Project 82 Stalingrad class
After W.W.II. the Soviet Union again became interested in battlecruiser construction. These three vessels were laid down in 1952 and 1953, but the death of Stalin and Krustchev's lack of interest in large vessels led to the cancellation of all three. Kronshtadt was briefly considered for conversion to a missile ship. Four more were planned but never started.
By 1945 domestic surface ships - battleships, cruisers and destroyers not only were substantially inferior to their American analogs, [vvedennym] into the system in 1941-45 yr., but also they were extremely worn. The wear of our ships was determined by intensive use in the years [VOV] of in the absence proper repair. Actually by January 1, 1946. Soviet fleet was in the unfit for action state. However, the cost of repair and modernization of old ships in the majority of the cases was commensurate with the cost of building new. As a result our Admirals and ship builders proved to be before the simple selection: either to build artillery ships taking into account the experience of the Second World War, or to prove to be generally without the fleet. In our fleet linear cruisers were named the heavy cruisers ([KRT]). First [KRT] of project 69 - "Kronstadt" and "Sevastopol" - were already laid, but after the war of [pr].69 they recognized as that become obsolete, and in 1948. the unfinished housings of these cruisers dismantled.
Operational-tactical task for designing [KRT] of project 82 was affirmed by the druggie of the Navies [N].[G]. Kuznetsov in May 1941. Actually this was somewhat altered [pr].83, as was named the heavy cruiser "Of [lyuttsov] purchased in Germany". [KRT] of [pr].82 had to have the same major caliber artillery (eight 203- mm of guns in four towers) that also "[Lyuttsov]". By designing [KRT] [pr].82 was initially occupied [TSKB]-17. Since in 1941-42 yr. it was explained that German 203- mm of guns to acquire will no longer come out, just as to 305- mm of guns B -50 from the plant "of barricade", the designers OF [TSKB]-17 in 1943. they began to dream with the main battery, proposing to arm cruiser nine times with the instruments of caliber 210. 230 mm. of this caliber in our sea artillery then it was not, but project originators they risked in no way: it was clear that in the course of the war [KRT] of [pr].82 it will not be built. It was considered that the cruiser, [vooruzhennyy] 210. 230- mm by instruments, will easily manage any foreign cruiser, [vooruzhennym] 203- mm by instruments.
In November 1944. Blacksmiths affirmed new [OTZ] to project 82, where he proposed to arm cruiser nine times 220- mm with instruments [GK], the 16th 130- mm by universal instruments, 32- I 45- mm and the 12th 25- mm by zenith automatic weapons. The displacement of this cruiser it had to be 25. 26 thousand tons, but the running speed - is not less than 30 units. At the end January 1947. in the Kremlin with the participation Of [i].[V].[Stalina] took place special conference on the problems of military shipbuilding. In the course of conference Stalin proposed to arm [KRT] of [pr].82 305- mm by instruments. On the sums of this conference on January 28, 1947. the decision of Council of Ministers of the USSR, by which to the ministry Of [vooruzhennykh] forces and to the ministry of ship-building industry it charged to work versions of the ship of [pr].82 with 305- mm and 220- mm by major caliber artillery, also, within the two-month period to present them for consideration, left. At the beginning February 1947. new by the central board Navy [I].[S]. Of [yumashev] affirmed [OTZ] to the study of the versions indicated. The selection 305- mm of major caliber artillery was determined by the new enumeration of tasks for the heavy cruisers: giving combat stability to the light forces, which act in the composition of maneuverability compounds; the destruction of the cruisers of enemy, [vooruzhennykh] 203- mm and by 152-mm instruments, in the naval action; inflicting powerful artillery impacts on especially important coast purposes in the operations against the bases and the coast of enemy (both with the independent operations and with interaction with the seaside flank of its troops and landing).
With the development of these versions were examined different compositions of major caliber artillery (8. 12 305- mm of instruments in two- or three-gun tower installations) and universal (with 130- mm or 152-mm instruments in the twin tower installations), the united composition of small-calibre antiaircraft artillery (45- mm and 25- mm automatic weapons).
