Forward Deployments
The geography of Russia necessitates a forward presence for their Navy. Russia stretches over 7000 miles from east to west and comprises 11 time zones. As a northern country, its fleet locations are distant from world shipping lanes, subject to icing and are vulnerable to choke points and blockades. It is this situation that causes Russia to have increased requirements for equipment, stores and ship repair facilities and therefore a need for forward base support facilities for its four fleets.
With this in mind, it becomes apparent how Russia's requirement for warm weather naval bases to compensate for geographic liabilities shapes a foreign policy that can never by fully divorced from relations with Third World countries. This analysis may be somewhat sterile given current circumstances in Russia. It is apparent that geography places Russia at a distinct maritime disadvantage compared to the United States. Russians must deal with often inhospitable climates, restricted access to the world's oceans, and isolation from major sea lanes and strategically important regions. Its fleets are separated by thousands of miles of long, sinuous and vulnerable supply routes. Moreover, its somewhat limited access to foreign bases and reliance on the vagaries of Third World politics further impedes its naval strategies. All of these geographic liabilities are major determinates in the formulation and continued evolution of Russian naval strategies, out-of-area operations, and foreign policy.
Indian Ocean
A Soviet naval force maintained an Indian Ocean presence for many years. It was formed to provide Russia a vehicle to respond in the area in the event the Suez Canal was closed, an act which would prevent timely response by units operating from the Mediterranean or Black Seas. The cost of maintaining facilities is high in the region and Russia (as well as any other nation) will always be at the mercy of political instability in the realm.
A distinct disadvantage the Indian Ocean Sqaudron experienced was that units were at the extreme end of the Russian naval supply chain, with long lines from the Pacific or Black Sea Fleet bases. In addition there are numerous choke points along the way. In the west, these include the aforementioned Middle East choke points, while in the east, they include those noted in the section on the Pacific Fleet, as well as the more proximate restrictions through the Indonesian archipelago. Most significantly, this includes the dominant Strait of Malacca between the Malay peninsula and the island of Sumatra, and the lesser Sundra and Lombock Straits, lying at the western and eastern ends, respectively, of Java.
The U.S. Naval base at Diego Garcia, whose central location in the Indian Ocean acts somewhat like a "control point" for all maritime forces operating in East Africa, South, and Southeast Asia.
West Africa
Soviet naval presence in West Africa was always multipurpose. In recent years, the near continuous presence of one or two minor combatants off Morocco and Western Sahara was for the protection of a Russian fishing fleet. Their patrols ranged from the Spanish Canary Islands (off Morocco) southward to Conakry, the capital of Guinea. On average, patrols lasted approximately six months. Russia also conducted port visits to "show the flag" and strengthen influence in the region.
During the Angolan Civil War (late 1970's - early 1980's) the government was militarily supported indirectly by the USSR via Cuba. During that time, the USSR was granted port privileges at Luanda, Lobito and Mocamedes, Angola. However, they were not permitted to build any permanent naval facilities in these ports. During a six month deployment to the West African coast, the Russian platforms had to be replenished by visiting auxiliaries. Since the end of the Civil War, the withdrawal of Cuban forces, the collapse of the USSR, and economic problems at home, Russia has not been able to maintain a constant vigil in the Equatorial Atlantic of western Africa.
Caribbean
Russian naval presence in the Caribbean had almost a 40 year history based upon Soviet influence and ties with Cuba. Operations ranged throughout the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico and South Atlantic and provided a base for political support in such countries as Nicaragua, Guyana, Suriname, Trinidad and St. Lucia. Surface and submarine units paid particular attention to U.S. naval forces based in the area (e.g., Guantanamo Bay, Puerto Rico) and on regional shipping traffic. Since the bulk of imported U.S. oil flows through the Caribbean, its many straits, channels, and passages are of strategic importance.
From the southwest, access is managed at the Panama Canal. To the north, the Gulf of Mexico is controlled by the Yucatan Channel between Mexico and Cuba and by the Straits of Florida between the U.S. and Cuba. Moving eastward through the Greater Antilles several key waterways emerge. The Windward Passage separates Cuba and Hispanola (the island comprising Haiti and the Dominican Republic); separating Hispanola and Puerto Rico through the Lesser Antilles lies no less than eight major passages. These choke points provide ample opportunity to control maritime movement in the Caribbean theater.
With the collapse of the Soviet state in 1990, Russian influence in Cuba has been severely diminished. While ties still remain and while naval facilities and intelligence collection activities are still available to Russia, recent efforts have been substantially reduced from their Cold War levels. Yet, a Russian "presence" is still visible at such sites as Cienfuegos on the southwest coast and in Havana and nearby San Antonio do los Banos.
One must recognize, however, that as a base of operations, Cuba does present limitations from a naval geographic perspective. A quick glance at the map will demonstrate its position "behind" a series of U.S. and Allied controlled outer islands, as well as its position at the southern end of the U.S. controlled North Atlantic Ocean.
