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Russian Navy

Like the rest of the Russian armed forces, the Navy faced severe financial constraints which affected procurement, readiness, manning and morale. To manage the impact of its resource problems, the Russian Navy, in the early 1990’s, made a series of hard choices aimed at preserving its core submarine force capabilities. These included early retirements of older and less capable units, strict controls on operating tempo, and focused maintenance on its best units.

By the early 1990s the Russian Navy appeared unable to deploy more than a few ships. According to a Russian source, in 1996 most ships were at a relatively low readiness level, with most units remaining close to home port. The Russian submarine force has been investing in its tactical and operational development by conducting demanding anti-SSBN and anti-Surface deployments near the US and allied nations. According to one intelligence estimate, more than half of the 1996 fleet was capable of moving undetected into Western sea-lanes.

By the late 1990s, however, the annual "West" excercise series involved up to 50,000 troops from five military districts and three naval fleets. The West'99 exercise conducted in June 1999 involved more than 30 ships, four submarines, and the nuclear-powered Kirov, as well as Russian air force and navy aircraft capable of launching air-to-air and air-to-ground cruise missiles. A similar array of forces was deployed for the West'00 excercise conducted in August 2000 [during which the submarine Kursk was lost].

During the period between 1990 and 1995 the number of ships declined by 50 percent, and fleet aircraft by 66 percent. As of December 1998 the Russian Navy had taken 170 nuclear-powered submarines out of operation, but 130 had not been dismantled and between 110 and 115 still have operating nuclear reactors on board. As of 1997 it was estimated that the Navy was losing thirteen to fifteen ships each month.

By the late 1990s the Russian Navy continued modest investments in new construction, though some pessimists feared that by 2000 the reduction in Russia's shipbuilding capacity could become irreversible. In 1996 the nuclear-powered cruiser Petr Velikiy (Peter the Great) was launched at St. Petersburg after eight years under construction; assigned to the Pacific Fleet, the 28,000-ton vessel was armed with guided missiles designed to destroy enemy aircraft carriers. Experts rated the Petr Velikiy the most powerful cruiser in the world. The Russian Navy has also completed several new submarines of the third generation OSCAR SSGN and AKULA SSN classes.

In mid-1996 the Navy scheduled four submarines for production, including one upgraded addition to its existing fleet of Akula-class vessels and three of the new Severodvinsk class, which were expected to go into service in 2000. The Severodvinsk is a state-of-the art submarine that allegedly is so quiet that it eliminates the United States technical lead in this area, and it is armed with the new 650mm Shkval rocket that travels at 200 knots underwater. It also begun construction of its fourth generation LADA SS and BOREY SSBN class submarines.

According to "THE WORLD OCEAN - CONCEPT of the Purpose-Oriented Federal Program" APPROVED by Decree # 11 dated January 11, 1997 of the President of the Russian Federation, the principal task of the first phase, 1997-2002, "is to stop the uncontrolled decline, and stabilize the main parameters characterizing activity of Russia in the World Ocean".

In 1997 Rear Admiral Valery Aleksin of the Russian Navy suggested that Russia needed a Navy of 300-320 modern combat ships, about one-third the size of the Navy in 1990. He suggested that this should consist of 20 SSBNs in the North and Pacific Fleets (one-third of the 1990 force), of which 12-15 should be ready for action. He also called for a force of at least 70 SSNs and up to 40 modern conventionally powered submarines. An unspecified number of large aircraft carriers [though more than one] would each carry some 50 air-defense fighters and 10 antisubmarine aircraft. The surface force would consist of 10-12 guided-missile cruisers, 35-40 guided-missile destroyers, and 40-50 guided-missile frigates. To these forces he would add s 30-40 amphibious ships, at least 60 ready missile boats and 70 mine sweepers. [Russia Needs a Strong Navy]

However, Rear Admiral Aleksin observed that

"If we cannot restore finances, material resources, fuel, and shipyards, in the early 21st century we will have no more than 6-8 ready SSBNs.... We also will be reduced to 20-25 relatively modern multipurpose SSNs and about 10 conventional SSs. For ready surface ships, we will have no more than 1 aircraft carrier, 2-3 guided-missile cruisers, 7-10 guided-missile destroyers, 10-12 guided-missile frigates, and 30 mine sweepers and 30-40 guided-missile boats." [Russia Needs a Strong Navy]

In 1998, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov outlined Russia's force level goals as follows:

"To balance out the development of all arms of service, the minimum strength of the Navy will include 14 or 15 strategic missile submarines, 50 to 55 multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines, 40 diesel submarines, 40 to 45 ocean zone surface warships, 130 to 140 surface warships of other classes, up to 60 minesweepers, 600 warplanes, and 300 combat helicopters of various purposes." [RUSSIA'S NAVAL STRATEGY]

Russia’s continuing investment in its submarine force, even in this period of great austerity, is not particularly surprising. Much of Russia’s international status springs from the viability of its remaining strategic nuclear weapons. Under START II, if implemented , more than half of Russia’s strategic weapons may reside aboard SSBNs. Thus, by their inherent strategic value, the SSBNs, and their supporting general purpose forces (SSs, SSNs and SSGNs), remain at the vital center of Russian defense planning and national security.

