F-16 FIGHTING FALCON
In the mid-1970s, the US Congress became concerned about increasing evidence of international nuclear trade in dangerous technologies associated with producing nuclear weapon materials. In an attempt to dampen such activity, in 1976 and 1977, Congress enacted the Glenn/Symington amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. This provided that countries importing or exporting such dangerous technologies under certain conditions would be cut off from US economic and military assistance. This law was universal in its application and was not directed specifically toward Pakistan.
In 1979, after much information became available about illegal Pakistani activities involving the smuggling of design information and equipment related to nuclear enrichment, President Carter invoked the Glenn/Symington Amendment to cut off the Pakistanis. After the war in Afghanistan broke out, attempts by the Carter Administration to restore some assistance to Pakistan in return for restraint on their nuclear program were rebuffed by the Pakistanis.
American Security assistance programs for the Pacific region and Asia during the early 1980s were affected by the instability in the Indian Ocean area. This was caused by several factors: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the possibility of further Soviet advances into Pakistan and Iran. When the Reagan Administration arrived, aid to Pakistan and the Mujahideen was high on the administration's foreign policy agenda. An amendment to the Glenn/Symington Amendment was adopted that allowed the President to resume aid to Pakistan for six years despite its violations the Glenn/Symington Amendment (relating the uranium enrichment activities).
Pakistan were mainly concerned with the early delivery of F-16 aircraft. However, armor, air defense, and other combat capabilities also received considerable attention. The Army targeted its security assistance efforts on the deficiencies in Pakistani defenses and on the obsolescence of existing equipment. US overtures to Pakistan, of which the Washington Security Assistance Conference was only one example, caused US relations with India to cool.
The first aircraft were accepted at Fort Worth in October of 1982. The first F-16 landed in Pakistan at Sargodha Air Base on 15 January 1983 as part of a package of 2 F-16A and 4 F-16B Peace Gate I aircraft. Another 34 F-16A/B Block 15 aircraft were delivered under Peace Gate II.
The ongoing information that the Pakistani nuclear program was progressing resulted in the enactment of the Pressler Amendment in 1985. This was designed to draw a new line in the sand regarding the extent of US forbearance of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. The amendment required the US President to certify annually that Pakistan did not `possess' a nuclear explosive device in order for assistance to continue, and that such assistance would `significantly reduce the risk' that Pakistan would possess such a device. In 1989 Pakistan was ostensibly warned that there would be no further certifications that would allow them to receive military equipment from the United States.
In September 1989 Pakistan announced plans to acquire 60 more F-16s, and a contract was signed later in theyear under the Peace Gate III/IV program. Pakistan had a total of 71 additional F-16s on order, for $1.6 billion. Of these, 17 aircraft had been fully paid for, built and stored by the end of 1994. The first cash payment of $50 million was made at the beginning of FY 1990. Pakistan continued to send periodic payments for the manufacture of F-16s, i.e., $150 million in FY 1991, $243 million in FY 1992, and $215 million in FY 1993, for a total of $658 million.
Delivery was suspended in 1990 by the United States. The Pressler Amendment forbade arms supply if Islamabad crossed a nuclear threshold and weaponised. The stop order halted work on the remaining 43 planes on the contract.
Clinton Administration
In early 1994 the Clinton Administration initiated consultations with Congress concerning a proposed one-time sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan. Delivery of the planes would be contingent on specific commitments from Pakistan regarding its nuclear program, including a verifiable cap on the production of fissile materials.
When Pakistan declined this proposal, in September 1995 the Clinton Administration proposed revisions to the Pressler Amendment to facilitate cooperation with Pakistan in areas such as combatting terrorism and furthering US commercial interests in Pakistan. The agreement broke down after Pakistan ignored the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the U.S. government and its allies, canceling military foreign sales to that country.
