Helicopters [vertolet]
Apart from a few autogyros, no rotary-wing aircraft were produced in the Soviet Union until the post-war years. Then on December 12, 1947, the first helicopter design bureau was founded under the leadership of M. L. Mil. It was here that the first helicopter, the Mi-i Hare, was designed. Less than a year later in October 1948, it is said to have made its maiden flight and three years later was shown to the world in the 1951 Tushino Air Show.
By the mid- to late-1950s, two different Mi-1 helicopter designs were operational in Frontal Aviation units. The small, lightly armed Mi-i Hare has now been largely forgotten; but despite its technological limitations it performed well as a small liaison craft for nearly a decade. The advent of turbine engines in American and French helicopters led to the demand for new designs incorporating this new technology.
The first flight of the turbine-engined Mi-2 Hloplite took place in Poland on August 26, 1965. While it would be unwise to be too critical of the Soviet practice oi making proven equipment serve new purposes by "strapping on" new technology, the idea of the Hoplite serving as an attack helicopter seem quite unlikely. It is more reasonable to assume that it would be used to transport squad-sized subunits at low altitude over surface obstacles, including nuclear contaminated zones. Polish marineinfantry units have, in fact, demonstrated the utility of the Mi-2 in landing airborne units on a coast in connection with amphibious maneuvers.
With each of the five ground armies in the Group of Soviet Forces in East Germany (GSFG) being supported by a regiment of Mi-2 Hoplites, one can postulate the existence of approximately 150 helicopters each capable of transporting eight-ten GSFG infrantrymen. At least theoretically, that is enough tactical airlift support for between 1,000 and 1,500 soldiers armed only with automatic rifles and light machine guns. Configured as a medical evacuation helicopter, the Mi-2 can carry four wounded on stretchers, one medical corpsman and equipment.
The first of the medium-sized helicopters to enter service with Frontal Aviation was the Mi-4 Hound. The second of the new turbine-powered helicopter to appear in Frontal Aviation was another Mil product, the Mi-8 Hip C. Designed as a replacement for the weary Hound, the Hip quickly proliferated throughout the military during the 1960s and also entered Aeroflot service in great numbers. Capable of transporting at least three rifle squads, it provides considerable tactical airlift capability. Twenty of these helicopters could, for example, transport an airborne battalion of approximately 550 men with light arms. Equipped with large rear clamshell doors, the Hip is said to be also able to transport small vehicles of approximately BRDM (BTR-40) or Uaz-69 bulk.
An East German milltary author points to the fact that the Mi-8 is proof that all capable general purpose helicopters can be armed. Automatic grenade launchers (up to 40mm) and a 12.7mm machine-gun with a range of 1,000-3,000 m for use against moving targets reclaimed for the Hip. In an air assault role, however, the Hip would undoubtedly be equipped with four standard 16- or 32-shot 57mm unguided rocket pods. Our East German author even points to the possibility of unguided rockets or guided missiles on side-mounted out-riggers which are intended for use in an anti-tank role. Moreover, each window in the Hip's transport section is also equipped with a device which the infantryman can use to support his weapon to fire at ground targets from the air. Apart from its obvious ability to support assault operations, its practical size and fine performance make the MI-8 an outstanding utility helicopter which found increasing utilization throughout the military forces of the Warsaw Pact.
The decisive step from armed helicopter to true combat helicopter took place during the course of the Vietnam War, whose very special characteristics made the introduction of such aircraft a necessity. In the USSR, this development started considerably later. Large scale equipping of various types of helicopters with weapons only began in 1967. With the exception of the naval Ka-25 "Hormone", fire power was provided by arming older, partially obsolete types. Thus, the Mi-4 "Hare", thg Mi-2 "Hoplite", the Mi-M "Hound", and the Mi-8 "Hip" were used for combat missions equipped almost exclusively with UB-16 or UB-32 pods containing unguided 57mm rockets, and with wire-guided anti-tank missiles of the "Sagger" type. Weapons systems electronics were kept to a minimum.
There can be little doubt that a great amount of indecision within the U.S. intelligence community surrounded the employment of a "strictly attack-type" Soviet helicopter. As late as 1967, such statements as the following could be found in "informed" U.S. sources: "At present there is no evidence to indicate that the Soviets are actively developing a heavily armed helicopter in the "gunship" or "flying tank" category." Also in 1967, Malcolm R. Currie, then Director of Defense Research and Engineering, said that the Soviets did not consider helicopters a major military item, although US experience in helicopter development for warfare in Southeast Asia may have changed that outlook.
In contrast to these statements, 1967 saw the staging of the Soviet military exercise "Dnepr" which was filmed for western showing. Here, extensive use of armed helicopters supporting ground attacks and river crossings was displayed. These helicopters, Mi-4s "Hounds", were shown firing ATGMs at armored vehicles and scoring impressive hits.
In Soviet military circles, there appeared to have been a debate over the survivability of the helicopter on the mid or high intensity battlefield. Criticism of the US use of attack helicopters in Vietnam began to wane in such publications as Voennyi Vestnik (Military Herald) and Krasnaia Zvezda (Red"Star) in the 1969-70 time frame, conveniently timed with the first appearance of the "Hind" combat helicopter. The 1973 Mideast War seems to have added the final initiative to an already quickly developing Soviet hellcopter force, with military opinion swinging almost totally in the direction of a more pronounced combat helicopter force.
With more than 200 helicopters (Ni-2s, Mi-6s and Mi-8s) already present in GSFG 15th Air Army, the Soviets introduced the Mi-24 HIND into Frontal Aviation's inventory in 1974. The rapid deployment of this new helic-pter soon resulted in two unite, each of regimental strength, based at Stendal and Parchim airfields in East Germany. With at least 72 HINDS -- possibly more, considering the Soviet affinity for the principle of mass (a West German source credits GoSG with 180) -- the presence of this aircraft in the forward area has added a new dimension to theater warfare.
