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Urban Areas
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=98854915">DEFENDING THE LION CITY - THE ARMED FORCES OF SINGAPORE TIM HUXLEY, ALLEN & UNWIN After an extended period as the SAF's 'cinderella' service in the 1970s and 1980s, the RSN's capabilities expanded near-exponentially during the 1990s following decisions made both in 1983 and in 1988. The 1983 decision to expand the RSN's capabilities to allow it to protect Singapore's SLOCs led to the delivery of missile corvettes; the implementation of the Navy 2000 plan after 1988 saw the acquisition of minehunters, maritime patrol aircraft, new patrol vessels, submarines and new landing ships. Older vessels were modernised and many vessels were armed with air defence as well as anti-ship missiles. At the same time, major infrastructure has been built in the form of two new naval bases. Although RSAF doctrine emphasises air power's centrality in Singapore's overall military deterrent, public statements naturally avoid mentioning its potential role in pre-emptive operations. Instead, the air force's status as the 'first line of defence' against threats to Singapore is emphasised, together with its air defence role exercised through a multi-layered 'shield' consisting of various types of radar (including AEW), interceptor aircraft, SAMs and anti-aircraft guns. Air power is also seen as playing a key role in supporting surface forces, through interdiction (targeting hostile forces' infrastructure and supply lines), tactical strike and reconnaissance, the provision of air mobility for the army and maritime reconnaissance for the navy. Ancillary roles include search and rescue and emergency relief operations in the event of civilian disasters. Particularly in light of the limited resources at the RSAF's disposal, it is understandable that senior RSAF officers are sceptical of the notion, advanced by some western strategists during the 1990s, that air power can win conflicts on its own: they emphasise instead close integration with the other services. However, during the 1990s the RSAF has become a more assertive partner in joint operations, attempting to anticipate rather than merely react to the requirements of the army and the navy by providing these services with 'plans and options' for the use of air power.



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