The US would not deliver the controversial F-16 aircraft or resume an official military supply relationship with Pakistan, but the President decided to sell the F-16 aircraft to other countries and return the proceeds to Pakistan. That left the aircraft in storage at Davis-Monthan for more than a decade. After several years of modifications and rebuilding, the aircraft made their way to Edwards AFB. The aircraft are late A and B models, versus the C and D models pilots routinely fly today. They were built in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They replaced some of the older F-16s in the Edwards’ inventory.
In June 1995 Lockheed Fort Worth Company, Fort Worth, Texas, was awarded a $288,830,751 face value increase to a Firm Fixed Price contract for restructuring the Peace Gate III/IV foreign military sales program to Pakistan from 71 to 28 F-16 aircraft. Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio was the contracting activity (F336576-90/C-2002, P00240).
Lockheed Fort Worth Company, Ft. Worth, Texas, was awarded a $11,081,534 face value increase to a Firm Fixed Price contract for the cost impact on the F-16 production program resulting from the restructure of the Peace Gate III and IV Pakistan F-16 programs. This effort supported foreign military sales to Egypt, Korea, Thailand and Portugal. Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio is the contracting activity (F33657-90/C-2002, P00373). Lockheed Fort Worth Company, Ft. Worth, Texas, is being awarded a $8,899,594 face value increase to a Firm Fixed Price contract for the cost impact on the F-16 production program resulting from the restructure of the Peace Gate III and IV Pakistan F-16 programs. Aeronautical Systems Center Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio is the contracting activity (F33657-88/C-0037, P00835).
By 1998 President Clinton made it clear that he thought that the Pakistanis should be repaid for the money that they had already invested in the F-16s they didn't get. The law made it impossible for the US to provide the F-16s. Once Pakistan went ahead with nuclear tests in May 1998, there was even less congressional support for helping to resolve the F-16 problem with Pakistan.
In December 1998, the United States reached agreement with Pakistan on compensating Pakistan for the purchase of F-16 fighters. The US compensated Pakistan for the $658 millions it paid for purchasing 28 F-16 fighters, while Pakistan agreed to give up the demand of having the planes delivered. This ended the 8-year dispute about the Jet fighter purchase.
At that time, of the 40 F-16 fighter-bomber aircraft originally acquired by Pakistan, 32 remained in service in 3 squadrons.
Nuclear Delivery System?
Pakistan could use the F-16 bombers to drop nuclear weapons on visually acquired targets by improvising the necessary electronic wiring which is omitted from these export models. Although the Pakistan Air Force F-16 and Mirage 5 aircraft are probably of delivering nuclear weapons, the liquid-fuel Ghauri missile and the solid-fuel Shaheen 1 and 2 missiles are more likely choices.
According to a 1989 report by the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), relevant tests had already been successfully concluded. The BND reported to the Chancellor's Office that, using an F-16 model, the Pakistanis had made wind tunnel tests and designed the shell of the bomb in a way that allowed them to install it underneath the wings. At the same time, the detonating mechanism was improved, so that the weapons can be used. . . According to the BND report, the Pakistanis long ago found out how to program the F-16 on-board computer to carry out the relevant flight maneuvers in dropping the bomb. According to the report from Pullach [BND headquarters], they also know how to make the electronic contact between the aircraft and the bomb.
Deptuy Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Hughes, in testimony before House Subcommittee, 2 August 1989, said: "In order to deliver a nuclear device with any reasonable degree of accuracy and safety, it first would be necessary to replace the entire wiring package in the aircraft. In addition to building a weapons carriage mount, one would also have to re-do the fire control computer, the stores management system, and mission computer software to allow the weapon to be dopped accurately and to redistribute weight and balance after release. We believe this capability far exceeds the state of the art in Pakisan and could only be accomplished with a major release of data and industrial equipment from the U.S. . . ."
Western intelligence sources were cited in U.S. News & World Report, 12 February 1990: "The sources say Pakistan, in violation of agreements with Washington, is busily converting U.S.-supplied F-16 fighter planes--60 more are scheduled to be sent this year--into potential nuclear-weapons carriers by outfitting them with special structures attached to the plane's underwing carriage. The structure allows the mounting of a dummy under one wing of the F-16 to balance the weight of the bomb under the other wing."
