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Further Reading

Naval Infantry - Soviet History

Soviet military strategy eventually recognized the importance and complexity of amphibious operations. By the end of the Khrushchev period, the Soviet Union had commenced to break out of her continental shell and began to assert influence and interests worldwide. However, Khrushchev never succeeded in fully reshaping Soviet military power to support a political strategy of global dimenuions. The succeeding regime saw this as one of their basic tasks. The Soviets re-evaluated their position in the early 1960s and re-activated the Soviet Naval Infantry in 1964, when Naval Infantry became a combat arm of the Soviet Naval Forces.

In 1964 Soviet fleet responsibilities encompassed the protection of fleet areas, the expanded merchant fleet, fishing fleet, and oceanic research ships. By 1967 this responsibility clearly extended to the protection of Soviet interests ashore. Since then, the Soviet Navy has been used in various ways for political and diplomatic purposes. Traditionally, the Soviet Union did not rely on her navy for the external projection of power. But the Soviet Union began relying more and more on her navy for such projection as the reactivation of naval infantry, the deployment of the Kiev class carrier, and the construction of ocean-going landing ships clearly indicate.

A key problem for the Soviet Navy would be assuring naval passage to thc open oceans from the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Sea of Japan, and denying to enemy forces thc strategic straits into these seas and the land areas near the Fleet bases. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies maintained amphibious forces in the Barents Sea area, in the Baltic and Black Seas, and in the Sea of Japan. The effectiveness of operations of these forces would probably vary widely. Amphibious raids or counteroffensives would probably be conducted to outflank NATO forces in coastal theaters. Amphibious forces would be limited to regimental size in the Northern Fleet, to two regiments in tlte Pacific and Black Sea areas, and to about three regiments in thc Baltic. Amphibious operations in thc Baltic would probably include Polish amphibious troops and would be coordinated with airborne assaults and with major ground offensives.

The North Cape of Norway could probably be taken fairly readily if the Norwegian brigade normally deployed there were not reinforced. In the Baltic, Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces could probably capture thc Danish islands, if the Danish air and ground forces on Zealand were not reinforced, and link up with land forces attacking Jutland. In the Black Sea area, strong Turkish defenses and difficult terrain would make a coordinated land and sea assault on the Turkish straits more difficult. The Soviets probably could not seize these Straits quickly. Soviet Naval Infantry capabilities in the Pacific were insufficient for conducting amphibious assaults on the Japanese home islands to secure exits from thc Sea of Japan.

Exercise 0kean in April-May 1970, was one of the largest peacetime naval maneuvers conducted by the Soviet Union. These manetivers included several amphibious assaults. In the Northeim Fleet area at least two battalions of naxval infantry from the Baltic Fleet conducted an amphibious assault on the northern portion of Ry~bachiy Peninsula. The tasks assigned the naval infantry force were familiar ones: conduct an amphibious landing, seize a beachhead, and hold it until the arrival of follow-on ground forces. "Alligator" and "Polnocny" landing ships approached the beach preceded by Soviet minesweepers. Surface vessels and shore-based air support provided the necessary cover.

By 1977 the naval infantry force structure consisted of five naval infantry regiments with a total strength of 14,500 men. Soviet journals previously referred to these units as brigades. Since 1967, however, all references have been to regiments. This newer title suggests that a more uniform or perhaps fixed organization exists, probably as a result of the qualitative improvements and accompanying restructuring which had occurred in the past few years. Naval infantry strength grew from approximately 3,000 in 1964 to 12,000 in 1969 and to 17,000 in 1975. Available Western sources indicate that naval infantry strength was reduced to 14,500 in 1976.

By 1989 Naval Infantry consisted of 18,000 marine troops organized into one division and three brigades. Naval Infantry had its own amphibious versions of standard armored vehicles and tanks used by the Ground Forces. It has the capability to conduct tactical landings with highly mobile forces, air cushion vehicles, and landing ships.

Its primary wartime missions would be to seize and hold strategic straits or islands and to make seaborne tactical landings behind enemy lines. During the 1980s Soviet Naval Infantry exercises in the Kuril Islands north of Japan indicated that the intended target of Naval Infantry was the shores bordering various chokepoints. In a conflict, these troops would most likely be sent ashore to capture the Dardanelles or the Kattegat straits and then wait for rapid reinforcement.

On 18 November 1990, on the eve of the Paris Summit where the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) were signed, Soviet data were presented under the so-called initial data exchange. This showed a rather sudden emergence of three so-called coastal defence divisions subordinate to the Soviet Navy, which had previously been unknown as such to the West. A lot of equipment, which was commonly understood to be treaty limited (TLE) was notified as part of the naval infantry. The Soviet argument was that the CFE excluded all naval forces, including its permanently land-based components. The Soviet Government eventually became convinced that its position could not be maintained. A statement by the Soviet Union (later adopted by its successor states) enacted on 14 June 1991 provided that all treaty-limited equipment (tanks, artillery, and armored combat vehicles) assigned to naval infantry or coastal defense forces count against the total treaty entitlement.

Things went from bad to worse in Abkhazia during the final weeks of 1993. Gamsakhurdia retumed to western Georgia from exile in Chechnya while Russian support enabled the Abkhaz separatists to eject the demoralized Georgian forces from all Abkhaz republican territory. Shevardnadze joined the battle at the end of the year and barely escaped with his life. When Sukhumi fell he ?ed southward to the airport and boarded a plane with Russian and Abkhaz troops in hot pursuit. They attempted to shoot his plane down as it ?ew away. Back in Mingrelia, he had to fight Gamsakhurdia's irregulars who were prevented from capturing the port of Poti by the landing of Russian marines. Gamsakhurdia was either killed or committed suicide while a shaken Shevardnadze returned to Tbilisi and soon had to agree to Russian pressure for Georgian membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States.