Requirements [OTZ] for the development of alternative designs 82 s 220- mm in terms of artillery differed from task 1944 g. the ammunition of main battery it was reduced from 170 to 125 shots by the stem, a quantity 130- mm of universal (zenith of distant battle) instruments was decreased from 16 to 12, the ammunition 45- mm of automatic weapons - from 1500 to 1000 shots to the stem. A quantity 25- mm of automatic weapons increased from 12 to 30, and their ammunition was reduced from 3000 to 2500 shots by the stem.
In August 1947. the ministers of the [vooruzhennykh] forces ([N].[A]. Bulganin), of the ship-building industry ([A].[A]. Of [goreglyad]) and of armament ([D].[F]. Ustinov) presented for consideration of government three versions [KRT] of [pr].82: two s 305- mm and one s 220- mm by major caliber artillery. In their report to Stalin they based the expediency of applying 305- mm of instruments and noted that the represented two versions with the identical armament were characterized by the thickness of armor of the main onboard belt of ship, which was explained by the differences between the ministry Of [vooruzhennykh] forces and [Minsudpromom] on the optimum thickness of armor. Bulganin proposed the version of ?1 with a thickness of armor of 200 mm, which ensures the protection of major vitally important portions of the ship of 203- mm of the projectiles of enemy from distance 70 of [kabeltovykh] and the high degree of freedom of maneuvering in combat with the same ships, what was his important tactical advantage. However, [Goreglyad] proposed to accept the version of ?2 with 150- mm as armor belt, with the appropriate decrease of the displacement of ship and an increase in the speed of its complete running. This, in the opinion [Minsudproma], it had to allow the ship of [pr].82 to successfully conduct battle with the heavy cruisers of enemy with 203- mm by artillery on the distant distances, and in this case the armor protection of ship is completely sufficient from the projectiles on distance 85 of [kabeltovykh]. The version of ?3 with 220- mm by artillery was strongly inferior to the previous versions on the firepower and the combat vitality. The higher (1,5 units) speed of complete running and smaller (to 25%) displacement was its advantage.
In March 1948. Stalin approved for further design the version of ?1 (with 305- mm by artillery and 200- mm by armoring, standard displacement of 40000 tons and speed of running of 32 units), gave indication to accelerate the creation of such cruisers and subsequently itself controlled works. [KRT] of [pr].82 was considered as the main opponent of American cruisers of the type "Alaska".
After making of a decision about the selection of the version [KRT] of [pr].82 prepared in 1947. the project of tactical-technical task for the design of ship was corrected by Navy, it was coordinated [Minsudpromom] and in April 1948. it is represented into the Council of Ministers of USSR. On August 31 the same year left the decision of Council of Ministers about design and building of the head ship of [pr].82. By chief designer on the project it was assigned [L].[V]. Of [dikovich], while by main observing from the Navies - captain of 1 ranks [M].[S]. Mikhaylov.
Still at the end 1947 g. in [TSKB]-17 began the development of the preliminary design of the ship, which was presented for consideration into the ministry Navy and ministry of ship-building industry in March 1949. Developers represented four versions of preliminary design, characterized by arrangement universal artilleries also of zenith automatic weapons, by a quantity and by the steaming capacity of main boilers and by the arrangement of main power plant.
Version L -3-6 had the rhombic arrangement 130- mm of guns and mountings BL -110, of 12 boilers with a productivity of 80 t pair in the hour into four the boiler rooms and two machine rooms.
In the version B -3-8 of the gun and mounting of universal caliber were placed on four from each board, and 12 boilers of the same steaming capacity - in six boiler rooms.
Version L -2-4 had rhombic arrangement 130- mm installations BL -110, four machine- boiler departments (on two boilers with a productivity of 130 t/h and to one [GTZA] in each).