Robert Gates, CIA Director, in testimony Before Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 15 January 1992: [Sen. Glenn]--`How about delivery systems? Is there any evidence that Pakistan converted F-16s for possible nuclear delivery use? [Gates]--`We know that they are--or we have information that suggests that they're clearly interested in enhancing the ability of the F-16 to deliver weapons safely. But we don't really have--they don't require those changes, I don't think, to deliver a weapon. We could perhaps provide some additional detail in a classified manner.'
William T. Pendley, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA, in a Letter to Sen. Glenn on 13 April 1993 stated: `Pakistan could . . . theoretically attach a [nuclear] weapon and deliver it to a target with their F-16s, or any other aircraft in their inventory, if arming and fuzing procedures were accomplished before takeoff, and safety and placement accuracy were not considered.'
Bush Administration
President Bush formally lifted sanctions against India and Pakistan 22 September 2001 in a special memorandum to Secretary of State Colin Powell. The sanctions were imposed in response to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs and testing. Powell said on NBC's "Meet the Press" September 23 that lifting these sanctions, which had been under consideration for some time, sends an important signal that "we will stand by our friends who stand by us."
After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the Bush administration authorized the sale of F-16 parts to Pakistan to keep the F-16s flying. In November 2001 Pakistan's military leader Pervez Musharraf sought additional F-16 fighters, to replace jets that had fallen to attrition. The request was immediately shot down by Washington. At that time Pakistan was left with only 30 of the 40 planes it bought in the 1983-87 timeframe.
In March 2003 President Bush lifted sanctions against Pakistan that were imposed following the 1999 bloodless coup that brought President Pervez Musharraf to power. A White House statement said President Bush decided to lift the sanctions because it will "facilitate the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan" and help in efforts to fight international terrorism. Pakistani cooperation was key to US military action against the Taleban government in neighboring Afghanistan and al-Qaida terrorists thought responsible for the September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington.
Pakistan still wanted to buy US-made F-16 fighter jets, which Islamabad officials said will help combat terrorism by giving military forces better access to the country's mountainous border regions. But these sorts of weapons are not used to combat terror in the remote hinterlands of the Pakistan - Afghanistan border; instead, they are attack weapons to be used against other sophisticated militaries. New Delhi opposes the plan, fearing the jets could be used against India. The two nations have fought three wars since British colonial rule ended in 1947.
In September 2004 negotiations regarding the F-16 purchase, which were suspended in 1990 following sanctions, commenced again. According to London's Financial Times, Pakistani's Air Chief Marshal Kaleem Saadat stated, "Now there is a change in their (U.S.) attitude. They have indicated that they are ready to give us F-16s." London's Financial Times reported, "The Bush administration was likely to wait until after the US presidential elections in November before proposing a new fighter aircraft sale to Islamabad."
Secretary of State Rice discussed the potential sale of F-16 fighter-jets to Pakistan with Indian officials, who hade long opposed the plan. She also talked about selling the jets to India. Ms. Rice said at news conference 16 March 2005 in New Delhi that it was too soon to expect any deals to be signed with either country. "We are going to continue to have broad discussions about the security needs, about the defense needs of India. I'm quite certain that when I go to Pakistan that I will have discussions about the defense concerns and the defense needs of Pakistan. But there has been no such agreement … and as I've said to you, I don't expect that there are going to be any announcements out of this."
The Bush administration said 25 March 2005 it is notifying Congress of plans to sell F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. US officials said it will not affect the military balance in the region, though India has expressed displeasure. The decision to sell Pakistan what officials here say will be a relatively small number of F-16s had been under consideration for several months. The transfer of the planes would not affect the military balance in the region, in part because India will likely proceed, with the blessing of the United States, with its own purchase of advanced aircraft, American F-16s or F-18s, or planes from another supplier.
On September 9, 2005, it was announced that Pakistan would receive two US F-16 fighters by the end of the year.
