General Staff - Recent Developments
Minister of Defense vs Chief of the General Staff
In 2000 the open conflict between the Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeyev and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Anatoly Kvashnin, in which both sides decided that they could "air their laundry in public," clearly took everyone by surprise, including President Vladimir Putin, the Russian public, and the military itself. The Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Kvashnin, openly ignores his direct superior, Igor Sergeyev. Without informing the head of the military department, Kvashnin sends the president his own plan for reforming the Armed Forces. The basic condition that made it possible for the Chief of the General Staff -- who is the Deputy Defense Minister -- no longer to consider himself a subordinate of the Defense Minister was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to allow Kvashnin to report to him personally and to make him a member of the Security Council.
In April 2002 the Defense Ministry initiated a new streamlining of the staff structure in the supreme command of the Armed Forces. The changes were in line with President Vladimir Putin's demands concerning reduction of the administration staff and expenses on its maintenance that were voiced in his address to the Federal Assembly (parliament). In accordance with restructuring plans, ranks that correspond to most posts of generals in the Defense Ministry and General Staff were lowered, and some of the posts currently held by generals were held by colonels after the reduction. Almost 90 percent of posts of chiefs of main and central departments in the ministry and General Staff correspond to the rank of lieutenant general. Deputy chiefs hold the rank of major general. A total number of deputy chiefs was reduced. The new staff structure was to start functioning on 01 June 2002. In addition to the Defense Ministry and General Staff, staff restructuring was effected in commands of armed services, and about 200 posts of generals were abolished as a result of the reform.
Kvashnin and Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov fought for power and over virtually every defense policy issue, revealing Moscow’s inability to forge or control defense policy. As of mid-2003 Anatoly Kvashnin was said to be slated to be removed from position of Chief of the General Staff. To all appearances, everybody was tired of his inconsistent moves related to army reformation. By his proposal the combat arms of RVSN, the Space Forces and the Missile-Space Defense Forces were merged into the new force - the RVSN. By 2003 this phase of a military reform had been admitted fallacious and the Space Forces and the Space Defense Forces had again become independent forces. The RVSN had also lost its status of a force (it became an independent combat arm). The Ground Forces Main Command was disbanded in 1998. It was restored in 2001 and the status of the Main Ground Forces Commander was brought to the level of deputy defense minister.
In January 2004 a concluding conference of members of the Academy of Military Sciences (AVN) was conducted at the Defense Ministry.At the conference, Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that the functions of the General Staff and the Defense Ministry wouldn't be divided any further. Ivanov reminded the participants that the Defense Ministry, rather than the General Staff remained the main managing security structure in the country. At the same time he noted that the General Staff is overloaded with administrative and management functions and needs to be reformed, under the guidance and control of the Defense Ministry alone.
On 11 June 2004 the Russian Duma passed a law that gave Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov operational control of the army. The lower house of parliament deleted most of the responsibilities of the General Staff, which was taken out of the direct chain of command and given a more advisory role. The Defense Ministry and the General Staff battled for over a decade for control of Russian military operations and army financing. The move appeared to strengthen civilian control of the military, but in real life, this did not change much.
In July 2004 Anatoly Kvashnin was dismissed as Chief of Russia's all-powerful General Staff, after seven years of holding the job. A few months later Kvashnin was appointed Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Siberian Federal District, where he represents the President in the Siberian Federal District, ensures the exercise of the President’s constitutional powers throughout the federal district.
The result of these changes appeared to be that the once-powerful General Staff was largely cut out of the military power structure, having been relegated by reform legislation to think tank status. In its place was a 10,000-person strong central apparatus staff that reported directly to Ivanov. The previous version of the law had stated that the supervision of the armed forces was carried out by the minister of defense through the Ministry of Defense "and the General Staff, which is the main organ of operational command of the Russian Federation Armed Forces." This has been changed to take out the General Staff and the final phrase.
But Major General Pavel Zolotarev, former Chief of the General Staff’s Information and Analysis Center, charged that despite the changes and reshuffling that were passed off as reform, work continued as before — including in the General Staff.
In July 2004, replacing Anatoly Kvashnin, General of the Army Yuri Baluyevsky was appointed Chief of the General Staff, First Deputy Prime Minister. In 1993, Baluyevsky had been sent to Transcaucasia where he served as First Deputy Commander, Group of Russian Forces, till 1995. In June 1995, Yuri Baluyevskiy returned to the General Staff taking the posts of Chief of Directorate and Deputy Chief of Generall Strategic Directorate. Assuming the office of Chief at the General Strategic Directorate, August, 1997, Baluyevskiy simultaneously took the post of First Deputy Chief of the General Staff where he served till July, 2004, when he was delegated the powers and responsibilities of Chief of the General Staff, First Deputy Minister of Defence.
On 03 June 2008 Russia's new President Dmitry Medvedev made personnel changes in the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces. Deputy Defence Minister Nikolai Makarov was appointed Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. Yury Baluyevsky, who previously held this position, was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council. Baluyevsky had held the post and that of first deputy defence minister since 2004. The replacement came after months of rumors that Baluyevsky would resign over his vehement opposition to Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov's plans for reforming the armed forces and army staff reshuffles. The head of state made these new appointments public at a meeting with Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, Yury Baluyevsky and Nikolai Makarov. The President also signed a decree awarding Yury Baluyevsky the order For Services to the Fatherland II degree.
In September 2008 it was reported that an upcoming large-scale reshuffle of the Russian General Staff was aimed at optimizing the number of officers and generals serving at central headquarters in Moscow. Up to 30% of the General Staff's personnel could be either transferred to other posts, including civilian positions, or retired. The General Staff will be reorganized by March 1, 2009. Russia had downsized its Armed Forces from 4.5 million in the Soviet era to about 1.1 million personnel, while staff numbers at central offices have remained almost unchanged, numbering up to 10,500 senior officers and generals.
Future reductions will affect all main directorates and departments, including the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and the Main Operational Directorate. Reduction in the number of directorates and services concerns all the main directorates without exception, including such important ones as the Main Operational Directorate, the Main Intelligence Directorate and the Main Organization and Mobilization Directorate. Such a large-scale downsizing of the Armed Forces' central command body was not seen even in the 1990s when the USSR's Armed Forces were dismantled and the Russian army was being set up. Specifically, the Main Operational Directorate and the Main Organization and Mobilization Directorate will be cut by 50 per cent. Around 150 officers and generals will be transferred or sacked from each of these directorates. Some structures will grow, while others will become smaller. Not a single one of them will disappear. Some of the names may change.
The benefits of moving responsibilities and tasks performed by the General Staff to the MoD, including subordinating the GRU to the MoD instead of the General Staff, were thought by proponents to improve the effectiveness of the General Staff as an analytical-planning body, not involved in purely organizational work. Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, the president of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems and formerly head of the Main Department for International Military Cooperation, believed that the plan approved by President Dmitry Medvedev on July 21 could potentially destroy the army, eliminating up to 200,000 officers. In particular, Ivashov challenged the idea that the optimization of the General Staff would improve the combat capabilities of the Russian Army. [Shortly after becoming President, Putin fired Colonel General Ivashov, an ultraconservative and one of the most vocal critics of Putin's efforts to improve ties with Washington.]
