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Further Reading

Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere

In November 1936, the Anti-Comintern Pact, an agreement to exchange information and collaborate in preventing communist activities, was signed by Japan and Germany (Italy joined a year later). War was launched against China after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937, in which an allegedly unplanned clash took place near Beiping (as Beijing was then called) between Chinese and Japanese troops and quickly escalated into full-scale warfare. The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) ensued, and relations with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union deteriorated.

In January 1938 Germany offered Japan a proposal on the setting up of a tripartite alliance. But Germany demanded that the alliance oppose not only the Soviet Union but also Britain, the United States, and other Western countries. Members of the Japanese ruling class unanimously supported the plan to establish the alliance, but they had great differences of opinion over the question of which countries should be classified as enemies of the alliance. Their disputes were closely linked to the Chinese issue. The Japanese army was in favor of Germany's proposal, holding that Japan, in order to solve the "Chinese issue," had to make use of Germany's force, prevent the Soviet Union from intervening in the Sino-Japanese war, and warn Britain and the United States not to support China.

However, the Navy and Foreign Affairs Ministries objected to directing the spearhead at Western countries. On the one hand, they held that Japan needed to make use of the appeasement policy followed by Britain and the United States and had to rely on them for material supply; on the other hand, they were reluctant to engage the United States and Britain before the end of the Sino-Japanese war, being aware that the US and British Navies were not forces to be ignored.

On 4 May 1939, Hiranuma, then Japanese prime minister, sent a letter to the German and Italian Embassies in Japan saying: "In the hope of strengthening our relations. . .Japan is determined to firmly stand by theside of Germany and Italy, giving political and economic support to them, or even providing them with military aid as long as it can afford to, in case the two countries are attacked by one or more than one countries including or excluding the Soviet Union." However, the letter also asserted: "In view of its present situation, Japan cannot provide at present and will not be able to provide in the near future any substantial military aid to the two countries." Since the main force of the Japanese army was trapped on the Chinese mainland, Japan actually gave no military aid to Germany before the Pacific War broke out.

The increased military activities in China -- and the Japanese idea of establishing "Mengukuo" in Inner Mongolia and the Mongolian People's Republic -- soon led to a major clash over rival Mongolia-Manchukuo border claims. When Japanese troops invaded eastern Mongolia, a ground and air battle with a joint Soviet- Mongolian army took place between May and September 1939 at the Battle of Halhin Gol. The Japanese were severely defeated, by one estimate sustaining as many as 80,000 casualties, and thereafter Japan concentrated its war efforts on its southward drive in China and Southeast Asia, a strategy that helped propel Japan ever closer to war with the United States and Britain and their allies.

Under the prime ministership of Konoe Fumimaro (1891-1945) -- the last head of the famous Fujiwara house -- the government was streamlined and given absolute power over the nation's assets. In 1940, the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of Japan, according to tradition, Konoe's cabinet called for the establishment of a "Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere," a concept building on Konoe's 1938 call for a "New Order in Greater East Asia," encompassing Japan, Manchukuo, China, and Southeast Asia.

The Japanese had for a long time bifurcated management at the top because of two political realities: the army and the navy were intense rivals, and no agency, institution, or individual proved strong enough to prevent military predominance in matters of national policy. And even each service was divided so that, for example, one of the principal commands in China, the Kwantung army, was independent of Imperial headquarters in Tokyo and chose its own course, including opening hostilities with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) at Khalkin Gol in 1939, while Japan was already embroiled in a struggle with China.

In April 1940 Japanese military strength in Manchuria, consisting mainly of the Kwantung Army, was in the midst of a general expansion. The number of divisions had increased from two in 1931, when the Mukden Incident led to full Japanese control of Manchuria, to nine. Nondivisional strength, moreover, a significant proportion of the total Japanese garrison, had increased steadily. It was only after the German troops' invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg in May 1940, and especially the surrender of France on 22 June that Japan decided to take the opportunity of Germany's victory to advance southward, in anticipation of an early end to the war in Europe.

There had been a long-standing and deep-seated antagonism between Japan and the United States since the first decade of the twentieth century. Each perceived the other as a military threat, and trade rivalry was carried on in earnest. The Japanese greatly resented the racial discrimination perpetuated by United States immigration laws, and the Americans became increasingly wary of Japan's interference in the self-determination of other peoples. Japan's military expansionism and quest for national self- sufficiency eventually led the United States in 1940 to embargo war supplies, abrogate a long-standing commercial treaty, and put greater restrictions on the export of critical commodities. These American tactics, rather than forcing Japan to a standstill, made Japan more desperate.

After signing the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact in April 1941, and while still actively making war plans against the United States, Japan participated in diplomatic negotiations with Washington aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement. Washington was concerned about Japan's role in the Tripartite Pact and demanded the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Southeast Asia. Japan countered that it would not use force unless "a country not yet involved in the European war" (that is, the United States) attacked Germany or Italy. Further, Japan demanded that the United States and Britain not interfere with a Japanese settlement in China (a pro-Japanese puppet government had been set up in Nanjing in 1940). Because certain Japanese military leaders were working at cross-purposes with officials seeking a peaceful settlement (including Konoe, other civilians, and some military figures), talks were deadlocked. On October 15, 1941, army minister Tojo Hideki (1884-1948) declared the negotiations ended. Konoe resigned and was replaced by Tojo. After the final United States rejection of Japan's terms of negotiation, on December 1, 1941, the Imperial Conference (an ad hoc meeting convened--and then only rarely--in the presence of the emperor) ratified the decision to embark on a war of "self-defense and self-preservation" and to attack the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor.

Japanese military forces moved southward to takeover the Southern Resources Area [Indonesia and South East Asia]. The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere was to integrate Asia politically and economically--under Japanese leadership--against Western domination and was developed in recognition of the changing geopolitical situation emerging in 1940. In 1942 the Greater East Asia Ministry was established, and in 1943 the Greater East Asia Conference was held in Tokyo. Also in 1940, political parties were ordered to dissolve, and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, comprising members of all former parties, was established to transmit government orders throughout society. In September 1940, Japan joined the Axis alliance with Germany and Italy when it signed the Tripartite Pact, a military agreement to redivide the world that was directed primarily against the United States.

The policy of the Japanese aggressors to dominate China was indicated in the specific plans of establishing a "Manchukuo," a "Mongolian state," a "north China state," and a "central China state. The Japanese aggressors needed different kinds of running dogs, but did not want a head among them.

After almost 4 years of war, resulting in the loss of 3 million Japanese lives and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan signed an instrument of surrender on the USS Missouri in Tokyo Harbor on September 2, 1945. As a result of World War II, Japan lost all of its overseas possessions and retained only the home islands. Manchukuo was dissolved, and Manchuria was returned to China; Japan renounced all claims to Formosa; Korea was occupied and divided by the US and the USSR; southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles were occupied by the USSR; and the US became the sole administering authority of the Ryukyu, Bonin, and Volcano Islands. The 1972 reversion of Okinawa completed the US return of control of these islands to Japan.