The late 1970's saw the Soviet military rely increasingly on its attack helicopter assets to provide direct air support for troops along the FEBA. In Soviet terms, the attack helicopter would be used to support close combat operations with troops along the front line (the front line being defined as the line of contact with the enemy. The MI-24/HIND and later the MI-8/HIP E were formidable weapons systems that proved to be the mainstay of Soviet attack helicopter operations. Employed in the direct air support role, helicopters were capable of flying immediate or preplanned missions as well as independent, "free hunting" sorties.
By the end of the Cold War the Soviet Union was the second largest helicopter producing country and a world leader in the production of large heavy lift helicopters. There were seven helicopters in production in the USSR by 1990: Mi-17, Mi-14, Mi-24 Mi-26, Mi-28, Mi-34 and Ka-32. Both the Mi-14 and Mi-17 use a similar transmission; the Mi-14, Mi-17, Mi-24, Mi-28, Ka-32 all have the same power (they use the same engines) but are significantly different designs. Unique is the Mi-34 helicopter, which has a piston engine and a one stage gearbox, all another Soviet helicopters have two gas turbine engines. The helicopter Ka-32 features a coaxial rotor, while all "Mi" helicopters have one main rotor and a tail rotor.
Design of the transmissions of the Soviet helicopters was different than transmissions of Western helicopters. Power capacity of Soviet helicopter transmissions was typically in the range of 2200 - 23000 HP (1650-17000 Kwt). In comparison to Western helicopters, weight of the transmission on the Soviet helicopter relative to power is higher; but the method of assessing quality using the ratio of weight to power is not really accurate. If transmissions are compared on the basis of weight to torque ratio, transmissions of the Soviet helicopters look better. In addition, consideration must be given to level of technOlogy, quali£y of materials, life of service and scale factor.
Even a superficial observation would indicate that there were basic differences in the Soviet and Western design and operational philosophies of rotary-wing aircraft. On the other hand, one should not be surprised to find a lot of commonality in the approach to various technical and operational problems. It appears that helicopters designed in the West generally had much better hovering performance under high altitude-elevated temperature conditions than their Soviet counterparts.
Motor Sich, practically the sole large producer of engines for Soviet helicopters, found itself in the Ukraine following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Motor Sich exports a substantial part of its products (54% of 2006 revenue) to Russia, where engines are installed on Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters and An-124, An-140 and An-148 aircraft.
The year 2005 was a successful one for Russian helicopter producers, thanks to increased sales both at home and abroad. The Defense Ministry’s decision to spend more on military hardware will boost production at helicopter enterprises. The government’s policy of strengthening the country’s military potential will stimulate demand for military products, including helicopter technology. The process of consolidating Russia’s helicopter enterprises by folding them into a unified Russian Helicopter under holding company Oboronprom, sought improved manufacturing efficiency through greater specialization and the absence of competition on the domestic market.
Kazan Helicopter Plant is currently Russia’s biggest mass producer in terms of output. KVZ is the only helicopter enterprise with its own design bureau, which created two new models of light helicopters – the Ansat and Aktai. Faced in previous years with a total absence of government orders and support, KVZ moved into foreign markets and succeeded in selling its products in South East Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. Strengths are an in-house design bureau; external contacts; range of promising Ansat and Aktay light helicopters and medium multifaceted Mi-38. Weaknesses are the fact that production of promising helicopter models has yet to be launched; as part of the helicopter holding, foreign contracts for Mi-8(171) are redistributed in favor of UUAZ which depresses KVZ’s financials; relatively high leverage. Oboronprom owns nearly 30% in KVZ and management owns nearly 42% in the charter capital.
Ulan-Ude Helicopter Plant is a traditional rival of Kazan Helicopter Plant on the foreign market. In addition to helicopter products, UUAZ has also manufactured such combat aircraft as Su-25UB and Su-39. However, it would be incorrect to pin hopes on the fact that UUAZ will continue producing these planes after the new Yak-130 operational trainer appears. Since the state represented by Oboronprom owns a 63% stake in UUAZ, the state mediator in the area of military hardware trade Rosoboronexport will prefer UUAZ to KVZ when placing orders. According to expert opinion, UUAZ products are of higher quality than those manufactured by KVZ. Weaknesses include a limited aircraft range. UUAZ manufactures Mi-8 helicopters and their upgraded version Mi-171 which is one of the most widely used helicopter models. However, both of them are becoming obsolete and we cannot speak of prospects for these models. Oboronprom owns 63% in UUAZ.
Rosvertol is the only serial helicopter plant which had not been legally merged Oboronprom united helicopter holding until recently. However, in reality, Rosvertol was still considered part of this holding. On May 12, 2006, Rosvertol’s shareholders adopted a decision to place an additional share issue in favor of the Russian Federal Property Management Agency and Oboronprom. Thus, Rosvertol legally became integrated with the helicopter holding. The number of shares to be issued was 295.8 mn which accounts for about 26% of Rosvertol’s charter capital, taking into account an additional share issue. The buyout price will be Rb 3.67 ($0.135) per additional share. Rosvertol was the only serial producer offering the widest possible product range of promising helicopters. The Mi-26 is the only helicopter worldwide capable of transporting equipment and heavy cargo of up to 20 t both inside the cargo bay and using an external sling. The Mi-28H is a modern attack helicopter which will become a key assault force of RF Air Force. The Mi-24 (Mi-35) is the basis for the current combat helicopter power of the Russian military forces. After floating an additional share issue, Oboronprom will own a blocking stake in Rosvertol. In the future, Oboronprom plans to raise its stake in Rosvertol to a controlling interest.