But for technical designing was [rekomendovan] the fourth version - L -2-6. According to this version the arrangement of universal artillery and main power plant was analogous with version L -3-6, but in each of the boiler rooms there was on two main boilers instead of with three productivity of 130 t/h.
Engineering design [TSKB]-17 it had to present to the customer of at the end 1949 g. in order to ensure the beginning of building ships in THE III quarter 1950 g., and already in April 1949. designers approached technical designing. But in autumn of the same year with the examination in the Kremlin of the results of developing represented by ministries Navy and of ship-building industry for asserting the preliminary design Stalin asked in [Dikovicha]: "A it is not possible whether to increase the speed of running of ship so that our heavy cruiser could overtake and destroy less strong on the armament and the protection the ship of its enemy and in proper time leave from any, stronger ship?" This wish of Stalin was perceived as indication about the change [TTZ], [utverzhdennogo] by the government in all year ago. As a result developed BY [TSKB]-17 preliminary design they did not affirm, but in the protocol of its examination they noted that the ship has too great a displacement and insufficient running speed.
On October 15, 1949. Council of Ministers of the USSR published the decision "about an improvement in the design of ships and about the measures for aid to design bureaus and to the Research Institutes of military ship building", in whom one of the main reasons for delay in the execution of the plan acknowledged the unsatisfactory guarantee of plants with technical documentation. By the same decision Council of Ministers decided to organize design bureau for the design of battleships and heavy cruisers with the direct subordination To [minsudpromu] - [TSKB]-16. From this time the heavy cruisers of [pr].82 became to be occupied exceptionally new design bureau - [TSKB]-16.
At the beginning March 1950. took place new conference in the Kremlin office [I].[V]. of Stalin on project 82 with the participation [V].[A]. Of [malysheva], [I].[S]. Of [yumasheva] and deputy Of [glavkoma] Navy [P].[S]. Of [abankina]. About the designation [KRT] the seamen answered to Stalin's question, that it must fight with the heavy cruisers of enemy. On that Stalin objected, what basic task of the heavy cruiser must be different - fight with the light cruisers of enemy, and necessary to increase his speed to 35 units so that it always could leave from under the impact of the heavy ships of enemy. Then Stalin proposed the number of measures for the decrease of displacement. When seamen objected against some of them, it made the valid observations in composition of universal and antiaircraft artillery, also, on the fire unit of the artillery of all calibers, after noting that it is foolish to place on [KRT] 130- mm the anti-aircraft guns with the ceiling of shooting 16 km, indeed enemy will bomb him from height 500. 1500 m, and therefore small-calibre antiaircraft artillery is necessary. But also a quantity of zenith automatic weapons Stalin also ordered to reduce, counting which this ship will always have a protection, which must it protect. Seamen objected against the reduction of fire unit, referring to that U.S. Navy and England they have aboard the ships the heavy stock of projectiles. But Stalin it countered: "You do not blindly copy Americans and Englishmen, in them other conditions, their ships depart far to the ocean, being torn off from its bases. We do not think to conduct oceanic combat, but we will war near its shores, and we should have large ammunition aboard the ship". For the same reasons Stalin permitted decreasing the cruising range and noted that to create the ship, which would have all advantages, is impossible. After learning, that head cruiser they plan to place in Leningrad, Stalin said that he would want to first of all have two [KRT] in the Black sea, "where it is necessary to have large fleet, once in ten is greater than now, and to know how to strongly lock the Dardanelles. In the second turn - to build the heavy cruisers in the Baltic region".
