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Further Reading

MiG-21 FISHBED in Action

As a basic rule, the Soviets considered Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI), especially in supersonic flight, essential to effective use of the MiG-21. The desired intercept method is an undetected approach to the rear hemisphere. The fighter is vectored at about a 20 degree angle from the rear of the target so that visual detection may take place through the glass on the side of the canopy. Then, the fighter approaches the target at a closing rate of about 50 to 100 knots. The pilot then gets a missile lock-on, turns on the range-only radar, and launches the missile at the appropriate range. According to the Soviets, if an intercept is attempted on counter headings, an engagement through visual detection is nearly impossible. If GCI is used, the controller will compute a lead distance (5 to 15 nautical miles) for the aircraft to start a turn which will roll the MiG-21 out on the tail of the target.

When attacking a maneuvering target, the Soviets first recommend use of the infrared (IR) missile. They train their crews to overlead the target, then reduce G loading to permissible launch parameters. To effectively perform this technique, the Soviets state that at least 1.5 nautical mile separation is required in order to launch the missile. If a missile attack cannot be accomplished, the cannon may be used. A normal pursuit curve is used when attacking a maneuvering target. The desired firing range is under 2,000 feet, but firing can be expected against the F-105 as far out as 3,300 feet.

At low altitudes, a missile attack is first attempted. However, the maximum missile launch range of one nautical mile is a handicap, especially against a maneuvering target. Cannon fire is accomplished using a normal pursuit curve starting from 1 nautical mile out to the side and about 5,000 feet above the target. A small positive lead is used during the first part of the pursuit curve in order to prevent getting below the target. Because of the speed limitations of the MiG-21 at low altitude, the destruction of clean [no external ordnance or fuel tanks] F-105 aircraft is difficult, if such aircraft resort to high speed afterburner flight.

The North Vietnamese added the newer and more capable MiG-21 to its existing fleet of MiG-17 and MiG-19 fighters in late 1966. The maneuvering capability advantage of the MiG-21 is highlighted in its defensive tactics against the F-105. If normal acceleration can first gain the MiG separation, this technique will be used followed by a vector to a position advantage. Secondly, a climbing high G turn is recommended if a speed surplus exists; a diving high G turn, for a low speed position. This high G turn was considered by the Soviets to be the MiG-21's best defense against the missiles or guns of the F-105.

Target size determines the detection lobe size by increasing or decreasing the visual image size and, hence, the detection range. A head-on aircraft is much harder to see than one with a side or belly view because it is smaller. A MIG-21 has a head-on projected area of about 40 squarefeet and an estimated visual detection range of 2.5 nautical miles. In a sideview, the projected area increases to about 300 square feet, with an estimated detection range of 6 nautical miles. This increase in the visual image size enables detection to occur at a greater range.

In the spring of 1966 the North Vietnamese Air Force (VPAF) began flying the MiG-21. The MiG-21 quickly proved to be a worthy opponent of the USAF's F-4 Phantom. Even so, between April 26, 1965, and Jan. 8, 1973, USAF F-4s and B-52s downed 68 MiG-21s. The MiG-21 had two limitations that F-105 pilots capitalized on in aerial combat during the Vietnam War. The first was the visibility restriction of the MiG-21. Aft restrictions made defense against or even acquisition of a 6 o'clock (directly behind) difficult. Forward visibility was restricted by an internally mounted bullet proof glass, sight combining glass and glare shield. Vision is reduced to the extreme that targets normally acquired at 10 miles are not seen until within five miles. The second limitation was the MiG-21's speed restriction. Below 12,000 feet, the engine driven fuel pumps could not keep up the fuel requirements in full afterburner, thus limiting the MiG-21 to 595 knots indicated airspeed from sea level to 16,000 feet. Like the MiG-17, the MiG-21 had a relatively low wing loading when compared to the F-105 and enjoyed the same 2G advantage for a given airspeed as the MiG-17. Extremely heavy control forces are encountered above 500 knots indicated airspeed.

Flying an F-4D with the famous 555th ("Triple Nickel") Tactical Fighter Squadron, in 1972 Steve Ritchie became the only Air Force jet ace of the Vietnam War by downing a MiG-21 on May 10, another on May 31, two on July 8 and his last on Aug. 28. After completing 339 combat missions totaling more than 800 flying hours, Ritchie returned as one of the most highly decorated pilots of the war, having received the Air Force Cross, four Silver Stars, 10 Distinguished Flying Crosses and 25 Air Medals.