F-X Support Fighter
The F-X, is a requirement for a new fighter to enter service early in the next decade. This may involve license production at Mitsubishi, replacing F-2 production. Options include later model Boeing F-15s (F-15K equivalents, or better) or Boeing F/A-18E/Fs, Eurofighters, Lockheed Martin F-22s, and a new upgraded version of the F-2. Japan received its first Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter briefing in 2004, so that fighter may be in the running as well.
The most notable aspect of the F-X program is that it probably entails returning to the low-risk, high-budget seen in pre-F-2 Japanese fighter programs, which involved license production of U.S. designs. Before the F-2, for example, Mitsubishi built 199 Boeing F-15s at a unit cost of around $100 million. Before that, Mitsu-bishi built 125 McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantoms.
Some elements in the JASDF favor acquisition of the F-22, the most expensive and capable choice. While the US would agree to limited industrial cooperation, there is no prospect of outright license production for this aircraft. If the F-22 is selected, Japanese industry’s share of the procurement revenue would be rather limited. The loss of its fighter franchise would seriously impact Japanese aircraft industry, since it has historically been the backbone of its work.
Despite the setbacks on the military side, Japan’s commercial aviation industry has made some wise partnership choices. The country’s three major aviation companies — Kawasaki, Mitsubishi, and Fuji Heavy Industries — have a 21% share of Boeing’s 777 airframe, and 35% of Boeing’s 787 airframe. The first is well on the way becoming the second most successful widebody of all time (after the 747); while the later had the most successful commercial launch of any widebody to date.
It is also notable that F-X will not involve significant technology development work. The F-2 was designed to give Japanese industry a boost in platform design and integration, but this capability has went nowhere. The next Japanese fighter will not provide support to a fighter design department. The Japanese military aircraft downturn speaks to the desirability of off-the-shelf purchases or workshares in programs with larger production volumes, rather than indigenous solutions.