Taking into account of the observations of Stalin for the preliminary design and the results of developing the preliminary stage of [tekhproekta] Council of Ministers of the USSR by decision dated March 25, 1950. it affirmed the basic elements of task for the development of the technical of [pr].82 with the partial changes [TTZ], [utverzhdennogo] in August 1948. Now the speed of complete running [KRT] had to compose 35 units due to the decrease of the artillery armament of universal caliber and small-calibre antiaircraft artillery, displacements of 36-36,5 thousand tons, and cruising range and independence were reduced in comparison with the previous alternative designs. By [minsudprom] it had to represent [tekhproekt] in the assertion in February 1951. Simultaneously Council of Ministers of the USSR bound By [minsudprom] to begin in THE II quarter of the same year the building of two cruisers of [pr].82 at the plants of ? 444 in Nikolayev and ? 189 in Leningrad with the delivery to their customer into 1954 and 1955 yr. respectively. In December 1952. [tekhproekt] 82 was [zavershen] [TSKB]-16 and presented in the assertion to Naval ministry and [Minsudpromu].
Basic contractors by the armament, the instruments, the electrical equipment, the main turbine plant, the boilers and their auxiliary mechanisms did not cease the development of engineering designs and working drawings even in the period of a change in the elements of ship in connection with the requirement to increase its speed. Therefore in the first months of 1951 g. they could transmit working documentation into the production. A number of the models of auxiliary mechanisms was prepared and accepted by the interdepartmental commissions of toward the end 1950 g. because of the combination of the stages of design and preparation for production. In the creation [KRT] of [pr].82 toward the end of 1950 g. participated 45 collectives of the leading scientific research institutes, PKB and largest plants: [Izhorskogo], Kirov, Leningrad metal-working, Baltic, Novokramatorsk Heavy Machine Building Plant.
Since January 1951. on the solution of Naval ministry and [Minsudproma] the association [TSKB]-16 began the urgent preparation for working documentation, in order to accelerate the beginning of the building of the heavy cruisers immediately at three plants, without waiting until examination and the assertion of [tekhproekta]. On June 4, 1951. Council of Ministers of the USSR affirmed technical [pr].82. But on November 14 the same year was accepted the decision of government about the building of third [KRT] at the plant of ? 402 V g. Of [molotovsk] (now [Severodvinsk]).
It had to have on the [utverzhdennomu] project [KRT]: 3[kh]3 305- mm of instruments S -31 in the towers (general ammunition of 720 shots); 6[kh]2 130- mm of universal tower installations BL -109[a] (2400 shots); 6[kh]4 - 45- mm antiaircraft sites S -20-3[iF] (19 200 shots) and 10[kh]4 - 25- mm of antiaircraft sites BL -120 (48 000 shots). Into the composition of control system of artillery shooting entered RLS and optical means. Each tower installation S -31 was equipped WITH [PUS] "sea -82" and range-only radar "grotto", while each installation BL -109[a] - by range-only radar "Sirius- B".
Main armor belt (with a thickness of armor of 180 mm) for the elongation of citadel had a slope angle from the vertical line of 15° and protected the board of lower than the average (main armor) deck; the deepening of its lower edge on the midship section under the water line was 1,7 m. the transverse sortings of citadel they had thickness to 140 mm (nose) and 125 mm (stern), the walls of conning tower were to 260 mm, roof - 100 mm. of deck in the region of citadel had a thickness of the armor: upper - 50 mm, average - 75 mm, lower - 20 mm. the frontal wall of the towers of main battery protected by 240- mm of armor, side walls - 225- mm, the roof - 125- mm, and the rear wall, which carried out and the role of counterweight, consisted of three plates with a total thickness of 400-760 mm. the anti-mine protection ([PMZ]), which covered the vitally important sections of ship (cellar of ammunition, main posts, the accomodation of main power plant) for the elongation of citadel, it consisted of three-four longitudinal sortings. From them the second (with thickness 8. of 25 mm) and the third (50 mm) had cylindrical form, and the first (8. 15 mm) and the fourth (15. 30 mm) were flat. Volumes between the first (the second) and third sortings were used under the fuel-, which in proportion to expense was replaced by outboard water. For an increase in the extent of armor protection on the vertical line by third (basic shielding) sorting [PMZ] hung up additionally the armor plates with a thickness of from 20 to 100 mm.
