorating labor discipline and a decline in the quality of repairs and maintenance.