But the financial meltdown of August 1998 further deepened the crisis of state finances and the political leadership vacuum. The momentum of military reform slowed, and nailed shut the coffin on Yeltsin's Russian Armed Forces.

In July 1999 the chief of the Main Navy headquarters, Admiral Victor Kravchenko, commented on the future of the fleet. Evaluating prospects for the Russian Navy development over the coming decade, he noted that the government of Russian Federation had established the federal purpose-oriented program "World Ocean". The program provides for the vigorous activity of Russia in the world ocean, which in combination with stable economic development of the country will allow to increase "political stability and defensive capability of Russia at sea and ocean directions". Fulfillment of the goals of this program will permit, even under conditions of limited financing, definition in the period till 2002 of priorities for development of the Navy for next 5-10 years. The second stage - from 2003 to 2007 - will focus on the stabilization of the Navy's ability to protect interests and safety of Russia in the adjoining areas of the world ocean. And at the third stage - after 2007 - will focus on a mass re-equipment and the creation of a "basically new" fleet.

A few key concepts place Russian naval readiness at the end of the 1990s in perspective. On the national level, electoral uncertainties indicated a period of rough sailing ahead. Accelerating inflation and an overall decline of some 40-60% in gross national product had seriously eroded necessities of life. Electric power, fuel, food, clothing, spare parts, etc., were all in short supply. This is particularly acute for the armed services and has produced significant and rapid drawdowns of naval forces, ship scrapping, personnel and manning problems, and repair and maintenance shortfalls. While Russia was attempting to operate a viable navy, the economic and political problems presented serious obstacles to such efforts.

Overall Russian forces at the end of the 1990s stood at approximately 60% of manning levels; sailor acquisition in some Far East units stood at 10% or less; approximately 50% of Pacific Fleet sailors had not completed secondary school and some 20% of them sported previous criminal convictions or had been arrested by the militia; advancement opportunities were essentially closed and advanced training is almost non-existent, especially given the loss of the Baku and Sevastopol naval schools; and electricians, radar operators, and ship physicians are among the scarcest of all specialists.

Most ships were frozen at their docks; Northern Fleet ships and submarines were being removed from service well before their time; ships received less than 22% of necessary repairs; crews are seriously overworked and rarely paid; and most SSBNs are no longer fully operational. It is apparent from these statistics that the Russian navy faced severe constraints and was obviously a much reduced threat. Despite these circumstances, however, they still retain some semblance of an important navy, if only from the historical perspective and perhaps a future potential.

The Navy Under Putin

In April 2001 Russia Navy Commander-in-Chief, Adm Vladimir Kuroyedov stated that the Navy should consist of 12-15 strategic missile submarines, 50 nuclear-powered attack submarines and 35 diesel submarines, along with about 70 ocean-going surface combatants. However, to achieve these goals the Navy would need to receive at least 25% of the Russian defense budget, double the current allocation of about 12%.

Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov, commander of the Russian Navy, stated that the navy will be slashed by one-fifth over the next few years, "Krasnaya Zvezda" reported on 6 January 2003. Kuroedov said that since 1995 the navy had received about 12 percent of the funding it needs, and the underfunding had forced the navy to decommission ships it cannot afford to maintain. He also revealed that from 1992 to 1997, the navy received 10 new nuclear submarines and that one additional nuclear submarine was commissioned in 2002. He said the navy will be reviewing its maintenance and modernization priorities with an eye toward refurbishing and upgrading existing ships and weapons systems.

On 24 July 2004 RIA Novosti reported that Navy Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Kuroyedov said Russia's surface combatant ship force will not be downsized until 2020. He said that adequate repairs and maintenance will make it possible for the Russian Navy to avoid cuts on the number of its surface ships through 2020. Russia will be able to sustain its status of a great power only if it remains a naval power, which is impossible without a modern, well-balanced fleet, the admiral pointed out. In a longer term, surface vessels will be upgraded to carry modern weaponry systems.