For the first time in the domestic shipbuilding on the cruisers of project 82 was provided for the three-layered bottom protection, executed along the longitudinal-transverse system for the elongation of citadel. Its height from the outer covering to the third bottom was 2250 mm. the outer covering it was carried out from the armor with a thickness of 20 mm, the second bottom had a thickness of 18 mm, and the third - 12. 18 mm.
The [chetyrekhvalnaya] main power plant (four [GTZA] with power on 70000 hp and 12 main boilers by steaming capacity on 110 t/h, with the parameters of vapor 66 atm and 460°[S]) for that time was most powerful in the world. The USA similar [GEU] adapted on the aircraft carriers of the type "Kitti Of hawk" and "John F. Kennedy", which entered the system only in 1961-68 yr.
In 1950. in the sea general staff was developed the tentative project of state for [KRT] of [pr].82, on which was provided for the craft commander the title of rear admiral, for the senior Zampolit (Deputy Commander for Political Affairs) and the commanders BCh -2 and BCh -5 - captains of 1 ranks.
Formally the laying of head cruiser "Stalingrad" took place on December 31, 1951. at the plant of ?444 in Nikolayev, although the bottom sections of ship established on the stock still in November. The association of plant took upon himself socialist obligation before the appointed time, to 36- y to the anniversary of October (i.e. by November 7, 1953.), to go down ship to the water. In September 1952. to the stocks "A" of the plant of ?189 in Leningrad they placed second [KRT] - "Moskva". In October 1952. in the northern dock camera of the building-slip shop- airshed of the plant of ?402 in [Molotovske] was laid the third heavy cruiser of [pr].82, which did not receive the name of its own.
More rapid than all was built cruiser "Stalingrad". Toward the end 1952 g. contractors placed on it 118 models of the peripheral equipment: armament, boiler and turbine installation, electro and diesel-generator installations, auxiliary mechanisms, heat exchangers, ship devices and equipment, the system of automation and instrument technology.
But here on March 5, 1953. dies [I].[V]. Stalin, and already on April 18, 1953. left the order of ?00112 of the minister of transportation and heavy machine building [I].[I]. [Nosenko] about the curtailment of the building of all three [KRT] of the type "Stalingrad". It is understandable that this solution was carried out not by minister himself, but by someone of the highest leadership, which arrived at the authority after Stalin's death. All occurred rapidly and quietly, without the objections from the side of Admirals or ship-builders.
What the expediency of the curtailment of works on [pr].82 - understandably that there was no sense in this of any, which in the future strongly [auknulos] to our fleet. At the end 1960- X of years became clear that the paralyzing impact on the carrier-based striking forces U.S. Navy from the position of tracking on the combat service could effectively bring only the remained in the system artillery cruisers of [pr].26- bis and [pr].68- bis. At the crisis moments they actively were used in the forces of tracking for [AUS], continuously retaining with the aircraft carriers of potential enemy the effective distance of artillery fire. It is obvious that the unfinished heavy cruisers of [pr].82 cut into the metal could be used in this case still more effective, since any aircraft carrier on the effective distance of artillery fire its 305- mm of the instruments in 1-2 minutes could be [prevrashchen] into the blazing ruins. Finally, heavy artillery ships - battleships and cruisers - possess significant combat stability and are capable before their loss of inflicting defeat to aircraft carrier even in the retaliatory attack. All this confirms old rule that new military equipment of fight do not at sea reject old, but they supplement them.
In June 1953. the minister of transport and heavy machine building and as central board Navy made the decision to use a part of the housing of the unfinished cruiser "Stalingrad", the included citadel, as the full-scale test section for the checking by firing tests under the polygon conditions of the durability of the design (armor and anti-mine) protection of ship to the action of the new models of naval weapons, finalizing their fuses and warheads. Documentation on the re-equipment of section was developed by branch [TSKB]-16 in Nikolayev. [Nikolaevskiy] branch was shut after this. In 1954. section was gone down to the water, but in 1956-57 yr. it was used as the target for the tests of cruise missiles, artillery shells, aircraft bombs and torpedoes and in this case did not lose buoyancy in the absence on it forces and means of the struggle for survival, which confirmed the high efficiency of the provided by project protection of cruiser. The unfinished housings of other two [TKR] were cut into the metal on the stocks of the plants of ?189 and ?402.
