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Further Reading

Radiotechnical Troops (Radio-Teknicheskie Voiska)

In support of the Air Defense Forces, the Radiotechnical Troops operated 10,000 ground-based air surveillance radars for surface-to-air missile operations. In addition, the air defense systems of the Warsaw Pact countries were highly integrated into the Soviet network, effectively extending the range of Soviet early warning capabilities. The Radar Forces of the PVO consist of brigades and regiments, together with a number of independent battalions and companies. They are equipped with several thousand radar installations, for the detection of enemy aircraft and space weapons and for the guidance towards these targets of PVO robot and interceptor aircraft.

In the 1950s declared goals for Soviet air defense projected a defense in depth. Evidence of a continuing commitment to "brute force" solutions, high priority to warning, and indicative of the problems faced in protecting vast regions of the U.S.S.R., overlapping air surveillance and early warning networks began to appear in some regions of the Soviet Union during this period. Priority to these regions limited coverage capabilities in others. Large numbers of manned interceptors enabled the employment of barrier patrols to provide some warning and limited engagement capabilities for these regions in good weather. Visual observers also continued active even as overall radar warning capabilities grew.

The experience of the Korean War also showed the Soviets the increased importance of a first attack by jet fighters. In a "majority of cases" they found the first attack was the only possible one. This put a high premium on warning and effective GCI as well as improved pilot training. Thus, as PVO Strany moved to improve the Soviet national air defense system, increased and continuing emphasis was given to GCI equipment. The Token development and deployment gave evidence of Soviet technological capacity since it marked a modest time lag between appearance of a prototype and the subsequent large-scale deployment. It provided a practical demonstration of the great strides made by the Soviets in mastering Western technology, but in particular, seemed to underscore the sense of urgency and purpose in Soviet air defense developments.

Air defense requirements grew for the U.S.S.R. as the threat of Western strategic air increased. The Soviet actions to plug gaps in the developing air defense system with available capabilities and expedients contrasted with U.S. deliberations about costs and commitment to strategic offensive forces. The Soviet basic concern for warning was evident; less clear is whether it derived its form and dimension because of specific U.S. developments and deployments. As it uncovered, the major portion of the Soviet effort appeared to be directed against strategic attack possibilities. By the early 1950's, U.S. carrier aviation and the growth of NATO tactical capabilities extended the problem.

By the 1980s the Troops of National Air Defense (PVO) deployed extensive and effective radar target detection and fire control systems. The radars fall into two general categories: surveillance and fire control. Surveillance includes early warning, target-acquisition, and height-finding radars. Some fire control radars also have limited target-acquisition capability. Radars work as systems rather than as separate units. The majority of target-acquisition radars are at the operational level. Army and army group air defense operations centers accumulate and process most target information and pass it to maneuver divisions.

High-level commanders select the weapon system that can best engage a given target. Army group, army, and division target-acquisition radars detect and monitor targets. The radars then provide the necessary data for engagement. They gather the information without unnecessarily exposing the air defense firing battery and radars mounted on transporter-erector-launchers and radars (TELARs) to detection by enemy forces and subsequent neutralization by electronic countermeasures (ECM) or destruction.

Although equipped with numerous modern weapons systems, the Air Defense Forces made operational errors that raised serious questions about their command, control, and communications systems and training. In September 1983, Soviet interceptors shot down a South Korean passenger jet that strayed into Soviet airspace over Sakhalin. In May 1987, Mathias Rust, a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), flew his private airplane into Soviet airspace and landed in Red Square in Moscow. As a result, the commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces, a former fighter pilot, was fired and replaced with a high-ranking Ground Forces officer who had extensive combined arms experience.

Roughly 50 percent of Russia's airspace was not covered by the country's radar and tracking systems, "Izvestiya" reported on 8 August 2003, citing Defense Ministry air-defense officials. "Regular radar monitoring is carried out only on the western and southern borders of Russia," Air Force commander Colonel General Vladimir Mikhailov said. "In other regions, it is spotty. In the north, only one-third of the airspace is covered. In all, radar covers about 35 percent of the territory of the country." Defense Ministry air-defense official Mikhail Kizilov told the daily that President Vladimir Putin has ordered the complete overhaul and modernization of the country's air-defense system and that process is already under way. He said Russian aircraft have been equipped with recognition systems and that next year the country will begin deploying the new, advanced S-400 antiaircraft missile system. He added that the Air Force's fleet of interceptors is being upgraded, although money for new aircraft has not been allocated.

The joint CIS air-defense system was established in 1995 by nine CIS countries. However, it became clear that only Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan were continuing to improve the system. Ukraine and Uzbekistan cooperate with Moscow on a bilateral basis alone, while Georgia and Turkmenistan have not been involved in interaction over the last seven years. In 2005 Moscow and Minsk established a joint regional air-defense system in 2005. The Supreme Council of the Belarus-Russia Union State would appoint a general in charge of this bilateral air-defense system and its forces and resources would be subordinated to him.