According to Admiral Kuroyedov, smaller surface vessels and boats will have to be discarded first, as their service life is shorter than that of larger vessels. "The firstborn of our surface shipbuilding is the corvette - a new multifunctional littoral combat ship, which combines qualities of anti-submarine ships and missile carriers," the Russian Navy chief said, citing the Steregushchy and the Soobrazitelny by way of example.

Russian Navy orders for the Scorpion Project 1230.0 475-ton fast patrol craft and the Project 2038.0 1800-ton Steregushchy class corvette signal a recovery for domestic naval business. Construction is underway on the first hulls for these classes, with the first Steregushchy due for commissioning in 2005 and the Scorpion patrol craft in 2003. Russia would like to build 12 of the fast patrol craft and 10 Project 2038.0 corvettes if funding continues is available.

The construction of a multifunctional frigate will soon get underway, Adm. Kuroyedov announced. The next type of surface ship to manufacture for the Russian Navy will be an oceangoing torpedo boat destroyer. Its mass production was expected to start in about a decade's time, just as the large surface vessels, cruisers, and torpedo boat destroyers that are currently in operation will be approaching the end of their service life.

As of the end of 2003 the Russian navy consisted of 300 ships, 400 aircraft and helicopters, 150,000 personnel and 120,000 employees. The ratio between maintaining the fleet and newbuilding has been raised to 60/40. Four years ago it used to be 90/10.

A mid-2004 analysis of future shipbuilding priorities suggested that the following types of new ships might eventually enter service with the Russian fleet:

1. Strategic submarine missile carrier, within the framework of the American-Russian agreement on limiting the strategic attack potentials, signed by the Presidents in 2002.
2. Multi role nuclear submarines will become "multi functional and universal. The main criteria in the development will remain reducing the noise level, improving the hydro acoustic weapons and reducing the level of other fields. Utilizing the high precision cruise missiles with non-nuclear charges on such submarines will attribute the role of the strategic deterrence weapon to this class of subs."
3. Diesel-electric subs "The development of this class of subs, especially "coastal" subs of limited (as a rule 1000 tons) deadweight will go in the following directions: increasing the power and the suddenness of the strike due to the increased number of combat ready weapons; increasing the submarine speed aimed at intercepting the surface warships and transports within the vicinity of own coastline to ensure preventive strikes; increasing the submarine endurance; reducing the physical fields to the minimal level, first of all the fields of the electro magnetic group, aimed at minimal visibility when on patrol; complexly automating the control systems of the ships and reducing crews. Anaerobic power stations, especially single units, will make a great impact to the development of this class of subs."
4. Multi role ocean ship, with "the characteristics of a torpedo carrier, anti sub ship and missile-artillery ship (destroyer), will have the displacement of up to 10 000 tons, the speed of 28-30 knots and the endurance of up to 10 000 miles at 16-17 knots speed. The type of the main power station is gas turbine with fully electricity based movement. The destroyer will have a complex of missiles with universal vertical launching systems to use high precision missiles against ground targets, missiles against surface and submarine targets, air defense missiles of far, medium and small range targets as well as a universal artillery unit with high precision controlled shells against ground and surface targets. The ship will have one or two helicopters."
5. The universal ship of the sea zone (frigate) "will have the displacement of about 5000 tons. Even now there are prerequisites to provide absolutely the same complex of weapons to the destroyer and the frigate with the only difference in the number of spare charges."
6. Corvette "with the displacement of up to 2000 tons. It is supposed to conduct short range and coastal operations as well as the functions of the border guard."

As of mid-2006 there were about 50 large surface ships in the Russian naval fleet. This included one aircraft carrier, four Project 1144 and 1164 missile cruisers (with two more Project 1144 cruisers laid up), ten Project 956 destroyers, 12 large antisubmarine ships and 25 large amphibious ships. Not all of them are combat-ready, as some were under repair or awaiting major overhauls.

As of mid-2006 there were 45 nuclear submarines and 20 diesel submarines in the Russian fleet. Although the fleet includes three Project 941 ballistic missile submarines, the Dmitry Donskoi is a test pad for the Bulava missile, the Severstal was under renovation, and the Arkhangelsk had no missiles. The main nuclear deterrent was six Project 667BDRM missile submarines [one of which is under renovation], and six Project 667BDR vessels. Of the nine Project 959A submarines with anti-ship missiles, two were under renovation. And of the 21 Projects 971, 945 and 671RTMK nuclear torpedo submarines, at least six are under renovation. Of the 20 Project 636, 877 and 641B diesel submarines, only 12 were actually combat-ready. By 2010 it seemed the best-case scenario was there would be five or six Project 667BDRM ballistic missile submarines and one or two new Project 955 submarines, with the total number of submarines reduced to 35-40.