The finished being rocked parts 305- mm of the instruments of main battery [KRT] it was decided to use with the creation of the railroad batteries of coast defense. On January 19, 1955. left the decision of Council of Ministers about the creation four 305- mm of batteries with the use of 12 instruments S -33 of tower guns and mountings S -31 with their delivery Navy in 1957-1958. In [TSKB]-34 was begun the work on the creation 305- mm of railroad installation S -41 with the being rocked part S -[ZZt]. The development of drawings and technical documentation on the installation was finished in July 1954 ; however work on it was soon ended on Khrushchev's order [N].[S].
By decision of government dated March 19, 1955. "About the use of material values, which were remained from the curtailment the building of the ships of project 82" [Mintransmasha] and [Minsudproma] charged to ensure storage at the Kharkov turbogenerator plant of reserve on the production of eight main turbine gear aggregates OF TV -4 for [KRT] [pr].82, and at the plants of ?402 and ?444 - machine- boiler equipment. By the same decision to the ministry of defense industry were prescribed to transmit to Defense Ministry twelve being rocked parts of 2[M]-109, prepared with plant "Bolshevik" for 130- mm of the guns and mountings BL -109[a] of cruiser "Stalingrad".
LIST OF A SERIES AND DATE
. "Stalingrad": [[z]/[n] 400]. It is enrolled in the lists the Navies of 31.8.1951 g.; it is laid by 31.12.1951 g. on [SSZ] of ?444 in Nikolayev; it is gone down to the water in 1953. ; it is taken from the building 26.6.1953 g.; [isklyuchen] from the composition the Navy and is subsequently converted into the target for the tests of different weapon.
. "Moscow": [[z]/[n] 406]. It is enrolled in the lists the Navies of 31.4.1951 g.; it is laid in September 1952. on [SSZ] of ?189 in Leningrad; it is taken from the building 11.4.1953 g.; [isklyuchen] from the composition the Navy and is subsequently dressed to the metal.
. [the 3rd housing]: [[z]/[n] 401]. It is laid in October 1952. on [SSZ] of ?402 in [Molotovske] (now [Severodvinsk]), but it is soon taken from the building.
FUNDAMENTAL TACTICAL-TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS
Displacement, the tons
. complete -
Basic measurements, m
. the length overall (on [KVL])
. width is greatest (on [KVL])
. sagging is greatest (average) -
Main power plant:
. 12 steam boilers, 4 steam turbines,
4 [GTZA] TV -4, total power, hp (kW)
. turbogenerators, power, (kW)
. diesel generators, power, (kW) boiler and turbine
280 600 (206 000)
4 shafts; 4 screw propellers -
Speed of running, knots:
. economic -
Cruising range, miles (with the speed, knots) 5 000 (15)
Independence, day. [n]/[d]
Crew, man (into [t].[ch]. of officers) 1481 ([n]/[d])
. 305- mm [AU] [GK] S -31
. 130- mm [AU] BL -109[a]
. 45- mm [AU] S -20-[ZiF]
. 25- mm [ZAU] BL -120 -
3 X 3
6 X 2
6 X 4
10 X 4
Board 200 mm
Deck 90. 110 mm
Towers 323 mm
RLS of the general detection 1 X "reef"
IT WENT OUT . [n]/[d]
means REB . the [akustichekie] guardians
Fire-control radar 2 X "volley" for [AU] [GK]
3 X "anchor" (in the composition [SPN]-500)
for universal [AU]
2 X "Foot- B" (Hawk Of screech) for [AU] and [za]
the command- ranging posts 1 X [KDP]2-8-10 for the artillery [GK]
3 X [SPN]-500 for universal [AU]
the means of the connection the collection of the means
RLS of national recognition . [n]/[d]
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